Harter v. Carondelet Health Network

Filing 95

ORDER granting 72 Defendant Ascension Healths Motion to Dismiss. Ascension Health is dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs may file a third amended complaint on or before January 29, 2018. Signed by Judge Rosemary Marquez on 1/19/2018. (KEP)

1

WO

2
3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

8
9

Carol Harter, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

10
11

ORDER

v.

12

No. CV-15-00343-TUC-RM

Ascension Health, et al.,

13

Defendants.

14
15

Pending before the Court is Defendant Ascension Health’s Motion to Dismiss.

16

(Doc. 72). The Motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 83, 88.) For the following reasons, the

17

Motion will be granted.

18

I.

Background

19

On August 5, 2015, Plaintiff Carol Harter filed a Complaint against Carondelet

20

Health Network d/b/a St. Joseph’s Medical Hospital and Carondelet Neurological

21

Institute, an Arizona corporation (“Carondelet Health Network”). (Doc. 1.) Harter

22

alleged various discrimination claims arising from visits to St. Joseph’s Hospital and

23

Carondelet Neurological Institute (“CNI”) in August 2013, where Harter avers she

24

received inadequate accommodations for her disability. (See id. at 16–23.)

25

On March 15, 2016, Harter and Carondelet Health Network stipulated to the filing

26

of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which added Plaintiffs Gerald Brown and

27

Leticia Moran. (Docs. 13, 15.) Brown and Moran alleged the same discrimination

28

claims as Harter, based on their visit to St. Mary’s Hospital in November 2015 where

1

they allege Brown received inadequate accommodations for his disability. (See Doc. 15

2

at 24–31.) To reflect the addition of Brown and Moran’s claims, the case caption was

3

amended to identify the defendant as Carondelet Health Network d/b/a St. Joseph’s

4

Medical Hospital, Carondelet Neurological Institute, and St. Mary’s Hospital, an Arizona

5

corporation. (See id. at 1.)

6

Carondelet Health Network filed its Amended Answer to the FAC on June 15,

7

2016. (Doc. 30.) Carondelet Health Network admitted doing business as St. Joseph’s

8

Hospital, CNI, and St. Mary’s Hospital in August 2013 (when Harter was treated), but

9

denied doing business as St. Mary’s Hospital in November 2015 (when Brown was

10

treated). (Id. ¶ 12.) Carondelet Health Network affirmatively alleged that SMSJ Tucson

11

Holdings, LLC operated St. Mary’s Hospital in November 2015 and currently operates all

12

three medical facilities at issue in this case. (Id.)

13

On May 1, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Amended

14

Complaint. (Doc. 45.) The motion sought to add Dennis and Julie Lotz as plaintiffs

15

based on allegations they received inadequate accommodations for their disabilities

16

during visits to St. Mary’s Hospital in December 2015, February 2016, July 2016, and

17

September 2016. (See Doc. 45-1 at 21–32.) Carondelet Health Network opposed the

18

motion, arguing in part that SMSJ Tucson Holdings, LLC owned and operated the

19

medical facilities when the Lotzes were treated in December 2015 and thereafter. (Doc.

20

49 at 4–5.)

21

To aid the Court in determining whether the change in ownership barred Plaintiffs’

22

theory of a policy of discrimination, Carondelet Health Network was ordered to provide

23

information regarding the relationship between the entities that held an ownership interest

24

during the time periods in which Plaintiffs’ claims arose. (Doc. 53.) In response to that

25

Order, Carondelet Health Network set forth the following ownership structure: when

26

Harter was treated in August 2013, the hospitals were owned by Carondelet Health

27

Network. (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 8.) Thereafter, Carondelet Health Network changed its name to

28

-2-

1

Ascension Arizona.1 (Id.) When Brown and the Lotzes began receiving treatment in

2

November 2015, the hospitals were owned by SMSJ Tucson Holdings, LLC. (Id. ¶¶ 9–

3

10.) SMSJ Tucson Holdings is owned by CHN Holdings, LLC, which is a joint venture

4

between Ascension Arizona, Tenant Healthcare, and Dignity Health. (Id. ¶ 9.)

5

The Court rejected the change in ownership as a basis for denying joinder of the

6

Lotzes because, although now twice removed from direct ownership, “Ascension Arizona

7

had an interest in the medical facilities at all times relevant.” (Doc. 60 at 8.) Finding all

8

other requirements for leave to amend satisfied, Plaintiffs’ motion was granted and the

9

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed. (Id. at 11; Doc. 69.)

