Humphreys & Partners Architects LP v. Atlantic Development & Investments Incorporated et al
Filing
140
ORDER: IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff Humphreys & Partners Architects, LP's Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 113 ). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff Humphreys & Partners Architects, LP's Motion to Strike (Doc. 127 ). (See attached Order for complete details). Signed by Judge John J Tuchi on 4/27/16.(JAMA) Modified on 4/27/2016 to add Written Opinion (WO) (JAMA).
1
WO
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
2
3
4
5
6
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
8
9
Humphreys & Partners Architects LP,
Plaintiff,
10
11
ORDER
v.
12
No. CV-14-01514-PHX-JJT
Atlantic Development & Investments
Incorporated, et al.,
13
Defendants.
14
15
At issue are Plaintiff Humphreys & Partners Architects, LP’s (HPA) Amended
16
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 113, MSJ), to which Defendants filed a
17
Response (Doc. 126, Resp. to MSJ) and HPA filed a Reply (Doc. 128, Reply to MSJ);
18
and HPA’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 127, MTS), to which Defendants filed a Response
19
(Doc. 129, Resp. to MTS) and HPA filed a Reply (Doc. 130, Reply to MTS). The Court
20
finds these matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f).
21
I.
BACKGROUND
22
Defendants, including Atlantic Development and Investments, Inc. (ADI)—a
23
Connecticut corporation that conducts business in Arizona—and Auburn Ventures, LP
24
(AV)—a Colorado limited partnership that conducts business in Arizona—sought to
25
develop a plot of land in Castle Rock, Colorado into a senior living center.1 In November
26
2011, Defendants employed architect Paul Hendricks Masse and his firm, PHM Ltd., to
27
1
28
The Amended Complaint, the operative pleading, lists 13 Defendants, including
ten entities and three individuals. (Doc. 68, FAC.) All 13 Defendants filed a joint
Response to the HPA’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 124.)
1
complete schematic design plans (the “Masse Plans”) and Jones Engineering Associates
2
to complete earthwork grading plans (the “Jones Plans”). Once these initial plans were
3
complete, Defendants sought further architectural planning services from Plaintiff
4
HPA—a Texas firm that conducts business in Texas. On April 25, 2012, Defendants
5
accepted a proposal by HPA (“Proposal Agreement”) to provide renderings and plans that
6
included elevations and other information necessary to proceed with development at
7
Castle Rock. The Proposal Agreement provided as follows:
11
All documents furnished by HPA pursuant to this Agreement shall remain
the property of HPA and may not be used by the Owner for another project
without HPA’s prior written consent. Payment for design services does not
allow use of the design for construction documents by others without
written approval from HPA. There is no implied license granted in this
Agreement.
12
(Doc. 65-4, HPA’s Statement of Facts in Supp. of Its MSJ (PSOF), Ex. F, Proposal
13
Agreement.) Defendants agreed to pay HPA $30,000 in compensation and gave HPA
14
portions of the Masse and Jones Plans from which to conduct its work.
8
9
10
15
After HPA concluded the work described in the Proposal Agreement, Defendants
16
and HPA negotiated from June to August 2012 as to whether HPA would provide more
17
comprehensive architectural services to Defendants. Defendants ultimately decided to
18
retain another architect—Defendants Patrick William Nook and PWN Architects and
19
Planners, Inc.—and informed HPA that its work on the project was totally concluded on
20
or about August 7, 2012.
21
Thereafter, Defendants gave the renderings and plans completed by HPA to PWN
22
Architects for the further design and construction process at Castle Rock. HPA claims
23
Defendants’ use of the renderings and plans violated HPA’s copyright in the materials,
24
and, on July 7, 2014, HPA brought the present suit, raising a single claim of copyright
25
infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-504 against seven Defendants. (Doc. 1, Compl.;
26
FAC ¶¶ 48-55.) HPA now moves for partial summary judgment, asking the Court to rule
27
that no dispute of material fact remains that HPA owns valid copyrights in the three
28
-2-
1
documents it prepared for Defendants, including that HPA meets the copyright
2
requirements of authorship, originality and creativity. (MSJ at 4-12.)
3
This case already has an extensive procedural history. The seven original
4
Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint on October 14, 2014, which included a
5
single Count Counterclaim. (Doc. 30.) On November 3, 2014, HPA filed a Motion to
6
Strike the Counterclaim (Doc. 36), which the Court denied on January 22, 2015
7
(Doc. 48). HPA filed an Answer to the one-Count Counterclaim on February 2, 2015.
