Madden et al v. Lumber One Home Center of Stuttgart Inc et al
Filing
91
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW that Judgment will be entered against Lumber One in favor of, Terry Madden in the amount of $7,555.20, Rebecca O'Bar in the amount of $1,234.80, and Doug Wortman in the amount of $2,339.20. Signed by Judge J. Leon Holmes on 3/5/13. (vjt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION
TERRY MADDEN, DOUG WORTMAN,
and REBECCA O’BAR, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated
v.
PLAINTIFFS
No. 4:10CV01162 JLH
LUMBER ONE HOME CENTER, INC.
DEFENDANTS
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Terry Madden, Doug Wortman, and Rebecca O’Bar brought this action against Lumber One
Home Center, Inc., seeking overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. See
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Each of the plaintiffs was employed to work at a Lumber One store that
opened on November 16, 2008, in Mayflower, Arkansas. Each of the plaintiffs began work before
the store opened. Each of the plaintiffs worked more than forty hours per week. Each of the
plaintiffs was paid on a salary basis because Lumber One contended that each of them was exempt
from the FLSA’s overtime requirements pursuant to the exemption for executive employees. See 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
The case was tried to a jury on March 12 and 13, 2012. At the close of the evidence, the
plaintiffs made a timely motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, arguing that Lumber One had failed as a matter of law to submit evidence
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the plaintiffs were executive employees. The Court took
that motion under advisement. The jury returned a verdict against each plaintiff, finding that Lumber
One had met its burden of proving that each one of them was an executive employee. Because it
could not reasonably be concluded that Lumber One failed to meet its burden of proving that each
of the plaintiffs was an executive employee, the Court then granted the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment
as a matter of law.
The parties have now stipulated that the Court may act as the finder of fact with respect to
wages and may base its findings on the record developed at the trial in this case.
The disputed issues relate to the number of hours of overtime worked by each of the plaintiffs,
whether the method of calculating damages should be the fluctuating workweek method, and whether
the plaintiffs should be awarded liquidated damages. The legal conclusions that govern these issues,
as well as a number of findings of fact that must be made by the Court, are common to all of the
plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court will address the legal issues and make the factual findings that will
apply to all of the defendants before addressing the hours worked by each defendant and the
calculation of damages for each defendant.
I.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RELEVANT TO ALL THREE PLAINTIFFS
A.
HOURS WORKED
In Fast v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 638 F.3d 872, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2011), the Eighth Circuit
explained:
“[A]n employee who brings suit . . . for unpaid minimum wages . . . has the burden
of proving that he performed work for which he was not properly compensated.”
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-87, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90 L.
Ed. 1515 (1946), superceded by statute on other grounds, Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947, Pub. L. No. 49-52, § 5, 61 Stat. 84, 87 (May 14, 1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b)). Noting that it is the employer’s duty to keep employment records, the
Court in Mt. Clemens stated that as long as “the employer has kept proper and
accurate records [,] the employee may easily discharge his burden by securing the
production of those records. But where the employer’s records are inaccurate or
inadequate and the employee cannot offer convincing substitutes a more difficult
problem arises.” Id. at 687, 66 S. Ct. 1187. Penalizing the employee in that situation
2
would only encourage employers to fail to keep proper records, so the Court held
“that an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed
work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence
to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable
inference.” Id. “The burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with
evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the
reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee’s evidence.” Id. at
687-88, 66 S. Ct. 1187. By contrast, an exemption under the FLSA is an affirmative
defense, and the employer bears the burden of proof to establish that an exemption
applies. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97, 94 S. Ct. 2223,
41 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1974).
At trial, it was undisputed that each of the plaintiffs worked more than forty hours per week during
weeks for which overtime was not paid. Consequently, each of the plaintiffs met the burden of
proving work was performed without proper compensation.
Because the employer has the duty to keep employment records, the burden is on the
employer to produce records showing the number of hours worked by each plaintiff. Lumber One
did not maintain records of the hours actually worked by any of the plaintiffs because it deemed them
to be executive employees. At trial, Lumber One introduced into evidence work schedules prepared
by an employee named Chris Harris, who did not testify. Those schedules show that the plaintiffs
were scheduled to work eight hours per day Monday through Friday and on alternate Saturdays.
Those schedules and the testimony of the plaintiffs sometimes conflict as to which days that they
worked. According to Lumber One’s owner, John Morton, these work schedules were posted in a
breakroom. All three of the plaintiffs denied seeing the schedules in the breakroom and all three
denied that those schedules represent accurate records of the hours that they worked.
Despite those schedules, the preponderance of the evidence established that each of the
plaintiffs worked forty-five hours per week prior to the store opening and an additional eight hours
on alternating Saturdays after the store opened. The most credible testimony on this point was that
3
of Terry Madden and John Morton. Madden testified that when he was hired he was told that he
would work forty-five hours per week and eight hours every other Saturday. Tr. 90, 101.1 Similarly,
Morton testified as follows:
Q.
