Hopi Tribe v. Navajo Nation

Filing 37

ORDER that Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Decision, (Doc. 3 ), is granted. The matter is remanded to the Commission, and the Clerk is directed to terminate this action. FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Hopi Tribe's Second and Third Claims for Relief, (Doc. 15 ), is granted in part and denied in part. FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Hopi Tribe's First Claim for Relief, (Doc. 14 ), is dismissed as moot. Signed by Judge G Murray Snow on 11/8/2013.(KMG)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Hopi Tribe,

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No. CV-13-08172-PCT-GMS
Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER

Navajo Nation,

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Defendant.

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Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Hopi Tribe’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration

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Decision, (Doc. 3), Defendant Navajo Nation’s Motion to Dismiss the Hopi Tribe’s First

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Claim for Relief, (Doc. 14), and Motion to Dismiss the Hopi Tribe’s Second and Third

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Claims for Relief, (Doc. 15). For the reasons discussed below and based on the third

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claim from the Hopi’s Complaint, the Motion to Vacate is granted and the matter is

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remanded to arbitration. The Motion to Dismiss the First Claim is dismissed as moot. The

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Motion to Dismiss the Second and Third Claims is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff

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Hopi

Tribe

and

Defendant

Navajo

Nation

entered

into

an

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Intergovernmental Compact (the “Compact”) settling a long-standing dispute over, in

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part, access to each other’s lands and resources for religious purposes and the

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enforcement of trespass laws and other regulations against religious pilgrims. This action

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arises from a dispute over the meaning and applicability of the Compact.

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///

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///

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In 1934, Congress established a Navajo reservation for the benefit of the Navajo
people and for other Indians already located thereon in northeastern Arizona.1 (Doc. 1
(Compl.) ¶ 3 (citing Masayesva v. Zah, 65 F.3d 1445, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995)).) Forty years
later, Congress passed the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 640d to 640d31, enabling the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe to sue each other as a means of settling
their continuing dispute over which Party was entitled to which lands in the 1934
reservation. Id. That year, the Hopi Tribe commenced an action against the Navajo
Nation in this Court, which culminated in the Compact in 2006. Id.
The Compact was approved and made part of an Order issued by this Court. (Doc.
1 (Compl.) ¶ 3 (citing Order & Final Judgment, Honyoama v. Shirley, Case No. 74-842
(D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2006), Doc. 1149).) Under the Compact, the Parties grant to each other
the right to engage in traditional religious practices in designated areas. Some of those
designated areas are drawn on a confidential map which is attached to the Compact as
Exhibit B. The disputed substantive portion of the Compact states:

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The Navajo Nation grants to the Hopi Tribe, for the use and benefit of all
current and future enrolled members of the Hopi Tribe, a permanent,
irrevocable, prepaid, non-exclusive easement, profit, license, and permit to
come upon the Navajo Lands, and to gather and remove fledgling Golden
Eagles and hawks within the areas depicted on Exhibit B, and to gather and
remove minerals and plant materials for religious and medicinal purposes
from the Navajo Lands generally; provided, however, that such materials
and things shall not be gathered for sale or other commercial purposes. This
Compact does not grant to the Hopi Tribe or its members any easement,
profit, license, permit, or right to gather or remove any Golden Eagle or
hawk from any part of the Navajo Lands outside the areas depicted on
Exhibit B, and this Compact does not prevent, limit or restrict the Navajo
Nation from enforcing any law governing trespass, hunting or interference
with wildlife against any person who comes upon any part of the Navajo

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For purposes of the Navajo Nation’s motions to dismiss, the Court takes as true
the allegations contained in the Hopi Tribe’s Complaint. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213,
1217 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the standard to a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6));
Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying
the same standard to a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(2)).
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Lands outside the areas depicted on Exhibit B for the purpose of gathering
or removing any Golden Eagle or hawk. This Compact does not waive,
limit or restrict any right the Hopi Tribe or its members may have under the
United States Constitution or federal law to come upon any part of the
Navajo Lands outside the areas depicted on Exhibit B for the purpose of
gathering or removing any Golden Eagle or hawk.