8
(Doc. 54.)
9
The Court held a Rule 16 Scheduling Conference (Doc. 45) and entered a
10
Scheduling Order on December 9, 2014 (Doc. 46). The original fact discovery deadline
11
was June 30, 2015, the expert discovery deadline was October 23, 2015, and the
12
dispositive motion deadline was December 4, 2015. (Doc. 46.) “Early discovery” was to
13
focus on HPA’s vicarious liability or contributory infringement claim and whether HPA
14
holds a valid copyright to its work. (Doc. 46.) On February 17, 2015, pursuant to the
15
parties’ request, the Court extended the fact discovery deadline to August 17, 2015, and
16
the expert discovery deadline to December 4, 2015. (Doc. 60.)
17
On February 27, 2015, HPA filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint to add six
18
new Defendants, and Defendants did not oppose the Motion. (Docs. 62, 66.) On
19
March 25, 2015, the Court granted the Motion to Amend and HPA filed the Amended
20
Complaint. (Docs. 66, 68.) The same day, HPA also filed a Motion for Partial Summary
21
Judgment that was essentially identical to the one presently before the Court. (Docs. 63-
22
65.)
23
On April 27, 2015, the original seven Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended
24
Complaint, which again included a single Counterclaim. (Doc. 82.) Considering the
25
addition of six new Defendants, the parties jointly requested another Rule 16 Scheduling
26
Conference, which the Court held on May 6, 2015. (Docs. 81, 83, 85.) At the Conference
27
and on the parties’ request, the Court terminated all pending case deadlines, denied the
28
-3-
1
pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with leave to re-file, and reserved setting
2
a new case schedule pending the filing of Answers by the six new Defendants. (Doc. 85.)
3
Four of the six new Defendants filed an Answer on May 26, 2015 (Doc. 97), and a
4
fifth new Defendant filed an Answer on June 22, 2015 (Doc. 101). As for the sixth new
5
Defendant, it joined the other 12 Defendants in filing an Amended Answer and
6
Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint on July 7, 2015, which included an 11-Count
7
Counterclaim against HPA.2 (Doc. 106.) Defendants’ new claims against HPA are based
8
on certain Defendants’ assertion of their own copyright as well as HPA’s alleged
9
violations of the Proposal Agreement.
10
Defendants then indicated they intended to amend their Amended Answer and
11
Counterclaim once again, to try to avoid HPA’s filing of Rule 12(b) Motions to Dismiss
12
the Counterclaim, and the Court granted Defendants leave to amend. (Docs. 107, 108.)
13
While Defendants did file a “Revised First Amended Combined Answer to First
14
Amended Complaint” and Counterclaim on August 24, 2015 (Doc. 110), HPA
15
nonetheless filed two Rule 12(b) Motions to Dismiss the Counterclaim on September 3,
16
2015 (Docs. 111, 112). The next day, HPA re-filed its Motion for Partial Summary
17
Judgment—the Motion presently before the Court. (Doc. 113.) After Defendants timely
18
filed a Response and then amended it a week later, HPA filed a Motion to Strike the
19
amended Response on November 4, 2015, which is also presently before the Court.
20
(Docs. 124, 126, 127.)
21
The Court resolved HPA’s two Rule 12(b) Motions to Dismiss on April 15, 2016,
22
dismissing Count One of the Counterclaim with prejudice. (Doc. 138.) Counts Two
23
through Eleven of the Counterclaim remain pending. The operative pleadings in this
24
25
26
27
28
2
Because the amendment-as-a-matter-of-course period under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a) had passed for 11 Defendants who had already filed an Answer and
Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint (Docs. 82, 97), they violated Rule 15(b) by
neither seeking leave to amend from the Court nor providing the Court with HPA’s
written consent for the amendment. They also violated Local Rule 15.1(a) by failing to
provide the Court with a copy of the amended pleading indicating in what respects it
differed from their previous Answer and Counterclaim. See LRCiv 15.1(a). HPA filed no
objection to the amended pleading.
-4-
1
matter are currently Doc. 68, HPA’s one-Count Amended Complaint, and Doc. 110,
2
Defendants’ eleven-Count Amended Counterclaim with the exception of Count One.
3
The result of the parties’ extensive pleadings and motion practice is that, while
4
almost two years have passed since HPA filed this case on July 7, 2014, no discovery or
5
dispositive motion deadlines are currently set. The Court will set the remaining case
6
schedule at the next Rule 16 Scheduling Conference on June 6, 2016. (Doc. 139.)
