Harris v. Colvin

Filing 13

ORDER: The ALJ's decision is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge G Murray Snow on 5/15/2017. (REK)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Peggy Ann Harris,

No. CV-16-01994-PHX-GMS

Plaintiff,

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v.

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Commissioner
Administration,

ORDER

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of

Social

Security

Defendant.

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Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Peggy Ann Harris, which

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challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 1.) For

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the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the denial of benefits.

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BACKGROUND

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On July 5, 2012, Ms. Harris filed an application for disability insurance benefits,

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alleging a disability onset date of May 1, 2012. (Tr. 23.) Her claim was initially denied

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on January 7, 2013, and it was denied again upon reconsideration on September 6, 2013.

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(Id.) Ms. Harris then filed a written request for a hearing and she testified before ALJ

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Sheldon P. Zisook on May 22, 2014. (Id.) On October 14, 2014, the ALJ issued a

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decision finding Ms. Harris not disabled. (Tr. 30.)

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In evaluating whether Ms. Harris was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step

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sequential evaluation for determining disability.1 (Tr. 23–24.) At step one, the ALJ

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The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing
supplemental security income). Under the test:

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found that Ms. Harris had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2012,

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the alleged onset date. (Tr. 25.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Ms. Harris

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suffered from paroxysmal supraventricular tachycardia (“PSVT”), which is a severe

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impairment. (Tr. 25.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Ms. Harris’s PSVT did not

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equal or meet the severity of any of the Social Security Administration’s listed

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impairments. (Id.)

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At that point, the ALJ reached step four and made a determination of Ms. Harris’s

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residual functional capacity (“RFC”),2 concluding that Ms. Harris could “perform the full

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range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b).” (Tr. 25–26.) In making this

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finding, the ALJ found that Ms. Harris’s subjective testimony was “not entirely credible.”

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(Tr. 27.) The ALJ gave little to no weight to the treating physicians, Drs. Griffin and

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Cantor. (Tr. 28.) Instead, he gave great weight to the testimony of the state agency’s

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reviewing physicians. (Tr. 29.)

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The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (Tr. 1–4.) However, in

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doing so, the Appeals Council noted that it considered two questionnaires that were

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previously omitted from the ALJ’s decision; a spinal impairment questionnaire submitted

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A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she
is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2)
that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets
or equals one of the specific impairments described in the
regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of
the specific impairments described in the regulations, the
claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by
proving at step four that in addition to the first two
requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has
done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie
case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to
demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant
number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five
determination is made on the basis of four factors: the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience
and education.

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Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by her
impairments. See S.S.R. 96–8p (July 2, 1996).
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by Dr. Michael Steingart and a cardiac impairment questionnaire submitted by

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Dr. Stephen Cantor. (Tr. 2.) Ms. Harris filed the complaint underlying this action on

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June 20, 2016, seeking this Court’s review of the ALJ’s denial of benefits. (Doc. 1.) The

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matter is now fully briefed. (Docs. 11, 12.)

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DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
A reviewing federal court will generally only address the issues raised by the

claimant in the appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517
n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). However, in certain instances, such as where the Appeals Council
considered evidence not previously considered by the ALJ, the record may be
supplemented. See Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
2012) (“[W]hen the Appeals Council considers new evidence in deciding whether to
review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of the administrative record,
which the district court must consider when reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision
for substantial evidence.”). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits
only if that denial is either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error.
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more
than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial
evidence is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable
person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining
credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th
Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational
interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the
reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either
outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v.
Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

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II.

Analysis

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A.

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Once a claimant establishes that objective medical evidence illustrates an

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impairment that could reasonably cause the symptoms alleged, “and there is no evidence

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of malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her

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symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’”

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Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80

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F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 2006)). This is the most stringent standard required in Social

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Security cases. Id. To meet it, an ALJ must identify which testimony he considers not

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credible, and “link that testimony to the particular parts of the record supporting [the

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ALJ’s] non-credibility determination.” Id. The ALJ’s opinion “must be sufficiently

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specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s

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testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant's testimony

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regarding pain.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345–46 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal

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quotations and citations omitted).

The ALJ Properly Evaluated Ms. Harris’s Credibility.  

