Lea v. Colvin

Filing 17

ORDER that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment and terminate this case. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 3/4/15. (LSP)

1

WO

2
3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

8
9

Nicole H. Lea,

No. CV-14-01694-PHX-DGC
Plaintiff,

10
11

v.

12

ORDER

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security

13

Defendant.

14
15
16

Plaintiff Nicole H. Lea seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision

17

of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her

18

application for supplemental security income under §§ 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A)

19

of the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge

20

(“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on legal error, the

21

Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed.

22

I.

Background.

23

Plaintiff, a 41-year-old female, previously worked as a cab driver and courier. She

24

has an eighth-grade education. On April 14, 2008, she applied for supplemental security

25

income alleging disability beginning March 1, 2007. On April 7, 2010, she appeared

26

with her attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational expert also

27

testified. On July 12, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled

28

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council granted Plaintiff’s

1

request for review and remanded the case to the ALJ. Plaintiff appeared at another

2

hearing with her attorney on January 29, 2013, to provide additional testimony. A

3

vocational expert also testified. On March 8, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision that

4

Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review,

5

making the ALJ’s March 2013 decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

6

II.

Legal Standard.

7

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the

8

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court

9

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is

10

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d

11

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a

12

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate

13

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether

14

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole

15

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id.

16

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

17

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be

18

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

19

III.

The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process.

20

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security

21

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears

22

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five the burden shifts to the

23

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

24

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in

25

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not

26

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant

27

has

28

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step

a

“severe”

medically

determinable

-2-

physical

or

mental

impairment.

1

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of

2

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P

3

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to

4

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the

5

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is

6

still capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant

7

is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final

8

step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the

9

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the

10

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

11

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful

12

activity since April 14, 2008, the date of application. At step two, the ALJ found that

13

Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: bipolar depressive disorder with

14

psychosis; borderline personality disorder; and cannabis, opioid and alcohol abuse.

15

A.R. 119. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does have an impairment or

16

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in

17

Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. This determination, however, accounted

18

for Plaintiff’s substance use disorders. Id. The ALJ further concluded that if Plaintiff

19

discontinued substance abuse she would continue to have a severe impairment or

20

combination of impairments, but those impairments would not meet or medically equal

21

any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. A.R. 120.

22

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following RFC:

23
24
25

If the claimant stopped the substance use, the claimant would have the
residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional
levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: she would be
limited to simple work with occasional, superficial interaction with others.

26
27

A.R. 121. The ALJ found that even if Plaintiff stopped the substance abuse, she would

28

be unable to perform any of her past relevant work. A.R. 125. At step five, the ALJ

-3-

1

concluded that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual

2

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

3

economy that Plaintiff could perform. A.R. 126.

4

IV.

Analysis.

5

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is defective for two reasons: (1) the ALJ’s

6

RFC determination lacks substantial evidence because the opinion of a treating physician

7

and two social workers were not afforded appropriate weight, and (2) the ALJ improperly

8

discredited Plaintiff’s testimony as to the severity of her symptoms.

9

A.

Weighing Medical Source Evidence.

10

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions of the

11

following medical sources: Dr. Russell Gilbert, social worker Alice Alibrio, and social

12

worker Judith Buelhner. The Court will address the ALJ’s treatment of each opinion

13

below.

14

1.

Legal Standard.

15

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians,

16

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

17

830 (9th Cir. 1995).

18

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to

19

one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th

20

Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when

21

evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship,

22

frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective

23

evidence). If it is not contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the opinion of a treating

24

or examining physician can be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester,

25

81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)).

26

contradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician “can only be rejected for

27

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.”

28

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043).

Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating

-4-

A

1

An ALJ can meet the “specific and legitimate reasons” standard “by setting out a

2

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating

3

[her] interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403,

4

1408 (9th Cir. 1986). But “[t]he ALJ must do more than offer [her] conclusions. [She]

5

must set forth [her] own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’,

6

are correct.”

7

determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability and does not

8

give significance to a statement by a medical source that the claimant is “disabled” or

9

“unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d).

10

Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22.

2.

The Commissioner is responsible for

Russell Gilbert, M.D.

11

On December 31, 2012, Dr. Russell Gilbert, Plaintiff’s treating physician,

12

evaluated her functional capacity. A.R. 1604-05. The medical opinion consists of a

13

standard “check-the-box” form, wherein Dr. Gilbert checked boxes ranging from “none”

14

to “extreme” indicating Plaintiff’s level of limitation for each functional area. Although

15

Dr. Gilbert is a treating source, the ALJ declined to afford his opinion great weight

16

because “the doctor gave little explanation to his findings and only stated that the

17

claimant was ‘likely’ not able to sustain full-time employment due to her mental illness.”

