Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Dievernich et al

Filing 195

ORDER granting 142 , 144 motions for declaratory judgment and for summary judgment; and dismissing Cincinnati Insurance Company, Inc. as a party in this case. Signed by Judge Kristine G. Baker on 9/30/2021. (jbh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
DELTA DIVISION
CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC.
v.

PLAINTIFF

Case No. 2:19-cv-00115 KGB

ANDREA DIEVERNICH, et al.

DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Cincinnati Insurance Company, Inc. (“Cincinnati”), initiated this interpleader
action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 on July 27, 2018, and filed its second
amended complaint on October 19, 2020 (Dkt. Nos. 1, 140). At issue in this case is the total
amount of liability coverage under an insurance policy between Cincinnati and the Helena-West
Helena School District (“District”) for a collision involving three District school buses and a Jeep
Liberty (Dkt. No. 140, ¶¶ 118–121). Cincinnati seeks a declaratory judgment that the available
coverage amount under the policy is $100,000 (Id., ¶ 135).
Before the Court are Cincinnati’s motion for declaratory judgment and motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 142, 144). Allen Defendants 1 responded in opposition to both

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Allen Defendants are separate defendants Dr. Mark Allen, Sr., Montreal Allen, Kylaun
Anderson, Sandre Anderson, Marvie Askew-Evans, Andrew Bagley, Collin Bagley, Donna Block,
Richard Brown, Keyon Burrell, Ma’Kaylah Carruth, Shazmyne Jamekia Carruth, Bakarius Collier,
Murry Conail, Cypert Ridge Family Practice Clinic, Deketric Davis, Shamar Debnam, Cheryl
Dixon, Jameshia Edmond, Chiniya Ellis, Maxine Ellison, Tasheta Evans, Carl Ford, Jr., Cynthia
Ford, Magnola Ford, Nakiya Ford, Kylar Gamble, Jaylon Gates, Torri Gates, Adam Goodall,
Ashaunte Goodall, Nyrita Gray, Lakesha Hamilton, Chester Harrell, Katrina Harrell, Sharonda
Hart, Ahmaud Jones, Kayla Jones, Tangela King, Taylin King, Brandon McBride, Debbie Oliver,
Demontae Oliver, John Oliver, Philemon Oliver, Tracey Partee, Bobbie Randle, Justin Redmon,
Gian Roberts, Trina Roberts, Angel Sanders, Latesha Sanders, Shequina Shields, Earnest Simpson,
Keisha Simpson, Kobe Simpson, Amanda Smith, Javazze Smith, Kyron Smith, Shereka Spearman,
Gloria Spencer, Kylan Terry, Jordan Walker, Jimmy White, Phyllis White, Heaven Williams,

motions (Dkt. Nos. 153, 156). Separate defendant Helena Regional Medical Center (“HRMC”)
moved to adopt and join Allen Defendants’ responses to the motions (Dkt. Nos. 164, 165), and the
Court granted HRMC’s motions to adopt and join Allen Defendants’ responses to the motions
(Dkt. No. 184, at 2-3). Cincinnati filed a reply in support of its renewed motion for declaratory
judgment and in support of its renewed motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 160, 186). For
the following reasons, the Court grants Cincinnati’s motion for declaratory judgment and motion
for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 142, 144).
I.

Statement Of Facts

Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are drawn from Cincinnati’s statement of facts
and Allen Defendants’ response to Cincinnati’s statement of facts (Dkt. Nos. 146, 152).
On November 10, 2017, three school buses and one Jeep Liberty collided (Dkt. No. 146, ¶
1). Cincinnati characterizes the collision as an accident (Id.), but Allen Defendants disagree with
the characterization that the underlying events were a single accident (Dkt. No. 152, at 1–2). The
Arkansas State police completed a motor vehicle crash report (Dkt. No. 146, ¶ 2).
At the time of the motor vehicle collision, there was a commercial automobile policy in
effect for the District (Id., ¶ 3). The policy states on the page entitled “Business Auto Coverage
Part Declarations” that “the most we will pay for any one accident or loss” is “$100,000” (Id., ¶ 4;
Dkt. No. 99-2, at 66). According to the policy, “‘[a]ccident’ includes continuous or repeated
exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’.” (Dkt. No. 146,
¶ 5; Dkt. No. 99-2, at 34). The policy further states, “[r]egardless of the number of covered ‘autos’,
‘insureds’, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’, the most we will

