Steely-Judice v. Taylor Fine Art LLC

Filing 30

ORDER granting 22 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action and enter judgment. Signed by Judge G Murray Snow on 1/9/17.(LSP)

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WO

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Marcell Louise Steely-Judice,
Plaintiff,

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ORDER

v.

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No. CV-14-08238-PCT-GMS

Taylor Fine Art LLC,

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Defendant.

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Pending before the Court is Defendant Taylor Fine Art, LLC’s (“Taylor Gallery”)

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Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 22). For the following reasons, the motion is

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granted.

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BACKGROUND

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Taylor Gallery is an art gallery in Sedona, Arizona. (Doc. 23 at 1.) It employs

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sales consultants throughout the gallery, and expects these employees to have “great

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attitudes, be good team players, and have the desire to succeed.” (Id.) Taylor Gallery

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also upholds a professional dress code among its employees, and specifically prohibits its

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employees from wearing “flip-flop or thong sandals” while working. (Id. at 2.)

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Plaintiff Marcell Steely-Judice suffers back pain stemming from an injury in the

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1990’s that resulted in a broken back. (Doc. 23 at 3; Doc. 27 at 2.) Steely-Judice finds

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that changing her shoes throughout the day helps alleviate her back pain. (Doc. 23 at 5;

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Doc. 27 at 4.)

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orthopedic Dansk clogs and a pair of sandals. (Doc. 23 at 4; Doc. 27 at 4.)

Steely-Judice switches between two shoes in particular; a pair of

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Steely-Judice joined Taylor Gallery as a sales consultant on September 20, 2013.

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(Doc. 23 at 3; Doc. 27 at 2.) She worked there for a total of four days. (Doc. 23 at 6.)

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On her first day, Steely-Judice wore her Dansk clogs to work. (Doc. 23 at 4; Doc. 27 at

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3.) On her second day, she switched between the clogs and the sandals. (Doc. 23 at 5;

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Doc. 27 at 4.) The gallery director and Steely-Judice’s supervisor, Ms. Krista Drake,

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informed her that the sandals did not comply with Taylor Gallery’s dress code, and that

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she could not wear them to work. (Doc. 23 at 5; Doc. 27 at 4.) Steely-Judice told Drake

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that she needed to switch between shoes to manage her pain. (Id.) Drake told Steely-

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Judice that she would ask the owner, Michael Taylor, whether she could wear the sandals

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despite the fact that they violated the dress code. (Doc. 23 at 6; Doc. 27 at 4.) On the

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third day, Steely-Judice was informed that she could not wear the sandals during her

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shifts because they did not comply with the dress code. (Id.) Michael Taylor discharged

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Steely-Judice on the morning of her fourth day. (Id.)

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Taylor Gallery asserts that it discharged Steely-Judice due to her allegedly

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combative personality. (Doc. 23 at 7.) According to Drake, Steely-Judice was “angry,

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combative and pushy” during her shifts. (Id. at 5.) Steely-Judice argues that she was

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discharged due to her disability and her resulting request for an accommodation to wear

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shoes that did not comply with the dress code. (Doc. 27 at 5.) She further asserts that the

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“personality conflict” cited by Taylor Galley is merely a pretext for the true reason she

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was discharged. (Id. at 6.) Taylor Galley’s employees testified that the personality

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conflict was the sole reason behind Steely-Judice’s dismissal. (Doc. 23 at 6.) Taylor

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Gallery now moves for summary judgment against Steely-Judice.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standard

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Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most

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favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to
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any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 56(a). Substantive law determines which facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over

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facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

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preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

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242, 248 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

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could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.,

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281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Thus, the

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nonmoving party must show that the genuine factual issues “‘can be resolved only by a

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finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’” Cal.

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Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th

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Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).

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Although “[t]he evidence of [the non-moving party] is to be believed, and all

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justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor,” the non-moving party “must do more

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than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

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facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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The nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory

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allegations unsupported by facts. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

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“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the

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assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or other materials;

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or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a

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genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support

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the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in

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ruling on a motion for summary judgment,” and evidence must be authenticated before it

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can be considered. Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 773–74 (9th Cir. 2002).

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II.

The Americans with Disabilities Act

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The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) ensures that no employer “shall

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discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job

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application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
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compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”

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42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA provides a private right of action for employees that

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have been wrongfully discharged. To state a prima facie case, the employee “must

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establish that he is a qualified individual with a disability and that the employer

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terminated him because of his disability.” Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d

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1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001).

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under the ADA, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a “legitimate,

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nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.” Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540

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U.S. 44, 50 (2003). If such a reason is provided, then the inquiry becomes “whether

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respondent [can] produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that

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‘petitioner’s stated reason for respondent’s rejection was in fact pretext.’” Id. at 52

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(quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).

Once the employee establishes a prima facie claim

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“A plaintiff can show pretext directly, by showing that discrimination more likely

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motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the employer’s explanation is

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unworthy of credence.” Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.

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2003), as amended (Jan. 2, 2004). However, “[t]o show pretext using circumstantial

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evidence, a plaintiff must put forward specific and substantial evidence challenging the

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credibility of the employer’s motives.” Id. at 642. “[A]n employee’s subjective personal

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judgments of her competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of material fact,” and

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thus a plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext by arguing that she believed she was doing an

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adequate job, even if she “had no feedback indicating otherwise” from her employer prior

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to being discharged.

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1996).

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.

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“In some cases, temporal proximity can by itself constitute sufficient

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circumstantial evidence of retaliation for purposes of both the prima facie case and the

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showing of pretext.” Dawson v. Entek Int'l, 630 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2011). However,

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temporal proximity “is ordinarily insufficient to satisfy the secondary burden to provide

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evidence of pretext.” Hooker v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 548 F. App'x 368, 370 (9th Cir.
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2013). Furthermore, in cases “where the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and

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the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of

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time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.” Bradley, 104

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F.3d at 270–71. Therefore, temporal proximity is a less persuasive argument where an

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employee was only employed for a short period of time. Id.

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In the case at hand, it is unnecessary to address whether Steely-Judice presented a

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prima facie case under the ADA because she fails to present specific and substantial

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evidence to support her claim that Taylor Gallery’s nondiscriminatory rationale for her

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dismissal is pretext.

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Taylor Gallery asserts that Steely-Judice was dismissed solely due to her

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combative attitude, specifically due to her failure to get along with her manager. Steely-

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Judice asserts that this non-discriminatory rationale is pretext. However, she is unable to

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present specific and substantial evidence challenging Taylor Gallery’s motives, and thus

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summary judgment is appropriate. Steely-Judice argues that she believed that she was

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doing a satisfactory job, and that she was interviewed in person and selected for the job.

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However, her subjective belief that she was doing a good job is insufficient to challenge

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her employers’ rationale for dismissing her. Bradley, 104 F.3d at 270.

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The only valid argument Steely-Judice presents in favor of pretext is the temporal

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proximity of her request for an accommodation and her discharge. However, in this case,

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Steely-Judice only worked at the gallery for four days. The same individual that hired

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her, Michael Taylor, is the same individual that discharged her. This is not one of the

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exceptional cases where temporal proximity to the request for accommodation and the

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discharge is sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to pretext. See Bradley, 104 F.3d at

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270–71.

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CONCLUSION

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Because Steely-Judice cannot present significant and substantial evidence to

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challenge Taylor Gallery’s nondiscriminatory rationale for discharging her, the

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Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary

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Judgment, (Doc. 22), is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this

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action and enter judgment accordingly.

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Dated this 9th day of January, 2017.

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Honorable G. Murray Snow
United States District Judge

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