Greenfield v. Colvin

Filing 22

ORDER affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Magistrate Judge Eileen S Willett on 3/6/17. (DXD)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Brian Fredrick Greenfield,

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Plaintiff,

No. CV-15-02199-PHX-ESW
ORDER

v.

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Acting Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,

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Defendant.

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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Brian Fredrick Greenfield’s (“Plaintiff”)
appeal of the Social Security Administration’s (“Social Security”) denial of his
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under
Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleges disability beginning on
November 15, 2011. This Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to
enter, based upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or
without remanding the case for a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise
of U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 17).

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After reviewing the Administrative Record (“A.R.”) and the parties’ briefing
(Docs. 16, 21), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is
supported by substantial evidence and is free of harmful legal error.

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I. LEGAL STANDARDS

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A. Disability Analysis: Five-Step Evaluation

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The Social Security Act (the “Act”) provides for disability insurance benefits to
those who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a
physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1).

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also

provides

for

disabled and have limited income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382. To be eligible for benefits based
on an alleged disability, the claimant must show that he or she suffers from a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that prohibits him or her from engaging in
any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(A)(3)(A).
The claimant must also show that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a
continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.
To decide if a claimant is entitled to Social Security benefits, an ALJ conducts an
analysis consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four
steps: 1

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Step One: Is the claimant engaged in “substantial gainful
activity”? If so, the analysis ends and disability benefits are
denied. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step two.

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Step Two: Does the claimant have a medically severe
impairment or combination of impairments? A severe
impairment is one which significantly limits the claimant’s
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant does not
have a severe impairment or combination of impairments,

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Act

Supplemental Security Income to certain individuals who are aged 65 or older, blind, or

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The

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Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,746 (9th Cir. 2007).
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disability benefits are denied at this step. Otherwise, the ALJ
proceeds to step three.

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Step Three: Is the impairment equivalent to one of a number
of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges
are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity? 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets
or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is
conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is
not one that is presumed to be disabling, the ALJ proceeds to
the fourth step of the analysis.

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Step Four: Does the impairment prevent the claimant from
performing work which the claimant performed in the past?
If not, the claimant is “not disabled” and disability benefits
are denied without continuing the analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the
last step.

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If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner: 2

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Step Five: Can the claimant perform other work in the
national economy in light of his or her age, education, and
work experience? The claimant is entitled to disability
benefits only if he or she is unable to perform other work. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). Social Security is
responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that
other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can do, given the claimant’s
residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience. Id.

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B. Standard of Review Applicable to ALJ’s Determination

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The Court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence

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and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.

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2012); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although “substantial

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Parra, 481 F.3d at 746.
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evidence” is less than a preponderance, it is more than a “mere scintilla.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938)). It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Id.
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the
Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and
detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir.
1998); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient
evidence to support the ALJ’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own
determination. See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it
is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750
(9th Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving
conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence and determining credibility. Magallanes, 881
F.2d at 750; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).
The Court also considers the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an ALJ’s
decision.

This doctrine provides that an ALJ’s decision need not be remanded or

reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate
nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (an error is harmless so long as there
remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error “does not
negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion”) (citations omitted).
II. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff, who was born in 1956, has worked as an automobile mechanic. (A.R.
44-45, 59). In 2012, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability insurance benefits
and a Title XVI application for supplemental security income benefits. (A.R. 214-15,
216-24). The applications allege that on January 1, 2006, Plaintiff became unable to
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work due to the following impairments: (i) arthritis; (ii) back problems; (iii) high blood
pressure; (iv) diabetes; and (v) depression. (A.R. 59, 79). Social Security denied both
applications on October 19, 2012. (A.R. 150-56). On June 12, 2013, upon Plaintiff’s
request for reconsideration, Social Security affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s applications.
(A.R. 158-63). Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. (A.R. 164). At the
administrative hearing, Plaintiff amended the alleged disability onset date to November
15, 2011. (A.R. 23, 54). On April 24, 2014, the ALJ who conducted the hearing issued a
decision finding that Plaintiff has not been under a disability as defined in the Social
Security Act from January 1, 2006 through the date of the decision. (A.R. 23-34). The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 1-6, 18-19). On November 2,
2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requesting
judicial review and reversal of the ALJ’s decision.
B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Disability Analysis
The ALJ completed all five steps of the disability analysis before finding that
Plaintiff is not disabled and entitled to disability benefits.
1. Step One: Engagement in “Substantial Gainful Activity”
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since November 15, 2011. (A.R. 25). Neither party disputes this determination.

