Andrews v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 35

ORDER - IT IS ORDERED denying the Commissioner's "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)" (Doc. 30 ). (See document for further details). Signed by Magistrate Judge Eileen S Willett on 10/16/2020. (LAD)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Rick Andrews,
Plaintiff,

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No. CV-19-05247-PHX-ESW
ORDER

v.
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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On July 23, 2020, the Court issued an Order reversing the Social Security

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Administration’s (“Social Security”) denial of Plaintiff’s application for disability

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insurance benefits and remanding the matter to the Commissioner of Social Security for

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an immediate award of benefits.

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Commissioner’s “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 59(e)” (Doc. 30). Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. 33), to which the

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Commissioner has replied (Doc. 34).

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(Doc. 28).

Pending before the Court is the

Under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file a
“motion to alter or amend a judgment.” The Ninth Circuit has explained that
[s]ince specific grounds for a motion to amend or alter are not
listed in the rule, the district court enjoys considerable
discretion in granting or denying the motion.” McDowell v.

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Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
But
amending a judgment after its entry remains “an
extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). In general, there are four
basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be
granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest
errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if
such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or
previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is
necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the
amendment is justified by an intervening change in
controlling law. Id.

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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). Rule 59(e) “may not be

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used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have

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been made prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,

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485 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted). A Rule 59(e) “motion is not a substitute for appeal and

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does not allow the unhappy litigant to reargue the case.” Bollenbacher v. Comm'r of Soc.

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Sec., 621 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (N.D. Ohio 2008).

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In its July 23, 2020 Order, the Court concluded that the Administrative Law Judge

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(“ALJ”) discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without providing specific and

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legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 28 at 6-10). The Order

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recounts that Plaintiff testified that as a result of his pain, he needs to lay down or recline

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for more than a couple of hours a day. (Id. at 11) (citing A.R. 55). At the administrative

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hearing, the VE testified that an individual who “needed unscheduled breaks to recline

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for two hours or more in addition to the typical breaks in a normal day” would not be able

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to sustain employment.

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establishes that if Plaintiff’s testimony was credited as true, the ALJ would be required to

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find that Plaintiff is disabled. (Doc. 28 at 11). The Commissioner asserts that the Court

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committed clear error by remanding the matter for an award of benefits instead of further

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proceedings. (Doc. 30).

(A.R. 60-61).

The Court found that the VE’s testimony

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The Commissioner asserts that “Plaintiff’s statement about needing to lay down or
recline for more than a couple hours a day is insufficient—as a matter of law—for a
disability finding.”

(Doc. 30 at 7).

According to the Commissioner, “Plaintiff’s

statement that he needed to recline or lay down, even if credited as true, would not
require an ALJ to find Plaintiff disabled. It would have to be considered in the context of
all the evidence of record, including the inconsistent medical opinions.” (Doc. 34 at 8)

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(emphasis in original). Yet as the Ninth Circuit “held in Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d

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1028, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007), a claimant’s testimony alone may establish disability and an

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entitlement to benefits.” Rawa v. Colvin, 672 F. App’x 664, 668 (9th Cir. 2016)
(emphasis in original). In Lingenfelter, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to Social
Security for an award of benefits when the claimant testified that he needed to lie down
throughout the day due to his impairment, and the VE testified that such a limitation
would prevent sustained work. 504 F.3d at 1033, 1041; see also Rawa, 672 F. App’x at
668-69 (“Rawa testified that, due to pain and muscle weakness, she needed to rest for
seven hours out of an eight hour work day and to lie down frequently. At Rawa’s
hearing, the VE explicitly found that such a limitation would preclude employment.
Thus, if credited as true, Rawa’s testimony regarding her severe pain and debilitating
symptoms would require the ALJ to conclude that she was in fact disabled.”); Moisa v.
Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885–87 (9th Cir. 2004) (remanding for award of benefits when a

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claimant’s symptom testimony was credited as true). The Court affirms its finding that

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the VE’s testimony establishes that if Plaintiff’s testimony was credited as true, the ALJ

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would be required to find that Plaintiff is disabled.
The Commissioner also asserts that the Court failed to adequately analyze whether
there are any outstanding issues on which further administrative proceedings would be
useful. (Id. at 4-8). The Commissioner does not argue that the record is incomplete.
Instead, the Commissioner argues that there are a number of inconsistencies in the record
that should be addressed by the ALJ. The Court affirms its finding that the record in this

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matter is fully developed.1 “Given this fully developed record, the admission of more

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evidence would not be ‘enlightening,’ Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101, and ‘remand for the

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purpose of allowing the ALJ to have a mulligan [does not qualify] as a remand for a
‘useful purpose,’ Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021.” Henderson v. Berryhill, 691 F. App’x
384, 386 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090,
1100 (9th Cir. 2014) and Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014)).
Further, although there may be some doubt in the record as to whether Plaintiff is
disabled, the Court affirms its finding that there is not “serious doubt.” (Doc. 23 at 10).
Because (i) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting
Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, (ii) the record is fully developed and there are no
outstanding issues that must be resolved before a disability determination can be made
(i.e. further administrative proceedings would not be useful), (iii) crediting Plaintiff’s
testimony as true would require the ALJ to find Plaintiff disabled on remand, and (iv)
there is not “serious doubt” as to whether Plaintiff is disabled, the Court did not commit
clear error by exercising its discretion to remand this case for an award of benefits. See
Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (noting that the Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it
would be an abuse of discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits
when all of these conditions are met”). The Court concludes that the Commissioner has
not presented a valid basis for granting Rule 59(e) relief. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED denying the Commissioner’s “Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)” (Doc. 30).
Dated this 16th day of October, 2020.

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Honorable Eileen S. Willett
United States Magistrate Judge

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This finding is implicit in the Court’s statement “After examining the record, the
Court finds no outstanding issues of fact to be resolved through further proceedings.”
(Doc. 30 at 11).
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