Anderson v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada et al

Filing 49

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 43 Motion Discovery and Amend Scheduling Order. It is Ordered denying 29 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. However, Plaintiff is granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint consisten t with the terms of this Order within 30 days of the date of this Order. It is ordered granting in part 30 Motion for Discovery. The Court's June 7, 2012 Scheduling Order is amended to the extent that all discovery consistent with this Order, shall be completed by February 21, 2013. The deadline to file dispositive motions is extended to March 21, 2013. Signed by Judge Cindy K Jorgenson on 11/2/12. (See attached PDF for complete information.) (KAH)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Diana C. Anderson,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada; and )
Community Health Systems,
)
))
Defendants.
)
)

No. CV-12-145-TUC-CKJ
ORDER

Pending before the Court are three Motions filed by the Plaintiff. On June 26,
2012, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 29).
Defendant Community Health Systems filed its response in opposition on July 10, 2012
(Doc. 31) and Plaintiff filed her reply on July 20, 2012. (Doc. 37). Defendant Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada (“Sun Life”) has not filed a response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File a First Amended Complaint.
On June 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Allow Discovery in Anderson, a
Case with a De Novo Standard. (Doc. 30). Defendant Community Health Systems filed
its response to this motion on July 14, 2012 (Doc. 34) and Defendant Sun Life filed its
response in opposition on July 17, 2012. (Doc. 36). Plaintiff filed her reply on July 23,
2012.

On October 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Amend Scheduling Order.
(Doc. 43). Defendant CHS filed its response on October 26, 2012 and Defendant Sun Life
filed its response to this motion on October 29, 2012.
In its discretion, the Court finds these motions suitable for decision without oral
argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f). The Parties have adequately presented the facts and legal
arguments in their briefs and supporting documents, and the decisional process would not
be significantly aided by oral argument.

Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed her original Complaint (Doc. 1) on February 28, 2012. In her
Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she was employed as a registered nurse with Northwest
Medical Center from 1993 through 2009. (Doc. 1 at p. 2). She sustained a work related
injury on July 15, 2008 and as a result, she was unable to perform her duties as a registered
nurse. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶15, 19).

In 2008, Aetna Life Insurance Company was the insurance

company and claim administrator for the long term and short term disability plans in which
Plaintiff was a participant. (Doc. 1 at ¶26). Beginning on January 1, 2009, Defendant
Sun Life became the claim administrator and Defendant Community Health Systems was
the plan administrator for the disability plans. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶12, 27). These plans are
governed by the Employment Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).
Plaintiff plead two counts, the first was for a Declaratory Judgment that Defendant
Sun Life acted in violation of its duty (Doc. 1 at p. 17) and the second was for statutory
damages against Defendant Sun Life and the Defendant Community Health Systems for
violating 29 U.S.C. §1132(c)(1). (Doc. 1 at p. 18).

Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint

2

Plaintiff is seeking leave to amend the pleading to substitute CHS/Community
Health Systems, Inc. (hereafter “CHS”) for the previously named Community Health
Systems. In addition to amending the name of a Defendant in the caption, Plaintiff is also
seeking leave to add CHS as a defendant in her declaratory judgment claim for benefits
under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) and to add CHS as a defendant to her claim for the
statutory penalty under 29 U.S.C. §1132(c)(1).
Plaintiff’s Motion is timely. This Court’s June 7, 2012 Scheduling Order granted
Plaintiff to September 30, 2012 to file a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
(Doc. 26) and her Motion was filed on June 26, 2012. CHS argues that the amendment to
the Complaint is futile and the Motion should be denied. For the following reasons,
Plaintiff’s proposed First Amended Complaint has stated a valid claim for relief against
CHS pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B), but has failed to state a valid claim for relief
against CHS pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(c).

A.

