King's Ranch of Jonesboro Incorporated v. Jonesboro Arkansas, City of

Filing 32

OPINION AND ORDER granting 9 MOTON for Summary Judgment filed by King's Ranch of Jonesboro Incorporated; denying 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jonesboro Arkansas, City of. Signed by Chief Judge J. Leon Holmes on 4/25/2011. (jct)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
JONESBORO DIVISION
KING’S RANCH OF JONESBORO, INC.
v.

PLAINTIFF

No. 3:10CV00096 JLH

CITY OF JONESBORO, ARKANSAS

DEFENDANT

OPINION & ORDER
On April 26, 2010, King’s Ranch of Jonesboro, Inc., an Arkansas nonprofit corporation, filed
a complaint in this Court against the City of Jonesboro, Arkansas, for alleged violations of the Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1)-(3) (2006). Specifically, the complaint alleges that
the City of Jonesboro denied housing to handicapped children by refusing King’s Ranch’s request
to waive the definition of “family” in its zoning resolution so that King’s Ranch could house eight
children and two house parents in a single family unit. The parties have filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. For the following reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is
granted, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
I.
In February 2008, King’s Ranch purchased 10.57 acres located at 2816 Day Drive, Jonesboro,
Arkansas, to operate as a home for up to eight abused, neglected, and abandoned children as well as
two full-time houseparents. The property is located in Jonesboro’s R-1 residential zoning district
and contains a 4,900 square foot brick home. Pursuant to the City of Jonesboro’s zoning resolution,
a group of more than five unrelated persons living together in a single family home must obtain a
conditional use permit to reside in the city’s R-1 district as a “group residential.” The resolution
defines “group residential” as “[t]he use of a site for occupancy by groups of more than five (5)

persons, not defined as a family. Typical uses include fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories,
residence halls, and boarding or lodging houses.” (Pl.’s Mot. for S.J. Ex. 1 at 3.) In contrast, a
“family” is defined as “[o]ne or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption, or a group of
not more than five (5) unrelated persons living together and subsisting in common as a single, nonprofit housekeeping unit utilizing only one kitchen.” (Id.)
In January 2008, King’s Ranch submitted an application for a conditional use permit to
operate as a group residential to house up to eight unrelated children between the ages of six and
twelve. During the Metropolitan Area Planning Commission meetings in February and March 2008,
the application was denied. King’s Ranch appealed the decision to the Jonesboro City Council. At
the City Council meeting in which the issue was considered, residents of the neighborhood in which
the proposed facility was located expressed concerns over the operation of a group home in their
neighborhood. The City Council denied King’s Ranch’s appeal.
After its request for a conditional use permit was denied, King’s Ranch filed suit in the
Circuit Court of Craighead County, Arkansas, arguing that the City Council’s denial of their
conditional use permit was arbitrary and capricious. The circuit court found that there was a rational
basis for the City Council to deny the conditional-use permit, and King’s Ranch appealed its decision
to the Arkansas Supreme Court. The supreme court determined that the circuit court had erred in
applying the rational basis standard of review instead of de novo review, and it reversed and
remanded to the circuit court, where the case is currently pending. King’s Ranch of Jonesboro, Inc.,
v. City of Jonesboro, No. 09-1311, 2011 WL 1177097 (Ark. Mar. 31, 2011).
In addition to the appeal, King’s Ranch also sent a letter dated July 13, 2009, to the City of
Jonesboro, making an official request for reasonable accommodation pursuant to the FHA.
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Specifically, King’s Ranch requested that the City of Jonesboro waive its definition of “family” as
it applied to King’s Ranch’s proposed use. On August 7, 2009, King’s Ranch sent another letter to
the City requesting reasonable accommodation. On January 19, 2010, the Jonesboro City Council
acknowledged receipt of the August 7 letter, and City Attorney Phillip Crego provided a report to
the City Council in which he stated that, in his opinion, “the City code is reasonable and will allow
King’s Ranch to do what they want to do, but just not on the scale they are asking for.” (Pl.’s Mot.
for S.J. Ex. 4 at 4-5.) Based in part on his recommendation, the City Council voted to “stand on the
current City code and allow federal court to rule on the issue.” (Id.) King’s Ranch alleges that its
request is reasonable and necessary because the costs involved in maintaining a home and providing
care to children make it economically unfeasible for it to operate as a children’s home unless it can
do so with eight children. The City of Jonesboro disagrees.
II.
A court should enter summary judgment if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Cheshewalla
v. Rand & Son Constr. Co., 415 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2005). The party moving for summary
judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party must “come forward with ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475
U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1985) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e))
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(emphasis in original). A genuine issue for trial exists only if there is sufficient evidence to allow
a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511.
When a nonmoving party cannot make an adequate showing on a necessary element of the case on
which that party bears the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552.
III.
The FHA’s reasonable accommodation provision prohibits “refusal[s] to make reasonable
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling[.]” 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(3)(B). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained,
the duty to make a reasonable accommodation does not simply spring from the fact
that the handicapped person wants such an accommodation made. Defendants must
instead have been given an opportunity to make a final decision with respect to the
Plaintiffs’ request, which necessarily includes the ability to conduct a meaningful
review of the requested accommodation to determine if such an accommodation is
required by law.
Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1219 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Prindable v.
Ass’n of Apartment Owners, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1258 (D. Haw. 2003) (citations, quotation marks,
alteration, and ellipsis omitted)). “[P]laintiffs themselves need not be handicapped and are permitted
to argue on behalf of the proposed residents of their home that defendants discriminated against
those residents on the basis of their handicap.” Cohen v. Township of Cheltenham, Penn., 174 F.
Supp. 2d 307, 324 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
The City of Jonesboro acknowledges that it received two letters from King’s Ranch
requesting accommodation on behalf of handicapped children that King’s Ranch alleged was