Syieed Wilson, Breuna Womack, Earnest Womack, Michelle Wright, D’andreya Devay Young,
and D’andreya Young (Dkt. No. 153).
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pay for the total of all damages and ‘covered pollution cost or expense’ combined, resulting from
any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.”
(Dkt. No. 146, ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 99-2, at 29).
Cincinnati asserts that the policy language establishes unambiguously that the number of
school buses involved in the accident is irrelevant for purposes of determining the amount of
liability coverage (Dkt. No. 146, ¶ 7). Allen Defendants deny this and assert that the entire premise
of Cincinnati’s statement is based on Cincinnati’s allegation that the underlying events are to be
considered a single accident, which Allen Defendants dispute and deny (Dkt. No. 152, at 5).
Additionally, Allen Defendants submit that the policy states that “[o]ther words and
phrases that appear in quotation marks have special meaning.

Refer to SECTION V -

DEFINITIONS.” (Id.; Dkt. No. 99-2, at 24). Allen Defendants further submit that, on the page
entitled “Business Auto Coverage Part Declarations,” the language stating “the most we will pay
for any one accident or loss” does not use quotation marks around the word “accident” (Dkt. No.
152, at 6; Dkt. No. 99-2, at 66). Allen Defendants assert that, on this same page, terms that are
defined in the policy appear using quotation marks around such terms (Dkt. No. 152, at 6; Dkt.
No. 99-2, at 66). Cincinnati denies each of these statements to the extent that a response may be
required (Dkt. No. 160, at 6 n.3).
Cincinnati interpleaded $100,000 into the registry of the Court on October 29, 2019 (Dkt.
No. 146, ¶ 8).
II.

Procedural Background

This Court previously recounted the procedural history of this action in an Order dated
September 6, 2019 (Dkt. No. 88). After entry of that Order, Cincinnati filed motions for leave to
file its second amended complaint, for default judgment against certain defendants, for declaratory

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judgment, and for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 90, 92, 99, 107). On February 19, 2020, attorney
David Hodges entered an appearance on behalf of several defendants and represented that he had
reached an agreement with most of the defendants in this matter to take the lead in representation
of Allen Defendants (Dkt. No. 110, ¶¶ 2–3). Allen Defendants responded in opposition to
Cincinnati’s motions for default judgment, declaratory judgment, and summary judgment (Dkt.
Nos. 103, 111, 115). The Court granted Cincinnati’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint, denied without prejudice Cincinnati’s motion for default judgment, and denied as moot
Cincinnati’s motions for declaratory judgment and for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 139, 157,
159). Cincinnati subsequently filed its second amended complaint and the instant motions for
declaratory judgment and for summary judgment, arguing that the total amount owed under the
insurance policy is $100,000 (Dkt. Nos. 140, 142, 144). Allen Defendants filed an answer and
counterclaim, claiming that Cincinnati’s total liability is $300,000 (Dkt. No. 147, ¶ 22). Allen
Defendants responded in opposition to Cincinnati’s motions, and HRMC joined and adopted Allen
Defendants’ responses (Dkt. Nos. 153, 156, 164, 165). HRMC also filed a counterclaim and crosscomplaint against Avin Redmon, Devita Redmon, Justin Rogers, DeWayne Stackhouse, Jimmy
White, Phillis White, and Cincinnati (Dkt. No. 187). Finally, the Court adopted joint stipulations
between Cincinnati and separate defendant the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences
(“UAMS”) and between Cincinnati and separate defendant Radiology Associates, PA, and
dismissed as parties UAMS and Radiology Associates, PA (Dkt. Nos. 166, 172).
III.