Legal Standard

Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governs the amendment of pleadings in a
civil action. The rule mandates that A[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). AIn the absence of any apparent or declared reason B
such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. B the leave
sought should, as the rules require, be >freely given.=@ Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182,
83 S.Ct. 227, 228, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). Further, whether leave to amend should be
granted is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Id.
“A proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the
amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim.” Miller v.
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Rykoff-Sexton, 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). The test to determine futility is identical
to the one used when considering the sufficiency of a pleading under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. (citing 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶
15.08[4] (2d ed. 1974)).
A pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. While Rule 8 does not demand
detailed

factual

allegations,

Ait

demands

more

than

an

unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). AThreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Id. Neither
do mere assertions devoid of any factual enhancement. Id. A court does not have to
accept as true, legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Id at 678.
A[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Id at 678. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is
plausible Awhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.@

Id.

ADetermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.@ Id. at 679.
In the context of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, “the Court’s review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint.
Campanelli, v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996). However, “a court may
consider evidence on which the complaint necessarily relies if: (1) the complaint refers to
the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions
the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’ Educ.

4

Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) citing Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th
Cir.2006) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453–54 (9th Cir.1994)(internal
quotations omitted)).
In support of its position, CHS has submitted with its opposition papers, an affidavit
from John M. Scannapieco, outside counsel for CHS. (Doc. 32). In his affidavit, Mr.
Scannapieco states that Plaintiff’s counsel advised him that neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s
counsel had sent a written request to CHS for documents or information and the only items
Plaintiff had not received from CHS were documents purportedly related to negotiations
between CHS and Sun Life regarding the disability policy’s continuity of coverage
provision.

The affidavit from Defendant CHS’s outside counsel, which contains

purported hearsay statements of the Plaintiff’s attorney, is not referenced in the Complaint
and the Court will not consider the allegations in Mr. Scannapieco’s affidavit in deciding
this motion.
In addition to the affidavit, CHS has provided this Court with a copy of the group
long term disability insurance policy issued by Sun Life. (Doc. 33-1). This policy is
directly quoted in Plaintiff’s original complaint and the proposed amended complaint.
The policy is central to the Plaintiff’s claim and neither party has questioned the
authenticity of the copy attached to Defendant CHS’s response. Accordingly, this Court
will consider this document in its evaluation.
B.

Analysis

CHS argues that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief for benefits under 29
U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) because CHS is not responsible for the administration of Plaintiff’s
claim. (Doc. 31). Specifically, CHS argues that in accordance with the express terms of
the long term disability policy, CHS delegated full authority to administer claims for long
term disability benefits under the policy to Sun Life, including determining eligibility for
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and the payment of benefits. (Doc. 31). Plaintiff argues that as the plan administrator,
CHS is an appropriate party in a claim for benefits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132. (Doc.
37). Plaintiff and CHS both city to Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 642 F.3d
1202 (9th Cir. 2011).
In Cyr, the Ninth Circuit held that “defendants in actions brought under
§1132(a)(1)(B) should not be limited to plans and plan administrators.” Id. at 1206. The
court in Cyr discussed situations where the plan administrator may have no authority to
resolve benefit claims or any responsibility to pay them and envisioned situations where
parties other than the plan and plan administrator could be a named defendant in an ERISA
action. Id at 1207. The court in Cyr stated:
It is not enough to identify a plan administrator as a potential defendant, in
addition to the plan itself. A plan administrator under ERISA has certain
defined responsibilities involving reporting, disclosure, filing, and notice.
But the plan administrator can be an entity that has no authority to resolve
benefit claims or any responsibility to pay for them.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court in Cyr was not excluding plan administrators as
potential defendants in an ERISA action. Rather, it was acknowledging that there are
situations where parties other than the plan and plan administrator could be named as
defendants.

Id.