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When determining credibility, an ALJ may consider a variety of factors, including:

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the treatment the claimant sought and received, the type of medication she takes, the

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measures she’s taken to relieve her pain, and the location, duration, frequency, and

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intensity of her pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). An ALJ’s credibility determination

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should focus on “the individual’s statements about his or her symptoms and the evidence

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in the record that is relevant to the individual’s impairments” rather than conducting an

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assessment on “an individual’s overall character or truthfulness in the manner typically

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used during an adversarial court litigation.” S.S.R. 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *10

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(Mar. 16, 2016). Additionally, “it is error to reject a claimant’s testimony merely because

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symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017. The

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ALJ in this case discredited Ms. Harris’s testimony regarding her symptoms because he

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determined that her testimony was contradicted by the activities she engaged in

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throughout her disability, she improved throughout the course of a conservative treatment

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plan and the objective medical evidence did not indicate a severe disability. (Tr. 27.) For

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the following reasons, this Court finds that the ALJ did not err in considering these

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factors to discredit Ms. Harris’s testimony.

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i.

Activities of Daily Living

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An ALJ “may engage in ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as

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considering claimant’s reputation for truthfulness and inconsistencies in claimant’s

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testimony.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, if an

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activity described by the claimant during her testimony is inconsistent with her alleged

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limitations that may be grounds for discrediting her testimony. See Fair v. Bowen, 885

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F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“If the claimant runs marathons, as an extreme example,

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an ALJ could reasonably assume that the claimant’s pain is not so debilitating as to

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prevent him from working.”).

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concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because

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impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a

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workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in

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bed all day.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016.

However, “ALJs must be especially cautious in

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In this case, the ALJ properly concluded that Ms. Harris’s activities contradicted

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her alleged limitations. Ms. Harris testified that she was severely limited by her PSVT,

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becoming “dizzy easily and gets fatigue[d] during the day.” (Tr. 26; Tr. 43.) At one

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point during her hearing, Ms. Harris noted that “simply making a sandwich could raise

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her blood pressure.” (Tr. 26; Tr. 48.)

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Despite these limitations, the ALJ noted that Ms. Harris was capable of traveling

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to Europe during her period of disability to spend a week hiking in Ireland. (Tr. 26.) At

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her hearing, she claimed that she was forced to stop hiking and swimming for exercise

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roughly a year prior to the May 2014 hearing. (Tr. 26; Tr. 53.)

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inconsistent with her report to her doctor in March of 2014, where she claimed to still be

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engaging in hiking and swimming for exercise. (Tr. 26; Tr. 888.) These are strenuous

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outdoor activities, and the ALJ did not err in noting that these activities are beyond the

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However, this is

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capabilities of a claimant that allegedly has difficulty making sandwiches or completing

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basic household tasks without becoming fatigued. The ALJ also noted that in her function

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report, Ms. Harris claimed that she takes care of her husband,3 cooks, cleans, does light

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exercise, shops and otherwise “engage[s] in a somewhat normal level of daily activity

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and interaction.” (Tr. 27; Tr. 212.) While the evidence of Harris’s “daily activities may

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also admit of an interpretation more favorable” to her, the “the ALJ's interpretation was

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rational, and [this Court] must uphold the ALJ's decision where the evidence is

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susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 680–81. The

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ALJ’s citations to these instances of inconsistency provided “specific, clear and

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convincing reasons” for discrediting Ms. Harris’s testimony, and therefore he did not err

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in weighing this consideration. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015.
ii.

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Objective Medical Evidence and Improvement with
Conservative Treatment

“Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting
pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.” Burch,
400 F.3d at 681; see Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While
subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully
corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor
in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”).
Furthermore, “evidence of conservative treatment is sufficient to discount a claimant’s
testimony regarding severity of an impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled
effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for
SSI benefits.”). However, “it is error for an ALJ to pick out a few isolated instances of
improvement over a period of months or years and to treat them as a basis for concluding
a claimant is capable of working.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017.
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Ms. Harris’s husband suffers from a traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), and
Ms. Harris acts as his caregiver to help him “as needed.” (Tr. 213.)
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In discrediting Ms. Harris’s testimony, the ALJ noted that she received “routine,

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conservative, and non-emergency treatment since the alleged onset date,” and obtained

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marked improvement through those conservative measures.

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attempts to characterize this analysis as penalizing her for not seeking more rigorous

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treatment, but this misconstrues the ALJ’s analysis. The ALJ did not assert that Ms.