Standard of Review
A.

Declaratory Judgment

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction,” subject to some exceptions not at issue here, “any court of the United States, upon

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the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28
U.S.C. § 2201(a).
“There is no clear-cut standard to use in determining whether a court should exercise its
discretion to grant declaratory relief.” Bd. of Regents for Nw. Mo. St. Univ. v. MSE Corp., Case
No. 90-0125-cv-W-9, 1990 WL 212098, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 1990). “Basically, the question
in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co.,
312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). In general, courts should exercise their discretion in such a way as “to
strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the consequences of giving the
desired relief. . . . The actuality of the plaintiff’s need for a declaration of his rights is therefore of
decisive importance.” Eccles v. People’s Bank of Lakewood Village, Cal., 333 U.S. 426, 431–32
(1948).
B.

Summary Judgment

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may grant summary judgment
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable
jury could render its verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The mere existence of a factual dispute is insufficient alone to bar summary
judgment; rather, the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.” Holloway v.
Pigman, 884 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1989). Mere denials or allegations are insufficient to defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. See Com. Union Ins. Co. v.

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Schmidt, 967 F.2d 270, 271–72 (8th Cir. 1992); Miner v. Local 373, 513 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir.
2008).
The initial burden is on the party seeking summary judgment to demonstrate an absence of
a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Farver v.
McCarthy, 931 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 2019). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden
then shifts to the non-moving party to establish the presence of a genuine issue that must be
determined at trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 121 F.3d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1997). The non-movant “‘must
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ and must
come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Torgerson v.
City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 586, 587). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are
to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
IV.

Discussion

The Court will first address Cincinnati’s motion for summary judgment because resolution
of the motion is entirely dispositive of the parties’ arguments and Cincinnati’s claims. The Court
will then address Cincinnati’s motion for declaratory judgment.
A.

Motion For Summary Judgment

Under Arkansas law, if the language in an insurance policy is ambiguous, then the Court
must construe the language strictly against the insurance company and resolve all doubts in favor
of the insured. Southern Title Ins. v. Oller, 595 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ark. 1980). An insurance policy
is ambiguous if “there is doubt and uncertainty as to its meaning and it is fairly susceptible of two
or more interpretations.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Worthey, 861 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Ark. 1993).

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“Although the meaning of an ambiguity may become a question for the fact-finder if parol
evidence has been admitted to resolve that ambiguity, . . . where the meaning of the language of a
written contract does not depend on disputed extrinsic evidence, the construction and legal effect
of the contract are questions of law.” Smith v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 10 S.W.3d 846,
850 (Ark. 2000).
Further, if the language of a policy is unambiguous, then the Court need not resort to rules
of construction in order to ascertain the meaning of the insurance policy. The Court must apply
the plain and ordinary meaning of terms in the policy. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Williams,
543 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Ark. 1976). “[W]hen policy language is clear and unambiguous, the court
should decide, as a matter of law, the construction.” Nat. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 455
S.W.2d 120 (Ark. 1970).
The parties dispute whether the insurance policy is ambiguous. Cincinnati argues that the
policy is unambiguous as to the meaning of the word “accident” and that a single accident occurred
in this case (Dkt. No. 145, at 3). Cincinnati argues that, if the four-vehicle collision was a single
accident, then the maximum Cincinnati owes under the insurance policy is $100,000 (Id.).
Allen Defendants argue that the insurance policy is ambiguous and that the policy can be
interpreted to require Cincinnati to pay at least $300,000 (Dkt. No. 155, at 3–4). According to
Allen Defendants, the policy is ambiguous because the word “accident” as it appears on the
Business Auto Coverage Part Declarations page does not appear with quotation marks, which,
Allen Defendants argue, means that it is not a defined term in the policy and that accident is
therefore ambiguous (Id., at 4). Allen Defendants therefore assert that the collisions involving
three separate buses can reasonably be interpreted as three separate accidents under the policy
(Id.). Allen Defendants further argue that each bus driver had an independent duty under Arkansas

