Isaacson et al v. Brnovich et al

Filing 84

ORDER that Plaintiffs' motion to stay briefing and consideration of Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 73 ) is GRANTED. The Court will hold Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 68 ) in abeyance pending resolution of Plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal. See document for complete details. Signed by Judge Douglas L Rayes on 11/22/2021. (RMV)

Case 2:21-cv-01417-DLR Document 84 Filed 11/22/21 Page 1 of 3

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Paul A Isaacson, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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ORDER

v.

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No. CV-21-01417-PHX-DLR

Mark Brnovich, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff filed this lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of two aspects of

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Arizona’s Senate Bill 1457, which the Court has referred to as the “Reason Regulations”

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and the “Interpretation Policy.” Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of

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the Reason Regulations and the Interpretation Policy; the Court granted their motion as to

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the former and denied it as to the latter. Relying on Webster v. Reproductive Health

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Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Court found that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on

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their facial vagueness challenge to the Interpretation Policy because that claim is not ripe

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for consideration. Plaintiffs have since appealed the portion of the Court’s order denying

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relief as to the Interpretation Policy. Plaintiffs maintain that the Interpretation Policy is

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materially different from the law at issue in Webster and thus Webster does not control.

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After Plaintiffs noticed their appeal, Defendants moved to dismiss the challenge to

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the Interpretation Policy, which sits at Count V of the complaint. (Doc. 68.) Defendants

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argue that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Interpretation Policy is not ripe under Webster, and

Case 2:21-cv-01417-DLR Document 84 Filed 11/22/21 Page 2 of 3

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therefore the Court should dismiss Count V for the same reasons it denied preliminary

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injunctive relief on that claim.

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Plaintiffs have moved to stay briefing and consideration of Defendants’ motion to

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dismiss pending resolution of their interlocutory appeal. (Doc. 73.) “[T]he power to stay

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proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of

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the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for

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litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). When deciding whether to stay

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proceedings, the Court considers factors such as “the possible damage which may result

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from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being

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required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the

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simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected

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to result from a stay.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis,

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299 U.S. at 254-55); see also Kuang v. United States Dept. of Defense, No. 18-cv-03698-

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JST, 2019 WL 1597495, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019) (observing, based on a survey of

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case law, that “the Landis test or something similar” governs motions to stay proceedings

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pending resolution of an interlocutory appeal).

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The Court finds a stay of proceedings related to Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

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appropriate. Defendants’ ask the Court to dismiss Count V of the complaint as unripe

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under Webster. Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal asks the Ninth Circuit to find that Webster

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does not control. Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal

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pose the same fundamental question (albeit in different procedural postures): does Webster

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foreclose Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the Interpretation Policy?

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inefficient use of judicial resources for both this Court and the Ninth Circuit to consider

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the same issues simultaneously with the looming risk of inconsistent rulings.” SolarCity

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Corp. v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, No. CV-15-

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00374-PHX-DLR, 2016 WL 5109887, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2016). This is especially

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true when the Ninth Circuit’s decision could materially impact the Court’s assessment of

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Plaintiffs’ claim. See Head v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-18-08189-PCT-DLR, 2020 WL

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“It would be an

Case 2:21-cv-01417-DLR Document 84 Filed 11/22/21 Page 3 of 3

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6198950, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 2020).

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Defendants counter that they would be prejudiced by a stay because they will have

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to proceed with litigation of Count V despite a fair probability that it is unripe. (Doc. 79

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at 4.) But Count V is a facial vagueness challenge, which is unlikely to require significant

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fact discovery. A facial vagueness challenge, by nature, is more of a legal dispute than a

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factual one. Though a stay will delay consideration of Defendants’ legal arguments, that

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delay will be more of an inconvenience than meaningful prejudice. For these reasons,

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to stay briefing and consideration of

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Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 73) is GRANTED. The Court will hold Defendants’

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motion to dismiss (Doc. 68) in abeyance pending resolution of Plaintiffs’ interlocutory

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appeal.

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Dated this 22nd day of November, 2021.

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Douglas L. Rayes
United States District Judge

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