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(Doc. 3-1, Ex. 1 (Compact) § 2.4.)
The Parties formed the Compact out of a “desire to resolve both the disputes
involved in the Litigation and others.” (Id. at “Recitals”.) In the event that a dispute does
arise under the Compact and negotiations fail, the Parties waive their sovereign immunity
to resolve it through arbitration or suit as provided in the Compact. (Id. § 8.9.) Arbitration
is conducted before a Joint Commission (the “Commission”) made up of two
representatives from each party and a neutral fifth member. (Id. § 8.1.) It provides an
arbitration framework as follows:
Any dispute arising under this Compact that is not resolved by negotiation
may be submitted to the Joint Commission for arbitration, which shall be
commenced by mailing a written demand for arbitration setting forth in
detail the dispute and the relief requested to each member of the Joint
Commission and the other party, by registered or certified mail, postage
prepaid. Arbitration before the Joint Commission shall be the only
procedure and the only forum for resolution of such disputes unless and
until the Joint Commission shall fail to make a decision within the period
specified in Section 8.4.
The Joint Commission shall establish its own rules and procedures not
inconsistent with the terms of this Compact for the resolution of any dispute
which is the subject of a demand for arbitration, hearing such evidence and
argument as it may, in its discretion, choose to accept. When any dispute is
so submitted, the Joint Commission shall decide and resolve the dispute by
issuing a written Decision and Award signed by a majority of the 5
members within 180 days after the date on which the demand for arbitration
shall have been mailed to the last of the members of the Joint Commission
and the other party.
The Joint Commission in its Decision and Award shall have the authority to
issue restraining orders, injunctions, declaratory judgments, and orders of
specific performance enforcing the terms of this Compact, but shall not

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have the authority to award damages, attorneys’ fees, or the costs of
arbitration.
(Id. §§ 8.3–8.5.)

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The Compact authorizes federal court review of arbitration decisions and awards

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by this Court, but they “may be vacated or modified only on the grounds permitted under

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the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C § 1 et seq.) as it exists on the Effective Date.” (Id. §

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8.6.) In limited circumstances, the Compact also allows for original enforcement and

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dispute resolution proceedings in this Court. (Id. §§ 8.7–8.8.) This only occurs if the

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neutral fifth member of the Commission is not serving or appointed, or if the

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Commission “shall fail to issue a Decision and Award” within 180 days. (Id.)

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In May 2012, a Navajo law enforcement officer stopped a member of the Hopi

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Tribe who was accessing a religious site located within a designated area that the officer

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believed was also part of an “allotment.” (Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 41.) Allotments are parcels

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of land awarded by Congress to individual members of Indian tribes under the General

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Allotment Act (the “GAA”) and held in trust by the Secretary of the Interior of the United

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States. (Id. ¶ 42.) It is now uncontested that the site was not on an allotment, but the Hopi

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Tribe member may have entered or crossed an allotment at some earlier point. After the

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incident, the Parties entered into negotiations to resolve their dispute over access to

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allotted lands within the designated areas but were unsuccessful. (Id. ¶ 48.)

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The Navajo Nation has alerted the Hopi Tribe that criminal prosecution will

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follow future incidents involving Hopis accessing allotments. (Id. ¶ 45.) The Navajo

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Nation alleges that it does not have the authority to grant access to allotments. (Id. ¶ 46.)

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The Hopi Tribe maintains that, regardless of the allotted status of some of the land, the

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Tribe has been granted access to the designated areas under the Compact or that at a

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minimum the Navajo Nation has agreed not to interfere with access to the designated

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areas. (Id. ¶¶ 38–39.)

