Goodman v. Social Security Administration

Filing 14

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION recommending reversing and remanding the decision of the Commissioner with instructions to develop the record as necessary, to consider Ms. Goodman's credibility based on evidence, to set forth specific reasons for all findings, and to fully and properly consider all the evidence of record. Objections due within 14 days of this Recommendation's filing. Signed by Magistrate Judge Beth Deere on 8/3/2018. (cmn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
NORTHERN DIVISION
LORI GOODMAN
v.

PLAINTIFF
NO. 1:18-CV-3-JM-BD

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

DEFENDANT

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
Instructions
The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to
Judge James M. Moody Jr. Either party may file written objections with the Clerk of
Court. Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the
objection. To be considered objections must be received by the Clerk within 14 days of
this Recommendation’s filing. By not objecting, the right to appeal questions of fact may
be jeopardized. And, if no objections are filed, Judge Moody can adopt this
Recommendation without independently reviewing the record.
I.

Background
Lori Goodman applied for social security disability benefits with an alleged onset

date of August 6, 2015. (R. at 51). After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
denied Ms. Goodman’s applications. (R. at 24). The Appeals Council denied her request
for review. (R. at 1). The ALJ’s decision now stands as the Commissioner’s final
decision. Ms. Goodman filed this lawsuit seeking judicial review.

II.

The Commissioner’s Decision
The ALJ found that Ms. Goodman had attempted to work after the alleged onset of

disability, but that it was an unsuccessful work attempt. (R. at 14). The ALJ found that
Ms. Goodman had the following severe impairments: chronic obstructive pulmonary
disorder (COPD), asthma, osteoarthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, and obesity. (R. at 14).
The ALJ found that Ms. Goodman had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform light work and could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; occasionally
reach overhead with the right upper extremity; frequently, but not constantly, use the
bilateral upper extremities to finger and feel; and should not have concentrated exposure
to temperature extremes, dust, fumes, humidity, or other pulmonary irritants. (R. at 16).
The ALJ took testimony from a vocational expert (VE), who testified that the assigned
RFC would allow Ms. Goodman to return to her past relevant work as social service
worker as the job is generally performed. (R. 20–21). The ALJ held, therefore, that Ms.
Goodman was not disabled. (R. at 21).
III.

Discussion
Ms. Goodman argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination is flawed because

the ALJ did not properly consider the Polaski factors, failed to identify any
inconsistencies that would detract from her credibility, and improperly discredited her
subjective complaints based on the medical evidence alone.
The task of the Court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s findings. Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000).
“Substantial evidence” in this context means “enough that a reasonable mind would find

it adequate to support the ALJ’s decision.” Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). In performing this analysis, the Court must look not only at the
evidence supporting the Commissioner’s findings, but also, evidence that detracts from
the decision. Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2015).
Courts generally defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination. Even so, that
determination must be supported by good reason and substantial evidence. Milam, 794
F.3d at 984. In assessing the subjective complaints of a plaintiff, the ALJ is to consider
such matters as the plaintiff’s daily activities; the duration, frequency, and intensity of
pain; any precipitating and aggravating factors; the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects
of any medication; treatment other than medication; and functional restrictions. Polaski v.
Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). This does not require a methodical
discussion of each factor, as long as the ALJ acknowledges and examines these
considerations in assessing the claimant’s subjective complaints. Steed v. Astrue, 524
F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2008).
Ms. Goodman argues that the ALJ gave no proper consideration to her work
history. The ALJ wrote that, “[c]onsideration was also given to all the evidence related to
the claimant’s prior work history.” There is no further discussion of Ms. Goodman’s long
work history, which stretched over twenty years. (R. at 156).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s single statement is sufficient. Were the
rest of the credibility factors properly considered, this single sentence might satisfy the
requirement to consider all the credibility factors. Here, however, there are other flaws
with the ALJ’s credibility determination. Not only did the ALJ fail to discuss Ms.