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law to drive safely and avoid collisions and that, “if the various individual drivers breached their
duties, those are separate causes as to demonstrate that Plaintiff can be liable for at least $300,000
under the policy.” (Id., at 9–10).
Here, the insurance policy provides that “the most we will pay for any one accident or loss”
is “$100,000” for liability coverage (Dkt. No. 146, ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 99-2, at 66). According to the
policy, “‘[a]ccident’ includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in
‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’.” (Dkt. No. 146, ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 99-2, at 34). The policy further
states, “[r]egardless of the number of covered ‘autos’, ‘insureds’, premiums paid, claims made or
vehicles involved in the ‘accident’, the most we will pay for the total of all damages and ‘covered
pollution cost or expense’ combined, resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance
for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.” (Dkt. No. 146, ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 99-2, at 29).
The policy does not provide an exclusive definition of the word “accident.” Instead, the
policy provides that the word “includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions
resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’.” (Dkt. No. 99-2, at 34 (emphasis added)). See
Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Slaughter, 958 F.3d 1050, 1061 (11th Cir. 2020) (construing an identical
definition of “accident,” concluding that the word was “not fully defined” under the insurance
policy, and turning to state law to fill gaps); Frederking v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 195, 197,
197 n.1 (5th Cir. 2019) (construing virtually identical language, concluding that “accident” was
undefined, and giving “accident” its plain and ordinary meaning under state law). The Arkansas
Supreme Court has defined “accident” to mean “an event that takes place without one’s foresight
or expectation—an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known
cause, and therefore not expected.” Continental Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 534 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Ark.
1976) (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, as used in the policy, “accident” means an event

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that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation, including continuous or repeated exposure
to the same conditions resulting in bodily injury or property damage.
The policy further contemplates that a single accident may include multiple vehicles. The
policy states, in relevant part, “[r]egardless of the number of . . . vehicles involved in the ‘accident’,
the most we will pay for the total of all damages . . . resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit
of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.” (Dkt. No. 146, ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 992, at 29). The policy therefore makes clear that a single accident may include any number of
vehicles as long as the event takes place unexpectedly and involves continuous or repeated
exposure to the same conditions. Courts interpreting virtually identical language have reached the
same conclusion.

Munroe v. Continental W. Ins. Co., 735 F.3d 783, 790 (8th Cir. 2013)

(concluding that policy providing for coverage limit “[r]egardless of the number of covered
‘autos,’ ‘insureds,’ premiums paid, claims made or vehicles” unambiguously limited recovery
“regardless of the number of vehicles or people involved in the accident”); see also State Auto Ins.
Co. v. Stinson, 142 F.3d 436 (Table), at *4 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a policy with virtually
identical language was unambiguous and that it was the clear intent of the policy to pay no more
than $100,000 for any one occurrence, regardless of the number of vehicles involved in the
accident).
The plain and ordinary use of the word “accident” in the context of automobile collisions
also supports the conclusion that the word can describe multiple-vehicle collisions. See, e.g.,
Woodward v. Blythe, 462 S.W.2d 205, 206 (Ark. 1971) (referring to “multiple car collision”
involving three vehicles as “the accident”); Thomas v. Robinson, 596 S.W.3d 531, 532 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2020) (describing multiple car collision as “a car accident” where defendant rear-ended third
party who then rear-ended plaintiff).

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On the record before the Court, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to the contents of the insurance policy and that the policy unambiguously limits
the liability coverage for any one accident to $100,000. The Court further concludes that the fourvehicle collision at issue here was a single accident under the insurance policy. The vehicles
collided with each other in the same place at the same time. The same condition—backed-up rushhour traffic—caused each vehicle to brake unexpectedly and resulted in bodily injury and property
damage (Dkt. No. 99-1, at 1, 22, 26–30). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the insurance
policy requires $100,000 in liability coverage for this accident.
The Court is not persuaded by Allen Defendants’ arguments that the insurance policy is
ambiguous and that multiple accidents occurred.