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2. Step Two: Presence of Medically Severe Impairment/Combination
of Impairments

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The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: (i)

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degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; (ii) hypertension; (iii) diabetes mellitus;

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and (iv) depression (A.R. 25). The ALJ’s step two determination is undisputed.

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3. Step Three: Presence of Listed Impairment(s)

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The ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of

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impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

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Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 25-27). Neither party
disputes the ALJ’s determination at this step.
4. Step Four: Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
to perform medium exertional work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c) and
416.967(c), except that:
[Plaintiff] is limited to simple, unskilled work. [Plaintiff] has
the abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out,
and remember simple instructions; to respond appropriately to
supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and to
deal with changes in a routine work setting.
(A.R. 27). After considering Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable
to perform his past relevant work as an automobile mechanic. (A.R. 33). Although
neither party challenges the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is unable perform his past
work, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s RFC assessment does not account for all of
Plaintiff’s limitations. (Doc. 16 at 9-16).
5. Step Five: Capacity to Perform Other Work
At the final step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform other jobs existing
in significant numbers in the national economy. (A.R. 33-34). In making this finding,
the ALJ relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “Grids”). Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ erred at Step Five by failing to consult a Vocational Expert (“VE”) when
determining that Plaintiff can perform other work. (Doc. 16 at 20).
C. Plaintiff’s Challenge to the ALJ’s RFC Assessment

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1. The ALJ Did Not Improperly Discount the Opinions of Examining
Psychologist Dr. David Young

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In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, there are three

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categories of physicians: (i) treating physicians, who actually treat the claimant; (ii)

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examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (iii) non-

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examining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81

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F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons that

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are supported by substantial evidence for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of a
treating or examining doctor. Id. at 830-31; Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216
(9th Cir. 2005). An ALJ cannot reject a treating or examining physician’s opinion in
favor of another physician’s opinion without first providing specific and legitimate
reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.
On September 13, 2012, consulting psychologist Dr. David Young examined
Plaintiff.

(A.R. 644-49).

Dr. Young opined that Plaintiff “has adequate ability to

understand simple direction,” but “has serious difficulties with regard to concentrating
and persisting on tasks at hand.” (A.R. 648). Dr. Young also opined that Plaintiff is
easily discouraged, is “quite withdrawn socially,” “gets irritated easily,” “gets very
impatient,” and “will need some help with regard to maintaining standards of neatness.”
(A.R. 649). Dr. Young concluded that Plaintiff “has little ability to work for extended
periods of time” and “is likely to have difficulty maintaining responsibilities on the job.”
(A.R. 648-49).
The ALJ gave Dr. Young’s opinions little weight.

(A.R. 32).

Because Dr.

Young’s opinions were contradicted by another acceptable medical source, 3 the Court
must evaluate whether the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Young’s opinions are
specific and legitimate.
The ALJ gave two reasons for discounting Dr. Young’s opinions. First, the ALJ
found that Dr. Young’s opinions are not supported by Dr. Young’s objective findings
from the examination. (A.R. 32). The ALJ did not unreasonably state that Dr. Young’s
objective findings were generally within normal limits. (Id.). For instance, Dr. Young
observed that Plaintiff “had good immediate memory of words read to him. He had no
difficulty recalling the same three words after a short delay.

He had no difficulty

counting backwards x7.” (A.R. 644). Dr. Young also noted that Plaintiff spoke clearly,
was cooperative, was alert, his “attention was good,” and “[h]is thought processes were

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Dr. Young’s opinions were contradicted by Drs. Diane Kogut and Lynette M.,
who opined that Plaintiff could perform unskilled work. (A.R. 75, 119).
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logical and goal directed.” (A.R. 645). Although Dr. Young also stated that Plaintiff’s
“affect was flat and blunted,” his “[m]ood was depressed and anxious,” and “[h]e
sounded impatient and irritable,” it is well-settled that an ALJ, not the Court, is
responsible for resolving conflicts and ambiguity in the evidence. Magallanes, 881 F.2d
at 750; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court does
not find that the ALJ unreasonably concluded that Dr. Young’s opinions are unsupported
by Dr. Young’s examination findings.

The ALJ’s first reason for discounting Dr.

