AJF Inspections Incorporated v. IOC Franchising LLC et al
Filing
18
ORDER granting 14 Motion to Set Aside Default. The default entered at (Doc. 12 ) is set aside. Defendant IOC, Curt1 LLC, and Curtis Kloc shall answer or other response to the complaint within 14 days from the date of this order. Defendants' request for fees and costs is denied. Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery (Doc. 13 ) is denied as moot. Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 5/18/23. (DXD)
1
WO
2
3
4
5
6
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
8
9
AJF Inspections Incorporated,
Plaintiff,
10
11
v.
12
IOC Franchising LLC, et al.,
13
No. CV-22-01922-PHX-JAT
ORDER
Defendants.
14
15
Pending before the Court is Defendant IOC Franchising’s (“IOC”) Motion to Set
16
Aside Entry of Default Pursuant to Rule 55. (Doc. 14). Plaintiff AJF Inspections (“AJF”)
17
has filed a response, (Doc. 16), and IOC has replied, (Doc. 17). The Court now rules on
18
this motion.
19
I.
BACKGROUND
20
Plaintiff AJF Inspections brought a complaint against Defendant IOC and related
21
entities on November 10, 2022, claiming that IOC made false and misleading statements
22
in violation of the Lanham Act. (See Doc. 6 at 7); 15 U.S.C. § 1125. Specifically, AJF
23
claims that Defendants, in a series of advertisements, made eight claims regarding IOC and
24
its business practices that were false. (See id.). On December 2, IOC was served with the
25
complaint and summons. (Docs. 8, 9, 10). Prior to December 12, the date by which
26
Defendants were required to file a response, Defendant Kloc, the owner of IOC, sent an
27
email to Plaintiff’s counsel asking that the complaint be voluntarily dismissed and stating
28
that he would defend himself in litigation if necessary. (Doc. 14 at 1). No formal answer
1
or other motion was filed with the Court, however.
2
Plaintiff did not respond to the email and instead waited until December 13 and filed
3
an application for entry of default judgment. (Doc. 11). Only after the application was filed
4
did Plaintiff respond to Defendant Kloc’s email. (Doc. 14 at 2). That same day the clerk
5
entered default against Defendants. (Doc. 12). Shortly thereafter, Defendants hired
6
Counsel. (Doc. 15). Defendants now move to set aside the entry of default judgement.
7
(Doc. 14).
8
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
9
The Court may set aside an entry of default for good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
10
The Court considers three factors to determine if good cause exists to set aside an entry of
11
default: (1) whether the movant engaged in “culpable” conduct; (2) whether a meritorious
12
defense exists; and (3) whether setting aside the default judgment would prejudice the other
13
party.1 United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085,
14
1091 (9th Cir. 2010). “The party seeking to vacate a default judgment bears the burden of
15
demonstrating that these factors favor vacating the judgment.” TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v.
16
Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Egelhoff v.
17
Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). It should be noted that this standard is
18
disjunctive in that “a finding that any one of these factors is true is sufficient reason for the
19
district court to refuse to set aside the default.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091. Yet, “default
20
judgments are ordinarily disfavored. Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever
21
reasonably possible.” New Gen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016)
22
(quoting Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986)). Generally, only extreme
23
circumstances warrant the entry of default judgments. See Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091–92.
24
Furthermore, the rules governing the setting aside of default “are solicitous toward
25
movants, especially those whose actions leading to default were taken without the benefit
26
27
28
Plaintiff calls these three inquiries the “Falk factors,” citing to Falk v. Allen. See Falk v.
Allen, 739 F.2d 416, 463 (9th Cir. 1984). Falk concerns a motion under Rule 60(b),
however. See id. at 462; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). As this case concerns Rule 55(c), this Court
will cite to Mesle for this three-factor analysis. See Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091.
1
-2-
1
of legal representation.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1089.2
2
III.