7
Although discovery is presumably ongoing in this case, the Court will now turn to HPA’s
8
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 113) and related Motion to Strike Response
9
(Doc. 127).
10
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
11
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
12
proper when: (1) the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
13
fact; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the court
14
finds that the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex
15
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d
16
1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). Under this standard, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
17
affect the outcome of the suit under governing [substantive] law will properly preclude
18
the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
19
(1986). A “genuine issue” of material fact arises only when the “evidence is such that a
20
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
21
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must regard as true the
22
non-moving party’s evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.
23
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. However, the non-moving party
24
may not merely rest on its pleadings; it must produce some significant probative evidence
25
tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a material question
26
of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57 (holding that the non-moving party must present
27
affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
28
judgment); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968).
-5-
1
“A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory
2
allegations unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
3
1989). “Summary judgment must be entered ‘against a party who fails to make a showing
4
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
5
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” United States v. Carter, 906 F.2d
6
1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
7
III.
ANALYSIS
8
To establish copyright infringement, a party must show (1) ownership of a valid
9
copyright, and (2) unauthorized copying by another party of the constituent original
10
elements of the work. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361
11
(1991). Registration is not required to possess a valid copyright, but it is a prerequisite to
12
bringing a suit for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). A certificate of
13
registration made within five years of the first publication of the work is prima facie
14
evidence of a copyright’s validity. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
15
HPA moves for summary judgment as to only the first element of its infringement
16
claim, and specifically that it owns valid copyrights in the three works it prepared under
17
the Proposal Agreement with Defendants: “Auburn Ridge 12208 Architectural Work” as
18
documented under U.S. Copyright Office Certificate of Registration Number VAu 1-170-
19
460 (“Architectural Work”); “Auburn Ridge 12208 Technical Drawing” as documented
20
under Certificate of Registration Number VAu 1-170-461 (“Technical Drawing”); and
21
“12208 Auburn Ridge Rendering” as documented under Certificate of Registration
22
Number VAu 1-190-332 (“Rendering”). (MSJ at 3.)
23
A.
Statutory Presumption
24
HPA first argues that the registration of its works with the U.S. Copyright Office
25
is prima facie evidence of the validity of its copyright in the works and Defendants have
26
produced no reliable evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. (MSJ at 5-6 (citing 17
27
U.S.C. § 410(c)).) In response, Defendants contend that (1) HPA’s work was not original
28
and (2) HPA’s Certificates of Registration are invalid because HPA failed to inform the
-6-
1
Copyright Office that its work was based on preexisting materials, as the Copyright Act
2
requires. (Resp. to MSJ at 3-5 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 409(9)).) In reply, HPA argues that its
3
work was sufficiently original and Defendants have waived their invalidity contention (1)
4
by failing to ask the Court to consult with the Register of Copyrights to determine
5
whether the alleged defect in HPA’s copyright applications would have led to the denial
6
of copyright registrations, and (2) under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, by failing to
7
pursue a remedy in the Copyright Office, the only agency with jurisdiction to invalidate a
8
copyright registration. (Reply to MSJ at 9-11.)
9
1.
Rebuttal of the Statutory Presumption
10
In resolving a copyright infringement claim, the presumption of copyright validity
11
created by a plaintiff’s copyright registrations can be rebutted by the accused infringer’s
12
showing that plaintiff’s work is not original. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d
13
477, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the accused infringer offers evidence that the
14
plaintiff’s product was copied from another work or other probative evidence as to
15
originality, the burden of proving validity shifts back to the plaintiff. Entm’t Research
16
Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing North
17
Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1992)).
18
“Originality is the indispensable prerequisite for copyrightability. The originality
19
requirement, however, does not mean that for valid copyright protection, the copyright
20
must represent something entirely new under the sun.” North Coast, 972 F.2d at 1033.
21
Originality requires that a work “owes its origin” to the “author,” whose contribution is
22
“more than a trivial variation, something recognizably his own.” Id. (quoting Sid & Marty
23
Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977)).
24
However, to rebut the statutory presumption, an accused infringer must simply produce
25
some probative evidence showing that plaintiff’s work was not original but copied from
26
other work. Entm’t Research, 122 F.3d at 1218 (citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
27
Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the presumption of validity was
28
-7-
1
rebutted where ‘one look’ at the plaintiff’s allegedly copyrightable figures revealed a
2
complete absence of any originality)).