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On October 23, 2012, the Hopi Tribe made a Demand for Arbitration to the

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Commission. (Id. ¶ 48.) The Hopi Tribe alleged that the Navajo Nation had breached the

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Compact by denying access to allotments, and it requested2

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a declaratory judgment and an order of specific performance that . . .
members of the Hopi Tribe can access and collect golden eagles and hawks
from all areas depicted on Exhibit B in accordance with the terms of the
Compact, without regard to the land status of the underlying lands,
including whether the lands have been “allotted” to individual members of
the Navajo Nation . . . .

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The Hopi Tribe also seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction
enjoining the Navajo Nation from . . . interfering with Hopi religious
practitioners who access or gather eagles from the areas depicted on Exhibit
B in accordance with the terms of the Compact, including, but not limited
to, barring the Navajo Nation from bringing any legal action against
members of the Hopi Tribe for coming onto or collecting eagles from
“allotments” within the areas depicted on the Exhibit B map . . . .

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(Doc. 21, Ex. 2 (Demand for Arbitration) at 7–8.)

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In response, the Navajo Nation filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

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and authority to grant relief on November 30, 2012. (Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 56; Doc. 21-1,

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Ex. 4 (Navajo Nation’s Mot. to Dismiss).) The Nation argued that the Commission lacked

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authority and jurisdiction to grant the Hopi Tribe relief for three reasons: (1) the language

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of the Compact does not grant or require access to allotted lands; (2) the requested relief

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implicates property rights held by allottees and the United States which are not parties to

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the Compact and have not subjected themselves to the Commission’s jurisdiction; and (3)

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the allottees and the United States are necessary parties to any proceeding in which such

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relief can be obtained, but have not been and cannot be joined in the arbitration. (Doc.

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21-1, Ex. 4 (Navajo Nation’s Mot. to Dismiss) at 2, 5–6.)

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At an arbitration hearing on April 9, 2013, Judge Kenneth Fields stated the

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The Hopi Tribe also alleged that the Navajo Nation was not performing its
obligations under Article 4 of the Compact to prevent new development in NonDevelopment Zones depicted therein. Although the Hopi Tribe submitted that dispute to
arbitration, it does not bring that dispute to this Court. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15, 18.)
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Commission’s intention that it would grant the Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
(Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 59; Doc. 21-2, Ex. 6 (April 9, 2013 Hearing) at 90, 92.) On April 17,
the Commission issued a written Decision granting the Motion. (Doc. 21-2, Ex. 9
(Arbitration Decision).) The Decision states that “[the Commission] lacks jurisdiction to
consider the dispute involving allotted lands since it has no jurisdiction over the allotment
holders and the U.S. Secretary of the Interior (the allotment trustee) under the [Compact].
The jurisdiction lies with the United States District Court.” (Id. at 2.) Further, “should the
U.S. Courts determine that the Joint Commission has jurisdiction over the allotments then
the Commission would take such jurisdiction.” (Id.)
The Hopi Tribe filed this action on July 5. (Doc. 1 (Compl.).) The Tribe first
alleges breach of the Compact and brings that claim under Section 8.8 because it asserts
that the Commission failed to issue a Decision and Award. (Id. at 12–13.) Next, the
Tribe alleges that the Commission’s decision to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction
should be vacated under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) for failure to hear evidence
pursuant, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), and to make a mutual, final, and definite arbitration award,
id. § 10(a)(4). (Id. at 13–15.) The Tribe requests the Court to declare that the Navajo
Nation agreed not to prevent access to the allotted lands within its boundaries to the Tribe
and that the Nation may fulfill that agreement by not enforcing regulatory laws on those
lands. (Id. at 15.) The Tribe further requests the Court to enjoin the Nation from taking
any enforcement actions against members of the Tribe for accessing sites on the
allotments. (Id.) In the alternative, the Tribe seeks an order vacating the Commission’s
decision, finding that the Commission has jurisdiction, and remanding the matter for an
evidentiary hearing and ruling on the merits. (Id.)
The Hopi Tribe filed a separate Motion to vacate the arbitration on the grounds
described above. (Doc. 3.) The Navajo Nation moved to dismiss all of the Hopi Tribe’s
claims. (Docs. 14, 23.) This Court held a hearing on the matter on October 18, 2013.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Order of Remedies
The Hopi Tribe asks the Court for two alternative forms of relief based on