ANALYSIS
3
The standard under Rule 55 for setting aside an entry of default is “good cause.” See
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). Because there is good cause to set aside the default, and because
5
there are no extreme circumstances surrounding Defendants’ failure to respond that warrant
6
a default judgement, this Court will set aside the entry of default. Here, Defendants did not
7
engage in any culpable conduct that would warrant default. Further, Defendants have
8
alleged enough facts that, taken on their face, could provide a meritorious defense. And
9
finally, setting aside this default would not greatly prejudice Plaintiff. Therefore, setting
10
aside default in this case is warranted.
11
a. Culpable Conduct
12
In assessing culpability, courts must look to whether the failure to answer was done
13
in bad faith. Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1092. If a defendant “has received actual or constructive
14
notice of the filing and intentionally failed to answer[,]” his conduct is culpable. Id.
15
(emphasis in original). This means that the defendant purposefully did not answer in order
16
to “take advantage of the opposing party, interfere with judicial decision making, or
17
otherwise manipulate the legal process.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Mere failure to
18
respond, by itself, however, is not enough.
19
Defendants argue that there was no willfulness in their failure to appear. (See Doc.
20
14 at 5). They claim that they timely sent an email to opposing counsel discussing the case,
21
and assumed that they would receive a response before the time to file arrived. (See id.).
22
Furthermore, in the email, Defendants expressed their intent to defend in litigation if
23
necessary. (See id.). After Plaintiff failed to respond, Defendants again emailed Plaintiff,
24
on December 12, asking for an acknowledgement of the previous email. (See id.). Pointing
25
to language from Rule 60(b), which governs the opening of final judgments, Defendants
26
assert that the failure to appear was the result of “excusable neglect.” (Id. at 6). Because of
27
the actions they took to respond via email and attempt to resolve the case, they claim that
28
2
At all times leading up to the entry of default judgement, none of the Defendants were
represented by counsel. They are currently represented, however.
-3-
1
they were acting entirely reasonably in failing to respond. (See id.).
2
Plaintiff claims that the usual “bad faith” standard should not apply because the
3
Defendants are sophisticated parties. (See Doc. 16 at 9). When dealing with a sophisticated
4
individual or entity, the failure to answer is assumed to be intentional. Mesle, 615 F.3d at
5
1093. Courts assume that such defendants have “an understanding of the consequences” of
6
their actions and thus that their failure to respond was purposeful. See id. Plaintiff asserts
7
that Defendant Kloc is sophisticated because he owns and operates multiple businesses
8
throughout the country. (Doc. 16 at 9). Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that Kloc has been
9
involved in numerous lawsuits, and that he is therefore familiar with the legal process. In
10
addition, Plaintiff points to the email, which included “legal citations” and “acknowledged
11
the December 12th deadline,” to assert that Kloc had a “clear understanding of the legal
12
process and the requirement to file an answer.” (Id.). In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that
13
even if Defendants are not deemed sophisticated, they offer no credible explanation for
14
failing to respond, and thus that their conduct was culpable.
15
This Court finds that Defendants’ conduct was not culpable. First, Defendants are
16
not sophisticated entities for purposes of default analysis. The standard articulated in Melse
17
is not mere sophistication, but legal sophistication. As that court noted, intentionality is
18
never assumed “except when the moving party is a legally sophisticated entity or
19
individual.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1093 (emphasis added). Here, Defendant Kloc is not a
20
lawyer, and importantly, was not represented by counsel at the time of default. He thus did
21
not have the legal training or experience that would make him “legally sophisticated” for
22
purposes of default analysis. The Mesle court noted the importance of these factors in
23
making a sophistication determination. See id. (noting that it was “sufficient to observe that
24
Mesle is not a lawyer and that he was unrepresented at the time of default ....”). Simply
25
because Kloc owns a number of businesses and has been involved in legal proceedings at
26
some time in the past does not make him legally sophisticated. Therefore, his conduct can
27
only be deemed culpable if he acted in bad faith.