10

In accordance with the caption of Plaintiffs’ SAC, the Court ordered that

11

“Ascension Health d/b/a Carondelet Health Network, a nonprofit corporation; and SMSJ

12

Tucson Holdings, LLC, d/b/a Carondelet Health Network, a Delaware limited liability

13

company” be substituted as Defendants in place of Ascension Arizona. (Doc. 60 at 11.)

14

Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of Ascension Arizona and naming of Ascension Health,

15

the foreign parent corporation of Ascension Arizona, serves as the basis for the pending

16

Motion to Dismiss.2

17

II.

Standard of Review

18

A.

19

A plaintiff opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction bears the

20

burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068

21

(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073

22

(9th Cir. 2011)). When “the defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than

23

an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of

Motion to Dismiss

24
25
26
27
28

1

To avoid confusion, the Court will refer to this entity hereafter as
“Ascension Arizona,” even when referring to periods of time it was known as
“Carondelet Health Network.”
2

There seems to be no dispute that Ascension Arizona was subject to the
Court’s jurisdiction. Given the inaccuracy of Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Ascension
Health, it appears that Plaintiffs may have intended that Ascension Arizona remain a
defendant and that the substitution was an error.
-3-

1

jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation marks

2

omitted) (quoting Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1127

3

(9th Cir. 2010)). “A plaintiff may not simply rest on the ‘bare allegations of [the]

4

complaint.’” Id. (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800

5

(9th Cir. 2004)). Uncontroverted allegations are taken as true, and factual disputes are

6

resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. But allegations that are controverted by affidavit are

7

not presumed true. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th

8

Cir. 2011).

9

B.

Principles of Personal Jurisdiction

10

Due process requires that federal courts obtain personal jurisdiction over the

11

parties before adjudicating those parties’ rights. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie

12

des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701–02 (1982). Federal courts may exercise

13

personal jurisdiction if (1) the forum State’s long-arm statute is satisfied, and (2) the

14

exercise of jurisdiction would comport with the constitutional requirement of due

15

process. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 692 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Omeluk

16

v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1995)). Arizona’s long-

17

arm statute permits jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution.

18

Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Ariz. R. Civ. P.

19

4.2(a)). Therefore, the jurisdictional analyses under state and federal law are identical,

20

and the Court need only determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would

21

comport with due process. Id.; Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015).

22

Due process requires that a nonresident defendant have certain minimum contacts

23

with the forum State “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional

24

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121

25

(2014) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Depending on

26

the quantity and nature of the nonresident’s contacts, personal jurisdiction may be either

27

general or specific. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S.

28

Ct. 1773, 1779–80 (2017).

-4-

1

A court with general (or “all-purpose”) jurisdiction over a defendant may hear any

2

claim against that defendant, whether or not the conduct underlying the claim took place

3

in the forum State. Id. at 1780. A corporation is subject to general jurisdiction when its

4

“affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the

5

corporation] essentially at home in the forum State.”

6

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For corporations, the place of

7

incorporation and principal place of business are the “paradigmatic forums” for the

8

exercise of general jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014)

9

(citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924).

10

Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Only in an “exceptional case” will general

jurisdiction be available anywhere else. Id. at 761 n.19.

11

A court has specific (or “case-linked”) jurisdiction over a defendant when the

12

claim “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Id. at 754

13

(quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8

14

(1984)). “In other words, there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the

15

underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the

16

forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’” Bristol-Myers Squibb,

17

137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).

18

III.

Discussion

19

A.

20

Plaintiffs argue Ascension Health has sufficient contacts with Arizona to establish

21

a prima facie case of general jurisdiction. Ascension Health disputes whether Plaintiffs

22

have alleged general jurisdiction and argues that, in any event, Plaintiffs cannot make a

23

prima facie showing.

24

General Jurisdiction

As it pertains to Ascension Health, Arizona is not one of the “paradigmatic

25

forums” for the exercise of general jurisdiction.

26

Ascension Health is “an Arizona non-profit corporation” with “a principal place of

27

business in Tucson, Arizona.” (Doc. 69, ¶ 9.) However, the records presented to the

28

Court plainly establish that Ascension Health was incorporated in Missouri. (See Doc.

-5-

Plaintiffs allege in the SAC that

1

72-1, ¶ 4; Doc. 84, Ex. A.) Furthermore, in its filings with the ACC, Ascension Health

2

lists an address in St. Louis, Missouri as its “Principal Office Address.” (Doc. 84, Ex.

3

A.)

4

Therefore, Plaintiffs must establish this is one of the “exceptional cases” where a

5

corporation is subject to general jurisdiction elsewhere. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19;

6

see Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1069 (explaining that plaintiffs who wish to invoke general

7

jurisdiction must meet an “exacting standard”).

