Edington v. Sammons et al

Filing 43

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 24 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part Defendants' 28 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' 42 Motion to Amend Answer is denied. The Court intends to move the trial up a week to Tuesday, July 15, 2014. If either party objects, please submit objection by 5 p.m., Wednesday, July 2, 2014. Signed by Judge Billy Roy Wilson on 6/27/2014. (jak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
JONESBORO DIVISION
PATRICIA JANE EDINGTON
VS.

PLAINTIFF
3:13-CV-00202-BRW

ALEXANDRA JANE EDINGTON
SAMMONS and NATHAN SAMMONS

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

Pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 24) and
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 28). Responses to both motions have
been filed.1 As set out below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 24) is
DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 28) is GRANTED in PART
and DENIED in PART. Only the breach of contract claims remain.
Since Plaintiff’s claim for equitable mistake is dismissed, Defendant’s stated need to
amend their complaint to add the defense of “unclean hands” is unnecessary, so the Motion to
Amend Answer (Doc. No. 42) is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
The allegations from both sides are verbose and confusing. Best I can tell, once you trim

away the excess fat, this case is simply a dispute over two alleged oral agreements between a
mother (Plaintiff Patricia Jane Edington), daughter (Defendant Alexandra Edington Sammons),
and father/husband (Jerry Edington, Sr., deceased). Defendant Nathan Sammons is Alexandra
Sammons’s husband and Plaintiff’s son-in-law. The agreements involve three different
Arkansas properties: a home in Jonesboro, a home in Marion, and farmland in Jackson County.

1

Doc. Nos. 33, 35.
1

The first alleged agreement is that Plaintiff agreed that when she sold her home in
Jonesboro (where Defendants lived), the proceeds would go to Defendants. In return,
Defendants agreed that when they sold the home in Marion (where Plaintiff lived off and on) the
proceeds would go to Plaintiff. The second alleged agreement relates to a decision to put
Plaintiff’s farmland in Defendant’s name, with the understanding that Plaintiff would continue to
receive the rental income from the property for the remainder of her life.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, so
that the dispute may be decided on purely legal grounds.2 The Supreme Court has established
guidelines to assist trial courts in determining whether this standard has been met:
The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the
need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that
properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party.3
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment is an
extreme remedy that should be granted only when the movant has established a right to the
judgment beyond controversy.4 Nevertheless, summary judgment promotes judicial economy by
preventing trial when no genuine issue of fact remains.5 A court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.6 The Eighth Circuit has also set out the burden
of the parties in connection with a summary judgment motion:

2

Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

3

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

4

Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1979).

5

Id. at 728.

6

Id. at 727-28.
2

[T]he burden on the party moving for summary judgment is only to demonstrate,
i.e.,“[to point] out to the District Court,” that the record does not disclose a genuine
dispute on a material fact. It is enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the
record does not contain such an issue and to identify that part of the record which
bears out his assertion. Once this is done, his burden is discharged, and, if the record
in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is
then the respondent’s burden to set forth affirmative evidence, specific facts,
showing that there is a genuine dispute on that issue. If the respondent fails to carry
that burden, summary judgment should be granted.7
Only disputes over facts that may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.8
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

First Agreement

On August 12, 2008, Plaintiff and her now-deceased spouse (Defendant’s father)
executed a Quitclaim Deed transferring the Marion home to their daughter, Defendant Alexandra
Sammons.9 However, Plaintiff and Defendant’s father continued to live in the home.
Plaintiff and Defendant’s father bought the Jonesboro home in 2010. The deed was in
Plaintiff’s name, but Defendants lived in the home. In October, 2011, Plaintiff sold the home
and gave the money to Defendants, pursuant to an alleged oral agreement made at the closing.
The undisputed part of the oral agreement was that Plaintiff would give Defendant the proceeds
from the sale of the Jonesboro home and Defendant would repay her with proceeds from the sale

7

Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338, 1339 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting City of Mt.
Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273-74 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)).
8

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

9

In her statement of material facts not in dispute, Plaintiff claims that “only Plaintiff’s
name was on the title” to the Marion home.” (Doc. No. 26) However, the deed attached to her
response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment has the names of both Plaintiff and her
now-deceased spouse on the deed. Doc. No. 33-10.
3

of the Marion home. The Jonesboro home netted $132,000, and four months later, the Marion
home netted $177,631.00.
In their briefing Defendants “emphatically denies that there was a contract between the
parties for repayment of proceeds from the Jonesboro, Arkansas, sale” with the proceeds from
the sale of the Marion home.10 Yet, in her deposition, Defendant Alexandra Sammons testified
that she and her mother agreed that once the Marion home sold, she would use the money to
repay the $132,000 from the sale of the Jonesboro house, and any additional money would be
used to help pay Plaintiff’s living expenses.11 So, despite Defendants’ vehement denial and the
contradictory post-deposition affidavit,12 Defendant Alexandra Sammons appears to have
conceded that there was, in fact, an agreement regarding the house swap. Though this was an
oral agreement, it is outside the Statute of Frauds because there was full performance by
Plaintiff, acceptance of the money by Defendant, and partial performance by Defendant.13
So the questions of fact that remain for the jury to decide are: (1) did the oral agreement
require Defendants to provide Plaintiff with the additional $45,631.00 from the sale of the
Marion home; and (2) has Defendant provided Plaintiff sufficient money to satisfy her end of the
oral agreement.

