Franks v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 23

ORDER: The decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and terminate the case. Signed by Senior Judge Douglas L Rayes on 9/26/2024. (KJ)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Melvin Ray Franks, Sr.,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,

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No. CV-23-00484-PHX-DLR
ORDER

Defendant.

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On July 30, 2018, Claimant Melvin Franks filed applications for Social Security

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Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, alleging a disability

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beginning October 5, 2012. (AR. 236, 241.) He later amended the alleged onset date to

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November 17, 2017. (AR. 372.) The Social Security Administration denied his claims

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initially and again on reconsideration. (AR. 61, 69.) After an administrative hearing, the

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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued an unfavorable decision. (AR. 11.) The Appeals

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Council denied review of the decision, making the ALJ’s finding the final decision of the

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Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. (AR. 1.) Franks seeks review of the

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Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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I.

Standard

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To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ engages in a five-step process.

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20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps,

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but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,

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1098 (9th Cir. 1999). First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is presently engaging

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in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the ALJ determines

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whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental

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impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Third, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s

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impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed

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in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the

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claimant is automatically considered disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ moves to the fourth step,

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where he assesses the claimant’s residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) and determines

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whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. Id. §

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404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is not so capable, as the fifth and final step, the ALJ

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must determine whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy

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based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

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If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

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This Court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s

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decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ’s factual

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findings are “conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.

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Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019) (quotation and citation omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than

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a mere scintilla” and “means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable

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mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1154 (quotations and

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citations omitted). “When evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the

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ALJ’s decision, [the Court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Batson

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v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). The substantial

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evidence standard is a “highly deferential standard of review.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc.

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Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009).

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II.

Analysis

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Franks raises two issues for the Court’s consideration: (1) whether the ALJ properly

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evaluated the medical opinion of Joshua Medeiros, M.S., PA-C, a consultative examiner,

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and (2) whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.

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a. The ALJ properly evaluated PA Medeiros’s opinion, and his evaluation

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is supported by substantial evidence.

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For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, like Franks’s, ALJs give no specific

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evidentiary weight to any medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Instead, an ALJ is

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required to consider all medical opinions and articulate how persuasive he finds them. Id. §

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416.920c(b). The ALJ considers several factors in assessing the persuasiveness of a

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medical opinion, but he need only articulate in his decision his findings regarding the

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supportability and consistency of the opinion with other evidence in the record.

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Id. § 416.920c(b)(2). Supportability examines the relevant objective medical evidence and

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supporting explanations presented by the source. Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency

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examines the evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources. Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2).

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Here, the ALJ rejected PA Medeiros’s opinion as unpersuasive because it was “not

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supported by the longitudinal record, including the objective imaging and longitudinal

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clinical exam findings.” (AR. 21.) PA Medeiros reviewed Franks’s medical records and

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opined that Franks would be limited to no more than four hours of standing and walking in

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an eight-hour workday and could lift no more than twenty pounds. (AR. 1113.) PA

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Medeiros based this opinion on his examination of Franks’s medical records and diagnoses

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of pulmonary hypertension, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), and

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diabetes. (Id.)

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Franks contends that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to assess the

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supportability of PA Medeiros’s opinion. (Doc. 14 at 9.) PA Medeiros never personally

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examined Franks; instead, he reviewed Franks’s medical records and formed an opinion

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based on those records. (See AR. 1113–15.) He relied primarily on four treatment notes

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and one imaging study. (See id.) So here, the supportability element of PA Medeiros’s

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opinion was not entirely independent of the consistency element. Evaluation of the

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supportability of PA Medeiros’s opinion is properly based on an examination of the

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evidence on which he relied, as that evidence served as his “supporting explanations.” In

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other words, to determine the supportability of the opinion, the ALJ had to look to other

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evidence in the record, like he would typically do to assess consistency.

