Schreffler v. Colvin

Filing 20

ORDER, the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed; the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall terminate this case. Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 1/17/14. (REW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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No. CV-13-08051-PCT-NVW

Susan M. Schreffler,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.

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Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security

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Defendant.

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Plaintiff Susan M. Schreffler seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final

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decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under sections 216(i),
223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based
on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed.
I.

A.

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Factual Background

Schreffler was born in November 1962 and was thirty-five years old on the alleged

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BACKGROUND

disability onset date. She has at least a high school education and is able to communicate
in English. She previously worked as a laborer and utility worker at a coal-fired power
plant.

She alleges both psychological and physical medical problems, including

schizoaffective disorder, hypertension, diabetes, heart murmur, osteoporosis, sleep apnea,
osteoarthritis, peripheral neuropathy, and a disc protrusion at lumbar level L5-S1.

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Schreffler has had years of psychological treatment for substance abuse issues, which

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include use of alcohol and methamphetamine.

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B.

Procedural History

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Schreffler applied for disability insurance benefits on February 27, 2008, and for

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supplemental security income on February 29, 2008, alleging disability beginning May 6,

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1998. On June 7, 2011, she appeared with her attorney and testified at a hearing before

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the ALJ.

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On July 19, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision that Schreffler was not disabled

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within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Schreffler’s

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request for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the

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Commissioner’s final decision. On March 13, 2013, Schreffler sought review by this

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Court.

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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the

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ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court

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may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is

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not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d

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625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a

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preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate

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to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether

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substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole

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and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id.

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As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

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interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be

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upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

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III.

FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

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To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security

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Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears

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the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the

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Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

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At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in

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substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not

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disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant

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has

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§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step

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three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of

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impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P

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of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to

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be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the

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claimant’s residual functional capacity and determines whether the claimant is still

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capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not

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disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step,

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where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the

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claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.

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§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is

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disabled. Id.

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“severe”

medically

determinable

physical

or

mental

impairment.

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At step one, the ALJ found that Schreffler meets the insured status requirements of

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the Social Security Act through December 31, 2004, and that she has not engaged in

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substantial gainful activity since May 6, 1998. To obtain disability insurance benefits,

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Schreffler must prove disability before December 31, 2004. To obtain supplemental

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security income, she must prove disability from February 2008 through July 19, 2011.

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At step two, the ALJ found that Schreffler has the following severe combination of

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impairments: polysubstance dependence, anxiety disorder not otherwise specified, and

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mood disorder not otherwise specified. At step three, the ALJ determined that Schreffler

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does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically

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equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404.

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At step four, the ALJ found that, based on all of her impairments, including the
substance abuse disorders, Schreffler:
has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with the
following limitations/restrictions:
 The claimant is limited to simple and repetitive tasks
 The claimant must avoid work related hazards
 The claimant must avoid jobs requiring frequent
interacting with the public, supervisors, and coworkers
 The claimant would miss more than four days [of]
work each month due to substance abuse

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The ALJ further found that Schreffler is unable to perform past relevant work. At step

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five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Schreffler’s age, education, work experience,

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and residual functional capacity based on all of the impairments, including the substance

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use disorders, there are no jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy

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that Schreffler can perform.

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The ALJ made additional findings regarding whether Schreffler would be found

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disabled if she stopped substance use. He found that, if Schreffler stopped the substance

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use, the remaining limitations (anxiety and mood disorders) would cause more than a

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minimal impact on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities; therefore, she

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would continue to have a severe impairment or combination of impairments. If she

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stopped the substance use, she would not have an impairment or combination of

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impairments that meets or medically equals any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R.

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Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If she stopped the substance use, she would have the

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residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b)

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and 416.967(b) except limited to simple and repetitive tasks and only occasional

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interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public. With that residual functional

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capacity, there would be jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy

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that Schreffler could perform.

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The ALJ concluded that because Schreffler would not be disabled if she stopped

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the substance use, her substance use disorder is a contributing factor material to the

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determination of disability, and therefore she has not been disabled within the meaning of

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the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date through the date of his

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decision.

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IV.

ANALYSIS

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Schreffler does not dispute the ALJ’s assessment that alcohol materially

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contributes to her psychological issues of record for most of the period in question. The

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only issue Schreffler raises on appeal is whether the ALJ committed legal error by failing

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to consider her physical impairments. The ALJ’s hearing decision shows that he fully

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considered her alleged physical impairments and sufficiently explained why he did not

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find them to be severe.
Under Social Security Rules,

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No symptom or combination of symptoms can be the basis
for a finding of disability, no matter how genuine the
individual’s complaints may appear to be, unless there are
medical signs and laboratory findings demonstrating the
existence of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment.

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SSR 96-4p; SSR 96-7p. In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding

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subjective pain or other symptoms, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis:

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(1) determine whether the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an

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impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the pain or

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other symptoms alleged; and, if so with no evidence of malingering, (2) reject the

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claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms only by giving specific, clear,

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and convincing reasons for the rejection. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

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2009).

