Leland et al v. Yavapai, County of et al

Filing 267

ORDER granting 172 Renewed Motion to Strike Defendants' Notice of Non-Parties at Fault. Signed by Judge Steven P Logan on 6/27/19. (DXD)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Valerie Leland, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
vs.
County of Yavapai, et al.,

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Defendants.

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No. CV-17-08159-PCT-SPL
ORDER

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Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Strike Defendants’ Notice of

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Non-Parties at Fault (Doc. 172), Yavapai Defendants’ Response (Doc. 174), Wexford

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Defendants’ Joinder (Doc. 175), and Plaintiffs’ Reply (Doc. 176). For the following

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reasons, the Motion will be granted.

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I.

Background

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On May 9, 2016, decedent Frances Wright was arrested for failing to appear for a

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previously scheduled court hearing. (Doc. 13-1 at 4.) At the time of her arrest, Ms. Wright

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was at the home of Andrea Neff. (Doc. 174 at 4.) Ms. Wright allegedly ingested a large

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amount of drugs immediately prior to being arrested, though it is unknown whether Ms.

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Neff has any knowledge of such drug use. (Doc. 174 at 4-5.) Upon being arrested and

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booked into the Yavapai County jail, Ms. Wright was assigned to the jail’s infirmary

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because she self-reported on her medical intake form that she had taken drugs at 10 a.m.

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that morning, was currently detoxing, and had issues with withdrawing. (Doc. 13-1 at 3;

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Doc. 192, Ex. G.)

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In the infirmary cell with Ms. Wright were Johanna Hoffman, Katharine Davenport,

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Teddy Brake, and Elizabeth Blevins (collectively, “Ms. Wright’s cellmates”). (Doc. 174 at

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6.) Ms. Wright allegedly told Ms. Davenport, Ms. Hoffman, and Ms. Brake that she had

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ingested a large amount of drugs immediately before she was arrested. (Doc. 174 at 6.) It

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is not clear whether Ms. Blevins knew this information. (Doc. 174 at 6.) During Ms.

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Wright’s medical deterioration over a period of days, Ms. Wright’s cellmates notified

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medical professionals and other jail personnel about Ms. Wright’s medical condition by

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using the jail call button. (Doc. 174 at 6.) They did not inform anyone of Ms. Wright’s

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alleged statements regarding her drug use prior to being arrested. (Doc. 174 at 6.)

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On August 8, 2017, this case was removed from Yavapai County Superior Court to

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this Court. (Doc. 1.) On January 12, 2018, Defendants filed a Notice of Nonparties at Fault,

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pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2506(B) and Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5), which named Ms. Wright,

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Ms. Neff, Ms. Wright’s cellmates, and “Ms. Wright’s unidentified illegal drug dealers or

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suppliers” as nonparties at fault. (Docs. 51, 52.) On February 5, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a

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motion to strike Defendants’ Notice. (Doc. 56.) On February 20, 2018, Defendants

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responded (Docs. 57, 58), and Plaintiffs replied on February 27, 2018 (Doc. 62). On March

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9, 2018, this Court struck Ms. Wright as a nonparty and denied the motion without

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prejudice as to the others because discovery had not yet been completed. (Doc. 63.) On

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April 12, 2019, Plaintiffs filed this motion (Doc. 172), which is fully briefed (Docs. 174,

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175, 176).

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II.

Discussion

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Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ Notice of Nonparties at Fault should be struck

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because they have not shown how Ms. Neff and Ms. Wright’s cellmates owed Ms. Wright

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any duty. (Doc. 172 at 1-2.) Additionally, they argue that Defendants have not attempted

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to identify Ms. Wright’s drug dealers or suppliers; thus, they should also be struck from

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the notice. (Doc. 172 at 3-4.) Defendants concede that they do not have enough evidence

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to support naming Ms. Wright’s unknown drug dealers as nonparties at fault in this case

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and, thus, withdraw their designation. (Doc. 174 at 2.) However, Defendants argue that an

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express duty of care or public policy supports their designation of nonparties at fault for

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Andrea Neff and Ms. Wright’s cellmates. (Doc. 174 at 4.) As to Ms. Neff, they argue that

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“if Neff knew Wright had either ingested her drug stash or hidden it on her person, then

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Neff had an obligation to reveal that information to the arresting officers so Wright could

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be appropriately treated.” (Doc. 174 at 4.) As to Ms. Wright’s cellmates, they argue that

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the cellmates each “voluntarily undertook to render aid to Wright, or to help secure aid for

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her, triggering a duty to her.” (Doc. 174 at 6.) Further, they argue that because the cellmates

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“intentionally withheld” the information about Ms. Wright’s alleged drug ingestion, they

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left Ms. Wright “worse off” than before their involvement. (Doc. 174 at 6.)

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III.

Analysis

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A.

Legal Standard

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Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5), Arizona’s nonparty at fault notice

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disclosure, states that:
“[n]o later than 150 days after filing its answer, a party must serve on all
other parties--and should file with the court--a notice disclosing any person:
(A) not currently or formerly named as a party in the action; and (B) whom
the party alleges was wholly or partly at fault under A.R.S. § 12-2506(B).
The notice must disclose the identity and location of the nonparty allegedly
at fault, and the facts supporting the allegation of fault.”

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Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). “At its heart, Rule 26(b)(5) is in service of a defendant’s

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substantive right to have the jury assess fault to a nonparty – regardless of whether the

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plaintiff may hail that nonparty into court.” State v. Mahoney in & for Cty. of Maricopa,

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No. 1 CA-SA 19-0067, 2019 WL 2128212, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 16, 2019). Mahoney

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clarified that the court in Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Cendejas, 220 Ariz. 281, 286 (Ct. App.

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2009) did not rule that “a notice of nonparty at fault that lacks the name and location of the

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nonparty necessarily fails under Rule 26(b)(5) unless the defendant can show it tried

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without success to find the nonparty.” Id. Indeed, under A.R.S. Section 12-2506(A), “the

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issue is whether the defendant’s notice discloses ‘facts sufficient to establish the existence

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of another tortfeasor, despite the inability to further identify the tortfeasor.’” Id., at *2

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(quoting Rosner v. Denim & Diamonds, Inc., 188 Ariz. 431, 433 (Ct. App. 1996)).

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Therefore, “a notice of nonparty at fault is not necessarily defective if it lacks information

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that would enable the plaintiff to sue the nonparty directly.” Id., at *3.

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“Because an allegation of comparative fault relating to nonparties is an affirmative

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defense, the defendant must prove the nonparty is actually at fault. As such, the defendant

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must offer evidence that the nonparty owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the duty was

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breached, and that the breach caused injury to the plaintiff.” Hinshaw v. United States, 264

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F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1039 (D. Ariz. 2017); see Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz.

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1983). Typically, whether a duty exists is a question for the court as a matter of law.

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Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 706 P.2d 364, 366 (Ariz. 1985). A duty requires that a

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person “conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against

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unreasonable risks of harm.” Id.; see Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 143 (2007). A duty

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need not exist through a special or direct relationship. Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 145. Rather, a

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duty may exist “when public policy has supported the existence of a legal obligation … for

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the protection of persons with whom no preexisting relationship existed.” Id. (internal

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quotations omitted).

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As a general matter, an individual is under no duty to voluntarily help a rescuer. See

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Miller v. Arnal Corp., 129 Ariz. 484, 487 (Ct. App. 1981) (confirming that “the law

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presently imposes no liability upon those who stand idly by and fail to rescue a stranger

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who is in danger.”). Further, it is well-settled that “the existence of a statute criminalizing

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conduct is one aspect of Arizona law supporting the recognition of [a] duty.” Id. at 146

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(quoting Estate of Hernandez v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 177 Ariz. 244, 253 (1994)) (internal

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quotations omitted). However, a criminal statute establishes a tort duty only where the

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statute is “designed to protect the class of persons, in which the plaintiff is included, against

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the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred as a result of its violation.” Id.

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(internal quotations and citations omitted).

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Arizona Revised Statute Section 13-2403 states that a person commits “refusing to

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aid a peace officer” if the person, “upon a reasonable command by a person reasonably

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known to be a peace officer,” knowingly refuses or fails to aid the officer in “effectuating

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or securing an arrest” or in “preventing the commission by another of any offense.” A.R.S.

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§ 13-2403(A)(1)-(2). Additionally, Arizona Revised Statute Section 32-1471 states that a

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person who renders aid in an emergency situation will not be held liable for damages as a

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result of an act or omission associated with such aid, so long as the care was provided

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gratuitously and in good faith, and the person was not grossly negligent. A.R.S. § 32-1471.

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B.

Discussion

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First, the Notice of Nonparties at fault is not defective, and the Court will not strike

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it on that basis. Second, Defendants have not identified which Arizona statutes (or which

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public policies) it is relying upon for their proposition that Ms. Neff and Ms. Wright’s

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cellmates owed Ms. Wright a duty of care. As to Ms. Neff, assuming Defendants are

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referring to Arizona’s refusal to aid a peace officer statute, such statute requires that the

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officer “command” the person to do something, to which the person then “knowingly

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refuses or fails” to do. See A.R.S. § 13-2403(A). Furthermore, the failure or refusal must

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be in connection with “effectuating or securing an arrest” or “preventing the commission

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by another of any offense.” Id. Defendants have not alleged that the officers arresting Ms.

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Neff and Ms. Wright asked Ms. Neff to do anything. Even if Defendants had, however,

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Defendants cannot say that Ms. Neff knew this information and then refused or failed to

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provide it. Further, it appears this statute is aimed at helping police officers make arrests

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and prevent others from committing new crimes. It is not aimed at helping police officers,

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while making an arrest, become aware of possible health issues concerning the persons

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they are arresting. (See Doc. 174 at 4.) In short, Defendants have not shown how Ms. Neff

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owed Ms. Wright any legal duty, and the Court declines to find a duty of care, as a matter

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of law, on these facts.

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As to Ms. Wright’s cellmates, Defendants argue that they (1) voluntarily undertook

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to provide emergency services to Ms. Wright and (2) left Ms. Wright in a “worse off”

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position by not informing the medical professionals, after calling for help, that Ms. Wright

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had apparently ingested a large amount of drugs before being arrested. (See Doc. 174 at 6.)

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As an initial matter, Ms. Wright’s cellmates were under no duty to help Ms. Wright. The

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Court declines to find that Arizona’s Good Samaritan law, A.R.S. Section 32-1471, which

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would govern the cellmates’ actions in deciding to undertake emergency aid, applies in this

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case. Ms. Wright’s cellmates do not qualify as individuals who “render[ed] emergency

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care” to Ms. Wright “at the scene of an emergency occurrence.” See A.R.S. § 32-1471.

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Because Ms. Wright’s cellmates were under no duty to help Ms. Wright and because their

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actions in “helping” her do not amount to providing emergency aid in an emergency

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situation, there was also no duty to terminate their actions reasonably. However, the Court

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notes that Defendants are incorrect in their assertion that once an individual decides to

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provide emergency aid, she must continue to do so until it is reasonable to stop. (Doc. 174

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at 5.) The case they cite to for that proposition explicitly discusses the Second Restatement

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s 323, which provides that one is free stop aiding an individual whenever she wishes and

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for whatever the purpose, as long as she does not leave the other “worse off.” See Miller,

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129 Ariz. at 489 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts s 323, comment (c)). In any event,

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Defendants have not shown that Ms. Wright’s cellmates owed any legal duty to Ms.

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Wright. As such, they cannot be at fault for Ms. Wright’s death.

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IV.

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Conclusion
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Strike Defendants’ Notice of Non-

Parties at Fault (Doc. 172) is granted.
Dated this 27th day of June, 2019.

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Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge

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