Eaton v. Ryan et al

Filing 15

ORDER that Petitioner's 14 Motion for Reconsideration and request for counsel is DENIED. Signed by Judge G Murray Snow on 6/17/2011.(KMG)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Steven James Eaton,

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Plaintiff,

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vs.

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Charles L. Ryan, et al.,
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Defendant.
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No. CV-10-8134-PHX-GMS (DKD)
ORDER

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Pending before this Court is Petitioner Steven Eaton’s “Request to Appeal and

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Counsel” (Doc. 14), which the Court is treating as a motion for reconsideration of this

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Court’s June 8, 2011 Order, (Doc. 12). For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies

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Petitioner’s motion.

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In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner raised one claim for relief–that he

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was denied his right to appeal. (Doc. 1). Petitioner reasserts that claim and essentially argues

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that he gave his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief to prison officials, and that their failure to

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timely deliver his notice to the court should not be held against him. (Doc. 14). He further

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asserts that “the court should have considered [his] appeal and habeas.” (Id.).

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A district court may alter or amend its decision pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the granting of a motion for reconsideration “is an

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extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,

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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995). Such a motion “‘may not be

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used to relitigate old matters, or to raise argument or present evidence that could have been

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raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5

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(2008) (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1). A

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motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is appropriate “if the district court: (1) is

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presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision

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was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Circuit

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City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 417 F.3d 1060, 1063 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Petitioner’s motion raises an argument that he already asserted in his Objection to

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Judge Duncan’s Report and Recommendation (“R & R”). He does not allege that there is

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newly discovered evidence or that there has been a change in controlling law. Thus, the

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Court assumes that Eaton is arguing that the Court committed clear error.

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In the R & R, Judge Duncan described the discrepancy in Eaton’s statements

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regarding when he first gave his original notice to prison officials. (Doc. 10). As the Court

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explained in footnote 1 of its Order, during the state court proceedings, Petitioner asserted

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that he submitted the notice to prison officials on February 9, 2009, several months before

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he was actually convicted. (Doc. 12). Later he stated that he delivered the notice before the

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90-day deadline expired. As noted in this Court’s Order, Judge Duncan made the factual

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determination that Eaton’s original notice was submitted to prison officials on February 9,

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2010. Petitioner did not object to or even mention this determination. Thus, the Court

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adopted Judge Duncan’s factual determinations, including the date on which Petitioner

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submitted the original notice.

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As this Court noted in its Order, when a claim is procedurally barred, a petitioner must

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demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice. Gray v. Netherland, 518

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U.S. 152, 162 (1996). The Order explained that, even if prison officials failed to file the

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original notice, Petitioner’s notice was nevertheless untimely because it was filed several

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months too late. As a result, Petitioner could not establish cause for the default based on the

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actions of the prison officials. Moreover, he did not describe any additional circumstances
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that would have established cause for his delay in submitting the original notice. Therefore,

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Petitioner was not entitled to relief.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner Eaton’s motion for reconsideration
and request for counsel (Doc. 14) is DENIED.
DATED this 17th day of June, 2011.

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