Miller-Kidd v. Ducey et al

Filing 44

ORDER - The Motion to Strike (Doc. 37 ) is denied. The Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 27 , 29 ) are granted. The amended complaint and this case are dismissed and the Clerk shall terminate this action and enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Steven P Logan on 3/23/18. (DXD)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Danny L. Miller-Kidd,

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Plaintiff,
vs.

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Doug Ducey, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. CV-17-08019-PCT-SPL
ORDER

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On February 13, 2017, pro se Plaintiff Danny L. Miller-Kidd filed an amended

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complaint against Elizabeth Moss, an Assistant Arizona Attorney General, Tracy

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Stevens, a case manager for the Arizona Department of Child Safety, and Arizona

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Governor Doug Ducey.1 (Doc. 5.) Stevens and Moss have moved to dismiss the

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complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure. (Doc. 12.) After considering the parties’ filings,2 the Court finds that it lacks

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jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman and will dismiss this action.

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Miller alleges that on September 14, 2013, minor child K.M. and her siblings were

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removed by the State from their mother and were placed into foster care. (Doc. 5 ¶ 10.) A

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Ducey was dismissed from this action on April 11, 2017. (Doc. 8.)

Several of Miller’s submissions in this case have been filed and/or signed by a
non-lawyer proxy, inmate JD Merrick, who the parties have advised is Miller’s brother.
(See e.g., Docs. 33 & 34.) While the federal rules generally do not permit non-lawyers to
represent parties in federal court, as a matter of discretion and judicial economy, the
Court has considered the filings. Miller is forewarned however that further filings of this
kind will be summarily stricken by the Court.

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publication hearing was held on December 8, 2014 in the Mohave County Superior

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Court, at which time Judge Richard Weiss entered an order of default as to all putative

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fathers of K.M., thereby terminating their parental rights. (Doc. 5 ¶¶ 17, 26.) Miller

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alleges that in the weeks that followed, he was alerted by a relative of K.M. that he was

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possibly her biological father. (Doc. 5 ¶ 18.) Miller contacted Stevens and underwent

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DNA testing, the results of which confirmed on May 5, 2015 that he was K.M.’s father.

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(Doc. 5 ¶¶ 18 - 22.) Unbeknownst to Miller, however, K.M. and her siblings had been

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adopted the previous month. (Doc. 5 ¶ 24.) On August 24, 2015, Miller, through counsel,

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moved to intervene in the state court proceedings and to set aside the adoption of K.M.

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(Doc. 5 ¶ 26.) The state court denied the motion on October 15, 2015, reasoning: “There

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is no pending case to intervene in, as this case was dismissed as to K.M. on or about June

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8, 2015. This matter is not the adoption file and the father appears to have established

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paternity by genetic testing prior to the termination order. The father, although known to

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Department of Child Services, never participated in any court proceeding. He was

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defaulted as a John Doe father at a Publication Hearing held December 8, 2014.” (Doc. 5

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¶ 26.) Miller states that he pursued other avenues for relief in state court such as a “Writ

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of Habeas Corpus, Special Action, etc.,” but “[i]n every instance the court refused to

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hear” him. (Doc. 5 ¶ 27.)

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In his amended complaint, Miller brings three claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §

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1983 and asks for nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages against each defendant

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and judgment of the Court: (1) declaring that Stevens and Moss violated his “parental and

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constitutional rights and protections under the United States Constitution”; (2) declaring

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that Arizona Revised Statute § “8-106.01 et seq. that the court relied [on] to terminate

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[Miller’s] parental rights violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, and or Fourteenth Amendment

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rights under the United States Constitution”; (3) invalidating the adoption of K.M.;

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restoring Miller’s “right to due process”; reinstating Miller’s parental rights to K.M.; and

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remanding K.M. into the custody of Miller. (Doc. 5 ¶¶ 35-37.)

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine instructs that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear
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a direct appeal of a state court judgment3 or any “‘de facto equivalent’ of such an

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appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341

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F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003)). A federal cause of action functions as a “forbidden de

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facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains

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of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the

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judgment of that court.” Cooper, 704 F.3d at 777-78; Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. See also

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Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (the

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doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-

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court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

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district court review and rejection of those judgments.”). “Once a federal plaintiff seeks

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to bring a forbidden de facto appeal,… that federal plaintiff may not seek to litigate an

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issue that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judicial decision from which

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the forbidden de facto appeal is brought.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158.

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Here, each of Miller’s claims hinge on the allegation that the state court’s

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termination of his parental rights deprived him of his constitutional rights, and he asks

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that this Court invalidate the state court’s order of adoption on that basis. In other words,

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Miller challenges adverse state court orders and seeks relief from them in federal court,

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which is precisely the type of de facto appeal that Rooker-Feldman bars. See Cooper, 704

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F.3d at 777-78.

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Miller’s claims against Steven and Moss arising from their acts or omissions in

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connection with the state court proceedings are inextricably intertwined with the de facto

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appeal of the state court’s rulings and final judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158;

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Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2003). Miller does not argue that

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either defendant caused him some independent injury. Cf. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. Rather,

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Miller complains of harm caused by the state court’s judgment. (See Doc. 34 at 7 (“If not

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for their actions, the family court would not have defaulted Plaintiff or Plaintiff would

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The doctrine applies to both final judgments and “interlocutory state court
decisions.” Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.
2001).
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have been able to intervene for just cause before K.M.’s adoption.”); Doc. 5 ¶ 34 (“Moss

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and Stevens individually and or jointly caused the Plaintiff to lose any and all rights to his

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biological daughter, to include but not limited to custody and all rights guaranteed him

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and his biological daughter”).) Therefore, the claims against Steven and Moss for their

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actions are barred under Rooker-Feldman.

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Miller’s alternative claim challenging the constitutionality of Arizona’s putative

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fathers registry provision, cited as “A.R.S. [§] 8-106.01 et seq.,” also is inextricably

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intertwined with his de facto appeal. Although the introduction in his pleading attempts to

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allude otherwise (see Doc. 5 ¶ 2), Miller does not bring a general constitutional attack on

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the validity of the state statute that is independent of the state court’s rulings and

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judgment. Cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 534 (2011). Rather, Miller challenges the

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constitutionality of the application of the statute by the state court in his case; indeed, his

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claim specifically requests that the Court declare the statute on which the state “court

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relied to terminate [his] parental rights” to be unconstitutional. (Doc. 5 ¶ 36; see also e.g.,

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Doc. 5 ¶ 30 (“The statute allows judges in the State of Arizona to strip away the

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Plaintiff’s rights as a father”).) It follows that the claim is inextricably intertwined

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because the relief requested would effectively reverse the state court judgment or void its

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ruling. See Cooper, 704 F.3d at 778-81; Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898. (Doc. 33 at 9

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(“Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that if not for the unconstitutional actions of the defendants

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– and the unconstitutionality of the statute, ARS 8-106.01 et seq. – the court conducting

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adoption proceedings could not by law permit the adoption of Plaintiff’s daughter.”).)

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This claim is therefore also barred under Rooker-Feldman.

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Lastly, Miller’s argument that his claims are not barred under Rooker-Feldman

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because he is not a “losing party” is unavailing. (Doc. 33 at 9.) By his own allegations,

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Miller was indisputably a party to the action as his parental rights were defaulted, and

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thus, he was directly bound by the state court judgment whether or not he was allowed to

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intervene in the case after it became final.

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Accepting Miller’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his
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favor, the Court finds that they are insufficient as a legal matter to invoke the Court’s

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jurisdiction. See Snyder & Associates Acquisitions LLC v. United States, 859 F.3d 1152,

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1157 (9th Cir. 2017); Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014); Kougasian

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v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court finds that the

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jurisdictional deficiency in the amended complaint cannot be cured by the addition of

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known or discoverable facts that are consistent with the present allegations. It therefore

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concludes that further development of the record is not warranted and will dismiss the

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amended complaint without leave to amend. See U.S. v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d

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984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011); Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2010);

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Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

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1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED:

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1. That the Motion to Strike (Doc. 37) is denied;

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2. That the Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 27, 29) are granted;

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3. That the amended complaint and this case are dismissed; and

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4. That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action and enter judgment

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accordingly.
Dated this 23rd day of March, 2018.

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Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge

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