Klain v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 26

ORDER: The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 12/11/17. (EJA)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Carrie Michele Klain,
Plaintiff,

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ORDER

v.

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No. CV-16-04390-PHX-DGC

Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,

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Defendant.

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Plaintiff Carrie Klain seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision

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of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her

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disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act.

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The issues are fully briefed and the Court concludes that oral argument will not aid its

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decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); LRCiv 7.2(f). Because Plaintiff has not shown that

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the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is unsupported by substantial

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evidence or based on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed.

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I.

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Background.
Plaintiff is a 44 year old female who previously worked as a hair stylist.

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A.R. 2229.

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alleging disability beginning on June 30, 2006. A.R. 26. On July 10, 2012, after a

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hearing, an ALJ decided that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social

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Security Act. A.R. 26-38. This became the Commissioner’s final decision when the

In November 2009, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits,

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Appeals Council denied review. A.R. 1. Plaintiff sought review in this Court, but before

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a decision was made, the parties stipulated that the case should be remanded to the

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Commissioner to correct several errors. A.R. 2332-33. Judge Tuchi accepted the parties’

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stipulation and entered their proposed order. CV-14-01235-PHX-JJT, Doc. 23.

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On remand, the matter was assigned to a different ALJ and a hearing was held. In

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August 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. A.R. 2215-31.

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This became the Commissioner’s final decision when Plaintiff did not file exceptions.

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Doc. 1 ¶ 5. Plaintiff now seeks review of the second ALJ’s decision.

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II.

The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process.

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To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security

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Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears

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the burden of proof on the first four steps, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner at

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step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). To establish disability,

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the claimant must show that (1) she is not currently working, (2) she has a severe

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impairment, and (3) this impairment meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) her

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residual functional capacity (“RFC”) prevents her performance of any past relevant work.

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If the claimant meets her burden through step three, the Commissioner must find her

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disabled. If the inquiry proceeds to step four and the claimant shows that she is incapable

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of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must show in the fifth step that the

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claimant is capable of other work suitable for her RFC, age, education, and work

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experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

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At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements

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of the Social Security Act on September 30, 2010, and did not engage in substantial

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gainful activity between June 30, 2006, and September 30, 2010. A.R. 2217-18. At step

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two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: chronic

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interstitial cystitis, kidney stones, and mild lumbar degenerative disc disease. A.R. 2218.

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The ALJ acknowledged that the record contained evidence of hypertension, anemia,

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hypothyroidism, depression, and anxiety, but found that these impairments were non-

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severe. A.R. 2218-22. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an

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impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed

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impairment. A.R. 2222. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to

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perform sedentary work with some additional limitations, and that Plaintiff was unable to

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perform her past relevant work as a hair stylist. A.R. 2222-29. At step five, the ALJ

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concluded that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there

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were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could

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have performed. A.R. 2229-30.

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III.

Standard of Review and Plaintiff’s Arguments.

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The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is

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not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495

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F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on the basis

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of error that is harmless, and “the burden is on the party claiming error to demonstrate not

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only the error, but also that it affected his substantial rights.” Ludwig v. Astrue, 681

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F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012).

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A claimant cannot prevail on appeal simply by re-arguing the evidence. An ALJ’s

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decision must be supported only by “substantial evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 630 (9th

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Cir. 2007).

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preponderance” – it is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as

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adequate to support a conclusion. Id. “Even when the evidence is susceptible to more

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than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported

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by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111; Batson v.

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Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a

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Plaintiff’s briefs in this case focus almost entirely on re-arguing the evidence.

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They urge the Court to accept Plaintiff’s testimony, her doctors’ opinions, and the

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testimony of her family members, but they do not show how the ALJ erred in discounting

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that testimony or rejecting those opinions. Indeed, Plaintiff says very little about the

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ALJ’s reasoning in her briefs.

Because Plaintiff largely fails to address the ALJ’s

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analysis and the evidence on which the ALJ relied – opting instead to restate evidence the

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ALJ has already considered – Plaintiff has not shown error or a lack of substantial

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evidence that would enable the Court to reverse the ALJ’s decision.

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The Ninth Circuit consistently has held that courts will not “manufacture

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arguments for an appellant,” but instead will “review only issues which are argued

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specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”

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Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has applied this

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principle in Social Security cases. See Hastings v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 581 F.

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App’x 694, 695 (9th Cir. 2014). Most district courts in the Ninth Circuit likewise apply

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Independent Towers to find waiver where a social security claimant fails to present an

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argument. See, e.g., Betts. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-16-01579-PHX-

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NVW, 2017 WL 4277178, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2017); Yager v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-

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CV-00051-GMN-VCF, 2017 WL 3495174, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 15, 2017); Hilt-Hayden

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v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:15-CV-00258-HZ, 2016 WL 3396937, at *2-3 (D.

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Or. June 14, 2016); Henry v. Colvin, No. 1:15-CV-00100-JLT, 2016 WL 164956, at *14

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n.5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2016). Some district courts in this circuit have held, however, that

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they have a “duty to make a full review of the facts and an independent determination as

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to whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Tadman

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v. Berryhill, No. CV 15-07795-KES, 2017 WL 1073341, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017)

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(quoting Farley v. Colvin, 231 F. Supp. 3d 335, 339 (N.D. Cal. 2017)). The Court does

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not find these decisions persuasive in light of the Ninth Circuit cases cited above and the

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clear majority to the contrary among district courts in this circuit. But even if the Court

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conducts its own review of the evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision in this case, it

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finds the decision supported by substantial evidence.

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IV.

Indep. Towers of Wash. v.

Analysis.

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Plaintiff makes seven general categories of arguments: (1) the ALJ posed flawed

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hypothetical questions to the vocational expert; (2) there was not substantial evidence to

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support the RFC; (3) the ALJ improperly classified the depression and anxiety as non-

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severe impairments; (4) the ALJ should have solicited a medical expert opinion; (5) the

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ALJ improperly rejected medical opinion evidence; (6) the ALJ improperly discredited

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Plaintiff’s symptom testimony; and (7) the ALJ improperly discredited lay witness

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testimony. Doc. 25 at 10-24. The Court will address each category.1

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A.

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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions erroneously assumed that

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she was capable of sedentary work when, in fact, evidence in the record suggested that

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her limitations would prevent such work. Doc. 25 at 10. Plaintiff cites Light v. Social

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Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that a valid

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hypothetical question must reflect all of a claimant’s limitations. Doc. 25 at 11. But

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Light explains that “the ALJ need not include all claimed impairments in [her]

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hypotheticals” so long as her opinion makes “specific findings explaining [her] rationale

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for disbelieving any of the claimant’s subjective complaints not included in the

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hypothetical.” Light, 119 F.3d at 793 (emphasis added).

Hypothetical Questions.

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Plaintiff claims that “all relevant medical evidence,” her symptom testimony, and

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the lay witness testimony contradicted the assumption that she was capable of sedentary

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work. Doc. 25 at 10. The Court does not know what Plaintiff means by “all relevant

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medical evidence” because she provides no explanation or record citations in support of

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this assertion. Id. The Court finds below that Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ erred

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in discounting her testimony or the testimony of her family members.

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Plaintiff argues that the vocational experts’ testimony likewise contradicted the

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assumption that she was capable of sedentary work. Id. at 11. Plaintiff characterizes the

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experts’ testimony as confirming that she was unable to perform work “at the light,

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unskilled level.” Id. But Plaintiff does not explain how an inability to perform light,

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unskilled work would preclude work of lesser intensity. Id. The relevant regulations

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The argument sections of Plaintiff’s opening brief were largely lacking in
citations to the 2,529-page record in this case (see Doc. 21 at 11-24), and the Court
therefore ordered that the brief be re-filed with specific page citations (Doc. 24). Plaintiff
complied, and citations in this order will be to the re-filed brief. See Doc. 25 at 11-24.
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explain that sedentary work requires less physical exertion than light work. See 20

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C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), (b).

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Plaintiff does focus specifically on her Global Assessment of Functioning

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(“GAF”) scores and argues that they show she was incapable of sedentary work. Doc. 25

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at 11-12. Plaintiff emphasizes that one such GAF score resulted from an examination in

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which she admitted suicidal ideation and the examining physician recommended

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treatment at an in-patient psychiatric facility. Id. But the ALJ gave no weight to the

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GAF scores for six reasons: (1) they are subjective; (2) they provide only short-term

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assessments of mental health; (3) they do not assess specific functional capacities;

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(4) they reflect factors unrelated to an ability to work; (5) the latest Diagnostic and

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Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) suggests that GAF scores are no longer

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best practice; and (6) even if they were reliable, “previous and subsequent evidence do

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not support significant limitations over a 12-month period.” A.R. 2220.

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Plaintiff never addresses reasons (1) through (4) or (6). Doc. 25 at 11. Later in

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her brief, Plaintiff addresses reason (5), contending that the ALJ erred in relying on the

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new DSM to discredit GAF scores that were the best practice at the time of each

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assessment and during her period of disability. Doc. 25 at 18; Doc. 23 at 2-3. But by

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failing to address the ALJ’s other five reasons for discounting the GAF scores – reasons

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the Court finds reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record – Plaintiff

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has failed to show that the ALJ erred in discounting the GAF scores.

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Thus, with respect to Plaintiff’s argument regarding the ALJ’s hypothetical

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questions, Plaintiff has not shown the ALJ failed to provide “specific findings explaining

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[her] rationale for disbelieving any of the claimant’s subjective complaints not included

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in the hypothetical.” Light, 119 F.3d at 793.

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B.

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The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work with some

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additional limitations. A.R. 2222. Plaintiff offers three reasons that this RFC was not

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supported by substantial evidence. Doc. 25 at 12.

Residual Functional Capacity.

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First, the vocational expert opined that being absent for more than 10% of a work

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day to self-catheterize would preclude all work. Doc. 25 at 13-14 (citing A.R. 2304-05).

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In light of this testimony and Plaintiff’s alleged need to self-catheterize, Plaintiff argues

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that she could not perform any sedentary work. Id.

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The ALJ specifically addressed Plaintiff’s need to self-catheterize. A.R. 2226.

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The ALJ noted that although Plaintiff has a significant history of treatment for interstitial

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cystitis, the record does not show that she was disabled by this condition before her date

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last insured – September 30, 2010. Id. The ALJ recounted Plaintiff’s lack of treatment

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for this condition between 2007 and 2009, and noted that the record did not include

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indications of self-catheterization before August 2011. Id. The ALJ found other reasons

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to discount Plaintiff’s testimony that she self-catheterized multiple times a day before

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September 2010. Id. Plaintiff does not address any of these findings. See Doc. 25

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at 13-14. Because Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ’s findings on this issue were

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erroneous, and the Court’s review suggests they are supported by substantial evidence in

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the record and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, Molina, 674 F.3d

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at 1111, Plaintiff’s first reason is not persuasive.

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Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide specific, clear, and

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convincing reasons for discrediting her symptom testimony. Doc. 25 at 13. A proper

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consideration of these symptoms, Plaintiff contends, would reveal that she cannot

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perform sedentary work. See id. at 13-14. The ALJ rooted her credibility determination

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in multiple inconsistencies between the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s symptom

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testimony: (1) Plaintiff’s thyroid disease, hypertension, and anemia were controlled by

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medication and did not impose limitations; (2) despite a brief hospitalization for

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depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation, treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff felt better

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and her mood stabilized; (3) Plaintiff travelled to California despite claiming to be

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homebound; (4) despite evidence of an ongoing condition, the interstitial cystitis did not

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impose any disabling limitations before September 30, 2010; and (5) Plaintiff was not

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self-catheterizing with the frequency she alleged before the date last insured. A.R. 2226.

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Plaintiff does not address these conclusions by the ALJ. See Doc. 25 at 13-14.

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Instead, Plaintiff re-argues her claimed limitations, asserting that they clearly would

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disrupt any work schedule. Id. But Plaintiff’s obligation before this Court is not to

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simply re-urge her position, but to show why the ALJ’s reasoning is legally flawed or not

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supported by substantial evidence. Because she makes no specific argument at to why

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the ALJ’s basis for discrediting her testimony was wrong, and the Court finds the ALJ’s

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five reasons to be specific, clear, convincing, and supported by substantial evidence in the

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record, Plaintiff has not established error.

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Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider all of her

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impairments in the disability analysis. Doc. 25 at 14-15. In support, Plaintiff cites the

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ALJ’s step-three finding, which broadly concluded that Plaintiff “did not have an

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impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled” a listed

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impairment. A.R. 2222. But Plaintiff cites no legal authority to suggest that an ALJ must

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describe and discuss all impairments at step three. Doc. 25 at 14-15. Nor does she

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address the lengthy discussion of her impairments in other parts of the ALJ’s decision.

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See A.R. 2218-28.

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determination was erroneous, and the Court’s review of the record shows substantial

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evidence to support that determination, the Court cannot find legal error.

Because Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ’s disability

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C.

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly ignored her testimony and medical

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evidence regarding depression and anxiety. Doc. 25 at 15-16. But Plaintiff again simply

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sets forth her testimony of debilitating impairments and argues that it establishes major

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depression under the Social Security guidelines. Id.

Depression and Anxiety.

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The ALJ devoted more than three single-spaced pages to evaluating Plaintiff’s

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claim of depression and anxiety. A.R. 2218-22. The ALJ reviewed the opinions of

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Plaintiff’s relevant medical providers, addressing their conclusions in light of a detailed

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analysis of the medical records. Id. at 2218-20. The ALJ addressed the opinion of the

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State-agency psychological consultant and explained why she gave credit to that opinion

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over Plaintiff’s treating providers. Id. at 2220. The ALJ also analyzed Plaintiff’s mental

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impairments in light of Social Security guidelines, specifically 20 C.F.R., Part 404,

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Subpart P. Appendix 1. Id. at 2220-22.

