Corzo v. Maricopa County Community College District et al

Filing 22

ORDER denying 17 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Magistrate Judge Eileen S Willett on 11/7/16.(KGM)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Miguel Corzo,

No. CV-15-02552-PHX-ESW

Plaintiff,

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v.

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Maricopa County
District, et al.,

ORDER

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Community

College

Defendants.

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Pending before the Court is Defendants’ fully briefed Motion to Partially Dismiss

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Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 17). Pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.,

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Defendants seek dismissal of Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiff’s Second Amended

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Complaint (Doc. 16). Assuming as true all well-pled factual allegations set forth in

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Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and interpreting them in a light most favorable to

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the non-moving party, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled causes of action

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for wrongful termination, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith

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and fair dealing. Therefore, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion to Partially Dismiss

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Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) as set forth below.
I. DISCUSSION

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A. COUNT II

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In its Order (Doc. 15) filed June 14, 2016, the Court set forth the requirements of

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the Arizona Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”) which an employee must demonstrate

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in order to challenge a termination of employment. The Court discussed the common law

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surrounding wrongful termination cases in Arizona, the legislative intent behind the

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passage of the AEPA, as well as an analysis of the AEPA under canons of statutory

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construction and common law principals of contract interpretation to delineate what

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Plaintiff must allege to set forth a cause of action for wrongful termination under the

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AEPA. In short, to prevail on a wrongful termination claim for breach of contract under

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the AEPA, Plaintiff must allege breach of a written employment contract signed by both

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parties that meets either of two substantive requirements: (1) the contract states that the

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employment relationship has a specified duration of time, or (2) the contract must

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expressly restrict the right of either party to terminate the employment relationship.

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ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501 (A)(2). There are three alternative methods to establish the

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existence of an employment contract that meets the signing requirement: (1) the written

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contract must be signed by both parties, (2) the written contract must be signed by the

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party to be charged, or (3) the written contract must be included in an employment

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handbook, manual, or similar document that expresses an intent for it to be an

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employment contract. See White v. AKDHC, LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1062 (D. Ariz.

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2009) (citing NLRB v. A-Plus Roofing, 39 F. 3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Here, Plaintiff alleges the breach of a written employment contract which

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expressly restricts the right of either party to terminate the employment relationship.

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(Doc. 16 at 57). In order to satisfy the signing requirement of the AEPA, Plaintiff sets

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forth allegations of an employment handbook, manual, or similar document that

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expresses the intent for it to be an employment contract. (Id.) Assuming as true all well-

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pled factual allegations of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and drawing all

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reasonable inferences therefrom in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

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alleged sufficient facts in the Second Amended Complaint to support a cause of action for

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wrongful termination under the AEPA.

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B. COUNTS III and IV

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In Counts III and IV Plaintiff alleges a claim for breach of contract and breach of

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the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising from Defendants’ alleged

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improper acts and omissions which occurred during the parties’ employment relationship

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unrelated to the alleged wrongful termination of Plaintiff’s employment. The AEPA does

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not prevent an employee and employer from further defining their relationship beyond

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one of the two substantive requirements of sentence one and one of the three formalities

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of sentence two of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501 (A)(2) necessary for a wrongful

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termination claim. The Court finds that the AEPA does not preclude Plaintiff from

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alleging that conduct other than the termination itself breached the employment contract

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and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that Plaintiff states existed between the

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parties. Plaintiff has done so sufficiently in Counts III and IV. See White, 664 F. Supp.

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2d at 1065 (“[A] viable claim for breach of the implied covenant may lie if a plaintiff is

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alleging conduct other than the termination itself breached the covenant.”) (citing

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Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1272 (9th Cir. 1990)).

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Plaintiff has alleged damages consistent with the claims set forth in Counts III and IV.

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The Court will deny the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV.

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II. CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth herein,

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IT IS ORDERED denying Defendants’ Motion to Partially Dismiss Second

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Amended Complaint (Doc. 17).
Dated this 7th day of November, 2016.

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