18

A.R. 125. The ALJ also noted that the opinion was “vague and not supported by the

19

record and the claimant’s continued substance abuse.” Id.

20

Dr. Gilbert concluded that Plaintiff had “marked” limitations in the following

21

functional areas: interaction with the public, interaction with supervisors, interaction

22

with coworkers, responding appropriately to work pressures in a usual work setting, and

23

responding appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. A.R. 1604-05. Dr. Gilbert

24

then listed Plaintiff’s “bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder” as the reasons

25

supporting his findings. A.R. 1605.

26

Dr. Gilbert’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinions of Dr. Brent Geary

27

(A.R. 450-55), Dr. Elliot Salk (A.R. 521-28), and Dr. Tracy Ristich (A.R. 1162-68). All

28

three sources opined Plaintiff had greater abilities than those identified in Dr. Gilbert’s

-5-

1

opinion. All three doctors gave consistent opinions and all three examined Plaintiff

2

during times of sobriety. Dr. Geary opined that Plaintiff had “mild limitations” in social

3

interaction and “moderate limitations” in adaptation. A.R. 454. Dr. Salk found Plaintiff

4

had anxiety and poor motivation, which would interfere with adapting to change and

5

social interaction. A.R. 527. Dr. Ristich concluded that Plaintiff had only “mild to

6

moderate limitations” in social interaction, such as responding appropriately to

7

supervision and ability to get along with coworkers. A.R. 1166. Dr. Ristich also noted

8

that Plaintiff had “moderate to marked limitations” in adapting to change in the

9

workplace. Id. Unlike Dr. Gilbert’s check-the-box form, all three opinions contain

10

extensive supporting clinical evidence including behavioral observations and medical

11

histories.

12

Plaintiff claims that Dr. Gilbert was not required to submit evidence in support of

13

his findings because “[t]here are more than 1000 pages of behavioral health records in the

14

Court transcript.” Doc. 16 at 3. This argument misses the point. If Dr. Gilbert relied on

15

such records, he should have discussed them in his opinion. The ALJ need only rely on

16

medical opinions that are supported by the administrative record. She is not required to

17

speculate as to the basis for Dr. Gilbert’s findings. In her decision, the ALJ noted the

18

vagueness of Dr. Gilbert’s report; summarized the clinical evidence and contradictory

19

findings by Drs. Geary, Salk, and Ristich; and clearly stated her interpretation of the

20

evidence. Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1408. The ALJ therefore discounted Dr. Gilbert’s opinion

21

with specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at

22

830-31.

23

3.

Social Workers Judith Buelhner and Alice Alibrio.

24

Plaintiff was also examined by two licensed social workers, Judith Buelhner and

25

Alice Alibrio. Like Dr. Gilbert, Ms. Buelhner and Ms. Alibrio filled out standardized

26

check-the-box forms indicating the degree of limitation Plaintiff suffered for each

27

functional category, ranging from “none” to “extreme.” A.R. 682-83, 906-07, 1301-02.

28

The ALJ afforded the opinions little weight because they were “made by licensed social

-6-

1

workers [and] can only be used to help our understanding of the record as a whole. In no

2

case [are they] entitled to consideration as the opinion of a treating source.” A.R. 125.

3

Plaintiff asserts these reports should have been afforded “great weight.”

4

The Social Security Regulations differentiate between “acceptable” medical

5

sources, which include licensed physicians, psychologists, optometrists, and podiatrists,

6

and “other” medical sources, which include nurse-practitioners, physicians’ assistants,

7

and public and private social welfare agency personnel. 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a) & (d).

8

ALJs may not discount “other” medical sources without explanation, but they may afford

9

them less weight if the ALJ provides “germane” reasons. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d

10

1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that an ALJ may reject testimony from “other”

11

sources if he provides “germane” reasons); see also SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at

12

*5 (Aug. 9, 2006) (explaining that an “acceptable” medical source opinion may be

13

afforded greater weight than an “other” medical source because “acceptable” medical

14

source opinions come from “the most qualified health care professionals”). Germane

15

reasons include opinions that are “conclusory” or that are provided via “standardized,

16

check-the-box form[s]” that fail to include supporting clinical evidence.

17

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253

18

(9th Cir. 1996)). “Inconsistency with medical evidence” is another germane reason.

19

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).

Molina v.

20

The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in affording little weight to the opinions.

21

Ms. Buelhner’s report dated February 22, 2011, provides no explanation for her findings.

22

A.R. 907. Ms. Alibrio completed two reports dated June 21, 2011, and July 28, 2011,

23

both of which provide some explanation at the end of the form. A.R. 683, 1302. The two

24

reports, however, are almost exactly the same, and instead of providing evidence to

25

support her findings, she merely records Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms. Id. Neither

26

Ms. Buelhner’s report nor Ms. Alibrio’s reports contain any objective medical evidence,

27

and they are the same check-the-box forms that Dr. Gilbert completed, which the ALJ

28

found “vague and unsupported by the record . . . .” A.R. 125.