Goodman’s work history, but when this is considered alongside the other inadequacies,
Ms. Goodman has overcome any presumption that the ALJ properly considered her work
history with this boilerplate statement.
Ms. Goodman also contends that the ALJ improperly considered her daily
activities, which the ALJ noted include “eating breakfast with her husband, watching
television, reading, using a computer, and visiting family.” (R. at 18). The fact that a
claimant “tries to maintain her home and does her best to engage in ordinary life
activities is not inconsistent with her complaints of pain.” Draper v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d
1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 2005). “The test is whether the claimant has ‘the ability to perform
the requisite physical acts day in and day out, in the sometimes competitive and stressful
conditions in which real people work in the real world.’” Id. (quoting McCoy v.
Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc)). Light housework and other
similar activities, standing alone, do not support a finding that a claimant can perform
fulltime, competitive work. Baumgarten v. Chater, 75 F.3d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1996).
The ALJ cited to hearing testimony in considering Ms. Goodman’s daily activities.
Ms. Goodman testified, in part, as follows:
Well, I get up in the morning, usually take care of my
personal hygiene, shower, all of that. If I eat breakfast, it’s
just, like, a bowl of cereal. My husband goes out for
breakfast. And I just basically kind of sit around the house.
I’ll watch TV. You know, read the newspaper. Might sit
down at the computer for 15, 20 minutes at a time, and just
read news headlines or something like that. And then some
days, just because I always was so active, my husband will
take me out. And I’ll spend the day with my sister or some of
the kids or something like that, just to get me out of the
house.

(R. at 40). She also testified that she used the computer for up to twenty minutes at a time
for light reading. There is no activity in this testimony that indicates the ability to engage
in light work.
Most concerning, however, is the ALJ’s statement that “[t]he undersigned suspects
the claimant is still working.” (R. at 18). The ALJ had already found that Ms. Goodman
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. (R. at 14). In
support of his “suspicion,” the ALJ pointed to nothing in the record, and this Court finds
no support for that statement.
The ALJ references a treating physician’s note from August 17, 2015 stating that,
“[Ms. Goodman] is able to work and is employed as her pain is controlled with pain
meds.” (R. at 634). This exact note first appears in June 17, 2015 records. (R. at 639). It
continues to appear in the “History of Present Illness,” “Lumbar Spine/ Lower Back”
section of medical records from that point forward. (R. at 634, 618, 612, 600, 594, 588,
583, 564, 555, 551, 539). Additional notes are added to this section as time progressed,
but those notes continued to be repeated in subsequent records. (R. at 612, 600, 594, 588,
583, 564, 555, 551, 539).
The Commissioner argues that this note supports the ALJ’s suspicion. The more
reasonable assumption is that the note is simply a repeated, historical note rather than a
comment on Ms. Goodman’s then-present situation. Notably, wage records reflect that
Ms. Goodman had earned no income since 2015. (R. at 154–67). The ALJ did not refer to
any medical records after August 17, 2015 to support his suspicion.

The ALJ’s suspicion is not only unsupported by the evidence, it is contradicted by
earnings records. The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ “properly noted that Plaintiff
may have still been working at the time of her hearing.” (Doc. 13, 7). The Commissioner
offers no legal authority to support the notion that an ALJ’s suspicions, feelings, or
instincts constitute substantial evidence. Indeed, judicial review would be futile if courts
were required to accept an ALJ’s suspicions, unsupported by record evidence, as
“substantial” evidence.
“The ALJ must neutrally develop the facts.” Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801,
806 (8th Cir. 2004). Substituting personal suspicion for evidence falls far short of that
duty.
IV.

Conclusion
The ALJ failed to perform a proper credibility determination. For that reason, the

Court recommends REVERSING and REMANDING the decision of the Commissioner
with instructions to develop the record as necessary, to consider Ms. Goodman’s
credibility based on evidence, to set forth specific reasons for all findings, and to fully
and properly consider all the evidence of record.
Dated this 3rd day of August, 2018.

___________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE