Palaniappan v. Gilbert Hospital LLC et al

Filing 106

ORDER: IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 99 ). (See attached Order). Signed by Judge John J Tuchi on 6/11/19. (JAMA) Modified on 6/12/2019 to add WO (JAMA).

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WO

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Nat Palaniappan,
Plaintiff,

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ORDER

v.

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No. CV-17-00517-PHX-JJT

Gilbert Hospital LLC, et al.,

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Defendants.

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At issue is Plaintiff Nat Palaniappan’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 99, Mot.).

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Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s September 4, 2018 Order (Doc. 96, Sept. 4

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Order) granting Defendant Principal Financial Group’s (“PFG”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

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51).

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The Court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order. Barber v. Hawaii,

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42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994). Motions for reconsideration are generally disfavored,

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however, and should be granted only in rare circumstances. Defenders of Wildlife v.

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Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Reconsideration is only appropriate if:

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(1) the court is presented with newly discovered, previously unavailable evidence; (2) the

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court committed a clear error of law and the initial decision was manifestly unjust; or (3)

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there has been an intervening change in controlling law. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah

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Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

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Plaintiff’s Motion does not present newly discovered evidence or argue that the

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controlling law has since changed. See id. Thus, the Court presumes that Plaintiff seeks

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reconsideration based on the grounds that the Court’s September 4 Order constituted clear

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error or was otherwise “manifestly unjust.” Id. Plaintiff’s Motion provides little argument

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as to why this may be true but contends repeatedly that the Court must “[reconsider] [sic]

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its definition of [PFG] as Fiduciary.” (Mot. at 2.)

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In its September 4 Order, the Court explained that in order “to survive a motion to

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dismiss, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that the defendant was acting as

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fiduciary when taking the action purported to be a breach.” (Sept. 4 Order at 5 (citing

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Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000)).) And while Plaintiff continues to allege

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that PFG acted in a fiduciary role, an ERISA action will be sustained only if the defendant

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was acting as a fiduciary at the time it undertook the specific actions purported to be a

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breach.

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In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff has not provided any new argument that

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his Complaint sufficiently alleges that PFG acted in a fiduciary context during the

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adjudication of Defendant Gilbert’s bankruptcy plan. Nor does Plaintiff adequately allege

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that PFG exercised discretionary authority over Plaintiff’s enrollment in the 409A plan. In

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fact, Plaintiff still does not argue that it was PFG who selected him for enrollment in the

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409A plan, only that PFG “[was] the Trustee of the Plan” and “had broad authority.” (Mot.

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at 2.) The Court explained in its September 4 Order that such conclusory allegations do not

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“confer upon [PFG] a blanket designation as a fiduciary.” (Sept. 4 Order at 6.) In short,

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Plaintiff provides no grounds to conclude that the Court’s September 4 Order constitutes

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clear error or a manifest injustice.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Doc. 99).
Dated this 11th day of June, 2019.

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Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge

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