Young’s opinions is specific and legitimate and is supported by substantial evidence. See
Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,
957 (9th Cir. 2002).
The ALJ also found that Dr. Young’s observations are inconsistent with the
observations of other treating sources.

(A.R. 32).

For instance, the ALJ correctly

recounted that treating physician Dr. Russell Hissock noted in June 2013 that Plaintiff
had good judgment, was oriented to time, place, and person, had a normal mood, was
active and alert, and had normal recent and remote memory. (A.R. 32, 670). The Court
finds that the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Young’s opinions are inconsistent with the record is
a valid reason for discounting the opinions and is supported by substantial evidence. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (ALJ must consider whether an opinion is consistent with the
record as a whole); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (finding it not improper for an ALJ to
reject a physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with the record).
Finally, the ALJ stated that “it appears Dr. Young primarily relied upon the
claimant’s own subjective statements in determining the claimant’s mental functional
capacity.” (A.R. 32). “An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to
a large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted as
incredible.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041; see also Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. Dr.
Young wrote numerous statements that reflect Plaintiff’s own account of his symptoms,
such as Plaintiff “reports he is having some problems remembering things,” Plaintiff “has
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had [anxiety attacks] a few times by his report,” and Plaintiff says “he is frustrated . . . .”
(A.R. 645). The ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Young’s opinions are largely premised on
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is not unreasonable. As explained in Section II(C)(3)
below, the ALJ did not improperly discount Plaintiff’s testimony. The Court finds that
the ALJ’s final reason for giving Dr. Young’s opinions little weight is specific and
legitimate and is supported by substantial evidence.
In light of the Court’s finding that the ALJ did not improperly discount Dr.
Young’s opinions, the Court does not find persuasive Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s
RFC assessment fails to account for moderate limitations in concentration, persistence,
and pace. 4 (Doc. 16 at 9-14).

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2. Alleged Limitations Regarding Social Functioning
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate limitations related to Plaintiff’s
social functioning. (Doc. 16 at 14). In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites the
opinion of non-examining psychological consultant Dr. Lynette M., who opined that
Plaintiff was “markedly limited” in the abilities to understand, remember, and carry out
detailed instructions and to interact appropriately with the general public. (A.R. 117-18).
However, Dr. M. opined that Plaintiff was “not significantly limited” in the abilities to
understand, remember, and carry out very short and simple instructions and to remember
locations and work-like procedures. (A.R. 117). Dr. M. also opined that Plaintiff had no
significant limitations in abilities to (i) maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods; (ii) sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; (iii) work in
coordination with or in proximity to others without being distracted by them; (iv) make

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While the ALJ found at Step Three that Plaintiff has a moderate limitation in
concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “still has the ability to
sustain focused attention and concentration sufficiently long enough to permit the timely
and appropriate completion of tasks commonly found in work settings despite his alleged
mental impairment.” (A.R. 26). This limitation is captured by the ALJ’s RFC
assessment, which restricts Plaintiff to simple, unskilled work. See, e.g., Sabin v. Astrue,
337 F. App’x 617, 620 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The ALJ determined the end result of Sabin’s
moderate difficulties as to concentration, persistence, or pace was that she could do
simple and repetitive tasks on a consistent basis.”).
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simple work-related decisions; (v) complete a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; (vi) accept instructions and respond
appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and (vii) get along with coworkers or peers.
(A.R. 117-18).
Dr. M. concluded that Plaintiff “is able to perform work where interpersonal
contact is incidental to work performed, e.g. assembly work” and assessed that Plaintiff
could perform unskilled work. (A.R. 119). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly
rejected Dr. M.’s opinion that Plaintiff is only able to perform work that involves limited
interaction with the general public. (Doc. 16 at 14-16).
The ALJ limited Plaintiff to “simple, unskilled” work. (A.R. 27). “The basic
mental demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work include the abilities (on a
sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond
appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with
changes in a routine work setting.” Social Security Ruling 85-15 (“SSR 85-15”), 1985
WL 56857, at *4 (1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a). “These jobs ordinarily
involve dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people, and they generally
provide