8

whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense

9

‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State

10

are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum

11

State.’” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). As explained

12

below, Plaintiffs have failed to show Ascension Health is “essentially at home” in

13

Arizona.

The determinative inquiry “is not

14

Plaintiffs submit a number of documents in an attempt to show that exercise of

15

general jurisdiction would be proper. (See Doc. 84.) Among the documents are ACC

16

filings showing that Ascension Health is registered to transact business in Arizona, that it

17

has appointed an agent for service of process in Arizona, and that it annually files a

18

Report & Certificate of Disclosure with the ACC. (Id., Exs. A–F.) Plaintiffs also submit

19

an agreement for Ascension Health to administer the disability-benefits plan for

20

Ascension Arizona employees. (Id., Ex. I.) Although these are relevant factors, see

21

Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, their existence is not determinative.

22

jurisdiction analysis requires examination of “a corporation’s activities in their entirety,

23

nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be

24

deemed at home in all of them.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. Ascension Health is

25

“the parent corporation of a national Catholic health care system with more than one

26

hundred health care facilities.” (Doc. 72-1, ¶ 5.) Arizona is only one of twenty-two

27

States in which Ascension Health has operations. (Doc. 84, Ex. H.) In this context, the

28

ability to transact business and appointment of an agent for service of process do not

-6-

The general

1

make Ascension Health “essentially at home” in Arizona. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

2

LeMaire, 395 P.3d 1116, 1122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (holding foreign corporation—Wal-

3

Mart, Arizona’s second largest employer—not subject to general jurisdiction in Arizona).

4

Nor do Plaintiffs’ exhibits “directly contradict” the assertion of Jenna Mihm,

5

Associate General Counsel for Ascension Health, that “Ascension Health does not do

6

business [in] Arizona.” (Doc. 72-1, ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs overlook the distinction between

7

having the ability to transact business (which is what the documents show) and actually

8

transacting business (which the documents do not show). Plaintiffs also question the

9

verity of Mihm’s statement that Ascension Health has never “operated any hospitals in

10

Arizona, or managed, hired, or supervised any employees providing patient care or

11

arranging for services” at the hospitals. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs also contend that Ascension

12

Health falsely suggests “it has no operational involvement at all with the Tucson

13

hospitals.”

14

administrator is “substantial evidence . . . that Ascension Health was involved directly in

15

the operation of the hospitals and the compensation and management of their

16

employees.” Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is directed at an inaccurate interpretation of

17

Mihm’s statement. Taken in proper context, Mihm was communicating that Ascension

18

Health, “as the parent corporation of a national Catholic health care system,” does not

19

directly manage hospitals or hospital employees in the daily activities relating to patient

20

care, not that Ascension Health has no involvement in the hospitals’ operations. (Doc.

21

72-1, ¶¶ 5, 11.)

They argue that Ascension Health’s role as the disability-benefits

22

Next, Plaintiffs point to isolated contacts between Ascension Health and Arizona,

23

comprising of a lawsuit filed in 2003 and the recording of documents in Pima County in

24

2006 and 2015. (Doc. 84, Exs. G, J–K.) These contacts fall far short of establishing

25

“continuous and systematic” activity by Ascension Health in Arizona. See Daimler, 134

26

S. Ct. at 751 (explaining that general jurisdiction requires corporation’s contacts with

27

forum State to be “constant and pervasive”); CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1074–75

28

(holding that “a few discrete acts over a relatively short period of time” did not support

-7-

1

exercise of general jurisdiction).

2

Plaintiffs also rely on Ascension Health’s status as sole owner of Ascension

3

Arizona to argue that general jurisdiction is proper. They contend there is “little doubt”

4

that the sole owner “would likely have actively managed, supervised, and/or involved

5

itself in the Arizona operations . . . .” For support, Plaintiffs rely on a press release issued

6

by Tenant Healthcare in July 2015 and two news articles dated July 2014 and July 2015,

7

which they contend show Ascension Health holds itself out as owner and operator of the

8

hospitals. (Doc. 84, Exs. L–N.) The press release announces the joint venture between

9

Tenant Healthcare, Dignity Health, and “Ascension” and contains a statement from

10

Robert J. Henkel, who is identified as “Executive Vice President of Ascension and

11

President and CEO of Ascension Health.” (Id., Ex. L.) The Arizona Daily Star article

12

published in July 2015 states that “Missouri-based Ascension is the current owner of . . .

13

Carondelet St. Joseph’s and . . . Carondelet St. Mary’s hospitals, both in Tucson.” (Id.,

14

Ex. M.)