different enforcement mechanisms provided in the Compact. Initially it asks for this
Court to resolve the dispute under section 8.8 of the Compact, which authorizes direct
litigation in this Court if the Commission fails to issue a timely “Decision and Award.” In
the alternative, it asks the Court to vacate the Commission’s determination that it lacked
jurisdiction and remand under section 8.5, which authorizes judicial review pursuant to
the FAA. The Court must consider whether the Compact indicates which mechanism of
relief should be considered first.
The Compact establishes a clear hierarchy for enforcement and dispute resolution.
First, section 8.2 states that the parties “shall attempt in good faith to negotiate and
resolve any dispute arising under this Compact.” (Doc. 3-1, Ex. 1 (Compact) § 8.2.)
These negotiations must occur before the dispute can be submitted to the Commission for
arbitration. (Id. §§ 8.2–8.3.) Arbitration before the Commission is the next step in the
hierarchy, and “shall be the only procedure and the only forum for resolution of such
disputes unless and until the Joint Commission shall fail to make a decision within [180
days].” (Id. § 8.3.) While this Court may review the outcome of arbitration, direct
litigation in this Court is only permitted “[i]n the event” that the Commission is missing
its neutral fifth member or that it “fail[s] to issue a Decision and Award within [180
days].” (Id. § 8.3.)
The Compact makes it clear that negotiation between the Parties is the preferred
method of resolution followed by an arbitration in which both Parties are represented on
the Commission. Direct litigation in this Court is only permitted in two narrow and
exceptional circumstances. This is in keeping with the recitals in the Compact which
emphasize the sovereign autonomy of the parties and their desires to live in harmony as
neighbors. (Id. at “Recitals.”) The Court will therefore address whether relief can be
granted by reviewing the Commission’s arbitration decision under the FAA before
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considering the exceptional mechanism of direct litigation.
II.

Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act
Under the Compact, the Parties waive sovereign immunity to authorize this Court

to vacate or modify a decision of the Commission “only on the grounds permitted under
the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §1 et seq.) as it exists on the Effective Date.” (Doc.
3-1, Ex. 1 (Compact) § 8.6.) The FAA authorizes district courts to enforce or vacate an
arbitration award entered pursuant to an agreement between parties. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–
11. Judicial review of an arbitration award is “both limited and highly deferential.”
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009). The Act
permits vacatur of arbitration awards in several circumstances, including:

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(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in . . .
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced; or . . .
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

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9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). The burden of establishing grounds for vacatur is on the party

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seeking it. U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat’l Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir.

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2010). The Hopi Tribe argues for vacatur for two reasons.

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First, the Hopi Tribe contends that the Commission refused to hear pertinent and

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material evidence before dismissing the Demand for Arbitration. Under the FAA, an

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arbitrator must provide parties with an “adequate opportunity to present its evidence and

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arguments.” U.S. Life, 591 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Sunshine Mining Co. v. United

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Steelworkers of Am., 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987)). Nonetheless, arbitrators enjoy

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“wide discretion to require the exchange of evidence, and to admit or exclude evidence,

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how and when they see fit.” U.S. Life, 591 F.3d at 1175 (internal citation omitted).