3
Here, Defendants have produced evidence that they provided the Masse and Jones
4
Plans to HPA, who merely revised those Plans, and that HPA’s work is substantially
5
similar to the Masse and Jones Plans, the copyright for which Defendants hold.3 (Resp. to
6
MSJ at 6-10; Doc. 125, Defs.’ Revised Statement of Facts (DSOF) at 20-21 ¶¶ 45-46.)
7
While HPA disputes that Defendants gave HPA all of the Masse and Jones Plans (Reply
8
to MSJ at 5-6) and does not admit that it used the Plans in completing its work (Reply to
9
MSJ at 2), Defendants have produced sufficient evidence of a lack of originality to shift
10
the burden of proving validity back to HPA.
2.
11
Remedies in the U.S. Copyright Office
12
With regard to Defendants’ assertion that HPA’s copyright registrations are
13
invalid because HPA failed to inform the Copyright Office that its work was based on
14
other work—contained both in Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaim and in
15
Defendants’ Response (Docs. 110, 126)—HPA argues that Defendants must seek relief
16
for such a claim from with the Register of Copyrights, via a request from the Court, or
17
through the Copyright Office directly, in its primary jurisdiction over such a claim.
18
(Reply to MSJ at 9-11.)
19
As HPA points out, 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1) provides that a Certificate of
20
Registration that contains inaccurate information still complies with the Copyright Act
21
3
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The Court does not sustain any of HPA’s evidentiary objections at this stage.
With regard to HPA’s objections to party Defendants’ declarations made for the purpose
of their Response (e.g., Reply to MSJ at 6), Rule 56(c) explicitly permits a party to file
such declarations in support of a motion for summary judgment or response thereto. With
regard to HPA’s objections related to Defendants’ timeliness of production of documents
(e.g., Reply to MSJ at 6), discovery is still ongoing in this case, as the Court pointed out
above. Indeed, HPA filed the present Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
September 3, 2015, a mere ten days after the newly named Defendants filed their
combined Answer to the Amended Complaint—albeit a revision of their initial combined
Answer filed six weeks before. (Docs. 106, 110, 113.) The newly named Defendants
hardly had time to provide discovery to HPA, let alone supplement it, prior to the
deadline for filing their Response to HPA’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and
the Court will not penalize them by way HPA’s procedural maneuver.
-8-
1
unless “(A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright
2
registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and (B) the inaccuracy of the
3
information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse
4
registration.” Pursuant to a 2008 amendment to the Copyright Act, if a party alleges
5
inaccurate information, “the court shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the
6
court whether the inaccurate information, if known, would have caused the Register of
7
Copyrights to refuse registration.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2).
8
While this amendment to the Copyright Act states that a request from a court to
9
the Register of Copyrights is triggered when inaccurate information in a copyright
10
application is “alleged,” the Register of Copyrights has stated, “[B]efore asking the
11
Register of Copyrights whether she would have refused to register a copyright . . . a court
12
should feel free to determine whether there is in fact a misstatement of fact.” DeliverMed
13
Holdings, LLC v. Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Response of
14
the Register of Copyrights to Request Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2) in Olem Shoe
15
Corp. v. Wash. Shoe Co., No. 09-cv-23494, 2010 WL 3505100, at *3 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Sep.
16
3, 2010)). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned “both courts and
17
litigants to be wary of using this device [in § 411(b)(2)] in the future” on account of the
18
delay it may cause to the case. Id. That court advises district courts to first determine if a
19
litigant has demonstrated the elements of § 411(b)(1), namely, “that (1) the registration
20
application included inaccurate information; and (2) the registrant knowingly included
21
the inaccuracy in his submission to the Copyright office.” Id.
22
Here, a genuine dispute exists as to whether HPA’s work was derivative of the
23
Masse and Jones Plans—including the extent to which HPA received copies of the Masse
24
and Jones Plans—and thus the Court cannot determine if HPA’s copyright application
25
contained inaccurate information, let alone whether HPA knowingly included any
26
inaccurate information. (Compare DSOF at 20-21 ¶¶ 45-46 with Docs. 65-5, 65-6, 65-7,
27
PSOF Exs. G, H, I.) As a result, the question to the Register of Copyrights as to whether
28
HPA’s provision of the alleged inaccurate information would have affected its copyright
-9-
1
approval may not be ripe. But, as the Court already noted, Defendants have rebutted the
2
presumption HPA’s copyright registration provided by proffering evidence of a lack of
3
originality. As a result, HPA’s copyright registration is not dispositive of its ownership in
4
a valid copyright; it must make a showing of authorship, creativity and originality. In
5
other words, an inquiry into HPA’s copyright registration is moot at this stage.4
6
Finally, HPA contends that the Court does not have jurisdiction to declare HPA’s
7
copyright registrations invalid. The Court agrees that, to the extent Defendants may be
8
asking the Court to declare HPA’s copyright registrations cancelled, the Register of
9
Copyrights has primary jurisdiction to make such a declaration. See Syntek
10
Semiconductor Co., Ltd. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780-82 (9th Cir. 2002).