Accordingly, since Plaintiff’s proposed First Amended Complaint

alleges that CHS is the plan administrator, her claim for relief under 29 U.S.C.
§1132(a)(1)(B) is plausible.
Defendant CHS next argues that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied because
Plaintiff did not allege in her proposed First Amended Complaint that she sent a written
request to CHS for plan information as identified in 29 U.S.C. §1024(b)(4), and that CHS
failed to provide the requested documents. Absent these allegations, Defendant CHS
argues that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against CHS with respect to the statutory penalty

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under 29 U.S.C. §1132(c)(1).
Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(c)(1)(B), “any administrator who fails to comply with
a request for any information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to
furnish to a participant or beneficiary …may in the court’s discretion be personally liable
to such participant or beneficiary.” 29 U.S.C. §1132(c)(1)(B). While the general duty to
disclose documents and information is outlined in 29 U.S.C. §1021, specific requests for
documentation and information outside of the routine reporting cycles is governed by 29
U.S.C. §1024(b)(4). Pursuant to that section:
The administrator shall, upon written request of any participant or
beneficiary furnish a copy of the latest updated summary, plan description,
and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement,
trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is
established or operated.
29 U.S.C. §1024(b)(4). In order to plead a sufficient complaint, Plaintiff must
allege that she made a written request for documentation or information identified in 29
U.S.C. §1024(b)(4) or another document “that provides individual participants with
information about the plan or available benefits,” and that CHS failed to provide her with
the requested documentation or information. Serpa v. SBC Telecommunications, Inc.,
2004 WL 3204008 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Plaintiff’s proposed First Amended Complaint alleges that on multiple occasions,
she requested necessary documentation from the plan administrator through Sun Life and
directly to CHS. The alleged documentation requested was the prior insurer’s long term
disability contract in effect in 2008. This contract is applicable to Plaintiff’s claim based
on the continuity of coverage provision in Sun Life’s group long term insurance policy.
That provision, in its calculation of potential benefits payable to an employee,
references the prior insurer’s group long term disability policy. Therefore, the prior
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insurers long term disability contract may fall within the purview of the documents
outlined in 29 U.S.C. §1024(b)(4). However, while Plaintiff alleged in her proposed First
Amended Complaint that she never received a copy of this contract from any of the
Defendants, she fails to allege that she ever made a written request for said document as
required by the statute. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to file a First Amended Complaint is
denied. However, Plaintiff is granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in
compliance with the terms of this Order.

Motion to Allow Discovery in Anderson, a Case with a De Novo Standard

A. Legal Standard
Plaintiff’s second motion requests that the Court permit the parties to exchange
discovery. Plaintiff argues that the Court should permit discovery between the parties
based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Kappos v. Hyatt, __U.S.__, 132 S.Ct. 1690
(2012) and the application of its reasoning to ERISA as anticipated by the Seventh Circuit
in Krolnik v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 570 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2009).
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that ERISA authorizes a civil action to enforce statutory
rights pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(a) and civil actions are governed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Plaintiff further contends that the
Supreme Court in Kappos held that where a statute authorizes a civil action and is silent
about evidentiary or procedural limitations, as in an ERISA action, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable. Kappos v. Hyatt,
__U.S.__, 132 S.Ct. 1690 (2012).
The Kappos case addressed the limitations, if any, of new evidence before the
district court in an action challenging the Patent and Trademark Office’s (hereafter PTO)
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decision to deny a claim. Id. That case dealt exclusively with civil actions brought
against the PTO. There is a long history of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence addressing the
limitations on the admissibility of new evidence in an ERISA action. Accordingly, this
Court declines to reject Ninth Circuit precedent and extend the holding in Kappos to
ERISA cases.
There are two possible standards of review recognized by the Ninth Circuit when
evaluating an ERISA claim. A court reviewing a denial of benefits challenged under 29
U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) generally applies a de novo standard “unless the benefit plan gives
the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or
to construe the terms of the plan. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. V. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,
115 (1989). When a plan does not confer on the administrator discretionary authority, the
appropriate standard of review is de novo, regardless of whether the administrator is acting
under a conflict of interest. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 963 (9th
Cir. 2006)(citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. V. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). If
however, the plan does confer discretionary authority, the standard of review changes to an
abuse of discretion. Id.
Except for evidence regarding a conflict of interest, “a district court may review
only the administrative record when considering whether the plan administrator abused its
discretion, but may admit additional evidence on de novo review.” Alta Health & Life Ins.
Co., 458 F.3d at 970. This Court may agree with the parties that the appropriate standard
of review is de novo. In fact, in its response, CHS acknowledges that the terms of the
employee welfare benefit plan do not confer discretion on the claim administrator in this
case and accordingly, the appropriate standard of review is de novo. (Doc. 34).
In most ERISA cases, judicial review is limited to the administrative record. 1
Ann.2004 ATLA-CLE 459 (2004); Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th
9

Cir. 1999). Under certain circumstances, additional evidence may be considered by a
district court, at the court’s discretion.

Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term

Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1995). When evaluating the case under
a de novo standard of review, the district court may allow evidence that was not before the
administrator in circumstances where it is clearly established that additional evidence is
necessary to conduct an adequate review of the benefit decision. Id. at 943-944 (quoting
Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir. 1993)) see
also Opeta v. Northwest Airlines Pension Plan for Contract Employees, 484 F.3d 1211,
1217 (9th Cir. 2007). “The district court should exercise its discretion, however, only
when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an
adequate de novo review of the benefit decision.” Id.
Under the de novo standard of review, the district court “evaluates whether the plan
administrator correctly or incorrectly denied benefits.

Opeta v. Northwest Airlines

Pension Plan for Contract Employees, 484 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2007). In Opeta, the
Ninth Circuit cited a non-exhaustive list of exceptional circumstances where introduction
of evidence beyond the administrative record could be necessary:
Claims that require consideration of complex medical questions or issues
regarding the creditability of medical experts; the availability of very limited
administrative review procedures with little or no evidentiary record; the
necessity of evidence regarding interpretation of the terms of the plan rather
than specific historical facts; instances where the payor and the administrator
are the same entity and the court is concerned about impartiality; claims
which would have been insurance contract claims prior to ERISA; and
circumstances in which there is additional evidence that the claimant could
not have presented in the administrative record.
Id. (quoting Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d at 1027).

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B. Discovery Requested by Plaintiff
Plaintiff has identified four areas where she believes discovery is appropriate: (1) a
potential bias among the medical reviewers associated with Sun Life; (2) the reasons that
alleged critical information was not provided; (3) Defendants’ conflict of interest and how
that conflict may have affected the handling of Plaintiff’s claim; and (4) Sun Life’s
interpretation of the continuity of coverage provision. (Doc. 30).
Plaintiff fails to allege in her proposed First Amended Complaint that any of the
Defendants retained medical personnel exhibited any bias. In fact, in Plaintiff’s proposed
First Amended Complaint and in her appeal of Sun Life’s decision to deny her claim,
Plaintiff references the opinions of Defendant’s retained medical personnel to further her
position that she was disabled and could not return to her nursing position. (Doc. 29-1;
1-1). The first time that Plaintiff mentioned any potential bias among Defendant’s
medical reviewers was in her reply to Defendant’s response to this motion, in which,
Plaintiff alleged that while the medical reviewers initially acknowledged that the Plaintiff
was disabled from being a registered nurse, they subsequently failed to concede that the
Plaintiff was disabled from performing her duties as a registered nurse. (Doc. 38).
According to the Plaintiff, these seemingly inconsistent opinions occurred after the
medical reviewers realized that Sun Life could not deny coverage based on the work
related injury exclusion, and thus show their bias.
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that there is an inherent conflict of interest "when
benefit plans repeatedly hire particular physicians as experts."