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reasonable and necessary. The City denies, however, that King’s Ranch is entitled to protection
under the FHA because King’s Ranch is not an organization designed to serve handicapped children.
The City of Jonesboro also argues that there is no evidence that any of the children who would live
at the King’s Ranch facility would be handicapped.
A threshold issue for finding liability under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) is whether the
proposed residents of the group home would be “handicapped.” Congress has defined “handicap”
as “(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s
major life activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such
an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). A “mental impairment” includes “[a]ny mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(1) (2010). “Major life activities”
include, but are not limited to, “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b).
King’s Ranch offers affidavit testimony that many of the children currently enrolled in its
program suffer from minor to moderate mental or behavioral disabilities, including Reactive
Attachment Disorder, and that its staff is specifically trained to deal with and has a desire to serve
children with these disabilities. King’s Ranch also provides evidence of one specific child currently
living at the residence who has been diagnosed with Reactive Attachment Disorder, Bipolar
Disorder, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). According to the affidavit of Dr.
Terry Levy,
King’s Ranch currently provides a home to a 7 year old female at King’s Ranch who
is diagnosed with [Reactive Attachment Disorder], Bipolar Disorder and ADHD.
She was removed from her biological mother at age one and placed in foster care,
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moved to and from several foster homes, and finally adopted at 4 years old. For 3
years in the adoptive family she exhibited severe psychological and social
difficulties, including acting-out in school, inability to make friends, and failing to
attach to her parents. This child is illustrative of the type of youngster that will be
residing in the King’s Ranch children’s home.
(Levy Aff. ¶ 18.) The affidavit also states that these disorders substantially limit the life activities
of children at home, in school, and in other social settings. This undisputed evidence shows that
King’s Ranch will in fact house handicapped children and, thus, is entitled to protection under the
FHA. See Cohen, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 325 (“[P]laintiffs in this case must establish that individual
children who would reside in plaintiffs’ proposed group home would suffer from an impairment that
substantially limits one or more of such children’s major life activities.”) (finding that plaintiffs were
not entitled to FHA protection because they failed to produce evidence that any of their potential
residents would have a physical or mental impairment); Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe,
Kan., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1299 and n.16 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding that, although the plaintiff’s home
is not for the handicapped, the plaintiff had provided evidence “that some potential residents meet
the FHA definition of handicapped,” and even though the plaintiff could not know who the specific
residents would be at the facility, “the Court [could] assume[ ] that at any given point, the residence
would include both handicapped and non-handicapped youth and that the mix would vary over
time”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 248 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001).
IV.
The City of Jonesboro next contends that, even if King’s Ranch is entitled to protection under
the FHA, the request for accommodation is neither reasonable nor necessary. Under the FHA,
disabled individuals must be provided reasonable “accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or
services when such accommodation may be necessary to afford [them] equal opportunity to use and
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enjoy a dwelling.” Wisconsin Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 748 (7th Cir.
2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)).
The basic elements of an FHA[ ] accommodation claim are well-settled. First, the
requested accommodation must be reasonable, which, as we have stated, is a “highly
fact-specific inquiry and requires balancing the needs of the parties. An
accommodation is reasonable if it is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to
implement it.” Oconomowoc Residential Programs [v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d
775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002)] (internal citations omitted). In the zoning context, a
municipality may show that a modification to its policy is “unreasonable if it is so at
odds with the purpose behind the rule that it would be a fundamental and
unreasonable change.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Second, the requested accommodation must be “necessary,” meaning that,
without the accommodation, the plaintiff will be denied an equal opportunity to
obtain the housing of her choice. See id. at 784; see also Giebeler v. M & B Assocs.,
343 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir.2003); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102
F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir.1996). This has been described by courts essentially as a
causation inquiry. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp.
of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 460 (3d Cir.2002) (“This requirement has attributes
of a causation requirement. And if the proposed accommodation provides no direct
amelioration of a disability's effect, it cannot be said to be necessary.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Id. at 749. In the Eighth Circuit, “the plaintiff has the burden to show that the requested
accommodation is reasonable [and necessary] upon its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.
Upon such a showing, the [defendant] is left to show special (typical case-specific) circumstances
that demonstrate [unreasonableness or] undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”
Developmental Servs. of NE v. City of Lincoln, 504 F. Supp. 2d 714, 723 (D. Neb. 2007) (quoting
Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 768 (8th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations omitted)). In other words,
the plaintiff must show that the requested accommodation is necessary to afford equal opportunity
to handicapped individuals and possible to implement. Huberty v. Washington Cnty. Housing &
Redevelopment Auth., 374 F. Supp. 2d 768, 773 (D. Minn. 2005).
The Vice President of the Board of Directors for King’s Ranch says in an affidavit that the
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request to house eight children at a time is necessary because
King’s Ranch relies completely upon donations. Most donors or donor families who
support our ministry sponsor an individual child living at King’s Ranch. Thus,
King’s Ranch’s financial support is based upon or directly tied to the number of
children King’s Ranch provides assistance to.
14. If King’s Ranch is not permitted to use the property in the manner intended—to
house eight children and two houseparents—King’s Ranch will be unable to maintain
the expenses related to operating the home.
(Cooper Aff. ¶¶ 13-14.); see Developmental Servs. of NE, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 724 (finding that
plaintiff had met its burden of showing the accommodation to be reasonable and necessary based in
part on evidence presented at trial that, if the accommodation is not granted, the plaintiff may be
financially unable to continue providing services). The City of Jonesboro does not rebut this
evidence with any evidence of its own to suggest that King’s Ranch feasibly could house fewer than
eight children.
King’s Ranch also alleges that its request is reasonable because it will impose no additional
expense or undue burden on the City of Jonesboro, nor would it “fundamentally alter the singlefamily character of the neighborhood.” (Pl.’s Mot. for S.J. Ex. 2.) Through affidavit testimony,
King’s Ranch contends that the addition of several children to the property would not impact
parking, traffic, noise, utility uses, or any other concerns of zoning differently than an ordinary
“family” of the same size. It points out that the City already allows conditional use permits for group
residentials, which typically include fraternities and sororities, dormitories, residence halls, and
boarding or lodging houses—entities which would affect the character of the neighborhood in a
much more significant manner than a ten-person children’s home. In fact, the staff report proffered
by Otis T. Spriggs, Planning Director for the City of Jonesboro, which was provided to the