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Harris is not disabled because she failed to seek alternative treatment; rather, he asserted

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that her PSVT symptoms appeared to be controlled through conservative treatment, and

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therefore her allegations that her condition continued to cause her severe distress are

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contrary to the record. For example, the ALJ noted that on June 29, 2012, Ms. Harris

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claimed that she saw a “dramatic improvement in palpitations since changing

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medications.” By her own account, the palpitations she experienced were “reportedly

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rare and last a maximum of 20 minutes.” (Tr. 27; Tr. 470.) The ALJ also referred to

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Ms. Harris’s examinations by Dr. Levinson in August of 2013 and June of 2014. (Tr.

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28.)

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intermittently symptomatic, her situation [did] not appear serious or life threatening.”

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(Tr. 679.) Likewise, her hypertension was deemed “moderately well controlled on [her]

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current drug regime.” (Tr. 679.)

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and rhythm without murmur,” and “recent Holter monitors and loop recorders show[ed]

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no significant issues.” (Tr. 934–35.) An ALJ is permitted to consider whether the

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claimant’s conditions may be treated and stabilized through conservative means during

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the credibility analysis, and the ALJ did not err in doing so in this case. See also Johnson

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v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming an ALJ’s credibility

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determination where the ALJ noted that the claimant’s doctor “prescribed only

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conservative treatment in 1986, suggesting a lower level of both pain and functional

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limitation.” (internal quotation omitted)).

(Tr. 27.)

Ms. Harris

In 2013, Ms. Harris appeared “normal from head to toe,” and “although

In 2014, her cardiac exam “reveal[ed] a regular rate

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In supporting his assertions that Ms. Harris’s PSVT appeared to be controlled

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through conservative treatment, the ALJ also cited to the lack of objective medical

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evidence to support the extent of her alleged disability. First, he referenced medical

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records reflecting a thirty-day monitor Ms. Harris wore in September of 2012, which

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showed supraventricular tachycardia to a maximum of 150 beats and did not show any

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atrial fibrillation. (Tr. 27; Tr. 621.) He then noted that in February of 2013, a loop

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monitor interrogation “revealed no episodes of tachycardia.”

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Furthermore, an echocardiogram in 2014 was similarly uneventful despite Ms. Harris’s

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continued reports of “[o]ngoing rate and rhythm control.” (Tr. 27; Tr. 906.) The lack of

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objective medical evidence was one of numerous factors he relied on in discrediting Ms.

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Harris’s testimony, and he specifically cited to the above tests in doing so. (Tr. 27.)

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Therefore, his analysis of the medical evidence was not “vague” as Ms. Harris asserts,

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and he did not err in considering the objective medical evidence while weighing the

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credibility of her testimony.

(Tr. 27; Tr. 716.)

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Additionally, the findings of the ALJ are further supported by the introduction of

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Dr. Cantor’s questionnaire from January of 2015. Although this questionnaire was not

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available to the ALJ at the time of hearing, and thus he did not consider it in his decision,

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it became part of the record when the Appeals Council considered it. See Brewes, 682

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F.3d at 1163. In the questionnaire, Dr. Cantor opined that Ms. Harris could be classified

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as Class I in New York Heart Association’s (“NYHA”) system. (Tr. 1037.) A patient

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that is classified as “Class I” under NYHA’s system suffers “[n]o limitation of physical

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activity. Ordinary physical activity does not cause undue fatigue, palpitation, dyspnea

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(shortness of breath).” Classes of Heart Failure, www.heart.org, http://www.heart.org/

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HEARTORG/Conditions/HeartFailure/AboutHeartFailure/Classes-ofHeartFailure_UCM

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_306328_Article.jsp#.WRTlhlXyuUk (last visited May 11, 2017).

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questionnaire provides further support for the ALJ’s determination that the objective

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medical evidence indicated that Ms. Harris’s PSVT was controlled through conservative

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treatment throughout the period of alleged disability.

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Therefore, this

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B.

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The ALJ Did Not Commit Prejudicial Error by Rejecting the Opinions
of the Treating Physicians.

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“As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source

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than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

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821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). If the treating physician’s opinion

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is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner cannot reject the treating physician’s

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opinion unless he provides “specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial

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evidence in the record.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

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opinions in this case were contradicted by the state agency review physicians, who

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opined that Ms. Harris is subject to “light limitations” due to her health conditions. (Tr.