28
Second, there is no showing of any bad faith in Defendants’ failure to respond. As
-4-
1
noted above, Defendant Kloc quickly responded to the lawsuit by sending an email
2
attempting to avoid litigation. He also noted his intent to defend himself should the lawsuit
3
proceed. Furthermore, this Court finds that it was reasonable for Kloc, who was
4
unrepresented at the time, to believe that he would receive a response before the filing
5
deadline. After the entry of default, he quickly hired an attorney and filed a motion to set
6
aside the default. Ultimately, then there is no evidence of intentionality or bad faith on the
7
part of Defendants in failing to appear. In addition, none of these circumstances are
8
extreme. Consequently, Defendants’ conduct is not culpable.
9
b. Meritorious Defense
10
In order to show that a meritorious defense exists, Defendants must “present specific
11
facts that would constitute a defense.” Id. at 1094. In this analysis, it is not the role of the
12
Court to assess the veracity of the facts alleged. Id. It merely must find that the facts
13
presented, if true, constitute the basis for a meritorious defense. Id. Ultimately, the burden
14
on defendants here “is not extraordinarily heavy.” Id. Because Defendants have presented
15
facts which, if true, show that their claims were not false or misleading, they do have a
16
meritorious defense.
17
Defendants assert that there are significant differences between the services they
18
offer and the services offered by AJF. (See Doc. 14 at 5). Specifically, Defendants claim
19
that they offer supplemental and additional coverage in areas that Plaintiff does not. (See
20
id.). Thus, they maintain, their claims about the services offered by Plaintiff are neither
21
false nor misleading. Defendants’ assert that their claims are based on information that
22
Plaintiff makes publicly available via its website and other means. (See id.). Furthermore,
23
Defendants claim that they were making comparisons between their companies and
24
Plaintiff’s company based on standard definitions of the terms “snapshot” and “summary,”
25
claiming that AJF does not offer a snapshot while Defendants’ companies do. (See id.);
26
Doc 16-2 at 4. In addition, Defendants point to the initial email correspondence with
27
Plaintiff in which Defendant Kloc pointed to a number of facts that he claims constitute a
28
basis for a meritorious defense. (See id. at 4). Specifically, the email states, among other
-5-
1
things, that IOC offers additional insurance coverage which AJF does not, that AJF does
2
not provide recall checks, that AJF does not provide a one-year warranty like Defendants
3
do, and that AJF does not include videos in its inspection reports. (See Doc. 16-2 at 3–4).
4
This, Defendants argue, shows that the advertisements that were sent out comparing their
5
services with Plaintiff’s were neither false nor misleading. (See Doc. 14 at 5). Defendants
6
also claim that Plaintiff cannot establish damages. (See id.).
7
Plaintiff counters that these are merely “conclusory positions” that lack “affirmative
8
facts” to support them. (See Doc. 16 at 11). It argues that all that Defendants have shown
9
is that Plaintiff’s website does not list all of the services AJF provides. (See id.). It states
10
that it will prove, through witness testimony, that it does provide all of the services that
11
Defendants claim it does not. (See id. at 12). Plaintiff maintains that no meritorious defense
12
can be based on the assertion that it did not advertise all available services on its publicly
13
available website. (See id.). Furthermore, it states that “[i]njury is presumed in Lanham Act
14
cases involving false comparative advertising.” (See id. at 13). Thus, the claim that AJF
15
cannot establish damages, it maintains, is without merit.
16
Defendants have alleged enough specific facts to establish a meritorious defense.
17
They have pointed to specific services which they claim are not provided by AJF, but that
18
are provided by IOC. Thus, they argue, their advertisements were factually based. They
19
assert that publicly available information about AJF shows that it does not provide certain
20
insurance coverage, snapshots or video in its inspection reports, and recall checks, among
21
other things. These move beyond conclusory statements. They are facts which, for purposes
22
of analyzing whether a meritorious defense exists, the Court must take as true. It may very
23
well be that Plaintiffs will present witness testimony that disproves these facts, but that
24
only serves to counter Defendants’ defense. It does not negate that defense completely.