substantial

vocational

opportunity

for

persons

with

solely mental

impairments who retain the capacity to meet the intellectual and emotional demands of
such jobs on a sustained basis.” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4. By limiting Plaintiff
to “simple, unskilled work,” the ALJ’s RFC assessment adequately captures Dr. M.’s
opinion that Plaintiff is limited to perform work where interpersonal contact is incidental
to work performed. See, e.g., Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 09–CV–01972–JLT,
2011 WL 445047 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011) (stating that “unskilled work accommodates a
need for limited contact with the general public”), aff'd, 490 Fed. Appx. 15 (9th Cir. Jul.
20, 2012) (holding a residual functional capacity for simple routine tasks, which did not
expressly note the claimant’s moderate limitations in interacting with others, nonetheless
adequately accounted for such limitations). Therefore, any error in failing to include in
the RFC assessment a limitation with respect to public interaction is harmless. See
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Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (to extent ALJ’s RFC finding
erroneously omitted claimant’s postural limitations, any error was harmless since
sedentary jobs required infrequent stooping, balancing, crouching, or climbing).

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3. The ALJ Provided Specific, Clear, and Convincing Reasons for
Discounting Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding

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his subjective symptoms. When evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff’s testimony

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regarding subjective pain or symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis.

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Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). In the first step, the ALJ must

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determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an

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underlying impairment “which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

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symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). The

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plaintiff does not have to show that the impairment could reasonably be expected to cause

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the severity of the symptoms. Rather, a plaintiff must only show that it could have

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caused some degree of the symptoms. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir.

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1996).

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If a plaintiff meets the first step, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ

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can only reject a plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of his or her symptoms by

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offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The

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ALJ cannot rely on general findings. The ALJ must identify specifically what testimony

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is not credible and what evidence undermines the plaintiff’s complaints. Berry v. Astrue,

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622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). In weighing a plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ can

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consider many factors including: a plaintiff’s reputation for truthfulness, prior

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inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, unexplained or inadequately explained

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failure to seek treatment, and the plaintiff’s daily activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see

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also 20 C.F.R. §

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conflicts between a claimant’s statements and the rest of the evidence). In addition,

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although the lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain

404.1529(c)(4) (Social Security must consider whether there are

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testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his or her credibility analysis. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Burch
v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2005).
In discounting Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff has received
“routine, conservative treatment on an infrequent basis for the alleged impairments.”
(A.R. 28). Generally, “[e]vidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a
claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.” Parra, 481 F.3d at 751; see
also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Our case law is clear that if a
claimant complains about disabling pain but fails to seek treatment, or fails to follow
prescribed treatment, for the pain, an ALJ may use such failure as a basis for finding the
complaint unjustified or exaggerated.); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.
1999) (the ALJ properly considered the physician’s failure to prescribe, and the
claimant's failure to request, medical treatment commensurate with the “supposedly
excruciating pain” alleged). However, “[d]isability benefits may not be denied because
of the claimant's failure to obtain treatment he cannot obtain for lack of funds.” Orn, 495
F.3d at 638 (quoting Gamble v. Chater, 68 F.3d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1995)) (alteration in
original).
Here, the record does not reflect that Plaintiff’s impairments required more than
conservative treatment. For example, in a September 2013 treatment note, Dr. Russell
Hiscock stated “labs looked pretty good considering [Plaintiff] had not seen a doctor for
several years and had not have [sic] his medications.
Complaining of some hand pain.

Generally doing well today.

Otherwise voices no acute complaints, issues, or

concerns today and denies any other interim changes in his health status.” (A.R. 657).
Plaintiff is ultimately responsible for providing the evidence to be used in making
the RFC finding. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040 (a claimant bears the burden of proving
entitlement to disability benefits); Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1113 (claimant carries burden to
present “complete and detailed objective medical reports” of his or her condition from
licensed medical professionals). The Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff
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has received minimal and conservative medical treatment is supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Because an ALJ may infer that pain is not disabling if a claimant
seeks only minimal, conservative treatment, the ALJ did not err in concluding that the
conservative and infrequent treatment Plaintiff has received is inconsistent with
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of his symptoms. (A.R. 28). See Burch, 400
F.3d at 681 (finding that if claimant’s complaints of back pain was “not severe enough to
motivate” the claimant to seek specialized treatment for the back pain (e.g. chiropractor
visits, physical therapy, etc.), it “is powerful evidence” regarding the extent to which the
claimant was in pain, even if the claimant did seek some treatment).
The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s testimony because “[t]he positive objective
clinical and diagnostic finding since the amended onset” does not support more restrictive
functional limitations than those contained in the assessed RFC. (A.R. 28). Because the
ALJ did not rely solely on the lack of supporting medical evidence in rejecting Plaintiff’s
testimony, the ALJ properly considered whether the objective medical evidence
corroborates Plaintiff’s claimed limitations. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (“While subjective
pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by
objective medical evidence, the evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the
severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(2)).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s symptom
testimony is inconsistent with the objective evidence. For instance, the ALJ correctly
recounted the September 2012 findings by evaluating physician William Chaffee, M.D.,
who opined that Plaintiff could perform a range of heavy work despite Plaintiff’s
diagnoses of Type II diabetes, hypertension, diabetic peripheral neuropathy, bilateral
Dupuytren’s contracture, chronic back pain, and possible chronic pulmonary fibroses.
(A.R. 29, 628-33). The ALJ also correctly recounted medical records that indicate that
Plaintiff’s condition was generally unremarkable, such as a September 2013 treatment