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The ALJ did so. For instance, he recognized that several treatment notes on which

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PA Medeiros relied noted shortness of breath, but evidence showed Franks’s breathing,

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heart rate, and heart rhythm were normal. (AR. 387, 945.) Some of the same treatment

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notes state that Franks had edema, but the longitudinal record shows that he did not. (AR.

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394, 400, 407, 442, 449, 945, 1113.) And one of the bases PA Medeiros offered for

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Franks’s limitations was “risk for further edema.” (AR. 1115.) The ALJ could not reconcile

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this assessment with the conflicting evidence—reflected in other records on which PA

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Medeiros relied—that Franks had no edema. Further, the ALJ highlighted PA Medeiros’s

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failure to address many normal cardiac, respiratory, musculoskeletal, and extremity

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examinations in the record. (AR. 459, 576, 400, 629, 648–49, 677–78, 939.) Because the

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ALJ plainly intended to make both supportability and consistency findings, his error in

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failing to properly employ those terms is harmless. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785,

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793 n.4 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding ALJ’s failure to use proper term for consistency finding

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was not reversible error where “meaning . . . [was] clear from context”). The ALJ properly

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evaluated both the supportability and consistency of PA Medeiros’s opinion, and

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substantial evidence supports his decision to reject the opinion as unpersuasive.

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b. The ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.

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“It is the ALJ’s role to assess a claimant’s [RFC] ‘based on all the relevant evidence’

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in the case file.” Steven R.T. v. Kijakazi, No. 20cv2257-KSC, 2022 WL 2303950, at *11

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(S.D. Cal. June 27, 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)). A claimant’s RFC is an

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administrative finding, not a medical opinion; “the final responsibility for deciding [this

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issue] is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

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Franks argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination “is the product of legal error”

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because the ALJ did not incorporate PA Medeiros’s assessed limitations and failed to

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further develop the record, “instead improperly rel[ying] upon his own lay interpretation

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of the medical record.” (Doc. 14 at 8.) But there is nothing improper about the ALJ

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interpreting the medical record; in fact, it is his duty to do so. Howard ex rel. Wolff v.

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Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ALJ must develop the record and

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interpret the medical evidence.”) (emphasis added).

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As the ALJ explained in his decision, his RFC determination was based on a

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consideration of “all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be

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accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” (AR. 19.)

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In his analysis, the ALJ discussed Franks’s symptom testimony, his daily activities, and

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various clinical findings. (AR. 20–21.) As discussed above, the ALJ also properly

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evaluated PA Medeiros’s opinion and rejected it as unpersuasive. Accordingly, he was not

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obligated to incorporate that opinion into the RFC. Franks’s argument to the contrary is

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essentially an argument for a different interpretation of the evidence—that the ALJ should

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have found PA Medeiros’s opinion persuasive. But this Court cannot “substitute its

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judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Moreover, the ALJ’s finding that COPD is a severe impairment does not necessitate

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the conclusion that his RFC must be “restricted to a light level of exertion,” as Franks

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suggests. (Doc. 14 at 25.) In fact, following that line of reasoning would be violative of the

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ALJ’s obligations because it fails to account for all relevant evidence in the record. See

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Willcockson v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen determining RFC the

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ALJ must consider the observations of treating doctors and others and the claimant’s own

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description of [his] limitations.”). Franks testified that he can lift sixty pounds and that he

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acts as a full-time caregiver to his wife with disabilities. (AR. 33–34.) Franks’s treatment

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records note marked improvement and stability in his conditions. (See, e.g., AR. 398, 404,

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435.) His clinical findings were generally normal. (See, e.g.¸ AR. 394, 400, 407, 442, 449,

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945.) The ALJ properly considered this evidence against the backdrop of Franks’s

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diagnoses and determined the record was inconsistent with a completely debilitating

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impairment. (See AR. 20–22.) Instead, it indicated the ability to maintain a full range of

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medium work. (AR. 21–22.) The ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial

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evidence.

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IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED. The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment accordingly and terminate the case.
Dated this 26th day of September, 2024.

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Douglas L. Rayes
Senior United States District Judge

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