11
B.
Copyright Validity
12
As an alternative to relying on the statutory presumption of copyright validity
13
through registration, HPA argues that no genuine dispute of material fact as to the
14
validity of its copyrights exists, entitling it to summary judgment as to the first element of
15
its infringement claim. (MSJ at 6-11.) Specifically, HPA argues that (1) even if its works
16
were derivative of the Masse and Jones Plans, Defendants provided the Plans to HPA and
17
its works have the requisite originality, and (2) the Masse and Jones Plans, upon which
18
Defendants contend HPA based its works, were uncopyrightable ideas. (MSJ at 6-11;
19
Reply to MSJ at 4-9.) In response, Defendants contend that (1) HPA’s works were simply
20
revisions to Defendants’ copyrighted works, and (2) to the extent HPA added new
21
elements to the Masse and Jones Plans, they were either co-authored by Defendants or
22
standard features not subject to copyright protection. (Resp. to MSJ at 6-15.)
23
24
25
26
27
28
4
HPA also argues that Defendants have waived any challenge to the validity of its
copyright registrations by failing to ask the Court to make the requisite request of the
Register of Copyrights under § 411(b)(2) by now. This argument is similarly moot at this
stage, but even if it were not, HPA provides no legal support for such a proposition.
Indeed, in a case in which neither party raised § 411(b)(2), the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals indicated the opposite to be true: “[I]gnoring a clear statutory directive due to the
inadvertence of the parties would defeat the purpose of 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2) and deprive
the Register of its right to weigh in on precisely this issue.” DeliverMed, 734 F.3d at 624.
- 10 -
1
The resolution of these issues comes down to an examination of the originality of
2
HPA’s works, the “sine qua non of copyright.” See Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345. HPA
3
essentially asks the Court to rely on the case law holding that just because a work is
4
substantially similar to another work does not mean it is not original and that originality
5
requires only slightly more than a trivial variation, but HPA does not point the Court to
6
specific, undisputed examples of originality in its works. (See, e.g., MSJ at 6-7; Reply to
7
MSJ at 6-7, 9.) Apart from conclusory statements regarding the originality of its works,
8
HPA attempts to demonstrate originality in its briefs by drawing a comparison between
9
its unit plans and Defendants’ Masse and Jones Plans, but this comparison lacks any
10
citation to the record and is therefore abstract. (See Reply to MSJ at 9.)
11
Otherwise, HPA and Defendants produce controverting evidence of originality
12
through, for example, testimony of an HPA architect that she “did not copy anything
13
from any other source” when she created the HPA plans and drawings (PSOF Ex. H ¶ 5)
14
and Defendants’ expert’s testimony regarding the identical nature of the copyrightable
15
elements of the Masse and Jones Plans and HPA’s plans and drawings (DSOF at 20-21
16
¶¶ 45-46). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the
17
controverting evidence and make a factual finding. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
18
Defendants have produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether
19
HPA’s works contain the requisite originality for copyright protection, and the Court
20
must therefore deny HPA’s request for summary judgment as to that issue.
21
C.
Motion to Strike Response
22
After Defendants filed their Response to HPA’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
23
they filed an Amended Response a week later with the principal purposes of changing the
24
numbering system of their exhibits and providing additional pin cites to the record.
25
(Resp. to MSJ at 1 n.1.) HPA moved to strike the Amended Response as a tardy and
26
impermissible second Response. (MTS at 1-2.) Because HPA was not prejudiced by
27
Defendants’ filing of the Amended Response and it served to facilitate both HPA’s and
28
the Court’s use of the Response, the Court will deny HPA’s Motion to Strike. However,
- 11 -
1
Defendants are warned that, in the future, they must seek leave of Court to make any
2
amendment not as-of-right after a deadline.
3
4
5
6
7
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Plaintiff Humphreys & Partners
Architects, LP’s Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 113).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff Humphreys & Partners Architects,
LP’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 127).
Dated this 27th day of April, 2016.
8
9
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
- 12 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?