Crespin v. Ryan et al

Filing 36

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1 ) under 28U.S.C. § 2254 is granted. The "without possibility of parole" provision of Petitioner's life sentence is vacated and Petitioner's case is remanded to the Pinal County Superior Court for resentencing. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action and enter judgmentaccordingly. Signed by Judge Steven P Logan on 11/08/2017. (KAS)

1
2
3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

8

Freddie Crespin,

9
10

Petitioner,
vs.

11
12

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,
Respondents.

13
14

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. CV-15-00992-PHX-SPL
ORDER

15

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett’s Report and

16

Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 21) in which she recommends this Court grant

17

Petitioner Freddie Crespin’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

18

(Doc. 1) (“Petition”). The Court agrees with Judge Willett’s determination that

19

Petitioner’s sentencing was an objectively unreasonable application of Miller v. Alabama,

20

567 U.S. 460 (2012), and will grant the Petition.

21

I.

Factual Background

22

Petitioner Freddie Crespin is serving a life sentence without the possibility of

23

parole for first-degree murder. (Doc. 11 at 1.) Petitioner was sixteen years old at the time

24

of the crime, but was charged as an adult. (Doc. 11-1 at 74.) Petitioner pleaded guilty to

25

first-degree murder in the Pinal County Superior Court, CR95021006—a crime

26

punishable by (1) death by lethal injection, (2) life imprisonment without the possibility

27

of parole (natural life), or (3) life imprisonment with no parole until at least 25 years have

28

been served. (Doc. 11-1 at 2.) The parties stipulated to a sentence of natural life. (Doc. 11-1 at 2.)

1

Through counsel, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on November

2

20, 2013, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under the United

3

States Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama. (Doc. 11-1 at 65-71.) Petitioner’s

4

petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court on April 23, 2014.

5

(Doc. 11-1 at 91-92.) Following Petitioner’s timely appeal of the trial court’s dismissal

6

(Doc. 11-2 at 2-21), the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review of Petitioner’s petition,

7

but denied relief. (Doc. 11-2 at 79-81.) In May 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court denied

8

Petitioner’s request for further review. (Doc. 11-2 at 88.) Petitioner filed this Petition for

9

habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 1, 2015. (Doc. 1.)

10

II.

Standard of Review

11

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole

12

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” In reviewing

13

a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the Court “must determine de novo any

14

part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ.

15

P. 72(b)(3). The Court need not undertake de novo review of a magistrate judge’s

16

recommendations that the parties accept as correct. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

17

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

18

When reviewing habeas petitions, federal courts “defer to the last reasoned state

19

court decision.” Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014). Federal courts

20

may not grant a state prisoner’s writ of habeas corpus as to any adjudicated claim unless

21

the adjudication of the claim either:

22
23
24
25

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.

26
27

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d

28

1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013).
2

1

III.

Discussion

2

The Supreme Court’s modern interpretations of the Eighth Amendment have

3

repeated that central to its prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is

4

proportionality—a right grounded in “the basic precept of justice that punishment for

5

crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense.” Miller,

6

567 U.S. at 469 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560

7

(2005); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002)). In 2012, the Court used

8

this tenet of proportionality to conclude that the “Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing

9

scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”

10

Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. Such a conclusion, the Court reasoned, was required by the

11

multitude of factors that make juvenile offenders different from adult offenders, including

12

(1) a lack of maturity leading to recklessness and impulsivity, (2) a heightened

13

vulnerability to negative influences and outside pressures, and (3) a recognition of the

14

evolution of character that accompanies age. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (internal citations

15

and quotations omitted). Because “children are constitutionally different from adults for

16

purposes of sentencing,” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, sentencing courts must “consider a

17

child’s ‘diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change’ before condemning

18

him or her to die in prison.”1 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726 (2016)

19

(citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479). Four years later, in Montgomery, the Supreme Court

20

clarified that the rule announced in Miller was a substantive rule of constitutional law to

21

be applied retroactively. 136 S. Ct. at 736.

