Turner v. McDonald's Corporation et al

Filing 33

ORDER granting 8 Motion to Remand to State Court and directing the Clerk of Court to return the case, including pending Motion to Amend the Answer forthwith. Signed by Judge James M. Moody on 10/14/2011. (dmn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION
DARON DEWAYNE TURNER
PLAINTIFFS
VS.

CASE NO. 1:11-CV-00051-JMM

McDONALD’S CORPORATION;
McDONALD’S USE, LLC; NEWPORT
ENTERPRISES, LLC; SHEILA SNOW;
JULIE SUMMERFIELD; SARA McGEE;
JOHN DOE ENTITIES 1-10; JOHN DOE
INDIVIDUALS 11-20
ORDER

DEFENDANTS

Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court. For the reasons
stated below, the Motion to Remand to State Court is granted (#8).
Plaintiff filed this action on April 6, 2011, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Arkansas. On June 15, 2011, defendant Newport Enterprises, LLC, removed the case to this
Court because the original complaint raised a federal question under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act. Subsequently, on June 21, 2011, this Court granted plaintiff’s motion to amend the original
complaint. Plaintiff removed any reference to a claim premised on the federal question and filed
his amended complaint on June 21, 2011.
Plaintiff seeks remand to state court contending that because plaintiff’s complaint no
longer raises a federal question, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants respond
that jurisdiction is determined as of the date of removal, even if subsequent events remove the
facts upon which jurisdiction is based. See Kansas Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Reimer
& Koger Assoc., Inc., 77 F.3d 1063, 1067–68 (8th Cir. 1996).
The record reflects that upon the filing of the original complaint and upon the date of
removal, plaintiff raised a federal question under the Fair Claims Reporting Act. This being the

case, plaintiff’s subsequent amendment deleting the federal question did not divest this Court of
jurisdiction over the case.
Nonetheless, this Court has discretion to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim after dismissal of the federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Glorvigen v.
Cirrus Design Corp., 581 F.3d 737, 749 (8th Cir. 2009). Defendant argues that this Court should
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction because Arkansas law does not recognize a claim of
disparate impact under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (“ARCA”). The Court finds this argument
to be without merit as disparate impact claims are within the purview of ACRA. See Robinson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1118–19 & n.9 (E.D. Ark. 2000) (disparate impact
claims may be analyzed under ARCA) (citing Henderson v. Simmons Food, Inc., 217 F.3d 612,
614 (8th Cir. 2000); Flentje v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 340 Ark. 563, 569–70, 11 S.W.3d 531,
536–38 (2000)). Further, language of ARCA renders it applicable to all claims of employment
discrimination. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–123–107(c)(1)(A) (“Any individual who is injured
by employment discrimination by an employer . . . shall have a civil action . . .”).
After considering the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity, the
Court finds that this case should be remanded to the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Arkansas.
See Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 581 F.3d at 749. The Clerk of the Court is directed to
return the case, including the pending Motion to Amend the Answer forthwith.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS

14

day of October, 2011.

____________________________________
James M. Moody
United States District Court