-7-

1

The ALJ properly afforded great weight to the opinions of Drs. Geary, Salk, and

2

Ristich, all of whom reported limitations that directly contradict Ms. Buelhner and Ms.

3

Alibrio’s opinions.

4

Plaintiff had no limitations in her ability to understand and remember simple instructions

5

directly conflicts with Ms. Alibrio’s June 2011 finding that Plaintiff had marked

6

limitations in the same functional area. A.R. 682, 1166 (emphasis added). The record

7

contains several of these direct contradictions, and the ALJ was certainly entitled to credit

8

the medical opinions of the licensed physicians over those of the social workers.

For example, Dr. Ristich’s conclusion in September 2011 that

9

The Ninth Circuit has held that “if an ALJ has provided well-supported grounds

10

for rejecting testimony regarding specified limitations, we cannot ignore the ALJ’s

11

reasoning and reverse the agency merely because the ALJ did not expressly discredit

12

each witness who described the same limitations.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1121. Further, if

13

the ALJ lists germane reasons for discounting similar testimony elsewhere in the

14

decision, the court cannot “reverse the agency merely because the ALJ did not ‘clearly

15

link [her] determination to those reasons.’” Id. (quoting Lewis, 236 F.3d at 512). Here,

16

the ALJ did not explicitly list her reasons for discounting the social workers’ opinions,

17

but she previously provided specific reasons supported by substantial evidence for

18

discounting Dr. Gilbert’s check-the-box opinion. Those same reasons apply to the social

19

workers’ testimony, both of whom used a similar standardized form as Dr. Gilbert and

20

found approximately the same limitations. Thus, the ALJ’s germane reasons easily can

21

be traced back to her analysis of Dr. Gilbert’s opinion.

22

Even assuming arguendo that the ALJ failed to adequately provide germane

23

reasons for discrediting the “other” sources, the error is harmless.

24

principles apply in the Social Security Act context. Id. at 1115. An error is harmless if

25

there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error does not

26

affect the ultimate nondisability determination. Id. The claimant usually bears the

27

burden of showing that an error is harmful. Id. at 1111. Plaintiff does not argue that the

28

uncontradicted opinions of Drs. Geary, Salk, and Ristich are flawed, nor does she submit

-8-

Harmless error

1

evidence that the social workers examined Plaintiff during a period of sobriety, a factor

2

the ALJ reasonably considered in her analysis. Plaintiff has therefore failed to meet her

3

burden in showing harm and presents no evidence that had the ALJ credited the opinions,

4

the disability determination would have been affected.

5
6

4.

The ALJ’s RFC is Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Plaintiff last asserts that the vocational expert found Plaintiff unemployable at the

7

hearing in March.

8

references was conducted by Plaintiff’s counsel and began by asking the vocational

9

expert to define “moderate” as “approximately 10 percent off task” and “marked” as “11

10

to 15 percent” off task. A.R. 53. Counsel then asked the vocational expert to consider a

11

hypothetical person with “moderate limitations in understanding, remembering detailed

12

instructions, moderate limitations in ability to make judgments on simple work-related

13

decisions” as well as “marked limitations” in social functioning and adaptation. A.R. 54.

14

After considering these factors, the vocational expert opined that this hypothetical person

15

could not work.

This argument is misleading.

The line of questioning Plaintiff

16

The hypothetical posed by Plaintiff’s counsel is based largely on the check-the-

17

box forms completed by Dr. Gilbert, Ms. Buelhner, and Ms. Alibrio. As stated above, the

18

ALJ properly afforded these opinions little weight, and thus they were not material to the

19

ALJ’s RFC. Instead, the ALJ relied on three consistent medical source opinions, which

20

Plaintiff does not challenge. The ALJ provided specific reasons in support of the RFC

21

and rationally interpreted all of the evidence in the record.

22

supported by substantial evidence.

Therefore, the RFC is

23

B.

24

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or

25

other symptoms, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine

26

whether the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could

27

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged;

28

and, if so, and if there is no evidence of malingering, (2) reject the claimant’s testimony

The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Credibility.

-9-

1

about the severity of the symptoms only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons

2

for the rejection. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009).

3

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could

4

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. The ALJ then found Plaintiff’s

5

statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms not

6

credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity

7

assessment. In other words, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements not credible to the

8

extent she claims she is unable to perform in a work environment.

9

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she has a hard time concentrating and

10

experiences depression from her bipolar disorder. A.R. 38. The disorder also causes

11

daily mood swings and panic attacks during stressful situations. Id. In fact, she claimed

12

to have been suffering from a panic attack during the hearing. Id. Plaintiff stated that she

13

has only two friends that she hardly ever sees and has trouble making decisions. A.R. 39.

