Cagle #079874 v. Ryan et al
Filing
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ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Transfer the Instant Case to Magistrate Judge Duncan in Parsons v. Ryan, CV-12-00601-DKD, (Doc. 92 ), is denied [see attached Order for details]. Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 6/5/18. (MAW)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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Shaine Carl Cagle,
Plaintiff,
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ORDER
v.
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No. CV-16-03912-PHX-JAT (JFM)
Charles L Ryan, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Shaine Carl Cagle’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to
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transfer the present case to Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan in Parsons v. Ryan, CV-
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12-00601-DKD. (Doc. 92). Defendants have responded, (Doc. 98), and Plaintiff has
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elected not to reply.
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I.
Background
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In the present case, Plaintiff filed a complaint against a prison director and prison
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supervisors, workers, and medical providers alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and
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Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
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(“RLUIPA”). (Doc. 21). In Parsons, the plaintiffs filed a class action suit against prison
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and health directors alleging Eighth Amendment violations. Complaint, Parsons v. Ryan,
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No. CV-12-00601-DKD (D. Ariz. Oct. 9, 2014) (“Complaint”). Plaintiff requests to
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consolidate his case with Parsons.
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II.
Governing Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) allows a court to consolidate cases “[i]f the
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actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
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District courts, however, “enjoy substantial discretion in deciding whether and to what
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extent to consolidate cases.” Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1131 (2018). A court “must
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balance the interest of judicial convenience against the potential for delay, confusion and
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prejudice that may result from such consolidation.” Sapiro v. Sunstone Hotel Inv'rs,
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L.L.C., No. CV-03-1555-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 898155, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 4, 2006).
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Local Rule of Civil Procedure (“Local Rule”) 42.1(a) allows consolidation if the
cases:
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(1) arise from substantially the same transaction or event; (2)
involve substantially the same parties or property; (3) involve
the same patent, trademark, or copyright; (4) call for
determination of substantially the same questions of law; or
(5) . . . [remaining unconsolidated] would entail substantial
duplication of labor if heard by different Judges.
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LRCiv 42.1(a). The Court considers these factors, but “has broad discretion in deciding a
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motion to transfer under Local Rule 42.1(a).” Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, No.
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CV-08-01633-PHX-NVW, 2010 WL 4117216, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2010). When
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considering a motion under Local Rule 42.1(a), “[a] principal factor is whether party
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economy or judicial economy is substantially served by transfer to another judge.” City of
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Phoenix v. First State Ins. Co., No. CV-15-00511-PHX-NVW, 2016 WL 4591906, at *20
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(D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2016), aff’d, No. 16-16767, 2018 WL 1616011 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 2018).
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III.
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Plaintiff appears to argue that consolidation with Parsons is proper under Local
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Application of Local Rule 42.1(a) to Present Motion
Rule 42.1(a). (Doc. 92).
A.
Arising From Substantially the Same Transaction or Event
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The cases do not arise from substantially the same transaction or event. While the
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plaintiffs in both cases allege prison mismanagement, the cases stem from entirely
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different facts and events. Compare (Doc. 21 at 7–55), with Complaint at 1–3, 15–56.
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The plaintiffs in Parsons allege systemic failures in the prison healthcare system,
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Complaint at 1–3, 15–56, while Plaintiff in the present case alleges mismanagement by
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specific prison officials and medical providers stemming from specific acts and incidents
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relating to Plaintiff’s unique medical situation, (Doc. 21 at 7–55).
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B.
Involving Substantially the Same Parties
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These cases do not involve substantially the same parties: only one of the several
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present case Defendants, Charles L. Ryan, overlaps with the Parsons defendants. (Doc.
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21 at 2–5); Complaint at 14–15.
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C.
Calling for Determination of Substantially the Same Questions
of Law
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These cases do not call for determination of substantially the same questions of
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law. While the plaintiffs in both cases allege Eighth Amendment violations, the existence
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of one common issue alone is insufficient to consolidate. See Robert Kubicek Architects
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& Assocs., Inc. v. Bosley, No. CV-11-02112-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 6554396, at *8 (D.
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Ariz. Dec. 14, 2012) (finding consolidation improper when, despite common issues, cases
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were at “opposite stages of litigation” and would therefore “create substantial
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inconvenience and delay”). The Parsons plaintiffs only make an Eighth Amendment
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claim, Complaint at 17; in addition to an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff in the
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present case also makes claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment, and
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RLUIPA. (Doc. 21 at 7–55). Further, Plaintiff in the present case focuses his claims on
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individual liability and seeks compensatory relief, (Id.), while Parsons is a class action
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focused on statewide policies and practices, and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,
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Complaint at 2.
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D.
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Finally, consolidation denial would not lead to substantial duplication of labor.
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Parsons has been settled since 2015 and the present case is still in the early stages of
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litigation. See Jolicoeur v. Minor, No. CV-17-00930-PHX-SPL (JZB), 2018 WL
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1805529, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 16, 2018) (holding that consolidation with Parsons was
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improper given Parsons’ status as a class action and the disparate stages of litigation,
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with Parsons being settled and Jolicoeur being in the early litigation stage). Given the
Entailing Substantial Duplication of Labor
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disparate stages and nature of the cases, consolidation provides no obvious benefits to the
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parties of either case. Further, there is no risk of inconsistent rulings, since no verdict was
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issued in Parsons. Any party or judicial convenience gained from consolidation is
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outweighed by the potential for confusion, delay, and prejudice.
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Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer the Instant Case to
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Magistrate Judge Duncan in Parsons v. Ryan, CV-12-00601-DKD, (Doc. 92), is denied.
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Dated this 5th day of June, 2018.
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