Hamel v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 20

ORDER - The decision of the ALJ denying benefits is VACATED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See document for complete details. Signed by Chief Judge G Murray Snow on 3/5/19. (MSA)

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WO

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Joanne Doris Hamel,

No. CV-18-00173-PHX-GMS

Plaintiff,

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v.

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Commissioner
Administration,

ORDER

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of

Social

Security

Defendant.

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Plaintiff Joanne Doris Hamel appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge

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(“ALJ”) of the Social Security Administration denying her disability insurance benefits.

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(Doc. 17). For the following reasons the decision of the ALJ is vacated, and the case is

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remanded for further proceedings.

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INTRODUCTION

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Joanne Hamel has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and

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borderline personality disorder. In May 2014, she applied for social security disability

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insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset date of February 11, 2014. The claim was

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denied in October 2014 and upon reconsideration in January 2015. Hamel filed a request

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for a hearing in February 2015, and a hearing was held in May 2016, at which she testified.

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Following the hearing, an ALJ issued a written decision denying benefits.

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The ALJ followed the required five-step analysis for determining disability. At step

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one, the ALJ determined that Hamel had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after

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the alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Hamel’s post-traumatic stress

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disorder and borderline personality disorder both constitute severe impairments. At step

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three, the ALJ determined that none of Hamel’s impairments (or any combination thereof)

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met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.

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§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. The ALJ then made a residual functional

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capacity (“RFC”) finding. The ALJ determined that Hamel “has the residual functional

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capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-

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exertional limitations: the claimant would have mild limitation in interaction with the

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public, moderate limitation in interaction with supervisors and marked limitation in her

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interaction with co-workers.” (Tr. 23). The ALJ also concluded that Hamel could perform

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unskilled work.

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In making his RFC finding, the ALJ considered testimony from Hamel about the

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severity of her symptoms, as well as medical opinions from various physicians that had

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treated or evaluated Hamel’s conditions. Regarding Hamel’s symptom testimony, the ALJ

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accepted her testimony insofar as it was consistent with his RFC finding, but concluded

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that “any allegation of greater limitation simply cannot be supported by the overall medical

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evidence. The treatment records indicated Ms. Hamel’s symptoms were controlled with

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compliance to medication and regular treatment.” (Tr. 27). As for the opinions of various

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physicians, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Mehmud Ahmed, M.D., Hamel’s

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treating physician; substantial weight to the opinion of Jose Abreu, Ph.D., a consultative

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examining physician; little weight to a second opinion from Dr. Ahmed; and reduced

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weight to the opinion of Eugene Campbell, Ph.D., a state agency medical consulting

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physician.

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At step four, the ALJ concluded that Hamel is unable to perform any past relevant

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work. Finally, at step five, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant

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numbers in the national economy that Hamel can perform. Hamel did not therefore qualify

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as disabled and was not entitled to benefits.

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The Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied Hamel’s request for

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review of the ALJ’s decision in November 2017. Hamel now appeals the ALJ’s decision,

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arguing that the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting the opinions of Dr. Ahmed while according

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substantial weight to Dr. Abreu, and (2) rejecting Hamel’s testimony regarding the severity

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of her symptoms.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of review

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Courts apply a “highly deferential standard of review” when entertaining appeals

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from the decisions of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Valentine

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v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ’s decision must

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be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence and is free of legal error. Luther v.

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Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere

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scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “It means

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such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

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conclusion.”

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Commissioner's findings are upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

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record, . . . and if evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, [the

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Court] must defer to the Commissioner's decision.” Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

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359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

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II.

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Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017).

“[T]he

Analysis
A.

The ALJ did not sufficiently justify his decision to discount Hamel’s
symptom testimony.

Evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony requires two steps. First, the ALJ must
determine whether there is a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that
could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763
F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014). “Once a claimant produces objective medical evidence
of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints
based solely on [the] lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged
severity of [the symptoms.]” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004)
(original alterations omitted). The proper question is whether the impairment(s) “could
reasonably be expected to produce [the] pain or other symptoms.” Batson, 359 F.3d at
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1196.

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To discredit the testimony of a claimant about her symptoms, an ALJ must give

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specific, clear, and convincing reasons. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488–89

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(9th Cir. 2015). An ALJ does not satisfy that burden by merely reciting the medical

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evidence that the ALJ used to support her residual capacity determination. Id. at 489.

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“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not

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credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at

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1163.

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Here, the ALJ failed to specify what testimony from Hamel he found not credible.

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Instead, the ALJ used general language: “[T]he claimant’s statements concerning the

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intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent

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with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this

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decision.” (Tr. 24). The ALJ then summarized the medical evidence in the case. Finally,

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the ALJ concluded his assessment of Hamel’s testimony by stating that “any allegation of

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greater limitation [than the RFC] simply cannot be reasonably be supported by the overall

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medical evidence. The treatment records indicated Ms. Hamel’s symptoms were controlled

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with compliance to medication and regular treatment.”