14

She does not trust other people and tends to shut people out. A.R. 40. She has trouble

15

with her memory and has to write things down to remember them. Id. Plaintiff also

16

claims that she experiences auditory hallucinations. Id. She hears things “all the time”

17

and talks to her voices to “make them shut up.” Id. This causes her to accidentally “blurt

18

out” offensive words. A.R. 41. She experiences a great deal of paranoia and night

19

sweats and nightmares. Id. She takes naps often and experiences pain on a daily basis.

20

A.R. 42. When asked about the range of pain she experiences on a scale of 0 to 10, she

21

claimed it was a “5.” Id.

22

Plaintiff also claimed that she took her required medication on a daily basis and

23

sets an alarm to remind her to do so. A.R. 43. She stated that she has a history of

24

alcoholism, but that she has been sober since 2009. Id. She also claimed that she has

25

fibromyalgia that prevents her from lifting more than 10 pounds. Id. When asked why

26

she could not work five, eight-hour days a week, she said that she takes naps a lot, is

27

constantly confused, has to be reminded of things, and has to be instructed several times

28

to perform tasks. A.R. 44. Plaintiff stated that she used to use marijuana every week, but

- 10 -

1

has abstained since November 2012. A.R. 45. She also claimed that she has been to her

2

pain management clinic once. Id.

3

Plaintiff testified that she cannot perform certain daily activities of living, such as

4

doing dishes, vacuuming, and mopping. A.R. 48. On most days, she listens to music,

5

takes a nap, pets her cat, colors, and watches movies. Id.

6

The ALJ gave several reasons for finding Plaintiff’s testimony not fully credible.

7

First, the medical evidence indicated that Plaintiff continues to abuse marijuana, alcohol,

8

and opioids.

9

statements about her alcohol use. At the hearing, Plaintiff claimed she had not used

10

alcohol since 2009, but she was arrested for DUI in January 2010. In 2011, she claimed

11

that she was sober from alcohol and marijuana since 2009, but she admitted using

12

marijuana in January 2010 and tested positive for cannabinoids in March 2011 and

13

November 2012. Plaintiff also repeatedly failed to take medication in accordance with

14

her doctor’s orders.

A.R. 124.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff made several inconsistent

15

Second, although Plaintiff claims she cannot perform many functions because of

16

fibromyalgia and chronic pain, she has not sought “any aggressive treatment for any pain

17

disorder.” Id. Instead, Plaintiff abuses medications and marijuana and has relapsed

18

several times. The record shows Plaintiff is “quite functional when she is not abusing

19

substances and is taking her medications.” Id. For example, in December 2012, she was

20

functional and able to arrange all the details surrounding her upcoming surgery.

21

A.R. 1626-27. The clinic notes indicate that Plaintiff called to change the time for her

22

pick up by the taxi company and that she “verbalized understanding and intent to

23

independently complete this task.” A.R. 1627. Plaintiff also informed the therapist that

24

her boyfriend would call with a post-surgical update. Id. She was fully aware of her

25

circumstances and she managed them accordingly.

26

Third, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff is not motivated. A.R. 125. This fact was

27

reflected in Plaintiff’s medical records, including Dr. Geary’s observation that Plaintiff

28

“is generally unproductive, unmotivated, and is a high risk for relapse on alcohol.”

- 11 -

1

A.R. 453. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s lack of motivation is a “conscious decision”

2

given that she appears to have adequate motivation when she is on her prescribed

3

medication and not using illicit substances. A.R. 125. The ALJ found that the lack of

4

motivation erodes Plaintiff’s credibility. Id.

5

Fourth, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s claims of hallucinations were “vague at

6

best.” A.R. 125. At the hearing, Plaintiff provided no specifics regarding the “voices”

7

that she hears. She admitted that the hallucinations would stop when she properly took

8

her prescribed medication. A.R. 522.

9

Plaintiff argues that none of the physicians found that Plaintiff “conflate[s] her

10

symptoms related to drug or alcohol abuse.” Doc. 16, at 4. But there is no evidence that

11

any physician examined Plaintiff both when she was sober and when she was abusing

12

substances, and the three doctors that found her functional examined her during periods

13

of sobriety. A.R. 125. The ALJ is entitled to make reasonable inferences based on the

14

medical evidence in the record. During times of sobriety, Plaintiff has greater functional

15

capacity, both physically and mentally. During times of substance abuse, the record

16

indicates that her problems are aggravated.

17

In sum, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s

18

testimony regarding the severity and frequency of her symptoms.

19

supported by the medical evidence in the record. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in

20

evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility.

21
22
23

Each reason is

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case.
Dated this 4th day of March, 2015.

24
25
26
27
28

- 12 -