Regula v. Delta

Family-Care Disability Survivorship, 266 F.3d 1130, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on
other grounds, Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 832, 123 S.Ct. 1965,
155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003) ("treating physician rule" has no application in ERISA cases;
plan administrators are not required to accord special deference to the opinions of treating
physicians; "we [do not] question the Court of Appeals' concern that physicians repeatedly
retained by benefits plans may have an incentive to make a finding of 'not disabled' in order
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to save their employers money and to preserve their own consulting arrangements.").
As such, discovery into the potential bias of the medical reviewers utilized by Sun Life is
appropriate. See Walker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 585 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1175 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
Plaintiff has alleged that critical information was not provided to her in violation of
29 U.S.C. §1132(c)(1). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks discovery into the reasons that this
information was not provided. While factors such as bad faith and prejudice are not
prerequisites for imposing the statutory penalty, under 29 U.S.C. §1132(c), they are factors
that a court can consider in determining whether to impose the statutory penalty. Kerr v.
Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 948 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Draper v. Baker
Hughes, Inc., 892 F.Supp. 1287, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 1995). The decision whether to assess
penalties rests with the district court. Paris v. F.Korbel & Bros., Inc., 751 F.Supp. 834,
839 (N.D. Cal. 1990). As such, this Court finds that information into the reasons behind
the Defendants’ alleged failure to provide necessary documentation may be beneficial in
an evaluation of this claim.1
Plaintiff further alleges that Sun Life has a structural conflict of interest because it is
responsible for evaluating benefit claims and paying them. (Doc. 29-1). A conflict of
interest exists where the same party evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits claims.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2348 (2008). An
ERISA plaintiff may be permitted to supplement the administrative record with evidence
of the Defendant’s conflict of interest. Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942,
949-950 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Tremain v. Bell Industries, Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 976-977 (9th
Cir. 1999)). As such, discovery into Defendant Sun Life’s alleged conflict of interest and
how that conflict may have affected the handling of Plaintiff’s claim is appropriate.
Finally Plaintiff alleges that Sun Life’s interpretation of the continuity of coverage

1 This discovery may not be appropriate for Defendant CHS, if Plaintiff chooses not to allege a violation of 29 U.S.C.
§1132(c) against Defendant CHS in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.

12

provision was unreasonable. Evidence related to the interpretation of the terms of the plan
may be beneficial to the Court, since the continuity of coverage provision is a critical
provision in this analysis. See Opeta v. Northwest Airlines Pension Plan for Contract
Employees, 484 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2007)(quoting Life Ins. Co. of North America,
987 F.2d at 1027).
While this Court agrees that discovery into the areas outlined by the Plaintiff may
be beneficial for a complete evaluation of this claim, this discovery will be limited in
accordance with Congress’ desire not “to create a system that is so complex that
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering
welfare benefit plans.” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 1070
(1995). Plaintiff is directed to limit her discovery requests to the areas discussed above.
Additionally, while the Court is permitting Plaintiff to engage in limited discovery, this
Court is not at this time deciding the admissibility of this evidence.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Scheduling Order
Plaintiff recently filed a motion to amend this Court’s June 7, 2012 Scheduling
Order. Defendant CHS filed its opposition on October 26, 2012 (Doc. 46) and Defendant
Sun Life filed its opposition on October 29, 2012. (Doc. 47). In light of this Court’s
decision regarding discovery in this case, this Court will amend the Scheduling Order and
permit Plaintiff to seek discovery.
However, this Court will not require Defendants to respond to the proposed
discovery requests attached to Plaintiff’s motions. Plaintiff is directed to serve discovery
demands consistent with the terms of this Order. Additionally, the Defendants shall have
the time prescribed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to respond to Plaintiff’s
discovery demands as this Court declines to compel disclosure within fifteen days after
notice.

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (Doc. 29) is

DENIED. However, Plaintiff is granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint
consistent with the terms of this Order within 30 days of the date of this Order.
Plaintiff’s proposed First Amended Complaint stated a valid claim for relief against
Defendant CHS under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B), however, Plaintiff’s proposed First
Amended Complaint failed to state a valid claim against Defendant CHS under 29 U.S.C.
§1132(c).
2.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Discovery in Anderson, a Case with De Novo

Standard (Doc. 30) is GRANTED in part, Plaintiff is permitted to conduct discovery
consistent with the terms of this Order.
3.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Scheduling Order (Doc. 43) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.
4.

Plaintiff is directed to serve discovery demands upon Defendants consistent

with the terms of this Order and Defendants must file responses to Plaintiff’s discovery
demands within the time prescribed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

The Court’s June 7, 2012 Scheduling Order is amended to the extent that all

discovery consistent with this Order, shall be completed by February 21, 2013. No
discovery shall take place after that date without leave of this Court and upon good cause
show. The deadline to file dispositive motions is extended to March 21, 2013.
Dated this 2nd day of November, 2012.

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