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Metropolitan Area Planning Commission, states that “[s]taff does not feel that the ranch-like
environment will be a detriment to the surrounding neighborhoods if the use is operated under an
around-the-clock supervised program for the youth. . . . The . . . home to be used will remain
residential in character and use, and a [sic] extreme demand for traffic has not been demonstrated
by the applicant to cause negative impact beyond that expected of a single family residence.” (Def.’s
Mot. for S.J. Ex. C at 9.)
King’s Ranch has met its burden of proving the necessity and reasonableness of its request
with unrebutted evidence, and the burden shifts to the City of Jonesboro to prove that the request is
unreasonable. In order to “establish that the accommodation proffered by [the applicant] was not
reasonable, [the municipality] [i]s required to prove that it could not have granted the variance
without:” (1) “imposing undue financial and administrative burdens;” (2) “imposing an ‘undue
hardship’ upon the Township;” or (3) “requiring a fundamental alteration in the nature of the
[zoning] program.” Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1104 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Developmental Servs. of NE, 504 F. Supp. 2d at
724-25. This inquiry is “highly fact-specific, requiring a case-by-case determination.” Hovsons,
Inc., 89 F.3d at 1104.
Although the City of Jonesboro argues that King’s Ranch’s waiver request is unreasonable,
it offers no evidence that granting the request would impose an undue financial or administrative
burden on the City of Jonesboro or result in any undue hardship. Nor does the City of Jonesboro
offer evidence that the request would require a fundamental change in the nature of the zoning
program. In fact, as King’s Ranch points out, the zoning program is designed with requests like that
of King’s Ranch in mind; the City of Jonesboro currently offers conditional use permits to groups
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like King’s Ranch, which are comprised of more than five unrelated individuals, to live in
residentially zoned areas. The City of Jonesboro presents absolutely no evidence to suggest that
King’s Ranch’s waiver request is unreasonable. Nor does it seek to postpone the Court’s ruling on
the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). With trial just a few weeks away, the City
has had ample time to discover and offer evidence to support its arguments, and it has not done so.
For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED,
and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of April, 2011.

___________________________________
J. LEON HOLMES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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