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29.)

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disregarding Ms. Harris’s treating physicians. For the following reasons, this Court finds

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that although the ALJ did err in one of his rationales, he did not commit prejudicial error

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during this analysis, and thus his opinion is affirmed. 4

The treating physician’s

Therefore, the ALJ needed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for

i.

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The Objective Medical Evidence

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The ALJ justified disregarding the opinions of treating physicians Dr. Cantor and

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Dr. Griffin because their opinions were contrary to the objective medical evidence in the

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record.

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inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of the record. See Batson, 359 F.3d at

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1195 (“Further, an ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are conclusory,

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brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole, or by objective medical findings”

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An ALJ may properly reject the opinion of a treating physician if it is

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Ms. Harris contends that the ALJ also erred by “dismissing the medical opinions
from the treating sources on the basis that the issue of disability is ‘reserved to the
Commissioner.’ ” (Doc. 11 at 14.) This is not what the ALJ did; rather, the ALJ stated
that he would not give that statement “special significance” or “controlling weight”
because it reflects an “opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner.” (Tr. 28.)
Such a statement is permissible, as an opinion that an individual is disabled under the
statutory definition of disability is not a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)
(including opinions that a claimant is disabled as one example of an opinion that is not a
medical opinion, because the Commissioner is “responsible for making the determination
or decision that [the claimant] meet[s] the statutory definition of disability.”).

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(citation omitted)). In making this determination, the ALJ cited to the objective medical

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testing referenced above; the thirty-day heart monitor observed in 2012, the loop monitor

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interrogation in 2013 “that revealed no episodes of tachycardia,” and the normal

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echocardiogram from 2014.

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physicians’ opinions were inconsistent with the medical evidence that demonstrated Ms.

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Harris improved while undergoing conservative treatment and medication.5 (Tr. 29.)

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The ALJ’s citations to these specific instances of inconsistency between the treating

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physicians’ opinions and the medical record provided substantial evidence to support the

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ALJ’s determination to discredit the opinions of the treating physicians, and thus the ALJ

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(Tr. 27.)

The ALJ also reiterated that the treating

did not err in doing so.6

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ii.

Contradictions with Ms. Harris’s Activities

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The ALJ discredited both physicians’ medical opinions on the basis that they were

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“inconsistent with the claimant’s admitted activities of daily living.” (Tr. 29.) ALJs may

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discredit a treating physician’s opinion to the extent that it contradicts the daily activities

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of the claimant. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601–02 (9th

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Cir. 1999) (upholding an ALJ’s rejection of a treating physician based, in part, on the

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Ms. Harris objects to this reasoning for the same reasons that she objects to the
ALJ considering her improvement throughout her conservative treatment in analyzing her
credibility. However, as explained earlier, this argument mischaracterizes the ALJ’s
analysis. His reasoning does not punish her for failing to seek more extreme treatment;
his reasoning is based on the assumption that if her condition can be managed through
conservative treatment, it is likely not as debilitating as alleged. See generally Warre v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can
be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining
eligibility for SSI benefits.”).
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Once again, although the ALJ did not have access to it at the time he wrote his
opinion, Dr. Cantor’s subsequent questionnaire supports this finding. The questionnaire
introduced to the Appeals Council is dated to apply from May 29, 2012 until January 1,
2015. These dates reflect a more recent medical opinion than the one cited by
Ms. Harris, which indicated that Dr. Cantor thought she was disabled due to her
condition. (Tr. 712; 625.) The more recent questionnaire reflects that Dr. Cantor does
not believe that Ms. Harris is disabled; rather, this questionnaire indicated that Ms. Harris
could sit for eight or more hours a day without any limitation, and that her symptoms
would require her to be absent from work “less than one day a month.” (Tr. 1039, 1041.)
The introduction of this questionnaire from Dr. Cantor presents further inconsistencies
within his findings, and presents additional support for discounting his opinion and that
of Dr. Griffin.
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inconsistencies between the treating psychologist’s “marked limitations” and the

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claimant’s daily activities).