Allen Defendants contend that the word

“accident” as used on the Business Auto Coverage Part Declarations page is ambiguous.
According to Allen Defendants, the policy clarifies that “[o]ther words and phrases that appear in
quotation marks have special meaning.” (Dkt. No. 155, at 3 (quoting Dkt. No. 107-2, at 24)). Allen
Defendants point out that words accompanied with quotation marks appear hundreds of times
throughout the policy documents (Dkt. No. 155, at 4). Allen Defendants further note that the
Business Auto Coverage Part Declarations page, which provides that the liability coverage limit
is $100,000, does not include quotation marks around the word accident, reading instead, “THE
MOST WE WILL PAY FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS” (Id. (quoting Dkt. No. 107-2,
at 66 (capitalization in original))). Allen Defendants therefore argue that the absence of quotation
marks around the word “accident” on the Business Auto Coverage Part Declarations page
“demonstrates that the defined term is not applicable” and that “there are ambiguities in this regard,
and construing the Policy strictly against the insurer, the policy can reasonabl[y] be read as to

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consider the collisions involving three separate buses . . . as three separate accidents.” (Dkt. No.
155, at 4).
However, other provisions of the insurance policy clarify that the limit of insurance for any
one accident is $100,000. The policy states:
Regardless of the number of covered “autos”, “insureds”, premiums paid, claims
made or vehicles involved in the “accident”, the most we will pay for the total of
all damages and “covered pollution cost or expense” combined, resulting from any
one “accident” is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the
Declarations.
All “bodily injury”, “property damage” and “covered pollution cost or expense”
resulting from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions
will be considered as resulting from one “accident”.
(Dkt. No. 99-2, at 29). The limit of insurance for liability coverage shown in the Business Auto
Coverage Part Declarations is $100,000 (Id., at 66). Thus, even if the word “accident” were
ambiguous as it appears on the Business Auto Coverage Part Declarations page, the policy overall
unambiguously provides that Cincinnati’s limit of liability coverage for any one “accident” is
$100,000.
Further, the lack of a definition does not always render a word or policy ambiguous, even
if the absence of quotation marks around the word “accident” were to mean that the word as used
on the Business Auto Coverage Part Declarations page is not a defined term. Undefined terms are
not necessarily ambiguous. Smith v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 114 S.W.3d 205, 207 (Ark.
2003). As explained above, the Arkansas Supreme Court has supplied a definition of the word
“accident” in the context of insurance policies. Allen Defendants do not offer any alternative
interpretation of the word “accident” which would create “doubt and uncertainty as to its meaning
and [make the word] fairly susceptible of two or more interpretations.” Worthey, 861 S.W.2d at
310. Thus, even if the Court were to assume that the word “accident” is an undefined term as it

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appears on the Business Auto Coverage Part Declarations page, the policy would not be ambiguous
because “accident” would retain its meaning as the Arkansas Supreme Court has defined it.
Allen Defendants further argue that each of the three bus drivers individually failed to meet
the requisite standard of care while driving and that these failures constitute separate and
independent causes of the collisions (Dkt. No. 155, at 5–10). Allen Defendants cite in support
Traveler’s Indemnity Co. v. Olive’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 596 (Ark. 1989), in which
the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the “cause theory” instead of the “effect theory” for
determining the number of occurrences under an insurance policy. 764 S.W.2d at 599. Under the
cause theory, courts must examine the cause of an occurrence, rather than its effects, to determine
the number of accidents or occurrences under a policy. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale
Ins. Co., 968 F. Supp. 444, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (“[T]his Court is bound to examine the ‘cause’
of the incident(s) to determine how many occurrences there were.”). Allen Defendants argue that
there were multiple causes of the collisions because each of the drivers had a duty under Arkansas
law to drive in a safe manner and to avoid collisions (Dkt. No. 155, at 8).
Allen Defendants’ cause theory argument is unpersuasive and, if anything, supports this
Court’s conclusion. In Olive Sporting Goods, the insured sold two weapons to a gunman, and the
gunman shot multiple people. 764 S.W.2d at 597. The insurance policy at issue defined an
occurrence as “an accident including continuance [of] or repeated exposure to conditions which
result in bodily injury neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Id. at
599 (alteration in original). The court examined the cause, rather than the effects, of the shooting
and concluded that the sale of weapons constituted a single occurrence under the terms of the
policy. Id.