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Second, the Hopi Tribe also argues that by dismissing its claims for lack of

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jurisdiction, and not resolving the dispute over the meaning of the Compact, the

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Commission exceeded its powers or imperfectly executed them. “The Federal Arbitration

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Act ‘requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other
contracts, in accordance with their terms.’” W. Employers Ins. Co. v. Jefferies & Co.,
Inc., 958 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). Parties “have a right to arbitration according to the
terms for which it contracted,” and “arbitrators can also ‘exceed their powers’ . . . when
they fail to meet their obligations, as specified in a given contract, to the parties. Id. at
261–62 (emphasis in original).
Here, the parties entered into a Compact and agreed that its terms would be
binding upon both the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe. As part of that contractual
agreement, they agreed that “any dispute arising under [the] Compact” would be resolved
through the procedures established by the Compact. (Doc. 3-1, Ex. 1 (Compact) §§ 8.2–
8.3.) In most cases, including this one, arbitration between the two parties before the
Commission was agreed to be “the only procedure and the only forum for resolution of
such disputes.” (Id. § 8.4.) The Compact explicitly provides that tribal members do not
“have the right as an individual to institute or participate in any legal proceeding
involving [the] Compact.” (Id. § 8.4.) Therefore, the Compact clearly dictates that
arbitration before the Commission, involving only the two parties to the Compact, is the
only forum and only procedure in which to resolve disputes about the meaning of the
Compact.
The Commission exceeded its powers when it determined that the federal court
and not the Commission should resolve the dispute over the meaning of the Compact
because in doing so it failed to meet its obligation to provide arbitration according to the
terms of the Compact. The parties only agreed to relinquish their sovereign immunity and
be sued in federal courts so that the District of Arizona could conduct a review of the
Commission’s decisions as limited by the Federal Arbitration Act, or in the exceptional
case where the Commission is not properly constituted or fails to issue a Decision and
Award. The agreement by both Parties to submit to arbitration is a fundamental aspect of
the Compact because the sovereign immunity of both Parties limits the availability of
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standard judicial proceedings. In other words, a claim that the Navajo Nation agreed
under the Compact not to prosecute Hopis present on allotted lands that fall within the
boundaries of the Navajo Nation when the Hopis are accessing such lands for purposes
identified in the Compact would have to be brought in the first instance to the
Commission and not to federal court. It could not be brought in federal court because the
Tribes have not agreed to waive their sovereign immunity to bring it here in the first
instance. This reality does not change merely because the overall nature of the claim also
implicates the interests of the holders of the allotment and the federal government as their
Trustee. The Commission has the jurisdiction to interpret and implement the terms of the
Compact as among those who are bound by it. It is, in fact, the only entity that, barring
one of the exceptions discussed above, has such jurisdiction in the first instance.
While the Commission can decide what the parties did or did not agree to do under
the Compact with respect to allotted lands, this decision does not necessarily bind the
allottees or the federal government as their Trustee in determining what Hopis, as a legal
matter, may or may not do as an absolute matter on allotted lands within the Navajo
Nation Indian Reservation. It can only bind those to whom the Compact extends.
Nevertheless, that the Commission may not be able to resolve all the rights of all persons
as it relates to such allotted lands, does not prevent the Commission from deciding what
the Compact permits and to whom it applies, subject to the limited review provided this
Court by the Compact itself.
Here, the Commission chose not to resolve a dispute over the meaning of the
Compact out of apparent concern as to what the practical effect of its interpretation might
be on non-parties to the Compact. Nevertheless, the Commission, in this respect, is not
akin to a court of law. It is neither its job, nor its jurisdiction, to adjudicate or even to
protect all conceivable rights pertaining to the affected land within either of the
reservations. Such a function belongs to the nations who govern such land, and to the
extent it may be applicable, to the United States government as trustee. The job of the
Commission is to determine the extent to which, if any, the parties to the Compact have
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agreed to act or not to act with respect to the activities that are the subject of the
Compact. It is not the job of the commission to decide the rights that the allottees
themselves may have against their own governments under tribal, or other law. Nor is it
the job of the Commission to apply any other possibly applicable tribal or federal law,
except the terms of the Compact. The reality that its decision may have some practical
effects on others does not relieve it from resolving, in the first instance, the dispute about
the meaning of the Compact and then determining what orders it may or may not issue in
order to bring those bound by the Compact into compliance.
There is no requirement that every person who might be affected by an arbitration
must be a party in the arbitration proceedings. Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass’n, Inc., 230
F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2000). In Lindland, a wrestler who did not make the Olympic
team prevailed in an arbitration proceeding that ordered a rematch in which the wrestler
won. Id. at 1037. The United States Olympic Committee and USA Wrestling argued that
the arbitration award was not valid because another wrestler, who would lose his spot on
the Olympic team, was not included in the arbitration. Id. at 1039. The court held that