10

Doc. No. 36.

11

Doc. No. 33-1, at 24.

12

“I was given the proceeds of the sale by Patricia Jane Edington, but did not make an
agreement to pay her the entire proceeds from a Marion, Arkansas sale.” Doc. No. 35-1.
13

Talley v. Blackmon, 271 Ark. 494 (Ark. App. 1980) (holding that full performance by
one party in extending a loan and part performance on the part of the other party by making
payments on a loan operated to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds).
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B.

Second Agreement

On August 12, 2008, Plaintiff and Defendant’s father executed a Quitclaim Deed
transferring 300 acres of farmland in Jackson County to their daughter, Defendant Alexandra
Sammons. Some of the land was inherited from Plaintiff’s parents, and some of it was purchased
from her sibling’s inheritance.
Plaintiff contends that the transfer was made with the understanding that she would
continue to get rent money generated by the property so long as she was alive. For several years
after the transfer, the rent money was mailed to the Marion home, where Plaintiff and
Defendant’s father lived. In 2011, after Defendant’s father died, the rent money was mailed to
Defendants’ home -- it appears that Plaintiff moved out of the Marion home after the father’s
death. For the next few years, Defendants gave the rent money to Plaintiff, but after a fallingout, Defendants stopped giving Plaintiff the rent money in 2013.
Factual disputes exist concerning whether there was an oral agreement that if Plaintiff
deeded the farmland to Defendant, Defendant agreed to provide Plaintiff with rent checks from
the farmland for the remainder of Plaintiff’s life. Defendants argue that the statute of frauds also
applies to this alleged oral agreement. Again, Arkansas courts have held that the Statute of
Frauds may not apply when there is full performance by one party and part performance by
another party.14 Here there appears to be full performance by Plaintiff -- signing the farmland
over to Defendant -- and a disputed question of fact as to whether Defendant’s giving the rent
checks to her mother were part performance from their alleged oral agreement or simply a gift.

14

Talley v. Blackmon, 271 Ark. 494 (Ark. App. 1980) (holding that full performance by
one party in extending a loan and part performance on the part of the other party by making
payments on a loan operated to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds).
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C.

Other Causes of Action

In addition to the breach of contract claims, Plaintiff alleges a litany of other claims
regarding the conveyances of the Marion home and farmland -- conversion, recission, outrage,
fraud, constructive fraud, promissory and equitable estoppel, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary
relationship, undue influence, duress, interference with business expectancy and economic
relationship.15 Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence to support any of these cause of action, so
they are dismissed.
For example, even if Plaintiff’s factual allegations regarding the 2008 conveyances are
accepted as true, her many causes of action that attempt to void the 2008 conveyances are
without merit. In a similar case where a wife argued that she was under duress from her husband
when conveying land, the United States Supreme Court held that the wife was required to
“disaffirm her conveyance” once the duress ceased.16 At the latest, this would have been when
her spouse died in December 2010, since he, allegedly, forced her to convey the property.
Plaintiff did not file suit until August 2013.
Additionally, neither the allegations nor testimony establishes behavior that would
support claims for outrage, fraud, or constructive fraud.

15

Doc. No. 22.

16

Barnette v. Wells Fargo Nevada Nat. Bank of San Francisco, 270 U.S. 438 (1926) (“If
there was duress here, appellant, as soon as she was relieved from its operation, was in a position
either to disaffirm her conveyance or to allow it to stand undisturbed as the free and formal
disposition of her rights. If her choice was to disaffirm, it might have been evidenced by suit
timely brought or by any other action disclosing her purpose to those who would be affected . . .
[a]n election to disaffirm . . . must be exercised promptly.”).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 24) is DENIED and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 28) is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. Defendants’ Motion to Amend
Answer (Doc .No. 42) is DENIED.
There was an abundance of extraneous information in both the briefing and depositions.
Both parties are directed to streamline their cases before trial, so that only the essentials relevant
to the remaining claims are presented to the jury. This is to both save time and avoid confusion
of the issues. It seems to me that this trial should take no more than a day and a half.
Additionally, I have a conflict with the current trial setting for this case. I intend to move
trial up a week to Tuesday, July 15, 2014. If either party objects, please submit your objection
by 5 p.m., Wednesday, July 2, 2014.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of June, 2014.
/s/ Billy Roy Wilson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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