Roach v. Social Security Administration

Filing 15

ORDER affirming the decision of the Commissioner and entering Judgment for the Defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jerome T. Kearney on 2/5/2024. (jak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
NORTHERN DIVISION
LORI D. ROACH
V.

PLAINTIFF
NO. 3:23-CV-00135-JTK

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

DEFENDANT

ORDER
I. Introduction:
Plaintiff, Megan Roach (“Roach”), applied for disability income and
supplemental security income on January 23, 2020, alleging a disability onset date
of March 31, 2019. (Tr. at 11). The applications were denied initially and upon
reconsideration. Id. After conducting a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) denied Roach’s applications in a written decision dated June 29, 2022. (Tr.
at 11-25). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. at 1-5).
The ALJ=s decision now stands as the final decision of the Commissioner, and Roach
has requested judicial review.
For the reasons stated below, the Court 1 affirms the decision of the
Commissioner.

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The parties have consented in writing to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge.

II. The Commissioner=s Decision:
The ALJ found that Roach had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset date of March 31, 2019.2 (Tr. at 14). The ALJ found, at Step
Two, that Roach had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder,
bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), fibromyalgia, migraine
headaches, osteoarthritis of the knee, cervical degenerative disc disease, and obesity.
Id.
After finding that Roach’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed
impairment (Tr. at 14-16), 3 the ALJ determined that Roach had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work at the light exertional level, with
additional limitations: (1) she is unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (2) she
can no more than occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; (3) she is unable to
operate lower extremity foot controls; (4) she should avoid exposure to concentrated
vibration and direct sunlight; (5) she can perform simple, routine, and repetitive task

The ALJ followed the required five-step sequence to determine: (1) whether the claimant was
engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant had a severe impairment;
(3) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) met or equaled a listed
impairment; (4) if not, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the
claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the impairment (or
combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing any other jobs available in
significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g).
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20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(d), 494.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926.

occupations; and (6) the supervision must be simple, direct, and concrete. (Tr. at 18).
At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Roach was unable to perform her past
relevant work. (Tr. at 23-25). Utilizing the testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”),
the ALJ next determined that, based on Roach’s age, education, work experience,
and RFC, she was able to perform a number of jobs in the national economy. Id.
Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Roach was not disabled. Id.
III. Discussion:
A. Standard of Review
The Court’s function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether
it is based on legal error. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While “substantial evidence” is that which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, “substantial evidence on the
record as a whole” requires a court to engage in a more scrutinizing analysis:
“[O]ur review is more than an examination of the record for the
existence of substantial evidence in support of the Commissioner’s
decision; we also take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from that decision.” Reversal is not warranted, however,
“merely because substantial evidence would have supported an
opposite decision.”
Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

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In clarifying the “substantial evidence” standard applicable to review of
administrative decisions, the Supreme Court has explained: “And whatever the
meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary
sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence . . . ‘is more than a mere scintilla.’”
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217 (1938)). “It means—and means only—‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Id.
B. Roach=s Arguments on Appeal
Roach contends that the evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision is less than
substantial. She argues that the ALJ failed to consider her impairments in
combination, the ALJ erred at Step Five, and the ALJ failed to conduct a proper
psychiatric review technique (“PRT”).
Roach suffered from mental impairments that made it hard to focus and stay
on task. (Tr. at 16-17). She said she had trouble getting along with family and friends.
Id. Roach testified that she had crying spells often. Id.
The ALJ recognized these impairments, but also noted that mental status
examinations were often grossly normal, with logical thoughts and normal mood and
affect. (Tr. at 19-20, 505, 529, 550-559). She did not seek regular psychiatric
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treatment, and she failed to comply with treatment plans (she canceled therapy
appointments) and she only attended therapy twice in 2022. (Tr. at 71, 547-551, 652663, 669, 695. 715-726). When she stopped taking mental health medication, her
symptoms got worse. Id. Moreover, Roach admitted she could drive, shop in stores,
prepare simple meals, wash dishes, and attend to personal hygiene.4 (Tr. at 52-53,
415-419). A behavioral health treatment note shows that she had no functional
limitations as of March 2022. (Tr. at 787).
The ALJ also observed that physical impairments were not disabling. Roach
had knee and back pain, but in February 2022, she had normal musculoskeletal range
of motion, and no tenderness on examination. (Tr. at 732, 739). In March 2020, she
denied back pain, joint pain, stiffness, or diminished strength. (Tr. at 645-646). She
had a normal gait. Treatment for physical impairments was conservative, consisting
of steroid injections and medications. (Tr. at 20-22). As for migraines, the record
reflects that this condition was relatively well-controlled when Roach took
medication. Id.
The ALJ considered all of Roach’s impairments in combination, contrary to