15

“Ascension Health . . . announced plans to sell a majority interest of its Arizona hospitals

16

to two other health systems through the creation of a joint venture.” (Id., Ex. N.)

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch article published in July 2014 states that

17

These articles do not establish that Ascension Health is “essentially at home” in

18

Arizona. They suggest only that Ascension Health was involved in the management of

19

its subsidiary’s assets, which is unsurprising given that Ascension Health is the “parent

20

corporation of a national Catholic health care system with more than one hundred health

21

care facilities.” (Doc. 72-1, ¶ 5.) Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument

22

that Ascension Health “actively managed, supervised and/or involved itself” in hospital

23

operations, Plaintiffs have not explained why that conduct is “exceptional” such that

24

general jurisdiction would be proper. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20 (explaining

25

that “at home” is not synonymous with “doing business”); Wal-Mart Stores, 395 P.3d at

26

1121–22 (explaining that Wal-Mart’s substantial business activities in Arizona were not

27

“exceptional” so as to give rise to general jurisdiction).

28

To the extent Plaintiffs suggest Ascension Arizona’s contacts should be imputed

-8-

1

to Ascension Health due to the latter entity holding itself out as owner, they are incorrect.

2

“The existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is insufficient, on its own, to justify

3

imputing one entity’s contacts with a forum state to another for the purpose of

4

establishing personal jurisdiction.” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1070. A subsidiary’s contacts

5

with a forum State may be imputed to the parent if the two entities are “alter egos”; that

6

is, they are “not really separate entities.” Id. at 1071. This requires proof “(1) that there

7

is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities [of the two entities]

8

no longer exist and (2) that failure to disregard [their separate identities] would result in

9

fraud or injustice.” Id. at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v.

10

Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs provide no allegations in the

11

SAC regarding the parent-subsidiary relationship between Ascension Health and

12

Ascension Arizona. Nor do they provide any arguments that track either of the alter ego

13

requirements. Plaintiffs make much of the press release and news articles, but those do

14

not establish (or even suggest) that Ascension Health exercises “pervasive control over

15

the subsidiary” such that it would be fair to impute Ascension Arizona’s contacts. Id.

16

The evidence suggests only that Ascension Health was involved in the management of its

17

subsidiary’s assets, which is insufficient by itself to meet the “unity of interest”

18

requirement. See id. at 1073–74 (explaining that parent’s involvement in subsidiaries’

19

acquisitions and divestments does not negate corporate separateness where each entity

20

observes corporate formalities (citing Unocal, 248 F.3d at 927–28)).

21

Even considering all of the aforementioned contacts together, Plaintiffs have

22

failed to show that Ascension Health’s contacts with Arizona are so continuous and

23

systematic that Ascension Health is “essentially at home” here. Consequently, Ascension

24

Health is not subject to general jurisdiction.

25

B.

26

Ascension Health contends that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction. Plaintiffs

27

disagree, arguing there is sufficient evidence showing their claims are directly related to

28

Ascension’s Health’s forum contacts such that specific jurisdiction exists. The Court

Specific Jurisdiction

-9-

1
2
3

agrees with Ascension Health and finds that it lacks specific jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit has articulated a three-part test to determine whether a
defendant is subject to specific jurisdiction:
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his
activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident
thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

4
5
6
7

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
defendant’s forum-related activities; and

8
9

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and
substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

10
11

Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). It is the plaintiff’s

12

burden to establish the first two prongs; failure to satisfy either prong means specific

13

jurisdiction does not exist.

14

therefore, the remaining requirements for specific jurisdiction are not addressed.3

Id.

Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the second prong;

15

The Ninth Circuit uses the “but for” test in determining whether a plaintiff’s

16

claim “arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Menken v.

17

Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238

18

F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs argue that Ascension Health is “directly

19

related to the people creating liability” because Ascension Arizona uses the employee

20

disability-benefits plan of Ascension Health. The proper inquiry, however, is whether

21

Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries would have occurred “but for” Ascension Health administering

22

the disability benefits of Ascension Arizona’s employees.

23

jurisdiction to exist, the answer must be “no.” The Court is unable to discern any causal

See id.

For specific

24
25
26
27
28

3

Plaintiffs assert that “Ascension Health falsely contends it has never availed
itself of Arizona law, or directed actions toward or in Arizona . . . .” These statements
appear nowhere in Ascension Health’s brief or Mihm’s affidavit. Furthermore,
Ascension Health’s failure to mention the lawsuit or recorded documents does not
establish that Ascension Health attempted to mislead the Court. As explained above,
Plaintiff’s alleged injuries plainly did not arise out of those contacts. (See Doc. 72 at 4
(“Plaintiffs cannot show that Ascension Health has any direct contacts with Arizona
sufficient for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it.” (emphasis added)).)
- 10 -

1

relationship between administration of employee benefits and discriminatory acts against

2

third parties by employees receiving benefits. Therefore, the inquiry must be answered in

3

the affirmative, and that contact cannot form the basis for specific jurisdiction.

