Brill v. Lawrence Transportation Company et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 70 . The Court denies the Motion as to Plaintiff's direct negligence claims. The Court grants the Motion as to Plaintiff's punitive damages claim. This matter will be set for trial, and the Court will set a pre- trial status conference by separate Order. Signed by Judge John J Tuchi on 12/20/2018. (REK)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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Jay Brill,
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No. CV-17-01766-PHX-JJT
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Lawrence Transportation Company, et al.,
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Defendants.
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At issue is Defendants William Smith and Lawrence Transportation Company’s
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Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 70, Mot.), to which Plaintiff Jay Brill filed a
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Response (Doc. 73, Resp.), and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 77, Reply). The Court
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resolves Defendants’ Motion without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f).
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I.
BACKGROUND
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Defendant William Smith was employed as a truck driver by Defendant Lawrence
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Transportation Company. In the three years prior to his employment with Lawrence, Smith
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committed three moving violations and had two preventable accidents. Despite these
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incidents, representatives of Lawrence deemed him qualified for the truck driver position
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during the hiring process.
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On February 21, 2017, Plaintiff and Smith were involved in a collision on Avenue
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7E in Yuma County, Arizona. Avenue 7E is a roadway consisting of two lanes heading
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westbound and two lanes heading eastbound, separated by a center turn lane. At the time
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of the collision, Smith was operating a trailer and truck in the course and scope of his
employment with Lawrence. While driving eastbound, Smith realized he was driving in
the wrong direction, and he pulled onto the shoulder of the roadway. After speaking with
his dispatcher and realizing he needed to drive westbound, he executed a U-turn across all
five lanes of Avenue 7E. At the same time, Plaintiff was heading eastbound, and his
motorcycle collided with Smith’s trailer. According to Lawrence’s company policy, Smith
was required to maintain logs detailing the performance of his duties and submit them at
the end of specified periods of time. However, the logs pertaining to this trip are
unaccounted for.
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In his Complaint (Doc. 1-1 at 5-9, Compl.), Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries
caused by the alleged negligence of Smith and Lawrence, as well as punitive damages.
Lawrence now moves for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim
and on any direct negligence claims against it.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
appropriate when: (1) the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the
movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th
Cir. 1987). Under this standard, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under governing [substantive] law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine issue”
of material fact arises only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must regard as true the
non-moving party’s evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. However, the non-moving party
may not merely rest on its pleadings; it must produce some significant probative evidence
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tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a material question
of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57 (holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative
evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment); First Nat’l
Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968).
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“A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory
allegations unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
1989). “Summary judgment must be entered ‘against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” United States v. Carter, 906 F.2d
1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Negligence Claim
In his Complaint, Plaintiff raises multiple claims alleging negligence on the part of
both Smith and Lawrence. Although the negligence claims do not include specific theories
of negligence, direct liability theories such as negligent hiring, entrustment, retention,
training, and supervision on the part of Lawrence may be inferred. As a result, Lawrence
has moved for partial summary judgment as to any potential claims of negligent hiring,
entrustment, retention, training, and supervision that Plaintiff is raising. Lawrence admits
that, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it is vicariously liable for Smith’s actions
because Smith was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the
collision. (Mot. at 1-2.) However, Lawrence argues that, because it has conceded vicarious
liability, any direct liability claims are subsumed and rendered superfluous by the vicarious
liability claims.
Lawrence cites Lewis v. Southern Pacific Company, in which the Arizona Supreme
Court stated that “failure of an employer to hire only competent and experienced employees
does not itself constitute an independent ground of actionable negligence.” 425 P.2d 840,
841 (Ariz. 1967). However, since Lewis, Arizona has adopted new theories of joint and
several liability and comparative negligence. See A.R.S. § 12-2501. Additionally, multiple
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subsequent cases decided by the Arizona Court of Appeals have held that the holding in
Lewis—that negligent hiring and supervision is not an independent ground of actionable
negligence against the employer—is limited. See Quinonez in re Quinonez v. Andersen,
696 P.2d 1342 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Pruitt v. Pavelin, 685 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); Kassman v. Busfield Enterprises, Inc., 639 P.2d 353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)
(recognizing negligent hiring, training, and supervision as a separate cause of action against
an employer).
As a result, the Court finds that Lewis is not controlling in this matter and Arizona
law allows Plaintiff to allege direct liability claims in addition to claims of vicarious
liability. Because Lawrence’s Motion only challenges the legal viability of Plaintiff’s
negligence claim against it, the Court will deny Lawrence’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment as to Plaintiff's direct liability claims.1
B.
Punitive Damages
Lawrence has also moved for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages. Under Arizona law, a separate cause of action does not exist for punitive
damages; instead, “the right to an award of punitive damages must be grounded upon a
cause of action for actual damages.” Quiroga v. Allstate Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 224, 226 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986). Additionally, summary judgment on the question of punitive damages is
inappropriate if “a reasonable jury could find the requisite evil mind by clear and
convincing evidence.” Thompson v. Better–Bilt Aluminum Prods. Co., 832 P.2d 203, 211
(Ariz. 1992). In determining whether a defendant exhibited an “evil mind,” courts consider
“the nature of the defendant's conduct, including the reprehensibility of the conduct and
the severity of the harm likely to result, as well as the harm that has occurred [in addition
to] [t]he duration of the misconduct, the degree of defendant's awareness of the harm or
risk of harm, and any concealment of it.” Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080
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In its Motion (Mot. at 7), Lawrence also states in passing that “Plaintiff has not
produced a trucking expert to give an opinion on the standard of care” for Lawrence.
However, Lawrence neither cites legal authority nor requests summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s negligence claim on this basis.
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(Ariz. 1987). The primary question where punitive damages are concerned is motive,
because gross negligence and reckless disregard are not enough. Volz v. Coleman Co.,
Inc., 748 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Ariz. 1987). Because defendants rarely admit to an “evil mind,”
improper motive is often inferred from sufficiently oppressive, outrageous, or intolerable
conduct. Id.
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Here, Plaintiff has conceded that the record does not establish sufficient facts to
create a genuine dispute as to the imposition of punitive damages. (Resp. at 2.) The Court
will therefore grant Lawrence’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to punitive
damages.2
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff may bring a claim of direct liability against Lawrence
in addition to a claim of vicarious liability. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his punitive damages claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 70). The Court denies the Motion as to
Plaintiff’s direct negligence claims. The Court grants the Motion as to Plaintiff’s punitive
damages claim. This matter will be set for trial, and the Court will set a pre-trial status
conference by separate Order.
Dated this 20th day of December, 2018.
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Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
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Although Plaintiff requests that the Court defer any decision on the availability of
punitive damages until trial, Plaintiff was obligated, upon Lawrence’s filing of a Motion
for Summary Judgment, to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Plaintiff has failed to do so, and Lawrence is thus entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.
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