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“[t]he notion, advanced . . . , that an arbitration must include
all persons who could be affected by the outcome is novel and
would work a revolution in arbitral proceedings. Neither
[organization] has cited any authority for the proposition that
a person potentially affected by an arbitration is a necessary
party to it.”

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Id. The court went on to note that the other, non-party wrestler is “not ‘bound’ by the
result, but USA Wrestling is, and it must implement the award.” Id. As shown in
Lindland, the Commission can resolve the arbitration dispute between the Parties even if
the rights of third-parties may be affected. In this case, the parties explicitly agreed in the
Compact that no other party may ever be included in a dispute over the meaning of the
Compact.
The Commission must determine the obligations of the Parties under the Compact
before it can determine the appropriate remedies. The Parties disagree about the
interpretation of the Compact. The Commission must look at the language of the
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Compact and any parole evidence permitted under the construction provisions of the
Compact itself to determine whether the Navajo Nation promised either rights of access
or rights against enforcement.
The Commission has broad remedial authority to implement its interpretation of
the Compact. This Court will not address the permissibility of the various remedies the
Parties have suggested, having no need to do so unless and until it is appropriate for this
Court to again take up this matter.
In addition to the arguments over the legality of various remedies, the Hopi Tribe
and Navajo Nation make various other arguments that do not affect the outcome here.
The Hopi argue that the Commission did not consider material evidence in reaching its
decision, but the Commission never reached the meaning of the Compact in a way that
would have required it to hear evidence on that issue. The Navajo Nation argues that the
outcome of arbitration should be given great deference. However, the Commission
determined that it had no jurisdiction and therefore it made no award. It made no factual
determinations or interpretation of the Compact and so there is little for this Court to
defer to.3 The only legal determination the Commission made was that it lacked
jurisdiction and that the dispute should be heard in this Court. As discussed above, that
determination was mistaken.
The Commission explicitly ruled that if this Court determines that the Commission
has jurisdiction then it would hear the matter. The Commission has jurisdiction over this
matter because it is a dispute arising under the Compact. To the extent that the
Commission interprets the Hopi Tribe to request it to order relief against the allotment

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While the Commission did generally say that it was granting the motion to
dismiss for the reasons stated in the Navajo Nation’s motion, that does not mean that it
adopted every legal position advanced in that motion. In fact the written decision and
order specifies that the motion was granted in part and denied in part. Critically, if the
Commission had actually adopted the Navajo Nation’s position that the Compact does
not cover allotted lands, then there would have been no reason to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over those lands.
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holders directly, it need not do so unless for some reason or purposes it determines that
they are covered by the terms of the Compact.

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CONCLUSION

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The Commission has jurisdiction to decide the meaning of the Compact and has
the authority to direct those bound by the Compact to fulfill their commitments under it.
Therefore, the Commission’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is vacated and the matter is
remanded for further action by the Commission. Because arbitration by the Commission
is the preferred method of dispute resolution, the Court will not consider whether the
exceptional method of direct litigation in this Court might also have been permissible
under section 8.8.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration
Decision, (Doc. 3), is granted. The matter is remanded to the Commission, and the Clerk
is directed to terminate this action.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Hopi
Tribe’s Second and Third Claims for Relief, (Doc. 15), is granted in part and denied in
part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Hopi
Tribe’s First Claim for Relief, (Doc. 14), is dismissed as moot.
Dated this 8th day of November, 2013.

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