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note indicating that Plaintiff had normal motor strength, normal tone, and normal
movement of all extremities. (A.R. 29-30, 658).
For the above reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ provided specific, clear, and
convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence when the ALJ discounted
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his symptoms.
4. The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Five by Relying on the Grids
At the fifth step of the disability analysis, the burden rests on the Commissioner to
show that the claimant can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Lockwood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). In determining whether the claimant
retains the ability to perform other work, an ALJ may refer to the Grids in certain cases.
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 § 200.00; Desrosiers v. Sec. of Health and
Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1988). The Grids are divided into three
job categories: (i) sedentary work, (ii) light work, and (iii) medium work. 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00. The Grids calculate whether or not the claimant is
disabled based on the claimant’s exertional physical ability, age, education, and work
experience. As such, the Grids are intended to streamline the administrative process and
encourage uniform treatment of claims. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62
(1983) (discussing the creation and purpose of the Grids).
However, an ALJ should rely on the Grids “only when the [G]rids accurately and
completely describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations.” Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d
993, 998 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting that the Grids “should be applied only where a claimant’s functional limitations
fall into a standardized pattern ‘accurately and completely’ described by the [G]rids” and
that a VE should be consulted where limitations “significantly limit the range of work” a
person can perform) (citation omitted).

Use of the Grids is inappropriate where a

claimant has non-exertional limitations that restrict the claimant’s ability to perform the
full range of work within a job category. Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1340-41. Examples of
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non-exertional limitations include those “mental, sensory, postural, manipulative, or
environmental (e.g., inability to tolerate dust or fumes) limitations.” Desrosiers, 846
F.2d at 579.
The presence of a non-exertional limitation does not automatically preclude
application of the Grids. See id. at 577. Rather, a non-exertional limitation must be
“‘sufficiently severe’ so as to significantly limit the range of work permitted by the
claimant’s exertional limitation.” Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a finding that a non-exertional impairment is severe at step two does not
necessarily mean it is “sufficiently severe” to significantly limit the range of work
permitted by a claimant’s exertional limitation. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the
determinations at steps two and five require different levels of severity of limitations,
“otherwise the two steps would collapse and a [VE] would be required in every case in
which a step-two determination of severity is made.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the Grids because “the
evidence, including the opinions from Dr. Young and [Dr. M.], indicates that [Plaintiff[
had significant and distinct functional limitations which would impact his ability to
perform jobs in the national economy.” (Doc. 16 at 20). However, as explained above,
the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Young’s opinion. As also explained above, any
error in omitting from the RFC assessment Dr. M.’s opinion that Plaintiff should be
restricted to jobs that have limited interaction with the general public is harmless.
Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff does not
possess non-exertional limitations that are sufficiently severe to limit Plaintiff’s ability to
perform unskilled work, the ALJ did not err by exclusively relying on the Grids at Step
Five of the disability analysis. See Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1077 (stating “we have not
previously held mild or moderate depression to be a sufficiently severe non-exertional
limitation that significantly limits a claimant’s ability to do work beyond the exertional
limitation” and holding that substantial evidence supported a n ALJ’s conclusion that
a claimant’s depression was not a sufficiently severe non-exertional limitation that
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prohibited the ALJ’s reliance on the Grids without the assistance of a VE). The Court
therefore finds that the Commissioner satisfied the burden at Step Five in showing that
Plaintiff can perform other work in the national economy that exists in significant
numbers.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and is free from reversible error. Accordingly, the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
Dated this 6th day of March, 2017.

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