Such daily activities undermine her claims of disability. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964,
967 (8th Cir. 2003).

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her first point on appeal. 5 The ALJ discussed both severe and non-severe
impairments, and he incorporated the state-agency medical experts’ opinions about
Roach’s impairments. (Tr. at 14-17, 22-23). The ALJ discussed how her
impairments affected her daily life, as well as the nature or her pain, objective
testing, and her treatment. He wrote that he considered all of Roach’s impairments
in combination. (Tr. at 14). He assessed RFC limitations based on his review of the
impairments in the record. Roach has not shown that her impairments were
disabling. The ALJ did not err at Step Two.
Roach also argues that the ALJ should have included additional mental and
physical limitations in the hypothetical he posed to the VE at Step Five.6 She says
that her crying spells would cause absenteeism that would prevent work. The ALJ
did acknowledge her crying spells in his analysis or her mental impairments, but
twice in 2020 and once in 2021 she denied crying spells. (Tr. at 19, 546, 651, 673).

See Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994)(ALJ properly considered the combined
effects of impairments when the ALJ noted that the evidence as a whole did not show claimant’s
symptoms would preclude all work).
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The claimant has the burden of proving that an impairment is severe, which by definition
significantly limits one or more basic work activities. Gonzales v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 890, 894
(8th Cir. 2006).
The ALJ may meet his burden at step five by eliciting testimony from a VE in response to “a
properly phrased hypothetical question that captures the concrete consequences of a claimant's
deficiencies.” Porch v. Chater, 115 F.3d 567, 572 (8th Cir. 1997).
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The ALJ also noted generally normal mental status examinations, as well as Roach’s
ability to perform daily activities. She has not shown that the ALJ should have
included her tendency toward crying spells as a restriction in the hypothetical posed
to the VE.
Roach also argues that she had an extremely limited ability to sit or stand, but
the state-agency specialists found she could perform light work. (Tr. at 22). The ALJ
discussed physical examination findings and objective evidence and arrived at an
RFC for light work, consistent with the specialists’ opinions. Roach has not shown
error. The ALJ properly examined the VE and proposed a hypothetical that reflected
accurately Roach’s limitations.
Finally, Roach makes a cursory that the ALJ did not conduct a PRT analysis
as required by the Administration’s regulations. 7 The state agency psychiatric
specialists conducted thorough PRTs, finding mild-to-moderate limitations from
mental impairments. (Tr. at 16-17, 22). The ALJ discussed these findings and created

The PRT rates a claimant’s degree of functional mental limitation in four broad areas:
understanding, remembering, and applying information; interaction with others; concentrating,
and persisting and maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a.
The standardized PRT form is now used only at the initial and reconsideration levels; at the ALJ
hearing and Appeals Council levels, documentation of the application of the PRT is in the
decision itself, rather than on a separate form. Id. If a psychological examiner completed a form
before the hearing and the ALJ discussed the technique within the decision, the ALJ has met the
requirement for assessment of mental impairments. Id.; Montgomery v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 98, 100
(8th Cir. 1994); Craig v. Astrue, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS *16 (W.D. Ark. February 25, 2013).
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an RFC limiting Roach to simple work. He fairly and fully considered Roach’s
mental impairments.
IV. Conclusion:
There is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner=s decision to deny
benefits. The ALJ considered all of Roach’s impairments, including those found on
the PRT, and he did not err at Step Five. The finding that Roach was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act, therefore, must be, and hereby is
AFFIRMED. Judgment will be entered for the Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2024.

___________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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