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Plaintiff addresses none of this. She does not explain why the ALJ’s analysis

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regarding her depression and anxiety is flawed, and merely recounting her own version of

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the evidence does not show error by the ALJ. The Court finds substantial evidence in the

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record to support the ALJ’s decision on Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression. Although

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Plaintiff clearly believes that the record favors her position, the ALJ’s conclusion must be

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upheld “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one

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of which supports the ALJ’s decision.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th

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Cir. 2002).

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Plaintiff argues for the first time in her reply brief that the first ALJ found her

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depression and anxiety to be severe impairments. Doc. 23 at 1-3. The Court normally

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will not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. Gadda v. State Bar

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of Cal., 511 F.3d 933, 937 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). But even if the Court considers this

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argument, it finds that the second ALJ’s detailed findings on anxiety and depression

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(A.R. 2218-22) provide a clearly sufficient basis – largely unchallenged by Plaintiff – for

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finding that Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression were not severe impairments.

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Plaintiff also asserts for the first time in her reply brief that the ALJ improperly

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disregarded the opinion of social worker Judith Welleck (Doc. 23 at 1-2), but fails to

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address the detailed reasons the ALJ provided for finding Ms. Welleck less reliable than

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the State-agency psychological consultant (A.R. 2220).

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reasons to be supported by substantial evidence in the record.

The Court finds the ALJ’s

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D.

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have called a medical expert to testify at the

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second hearing. Doc. 25 at 16-19. To bolster her argument, Plaintiff identifies several

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deficiencies in the ALJ’s opinion that might have been remedied with help from a

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medical expert. See id.

Medical Expert Opinion.

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Plaintiff cites no legal authority to suggest that an ALJ must call a medical expert,

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and the relevant regulation states only that an ALJ “may also ask for medical evidence

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from expert medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b)(2) (emphasis added). Plaintiff

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cites Judge Tuchi’s remand order in support of her argument, but that order was drafted

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and stipulated to by the parties and stated only that the ALJ would, “if warranted and

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available, obtain evidence from a medical expert regarding the nature, severity, and

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limitations, if any, of the claimant’s impairments.” CV-14-01235-PHX-JJT, Doc. 23.

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The order clearly left room for the ALJ to conclude that such an opinion was not

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warranted. The ALJ found that a medical expert was not needed “given the voluminous

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medical records submitted in support of the claimant’s request for benefits.” A.R. 2215.

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Because Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ otherwise committed error in her decision,

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the Court cannot conclude that the discretionary decision not to use a medical expert was

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erroneous.

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Plaintiff argues for the first time in her reply brief that S.S.R. 15-1p requires a

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medical expert to address Plaintiff’s interstitial cystitis. Doc. 23 at 5-6. In addition to the

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fact that this argument was made for the first time in a reply brief, Gadda, 511 F.3d

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at 937 n.2, the sections of S.S.R. 15-1p quoted by Plaintiff merely state that the ALJ will

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consider appropriate evidence from an “acceptable medical source.” Doc. 23 at 5. In this

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case, the ALJ made a detailed review of the medical sources in Plaintiff’s history and

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found that her interstitial cystitis did not preclude work before September 30, 2010.

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A.R. 2226. Plaintiff does not address this detailed analysis by the ALJ (Doc. 23 at 5-6),

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and the Court finds that it constitutes a reasonable consideration of relevant medical

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sources.

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E.

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discredited the medical opinions of two

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treating physicians, Drs. Kornfield and Wagman. Doc. 25 at 20. In determining how

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much deference to give a physician’s medical opinion, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes

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between the opinions of treating physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining

Discrediting Treating Physician Opinion.

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physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Where, as here, a

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treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, an ALJ can reject it “for

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specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.”

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Id. at 830-31.

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To show that an ALJ erred in rejecting a treating doctor’s opinion, a claimant

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normally must show that the ALJ did not have specific and legitimate reasons supported

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by substantial evidence. Plaintiff makes no attempt at this showing with respect to Dr.

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Kornfield. The ALJ specifically explained why she did not give Dr. Kornfield’s opinion

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controlling weight (A.R. 2227-28), but Plaintiff never mentions this explanation, much

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less challenges it (Doc. 25 at 21). The Court finds that the ALJ provided specific and

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legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.