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Relatedly, in Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., the parties
disputed “which of two types of causes should be considered for the purposes of deciding what the
occurrence was[,] . . . whether the cause/occurrence was the allegedly negligent
preparation/handling/storage of the food or instead was its sale.” 968 F. Supp. 444, 447–48 (E.D.
Ark. 1997). The Court concluded that “Arkansas’ Supreme Court would hold that in a case like
the one at bar, multiple sales of contaminated food at a restaurant to several customers would
nevertheless be one occurrence within the meaning of a standard [comprehensive general liability]
insurance contract.” 968 F. Supp. at 448. The Court further suggested that “if the factual evidence
were to reveal that two or more wholly independent events occurred, each resulting in injury (such
as food being contaminated by someone in August and someone else contaminating food in
October), then more than one occurrence might be found.” Id.
Similarly, the factual evidence here does not reveal that two or more wholly independent
accidents occurred. Instead, the record indicates that each collision was the direct result of the
same condition, namely rush-hour traffic (Dkt. No. 99-1, at 1, 22, 26–30). Allen Defendants argue
that each driver had a duty to drive safely under Arkansas law, but Allen Defendants do not offer
any record evidence that any driver was driving unreasonably or unsafely or otherwise violating
their duties of care. Instead, Allen Defendants suggest that “a failure of each of the drivers to meet
their duties could have each caused the various collisions” and that “if various individual drivers
breached those duties, those are separate causes as to demonstrate that Plaintiff can be liable for at
least $300,000 under the policy” (Dkt. No. 155, at 9–10 (emphasis omitted)). Allen Defendants
neither identify nor offer evidence of any other wholly independent events which may have caused
the collisions between the four vehicles, and this Court does not find any such evidence in the
record.

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Finally, the Court rejects Allen Defendants’ argument that apparent inconsistencies in
driver and witness statements in the record create factual issues which preclude summary judgment
(Dkt. No. 155, at 8). Allen Defendants assert that “the driver and witness statements attached to
the Accident Report recite varying accounts of how the events unfolded” and that “[t]here are clear
factual issues as to how the events unfolded” (Id.). The Court recognizes that it is unclear based
on the factual record whether the first school bus struck the Jeep Liberty or whether the second
school bus rear-ended the first school bus and caused the first school bus to strike the Jeep Liberty
(Dkt. No. 99-1, at 1, 22–30). However, even if these statements in the record were inconsistent,
these inconsistencies do not create an issue of material fact because nothing in the record before
the Court indicates that there was any condition other than rush-hour traffic that caused the
accident at issue. Allen Defendants do not provide any further evidence tending to support the
argument that different conditions arose which caused at least three distinct accidents.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the insurance policy unambiguously limits the
liability coverage for any one accident to $100,000. The Court further concludes that the fourvehicle collision at issue here was a single accident under the insurance policy.
B.

Motion For Declaratory Judgment

Cincinnati makes substantially similar arguments in its motion for declaratory judgment as
it does in its motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 142, 143). Likewise, Allen Defendants
make substantially similar arguments in their response to Cincinnati’s motion for declaratory
judgment as they do in their response to Cincinnati’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos.
153, 154). Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, the Court grants Cincinnati’s
motion for declaratory judgment.

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V.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Cincinnati’s motions for declaratory judgment
and for summary judgment (Dkt. Nos. 142, 144). The Court dismisses Cincinnati as a party in this
case.
It is so ordered this 30th day of September, 2021.
Kristine G. Baker
United States District Judge

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