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statement, not specifically identifying testimony from Hamel that the ALJ found not

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credible (and the reasons for that conclusion), is not a specific, clear, and convincing reason

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for discounting Hamel’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. See Brown-

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Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493–94. This error by the ALJ was not harmless, because “the ALJ

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made only a general credibility finding without providing any reviewable reasons why [he]

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found [Hamel’s] testimony to be not credible.” Id. at 494.

(Tr. 27).

This conclusory

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However, because there are potential inconsistencies in the medical evidence with

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some of Hamel’s testimony, the appropriate remedy is remand to the ALJ for further

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consideration. See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir.

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2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous,

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the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).

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B.

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The ALJ’s weighing of medical opinions is governed by regulation. 20 C.F.R.

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§ 404.1527(c). The regulations create a hierarchy of deference to medical opinions from

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various sources. At the top of that hierarchy are the opinions of treating sources. Id. (c)(2).

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When the treating doctor's opinion is uncontradicted, the ALJ can reject those conclusions

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only for clear and convincing reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).

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But when the opinion of a treating or examining physician is contradicted, an ALJ may

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reject the contradicted opinion for “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by

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substantial evidence in the record.” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d

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The ALJ properly weighed the various medical opinions.

1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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Here, the opinions of Dr. Ahmed were contradicted by the opinion of Dr. Abreu, the

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state agency examining physician. Thus, to justify his decision, the ALJ needed only to

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articulate specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence. Id. He did

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so by discussing the two separate opinions submitted by Dr. Ahmed and pointing to

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medical evidence that is inconsistent with Dr. Ahmed’s conclusion.

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Dr. Ahmed’s first opinion, dated May 1, 2014, was that Hamel has marked

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limitations in understanding and memory, and extreme limitations in her ability to sustain

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concentration and patience. He also opined that she had moderate and marked limitations

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in social interactions, and extreme limitations in her ability to adapt. All of this would, in

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Dr. Ahmed’s opinion, result in interference with her ability to work on a regular and

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sustained basis at least 20% of the time, and she would be absent in excess of twenty days

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each month. The ALJ pointed out, however, that during Hamel’s visit with Dr. Ahmed

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that same month, Hamel reported that her mood, anxiety, and hallucinations were all

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improving, even while she still had some symptoms. The ALJ concluded from this

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evidence that Hamel’s limitations were not as severe as indicated by Dr. Ahmed’s opinion.

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While this evidence may be reasonably be interpreted another way, the ALJ’s evaluation

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should be upheld “[w]here evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.”

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tre v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Likewise, the ALJ appropriately weighed Dr. Ahmed’s second opinion, dated

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August 26, 2016. In that opinion, Dr. Ahmed stated that Hamel had no useful ability to

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function and that she was unable to meet competitive standards on nearly every area of the

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questionnaire. He also opined that Hamel would be unable to perform all tasks, and that

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she would be absent more than four days a month due to her impairments or because of

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treatment. Yet treatment notes from Hamel’s providers—while noting that she was still

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suffering some symptoms—state that Hamel’s symptoms were being treated effectively:

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“[g]radually her major depressive symptoms are stable.” (Tr. 486). The physician also

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noted that Hamel was continuing to work with psychiatrists to adjust medications and

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dosages.

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Dr. Ahmed’s opinion regarding Hamel’s limitations. This constitutes a specific and

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legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence, so the ALJ’s weighing of Dr. Ahmed’s

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opinion was appropriate. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164.

The ALJ rationally concluded that this medical evidence conflicted with

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The ALJ also appropriately weighed the opinion of Dr. Abreu. Dr. Abreu examined

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Hamel in June 2016. After the examination, Abreu diagnosed borderline personality

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disorder. He noted that Hamel reported visual and auditory hallucinations, that she was

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aggressive at times, and that she slept excessively, preventing her from working.

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Dr. Abreu’s conclusion was that Hamel has mild limitations in interaction with the public,

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moderate limitations in interaction with supervisors, and marked limitation in her

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interaction with co-workers. These findings, the ALJ concluded, were in line with the

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medical treatment evidence, which demonstrated both that Hamel suffered from symptoms,

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and that those symptoms were improved through medication and treatment. Thus, the ALJ

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awarded Dr. Abreu’s opinions substantial weight, and adopted his findings within the

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ALJ’s RFC finding. The ALJ appropriately weighed this opinion by indicating that it was

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consistent with the medical evidence in the case. Again, though Hamel argues that the

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evidence the ALJ points to can be interpreted in ways other than the way in which the ALJ

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interpreted it, the ALJ’s rational interpretation where more than one exists must be upheld

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by the Court. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679.

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Hamel does not challenge the ALJ’s weighing of various other opinions, so the

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Court does not address those conclusions. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th

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Cir. 2001).

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CONCLUSION

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Because the ALJ made a legal error, but there are potential inconsistencies in the

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medical evidence with some of Hamel’s testimony, the appropriate remedy is to remand

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for further consideration. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ denying benefits is

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VACATED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this

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opinion.
Dated this 5th day of March, 2019.

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