Hutton v. McDaniel, et al

Filing 22

ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the stipulated protective order (Doc. 21 ) is denied, without prejudice [see attached Order for details]. Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 6/22/17. (MAW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Robert Hutton,
Plaintiff,

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ORDER

v.

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No. CV-17-00727-PHX-JAT

Terry McDaniel, et al.,

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Defendants.

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The parties have filed a “stipulated protective order.” Doc. 21. The Court will
deny the stipulation without prejudice.

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First, the Court finds that the parties have failed to show any cause for the need for

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a protective order in this case. Specifically, global protective orders are not appropriate.

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See AGA Shareholders, LLC v. CSK Auto, Inc., 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov.

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28, 2007). Rule 26(c) requires a party seeking a protective order to show good cause for

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issuance of such an order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist under Rule

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26(c), ‘the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or

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harm will result if no protective order is granted.’” AGA Shareholders, 2007 WL

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4225450, at *1 (emphasis added) (quoting Phillips v. G.M. Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-

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11 (9th Cir. 2002)). The party seeking protection “must make a ‘particularized

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showing of good cause with respect to [each] individual document.’” Id. (emphasis

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added) (quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th

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Cir. 1999)).

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Thus, “[t]he burden is on the party to requesting a protective order to demonstrate

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that (1) the material in question is a trade secret or other confidential information within

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the scope of Rule 26(c), and (2) disclosure would cause an identifiable, significant harm.”

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Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

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Deford v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 653 (D. Md. 1987)).

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Second, the parties state that they will potentially mark confidential, “all

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information or documents revealed or produced during the course of discovery in these

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proceedings by any party or third party and/or that were produced by Inventure pursuant

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to requests submitted pursuant to Title 8, Section 220 of the Delaware General

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Corporation Law Code (“Section 220[”]), whether in response to a document request,

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interrogatory, deposition, subpoena or otherwise (all such materials are collectively

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referred to hereinafter as “Discovery Materials”), including any information or

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documents produced in this action prior to the entry of this Order.” Doc. 21 at 2. This

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request is denied.

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The Court will not enter into a retroactive protective order that governs this

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litigation. In other words, to the extent documents were produced prior to this litigation,

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they are beyond the scope of this Court’s powers to govern discovery (which has not yet

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begun) in this litigation. Additionally, any protective order in this litigation will be

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entered into and governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the law in the

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Ninth Circuit. The Court will not look to Delaware state law for purposes of interpreting

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the scope of a protective order.

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Third, consistent with Ninth Circuit law, the Court will not give advance

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permission to file under seal. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d

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1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED that the stipulated protective order (Doc. 21) is denied, without

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prejudice.
Dated this 22nd day of June, 2017.

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