25
This Court does consider Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff cannot establish damages to be a
26
conclusory statement. Yet one conclusory statement does not negate the fact that another
27
meritorious defense has been established by Defendants. Consequently, Defendants have
28
met this prong of the test.
-6-
1
c. Prejudice to Plaintiff
2
Finally, this Court finds that Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the setting aside of
3
the entry of default here. To determine whether prejudice will result from setting aside
4
default, the court must look to whether Plaintiff’s ability to “pursue his claim will be
5
hindered.” Falk, 739 F.2d at 463. Further, the “setting aside of a judgment must result in
6
greater harm than simply delaying resolution of the case.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1095. Thus,
7
a mere delay in reaching a final judgment is not enough. Plaintiff must show that further
8
harm will result if the default is set aside. Here, no such harm has been alleged that cannot
9
be easily corrected by a court order.
10
Plaintiff asserts that setting aside the default will cut against the goal of expeditious
11
relief. (See Doc. 16 at 14). AJF states that it acted expeditiously in sending its initial cease-
12
and-desist letter, and in advancing its claims. (See id.). Further, it claims that it did this
13
because of its desire to see Defendants stop their false advertising. (See id.). Consequently,
14
if the default is set aside, Plaintiff argues, it would “provide further opportunity for
15
Defendants to attack AJF’s goodwill and reputation.” (See id.). As evidence of this they
16
cite Kloc’s email in which he “threatened to ramp up his attacks on AJF if the lawsuit was
17
not dismissed.” (See id.).
18
Defendants counter that throughout the course of this lawsuit, they have acted
19
expeditiously and will continue to do so. (See Doc. 14 at 4). They note that they
20
immediately responded to the lawsuit by emailing Plaintiff’s counsel and immediately
21
hired counsel after the notice of default. (See id.). Shortly thereafter, Defendants’ counsel
22
contacted Plaintiff’s counsel to discuss the default and find a solution. (See id.). This,
23
among other things, Defendants claim, shows that Plaintiff will be “subjected to no greater
24
delay than would ordinarily be expected” in any litigation. (See id.). Thus, they maintain,
25
setting aside this default will not prejudice Plaintiff. (See id.).
26
It seems clear that the delay in reaching final judgement that will result from setting
27
aside default here is no greater than the delay that would be present had Defendants timely
28
appeared and responded to the initial complaint. This type of delay is not enough to
-7-
1
prejudice Plaintiff to such an extent that default would be warranted. Additionally, given
2
that Defendant Kloc indicated in his email, sent before the default date, his intent to
3
vigorously litigate should the need arise, it is difficult to see how Plaintiff is truly
4
prejudiced. Despite knowing this, Plaintiff tactically decided not to respond to Defendants
5
and chose to wait and seek default instead. That Plaintiff is not getting an early victory
6
because of that is not prejudice. There may be some prejudice that would result from the
7
fact that Defendants would be able to continue to make allegedly false statements about
8
AJF and its business practices. Yet, as AJF stated it would have done had there been no
9
default, (See Doc. 16 at 14), it is free to seek a preliminary injunction blocking Defendants
10
from further attacking it with misleading advertising. Thus, the prejudice resulting from
11
setting aside default is not that great. And any prejudice of this type that results can easily
12
and quickly be prevented by this Court. Consequently, this Court finds that no prejudice
13
will result from setting aside the entry of default.
14
IV.
CONCLUSION
15
Accordingly,
16
IT IS ORDERED that IOC’s Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default Pursuant to
17
Rule 55, (Doc. 14), is GRANTED. The default entered at Doc. 12 as to Defendants IOC
18
Franchising LLC, Curt1 LLC, and Curtis Kloc is set aside.
19
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant IOC, Curt1 LLC, and Curtis Kloc
20
shall answer or other response to the complaint within fourteen days from the date of this
21
order.
22
23
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendants’ request for fees and costs
because the Court does not find any such award to be justified in this case.
24
///
25
///
26
///
27
///
28
///
-8-
1
2
3
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery, (Doc. 13), is
DENIED as moot.
Dated this 18th day of May, 2023.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-9-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?