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Schreffler contends that she has the following documented physical problems:

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hypertension, coronary artery disease, irritable bowel syndrome, peripheral neuropathy,

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osteoarthritis, obstructive sleep apnea, and lumbar spondylosis with radiculopathy

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(lumbar disc protrusion). She asserts that the ALJ “misinterpreted the physical problems

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of the claimant because he has apparently not reviewed and not cited the objective

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findings of peripheral neuropathy or lumbar disc protrusion.” In support of that assertion,

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she cites a March 2, 2010 report stating that an electrodiagnostic study reveals evidence

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of peripheral neuropathy in bilateral lower extremities and recommending follow-up with

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the referring physician. She does not cite the September 13, 2010 treatment notes that

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state that she had not started on gabapentin even though it was ordered in February 2010

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to treat pain related to peripheral neuropathy. Schreffler also cites an April 8, 2010 report

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stating that a CT scan shows “small central subligamentous disc protrusion L5-S1.” She

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does not cite any evidence of physical impairment before December 31, 2004, to support

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her claim for disability insurance benefits.

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The ALJ was not required to refer specifically to each of Schreffler’s medical

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records. He stated that Schreffler had sought “very intermittent treatment” for physical

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impairments, “especially knee pain, back pain, and neck pain.” The ALJ identified

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specific medical evidence supporting his finding that Schreffler’s physical impairments

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are not medically determinable or are not severe:

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 February 19, 2008: X-ray of Schreffler’s left knee was normal.

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 May 30, 2008:

Schreffler reported back, neck, and hand pain, and

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worsening of back pain the past two years, but reported the last time she

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had imaging of her back was fifteen years prior. The physical examination

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was normal.

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 June 30, 2008, and July 9, 2008: During treatment for injury to her toe,

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right hand, and left ear, Schreffler did not report any back or other

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musculoskeletal pain.

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 January 31, 2009: Schreffler sought treatment at the emergency room for

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chest pain, headaches, and panic attacks.

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musculoskeletal complaints, multiple diagnostic tests revealed mild to no

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abnormal results, and the physician noted a completely normal exam.

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She did not report any

 February 5, 2009: Schreffler sought treatment for chest pain, shortness of

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breath, and general malaise.

She did not report any musculoskeletal

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complaints, and the physician noted a completely normal exam.

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physician also wrote:

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methamphetamine and alcohol for a long time and then she had used heavy

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“She claims that she had stopped using

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alcohol for 2 days as well as she also used methamphetamine.”

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 Continued intermittent treatment through March 12, 2009:

Schreffler

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complained of chest pain, dizziness, headaches, alcohol-induced injuries,

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numbness, and burning sensation while urinating. Physical examinations

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were “mostly normal.”

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 March 2009: Colonoscopy revealed severe sigmoid diverticulitis. June
2010 CT revealed diverticulosis without diverticulitis.

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 April 11, 2009: Schreffler ambulated without difficulty and was able to get

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on and off the examination table without difficulty. The “mostly normal”

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objective examination did not corroborate her subjective complaints except

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for slight difficulty tandem walking and slightly decreased grip strength

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bilaterally.

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 April 8, 2010: An MRI of the brain revealed normal results.

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 August 10, 2010: Schreffler sought treatment for chest pain, shortness of

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breath, and other symptoms that she thought was a heart attack. She denied

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back pain, joint pain, joint swelling, muscle cramps, muscle weakness,

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stiffness, or arthritis.

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 January 1, 2011: Schreffler sought treatment at the emergency room for

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substance abuse.

She did not report any physical complaints, and the

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physician noted a completely normal physical examination.

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The ALJ noted Schreffler “testified at the hearing that she suffers from severe and

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debilitating back pain, headaches, trouble breathing, and sleep apnea” and “has very

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limited ability to sit, stand, and walk.” Although the ALJ concluded that Schreffler had

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not presented objective medical evidence of a physical impairment that could reasonably

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be expected to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged, he provided

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specific, clear, and convincing reasons for finding Schreffler’s statements concerning the

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intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms not credible to the extent they

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are inconsistent with the residual functional capacity assessment.

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considered the following:

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He expressly

the claimant’s own lack of subjective complaints; the absence
of medically determinable impairments which can reasonably
be expected to produce her symptoms; the absence of
longitudinal records showing regular contact with physicians;
the claimant’s receipt of only routine and conservative
treatment without reasonable or credible explanation; the
claimant’s lack of attempts to obtain relief from pain and
other symptoms; the claimant’s failure to try even prescribed
treatment modalities for relief; the lack of consistency of
claimant’s subjective complaints throughout the medical
record; the claimant’s inconsistent work history and earnings
record even prior to the alleged onset of disability; and the
presence of acknowledged daily activities at a level
fundamentally inconsistent with allegations of disabling
symptoms.
These are specific, clear, and convincing reasons for finding Schreffler’s testimony about
the severity of her symptoms not entirely credible.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security is affirmed.

The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall

terminate this case.
Dated this 17th day of January, 2014

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