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As discussed above, Ms. Harris admitted that she engages in hiking and swimming

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to exercise, and she was capable of traveling to Ireland during the period of alleged

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disability to engage in a week of extensive hiking. She also takes an active role in

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maintaining her home and serves as the primary caretaker for her husband, who suffers

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from a traumatic brain injury. (Tr. 213.) These activities do not align with Dr. Cantor’s

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opinion, which claims that Ms. Harris is “only able to stand or walk for a total of one

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hour” during an eight-hour period. (Tr. 712.) Likewise, such activities do not align with

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Dr. Griffin’s assessment, which claims that Ms. Harris cannot stand or walk for a

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collective total of more than two hours in an eight-hour period. (Tr. 711.) Ms. Harris’s

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exercise activities and active lifestyle also challenge Drs. Griffin and Cantor’s assertions

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that Ms. Harris’s health conditions prelude her ability to “meet the demands of full time

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work.” (Tr. 711.) Therefore, the ALJ did not err in weighing this factor to discredit the

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doctors’ opinions.

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iii.

Subjective Complaints

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A physician’s reliance on a claimant’s “subjective complaints hardly undermines

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his opinion as to her functional limitations, as a patient’s report of complaints, or history,

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is an essential diagnostic tool.” Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.

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2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, “[i]f a treating provider’s

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opinions are based ‘to a large extent’ on an applicant’s self-reports and not on clinical

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evidence, and the ALJ finds the applicant not credible, the ALJ may discount the treating

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provider’s opinion.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting

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Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)). It is also error for an ALJ to

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dismiss a summary of a treating physician’s opinion purely for being contained in a

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questionnaire if it is based on the treating physician’s “significant experience” with the

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claimant and “supported by numerous records.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1013.

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The ALJ discredited the treating physicians opinions in part because he found that

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their treatment notes were a summary of Ms. Harris’s “subjective complaints, diagnoses,

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and treatment, but they failed to provide objective clinical or diagnostic findings to

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support the functional assessment.” (Tr. 29.) The ALJ failed to note how the treatment

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notes reflected this; Dr. Cantor’s questionnaire noted that the clinical evidence reflected

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that Ms. Harris experienced fatigue, heart palpitations, and weakness.

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Likewise, Dr. Griffin’s questionnaire reflected that he based his findings on diagnostic

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cardiac testing. (Tr. 544.) The ALJ noted that these questionnaires were conclusory, and

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they are admittedly vague, containing mostly one-word explanations. (Tr. 29.) However,

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both of these doctors based these questionnaires on their “significant experience” with

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Ms. Harris after years of treating her on a regular basis. For example, Dr. Griffin treated

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Ms. Harris for the first time in 2002, (Tr. 543).

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Ms. Harris is far shorter, he appears to have seen her once a month since 2012, giving rise

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to numerous records to support his findings. (Tr. 712.) In a situation such as this, the

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ALJ cannot dismiss the treating physicians’ opinions due to the form of their presentation

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without providing substantial evidence for doing so. The ALJ erred by failing to provide

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support for his assertion that the doctors opinions’ amounted to a summary of

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Ms. Harris’s complaints beyond his critique of the form of their functional assessments.

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(Tr. 29.)

(Tr. 625.)

While Dr. Cantor’s history with

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Once it has been determined that an ALJ made an error during the review of a

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claimant’s file, the next step is to determine whether the error was prejudicial. See

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Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining

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that an error is not prejudicial if “the ALJ’s decision remains legally valid, despite such

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error.”) Ninth Circuit precedents “do not quantify the degree of certainty needed to

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conclude that an ALJ’s error was harmless.” Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th

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Cir. 2015). The ALJ’s error here was not prejudicial, and thus there is no need to remand

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the case. The two preceding sections outline two other “specific and legitimate reasons

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that are supported by substantial evidence in the record” for dismissing the findings of

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Drs. Griffin and Cantor, and thus the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits remains legally

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valid. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Furthermore, the additional evidence considered by the

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Appeals Council also indicates that this error was not prejudicial, as Dr. Cantor’s more

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recent questionnaire indicates that Ms. Harris’s PSVT only arises to the level of a Class 1

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on the NYHA classification system.

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introduces additional inconsistencies within Dr. Cantor’s medical opinion that add further

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support for the ALJ’s decision to discredit his assessment and that of Dr. Griffin. (Tr.

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1037–1041.) Therefore, despite the ALJ’s error, there is no need to remand this case.

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Dr. Cantor’s more recent questionnaire also

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated this 15th day of May, 2017.

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Honorable G. Murray Snow
United States District Judge

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