4

Next, Plaintiffs argue that Ascension Health is “directly related to the entities who

5

[discriminated against] Plaintiffs” because it owns the entity (Ascension Arizona) that

6

owned and operated the hospitals. This position is untenable. The general rule is to

7

respect the separateness of distinct corporate entities, including parents and their

8

subsidiaries. Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1070. Accordingly, a foreign parent corporation may

9

not be forced to litigate in a particular forum merely because it has a subsidiary there.

10

See Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 459 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It

11

is well established that, as a general rule, where a parent and subsidiary are separate and

12

distinct corporate entities, the presence of one . . . in a forum state may not be attributed

13

to the other . . . .”). As explained above, the separateness of affiliated entities may be

14

disregarded only when the entities are “alter egos” of each other. Ranza, 793 F.3d at

15

1071. Plaintiffs’ SAC and response brief are devoid of allegations or argument that the

16

entities are “alter egos.” The Court declines to find specific jurisdiction based solely on

17

what Plaintiffs term an “ownership contact”; to do otherwise would violate basic tenets of

18

business organizations law and due process.

19

The remaining contacts identified by Plaintiffs—including the lawsuit and the

20

recording of documents in Pima County—plainly were not a “but for” cause of Plaintiffs’

21

alleged injuries. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to show their claims “arise[] out of or

22

relate[] to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142 (quoting

23

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802).

24

C.

25

Jurisdictional discovery is proper in lieu of dismissal “where pertinent facts

26

bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory

27

showing of the facts is necessary.” Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir.

28

2008) (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs. Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.1 (9th

Jurisdictional Discovery

- 11 -

1

Cir. 1977)). District courts may deny jurisdictional discovery that is requested “based on

2

little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts.” Id. It is the

3

plaintiff’s burden to allege in the complaint or an affidavit what evidence he or she

4

believes could be obtained through discovery that would properly permit the exercise of

5

jurisdiction. Id.; see Ariz. Sch. Risk Retention Tr., Inc. v. NMTC, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 3d

6

931, 942–43 (D. Ariz. 2016) (denying jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff failed to

7

identify what evidence it believed it could obtain through discovery). But, where the

8

plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations are contradicted by declarations denying those

9

allegations, district courts need not permit even limited discovery. Pebble Beach Co. v.

10

Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49

11

F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995)); see MMI, Inc. v. Baja, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1113

12

(D. Ariz. 2010) (denying jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff failed to rebut

13

declaration denying jurisdictional allegations).

14

The Court will deny Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiffs

15

generally assert that jurisdictional discovery may show that additional entities are liable

16

for their alleged injuries, but they do not indicate what evidence they believe could be

17

obtained that would show jurisdiction is proper over Ascension Health.

18

Plaintiffs presented evidence rebutting Ascension Health’s declaration denying the

19

SAC’s jurisdictional allegations.

Nor have

20

Furthermore, the evidence and uncontroverted allegations do not indicate that

21

Ascension Health was ever the direct owner or operator of the relevant medical facilities.

22

Rather, the evidence is that Ascension Arizona (the original, former defendant) owned

23

and operated the facilities when Harter received treatment (see Doc. 72-1, ¶ 12), and the

24

uncontroverted allegations are that SMSJ Tucson Holdings, LLC owned and operated the

25

facilities when the remaining Plaintiffs received treatment (see Doc. 69, ¶¶ 21, 25, 27).

26

In the absence of allegations which, if true, establish Ascension Health should be liable

27

for the conduct of its subsidiaries, jurisdictional discovery would have no effect on the

28

Court’s conclusions.

- 12 -

1

Accordingly,

2

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Ascension Health’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

3

72) is granted. Ascension Health is dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal

4

jurisdiction.4

5

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend the

6

Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs may file a third amended complaint on or before

7

January 29, 2018.

8

concerning the parties.

9

Plaintiffs are limited to amending the parties and allegations

Dated this 19th day of January, 2018.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
4

28

The general rule is that dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction must be
without prejudice. See Fiorani v. Berenzweig, 441 Fed App’x 540, 541 (9th Cir. 2011)
(mem.). Ascension Health does not provide a persuasive reason to depart from that rule.
- 13 -