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The ALJ gave seven reasons for discrediting Dr. Wagman’s opinion: (1) he saw

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Plaintiff only four times in 2011 and only two times in 2012 before rendering his opinion;

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(2) his disability conclusions were inconsistent with his own objective findings; (3) he

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opined on an issue reserved for the Commissioner; (4) he opined that Plaintiff was

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“homebound” when in fact she was able to go the store alone and was experiencing

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diminished panic symptoms; (5) he used unclear language in describing the extent of

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Plaintiff’s disability; (6) his opinion appeared to be based more on sympathy than on

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objective medical findings; and (7) his opinion did not state specific limitations

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applicable to the workplace, and thus was not helpful in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC.

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A.R. 2219. In a separate part of her brief, Plaintiff mentions three of these reasons,

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challenges only one (the opinion about Plaintiff being homebound), and never addresses

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the others. Doc. 25 at 18. Because Plaintiff never challenges six of the ALJ’s seven

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reasons, she has not shown that the ALJ erred. The Court finds that reasons (1), (2), (3)

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and (7) constitute specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the

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record.

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F.

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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erroneously discredited her symptom testimony.

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Doc. 25 at 21-22. In evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony, the ALJ must engage in

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a two-step analysis. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant presented

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objective medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to

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produce the symptoms alleged. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014).

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The claimant is not required to show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to

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cause the severity of the symptoms she has alleged, only that it could reasonably have

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caused some degree of the symptoms. Id. Second, if there is no evidence of malingering,

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the ALJ may reject the claimant’s symptom testimony only by giving specific, clear, and

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convincing reasons. Id. at 1014-15.

Discrediting Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony.

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In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments

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could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. A.R. 2224. The ALJ then

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found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects

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of the symptoms were not credible. Id. In support of this finding, the ALJ provided a

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full-page explanation, including five specific inconsistencies between the medical

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evidence and her symptom testimony.

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explanation. Doc. 25 at 22-23. She makes no attempt to show that the ALJ’s reasons for

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discounting her testimony are not specific, clear, or convincing, and the Court finds that

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they are. Plaintiff therefore has not shown error.

A.R. 2226.

Plaintiff never addresses this

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G.

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“In order to disregard the testimony of a lay witness, the ALJ is required to

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provide specific reasons that are germane to each witness.” Fleming v. Comm’r of Soc.

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Sec. Admin., 500 F. App’x 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ

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simply “ignored” the testimony of her husband and mother-in-law. Doc. 25 at 24. This

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is not correct. The ALJ provided three reasons for rejecting their testimony: (1) the

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accuracy of their testimony was questionable due to their lack of medical training;

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(2) their testimony that Plaintiff could not work was inconsistent with the medical

Discrediting Lay Witness Testimony.

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evidence supporting the RFC; and (3) their testimony, like Plaintiff’s, was inconsistent

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with the preponderance of the medical evidence. A.R. 2228. Plaintiff never addresses

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these reasons. The Court finds at least reasons (2) and (3) to be specific and germane to

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each witness, particularly in light of the ALJ’s detailed discussion of the medical

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evidence and her detailed reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.

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Elsewhere in her brief, Plaintiff claims that “the ALJ, without explanation,

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erroneously opined the statements of Ms. Klain’s mother-in-law and husband were not

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consistent with the objective medical evidence.” Doc. 25 at 17 (emphasis added). But

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the ALJ noted the similarity of the lay witness testimony to that of the Plaintiff, which

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she determined to be inconsistent “with the preponderance of the opinions and

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observations by medical doctors.” A.R. 2228; see A.R. 2223-24 (characterization of

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testimony of Plaintiff, her husband, and her mother-in-law). Indeed, the ALJ provided

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detailed reasons to explain the inconsistency of Plaintiff’s testimony with the record –

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reasons Plaintiff never addresses and the Court finds to be sufficient. A.R. 2226; see

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Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (inconsistency with evidence is

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a germane reason). The Court cannot find error.

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V.

Conclusion.

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Plaintiff’s briefs reflect a strong view that she is disabled and entitled to disability

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benefits. The Court’s task, however, is not to reconsider the evidence and arguments de

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novo, but to determine whether the ALJ committed legal error or issued a decision that is

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not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff has not shown, and the Court has not

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independently found, legal error.

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evidence, urging the Court to view this case from her point of view, the Court’s job is not

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to re-weigh the evidence. The ALJ’s decision must be upheld if it is supported by

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“substantial evidence,” which is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a

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preponderance” of the evidence in the record. Orn, 495 F.3d at 630; Molina, 674 F.3d

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at 1111.

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analysis clearly meets this standard.

And although Plaintiff vigorously re-argues the

For reasons explained above, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s detailed

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IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case.
Dated this 11th day of December, 2017.

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