Taylor v. Pima, County of et al

Filing 127

ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that the parties shall attempt to resolve their disputes concerning the 30(b)(6) depositions and fact-witness depositions through further personal consultation. If parties are unable to resolve the disputes after sincere efforts at further personal consultation, they shall file a joint notice on 8/1/20. Joint notice shall not exceed 3 pages in length and shall provide a brief description of the issues remaining in dispute concerning the 30(b)(6) depositions and/or fact-witness depositions. (See attached PDF for complete information). Signed by Judge Rosemary Marquez on 7/13/20.(BAC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Louis Taylor,

No. CV-15-00152-TUC-RM
Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER

County of Pima, et al.,

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Defendants.

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On July 6, 2020, the parties notified chambers of a discovery dispute pursuant to

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the discovery-dispute procedure set forth in this Court’s Scheduling Order. (See Doc.

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113 at 3.) The dispute concerns Defendants’ objections to notices of two 30(b)(6)

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depositions and six fact-witness depositions. The Court will order the parties to attempt

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to resolve their disputes concerning the depositions through further consultation in light

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of the clarification set forth below regarding the current scope of this litigation.

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The currently operative complaint in this matter is Plaintiff’s Second Amended

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Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. 40.)1 In the SAC, Plaintiff alleged six claims under 42

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U.S.C. § 1983 and three claims under Arizona law. (Id.) On March 16, 2017, the Court

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partially granted and partially denied Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the SAC. (Doc.

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63.) The Court found that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) bars Plaintiff from

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premising his § 1983 claims on allegations that he “was wrongfully charged, convicted,

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On April 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 103.) On June 25, 2020, the Court took that Motion under advisement pending
supplemental briefing. (Doc. 124.) The Motion to Amend remains pending.

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and imprisoned,” and that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to the § 1983

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claims bars Plaintiff from premising the claims on allegations that he “was arrested

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without probable cause and unlawfully interrogated.” (Id. at 13.) “However, neither the

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statute of limitations nor Heck bars claims based on constitutional violations that affect

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the validity of Plaintiff’s 1972 convictions but not the validity of his subsequent 2013

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convictions.”

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interplay between Heck and the statute of limitations to the extent they alleged that

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“Plaintiff’s rights to due process and a constitutionally fair, racially unbiased trial were

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violated during [Plaintiff’s] original trial proceedings by the non-disclosure of the

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Truesdail Report, the hiring of an expert who believed Plaintiff was guilty because ‘black

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boys’ are more likely to start fires, and the presentation of false testimony from two

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‘jailhouse snitches.’”

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Defendants

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compensatory damages, but it declined to dismiss Plaintiff’s compensatory damages

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claim, reasoning that “Plaintiff may be able to establish non-incarceration-based

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compensatory damages,” such as damages for emotional injury not resulting from

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incarceration. (Id. at 19-20.) After analyzing the sufficiency of the SAC’s factual

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allegations under the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Court

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dismissed Count Two on the grounds that it contained insufficient non-conclusory factual

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allegations, but it declined to dismiss Counts One, Three, Four, Five and Six. (Id. at 16-

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18.)2

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immunity argument, dismissed with prejudice the state-law malicious prosecution claim

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asserted in Count Nine, and declined to dismiss the state-law claims asserted in Counts

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Seven and Eight because Defendants had not made any specific arguments in their

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Motions to Dismiss concerning those claims. (Id. at 18-20.)

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that

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims survived the

(Id. at 16; see also id. at 13-16.)

Heck

precluded

Plaintiff

from

The Court agreed with

obtaining

incarceration-based

Finally, the Court rejected Defendant Pima County’s Eleventh Amendment

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling that he was barred from

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(Id. (emphasis in original).)

The Court’s March 16, 2017 Order contained a typographical error; page 20 of the
Order stated that Count Four of the SAC was dismissed without prejudice when it should
have stated that Count Two of the SAC was dismissed without prejudice. The Court later
amended the March 16, 2017 Order in order to fix the typographical error. (Doc. 80.)
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seeking incarceration-based compensatory damages.

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reconsideration, finding that Plaintiff’s allegations “that he is innocent and was

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wrongfully incarcerated for 42 years necessarily imply the invalidity of his outstanding

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2013 convictions and outstanding sentence of time served.” (Doc. 81 at 10.) The Ninth

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Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed Pima County’s interlocutory appeal of

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this Court’s Eleventh Amendment ruling and affirmed this Court’s finding that Heck

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barred Plaintiff from seeking incarceration-related damages. Taylor v. Pima Cnty., 913

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F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2019).

(Doc. 68.)

The Court denied

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Accordingly, based on this Court’s prior Orders and the Ninth Circuit’s rulings in

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the parties’ interlocutory appeal, the following claims are at issue in this litigation:

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Claims One, Three, Four, Five, and Six of the SAC to the extent they allege that

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Plaintiff’s “rights to due process and a constitutionally fair, racially unbiased trial were

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violated during his original trial proceedings by the non-disclosure of the Truesdail

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Report, the hiring of an expert who believed Plaintiff was guilty because ‘black boys’ are

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more likely to start fires, and the presentation of false testimony from two ‘jailhouse

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snitches’” (Doc. 63 at 16), in addition to the state-law claims asserted in Counts Seven

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and Eight. Plaintiff’s compensatory damages claim also remains at issue. Although

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Plaintiff is precluded from obtaining incarceration-based compensatory damages, he may

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obtain compensatory damages for other harms, such as damages for emotional injury not

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resulting from incarceration. Nothing in the Court’s prior orders, or in Plaintiff’s 2013

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no-contest plea, precludes Plaintiff from seeking damages for emotional harm caused by

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the alleged constitutional violations that survived Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, even

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if that emotional harm relates to Plaintiff’s belief in his innocence. As this Court has

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previously recognized, “Plaintiff’s 2013 no-contest plea did not admit factual guilt.”

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(Doc. 35 at 13.)

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In light of the above clarification regarding the current scope of this litigation,

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....

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....

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IT IS ORDERED that the parties shall attempt to resolve their disputes

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concerning the 30(b)(6) depositions and fact-witness depositions through further personal

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consultation. If the parties are unable to resolve the disputes after sincere efforts at

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further personal consultation, they shall file a joint notice on August 1, 2020. The joint

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notice shall not exceed three pages in length and shall provide a brief description of the

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issues remaining in dispute concerning the 30(b)(6) depositions and/or fact-witness

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depositions.

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Dated this 13th day of July, 2020.

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