22
23
1

24
25
26
27
28

The Miller Court clarified that its holding did not impose a categorical ban on
natural life sentences for juveniles, only that the Eighth Amendment “forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders.” 567 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added). In Montgomery, the Court
explained that life without the possibility of parole is excessive for those “juvenile
offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth” and is reserved for “the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” 136 S. Ct. at 734
(internal citations omitted).
3

1

Here, Petitioner maintains that his natural life sentence violates Miller because

2

“the sentencing judge did not consider mitigating factors related to the defendant’s age

3

and immaturity but took pains to stress to Crespin and his family that no matter what

4

evidence they presented Crespin would be sentenced to natural life.” (Doc. 1 at 4)

5

(emphasis in original). In the R&R, Judge Willett concluded that the “Arizona Court of

6

Appeals’ decision reflects an objectively unreasonable application of Miller.” (Doc. 21 at

7

1.) Respondents challenge the R&R in its entirety, but its objections can be summarized

8

as follows: (1) that Petitioner’s guilty plea precludes habeas review, (2) that the state

9

court’s determination of facts was not incorrect or an unreasonable application of Miller,

10

and (3) that Petitioner’s sentence is nevertheless justified under Miller because of the

11

nature of his crime. (Doc. 27.) The Court addresses each objection in turn.

12

A.

Habeas review

13

Respondents dispute the R&R’s finding that Petitioner’s guilty plea does not

14

preclude review of his habeas claim. (Doc. 27 at 2-4.) To support this argument,

15

Respondents refer the Court to several cases that address the limitations prisoners face

16

when challenging guilty pleas.2 Here, Petitioner is challenging the constitutionality of his

17

sentence, not his underlying conviction as Respondents suggests. (Doc. 1 at 1; Doc. 21 at

18

8; Doc. 30 at 2.) The very first sentence of the Petition highlights this point and reads: “1.

19

Petitioner is challenging the sentence imposed by the Pinal County Superior Court in case

20

number CR95021006.” (Doc. 1 at 1.) The Court has the authority to hear such challenges

21

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and thus, will reach the merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition.

22

B.

Factual determinations and application of Miller by the trial court

23

Respondents object to the R&R’s conclusion that the Arizona Court of Appeals

24

made an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before it when it

25
26
27
28

2

Respondents cite to Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (Doc. 11 at 29),
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989) (Doc. 27 at 2-3), Bradshaw v. Stumpf,
545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005) (Doc. 27 at 3), and Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 979 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Doc. 27 at 3), all of which address the limitations of collaterally attacking
guilty pleas and not the issue presented here.
4

1

determined that Petitioner’s sentencing complied with Miller. (Doc. 27 at 5-11.) In its

2

Memorandum decision affirming dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition,

3

the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded:

4
5
6
7
8
9

Accordingly, although the trial court told Crespin’s family
‘there is no sentence to be given other than what’s called for
in the plea agreement,’ the court had the discretion to reject
the plea agreement if it deemed the stipulated sentence
inappropriate. It is clear from the record the court not only
understood there were multiple sentencing options for firstdegree murder, but that it considered those options in the
context of Crespin’s character, age and the nature of the
offense before deciding if it would accept the plea agreement.

10
11

(Doc. 11, Ex. L.)

12

Yet, as Judge Willett aptly noted, “[t]he preceding statement incorrectly recounts

13

the record.” (Doc. 21 at 9.) As the record shows, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement

14

on March 16, 1998. (Doc. 11-1 at 2-5.) Petitioner’s plea agreement specifically noted the

15

sentencing range available for first-degree murder and reflected the parties’ stipulation

16

that Petitioner “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.”

17

(Doc. 11-1 at 2.) The same day, Petitioner attended his change of plea hearing, at which

18

time the trial court judge explicitly stated that he accepted and entered Petitioner’s plea

19

agreement on the record. (Doc. 11-2 at 41.) Petitioner’s probation report, which was not

20

made available until May 1998—two months after the court had already accepted

21

Petitioner’s plea agreement—includes only a passing mention of the Petitioner’s juvenile

22

status as a mitigating factor for consideration. (Doc. 11-1 at 13.)

