Rudisill v. Ryan et al

Filing 114

ORDER GRANTING 109 Motion for Extension of Time Deadline. Defendants have until 3/28/19 for Defendant Ryan to respond to Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for Production dated 2/8/19. Signed by Senior Judge Cindy K Jorgenson on 3/19/19. (BAC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Stephen Louis Rudisill,

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Plaintiff,

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ORDER

v.

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No. CV-17-00033-TUC-CKJ

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Extend Deadline for Defendant

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Ryan to Respond to Plaintiff’s “Second Request for Production of Documents from

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Defendant Charles L. Ryan” Dated February 8, 2019. (Doc. 109). Plaintiff propounded his

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second set of requests for production upon Defendant Ryan on February 8, 2019. Counsel

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for Defendant Ryan states that they require additional time to research, procure, and redact

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the vast array of documents sought in Plaintiff’s requests. On March 14, 2019, Plaintiff

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filed an objection (Doc. 110) to Counsel’s Motion to Extend, claiming that counsel’s

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request was untimely. Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 111), alleging that, under Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 34 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, their request was timely.

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Plaintiff propounded his discovery requests on February 8, 2019. Ordinarily, a party

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has 30 days after being served with discovery requests to respond. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

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34(b)(2)(A). Therefore, Defendant Ryan had until March 11, 2019 to respond to Plaintiff’s

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discovery requests. However, since Plaintiff transmitted his discovery requests through

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mail, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) instructs that three (3) days are added after the period would

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otherwise expire. Therefore, Defendants had until March 14, 2019 to respond to Plaintiff’s

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discovery requests. Defendants filed the underlying Motion to Extend on March 12, 2019.

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Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ request was untimely due to the “prison mailbox

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rule.” Under that rule, “a prisoner’s federal habeas petition is deemed filed when he hands

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it over to prison authorities for mailing to the district court.” Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d

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1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff alleges that courts “have generally applied this ‘prison

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mailbox’ Rule to other civil litigation deadlines as well, including the filing of the

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complaint.” (Doc. 110, pg. 3). Despite that contention, Plaintiff provides no support

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showing that the rule has been applied to discovery requests propounded by a prisoner. The

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idea behind the rule is presumably to avoid prejudice to prisoners who have no control of

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the transit of their legal documents once they are transmitted to the care of prison

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authorities. If the rule was applied to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, it would not only fail

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to fulfill its original purpose, but would also effectively deprive Defendants of their rightful

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time-frame to respond as prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). Therefore, the Court

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finds the “prison mailbox rule” does not apply to Plaintiff’s discovery requests and finds

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Defendants’ request to be timely.

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Furthermore, the Court finds that Defendants’ request is reasonable. Although it is

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the subject of a separate motion (Doc. 108), the Court is concerned by the sheer volume of

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Plaintiff’s discovery requests. In total, to date, Plaintiff has propounded 479 separate

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discovery requests upon Defendants. Id. at 5. This is a staggering number and the Court

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finds that Defendants have more than shown good cause for a two-week extension of time.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

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1. Defendants’ Motion to Extend Deadline (Doc. 109) is granted.

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2. Defendants have until March 28, 2019 for Defendant Ryan to respond to

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Plaintiff’s Second Set of Requests for Production dated February 8, 2019.
Dated this 19th day of March, 2019.

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