23

At Petitioner’s sentencing hearing on September 29, 1998, the sentencing judge

24

began by reiterating that the plea agreement to which Petitioner had entered—and that the

25

court had already accepted—included a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

26

(Doc. 11-1 at 20-22.) The sentencing judge also stated,

27
28

And you understand that the sentence that’s provided, no
matter what testimony is presented on your behalf, and I
5

1
2
3

know [defense attorney] wants your family members to talk
to me, once I’ve accepted the plea agreement, you’ll receive a
life sentence, which is natural life sentence with no possibility
of parole, commutation of sentence, et cetera.

4
5

(Doc. 11-1 at 20.) Prior to allowing Petitioner’s family members to address the court, the

6

sentencing judge again noted, “Before they start, the Court wants to make sure the family

7

members understand that there is no sentence to be given other than what’s called for in

8

the plea agreement.” (Doc. 11-1 at 30.)

9

Respondents contend that “[t]he R&R ignores the decisions and reasoning of the

10

state appellate court, and instead focuses its analysis exclusively on the actions of the

11

sentencing court.” (Doc. 27 at 12.) But such an argument ignores that the Arizona Court

12

of Appeals’ finding that the sentencing judge complied with Miller was an unreasonable

13

one given the evidence before it. As Judge Willett concluded, “the trial court made

14

several statements at the sentencing hearing that it [was] bound by the stipulated natural

15

life sentence.” (Doc. 21 at 9.) Moreover, the record does not support the Arizona Court of

16

Appeals’ conclusion that “the [trial] court not only understood there were multiple

17

sentencing options for first-degree murder, but that it considered those options in the

18

context of Crespin’s character, age and the nature of the offense before deciding if it

19

would accept the plea agreement.” (Doc. 11-2 at 81.) In fact, the record itself warrants an

20

opposite conclusion. The trial court accepted Petitioner’s plea agreement two months

21

before Petitioner’s probation report was available for review. At Petitioner’s sentencing

22

hearing, the trial court made several statements on the record that clearly indicate it

23

believed itself to be bound by the stipulated natural life sentence, irrespective of the

24

probation report’s listing of Petitioner’s age as a mitigating factor and any favorable

25

testimony presented on Petitioner’s behalf during the sentencing hearing. Thus, the

26

determination that the sentencing court complied with the directives of Miller is not an

27

ordinary error to which a degree of deference must be afforded, but one “where there is

28

no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts
6

1

with this Court’s precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

2

C.

Petitioner’s crime

3

Respondents argue that if the Court were to undertake a de novo review of

4

Petitioner’s case, it should deny relief because Petitioner’s crime does not warrant a

5

different sentence, even when taking his juvenile status at the time of the crime into

6

consideration as Miller requires. (Doc. 27 at 22-25.) The Court declines what amounts to

7

Respondents’ invitation to now serve as Petitioner’s sentencing judge because the Court’s

8

present purpose is limited to ensuring that Petitioner’s sentence is in accord with the

9

Constitution. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 91 (“The writ of habeas corpus stands as a

10

safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation of the law.”).

11

IV.

Conclusion

12

Having considered the Petition, Judge Willett’s R&R, and Respondents’

13

objections, the Court finds that Petitioner’s sentencing was an objectively unreasonable

14

application of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Accordingly,

15

IT IS ORDERED:

16

1.

17

accepted and adopted by the Court;
2.

18
19

That the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 21) is

That Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 is granted;
3.

20

That the “without possibility of parole” provision of Petitioner’s life

21

sentence is vacated in accordance with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and

22

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016);
4.

23

That Petitioner’s case is remanded to the Pinal County Superior Court for

24

resentencing; and

25

///

26

///

27

///

28

///
7

1
2
3

5.

That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action and enter judgment

accordingly.
Dated this 8th day of November, 2017.

4
5

Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8