In fact, I believe I heard you testify that as to all three of the employees, the
understanding was 45 hours a week Monday through Friday; is that correct?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
And then every other Saturday after the store opened.
A.
Yes. That was common for every salaried employee.
Q.
Okay. So the estimates that my plaintiffs testified about earlier, where it was
five hours a week on the weeks they did not work on Saturdays and somewhere
around 13 on the weeks they were on Saturdays, would you essentially agree with
those estimates?
A.
Yes, I would, with the exception of that they didn’t put in holidays, birthdays,
vacations.
Tr. 243-44. Thus, based on the testimony of Madden and Morton, which the Court accepts as true,
all three of the plaintiffs worked forty-five hours per week Monday through Friday and, after the store
opened, on alternate Saturdays. In addition, Amy Quimby, the Lumber One office manager, stated
in a letter, which was read during her testimony, that employees were not assigned to work every
other Saturday until approximately a month leading up to the store opening. Tr. 85-86. Her
testimony on that point was corroborated by Rebecca O’Bar, who testified that employees began to
work on Saturdays approximately two weeks before the store opened. Tr. 137, 145.
1
The trial transcript appears in the record as Documents #77 and #78. Though the transcript
is filed as two documents in CM/ECF, the court reporter has paginated the transcript in a continuous
sequence. The citations in this Opinion and Order are to the court reporter’s pagination.
4
At trial, the plaintiffs offered charts showing the hours that they claimed to have worked, but
they admitted that their charts failed to take into account holidays, birthdays, vacations, and the like.
They have now submitted revised charts that take into account the fact that they did not work on
holidays, birthdays, vacations, and the like. Except as noted below with respect to the individual
plaintiffs, those charts accurately reflect what was proven by the preponderance of the evidence as
to the hours that the plaintiffs worked.
B.
THE METHOD OF CALCULATING DAMAGES
The next issue is how to calculate the damages. The Fair Labor Standards Act provides that
a nonexempt employee must be paid “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate
at which he is employed” for all hours in excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The
fluctuating workweek method calculates the hourly rate of pay for an employee who is paid a salary
and who works varying hours per week by dividing the weekly wage by the total number of hours
that the employee worked in a given week rather than by forty. See Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family
Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 2010). This calculation assumes that the salary is intended
to compensate the employee for all hours worked rather than merely for forty hours. The fluctuating
workweek method thus reduces damages that an FLSA plaintiff may recover in two respects. First,
the regular rate of pay is reduced inasmuch as the hourly rate is determined by dividing the salary by
total hours worked rather than by forty. Id. at 672. Second, assuming that the fixed weekly wage
is compensation for all hours worked, including hours in excess of forty per week, the overtime rate
is reduced from 150% of the regular rate to 50% of the regular rate. Id.
The fluctuating workweek method of calculating overtime derives from Overnight Motor
Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S. Ct. 1216, 86 L. Ed. 2d 1682 (1942), superseded on other
5
grounds by statute as stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 n.22, 105
S. Ct. 613, 625 n.22, 83 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1985). Subsequent to the decision in Missel, the Department
of Labor incorporated the fluctuating workweek method into an interpretive bulletin. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 778.114. According to that interpretive bulletin, an employer can comply with the overtime
requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) by paying overtime pursuant to the fluctuating workweek method
provided that the conditions specified in that interpretive bulletin are met.
The Eighth Circuit has not ruled on whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Missel or
29 C.F.R. § 778.114 constitutes the correct source of authority for deciding whether the fluctuating
workweek method applies to a claim for damages. In Urnikis-Negro, the Seventh Circuit explained
that Missel, not 29 C.F.R. § 778.114, is the correct source of authority for determining when the
fluctuating workweek method applies to a claim for damages. See Urnikis-Negro, 616 F.3d at 67581. This Court and other district courts in the Eighth Circuit have followed the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis in Urnikis-Negro. See Smith v. Frac Tech Servs., LLC, No. 4:09CV00679, 2011 WL 96868,
at *35-36 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 11, 2011); Pressler v. FTS USA, LLC, No. 4:09CV00676, 2010 WL
5105135 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 9, 2010); Ahle v. Veracity Research Co., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3463513,
at *18-19 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2010) (“The Seventh Circuit’s decision methodically analyzes the
competing arguments . . . . The Court adopts the reasoning set forth in Urnikis-Negro.”).2 Under
2
Other circuit courts also have held that the fluctuating workweek method is the appropriate
method for calculating damages in misclassification cases. Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Groc., Inc., 518
F.3d 1259, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that to calculate damages in a miscalculation case, the
court should divide the salary by the number of hours the salary was intended to cover); Valerio v.
Putman Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying the fluctuating workweek method
to the damage claim of an employee misclassified as an administrative employee); Blackmon v.
Brookshire Groc. Co., 835 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying the fluctuating workweek
method to the damage claims of employees misclassified as executive or administrative); Crawford
Prod. Co. v. Bearden, 272 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1959) (holding that the salary was to cover all
6
this analysis, the factual issue with respect to whether the plaintiffs’ damages should be calculated
using the fluctuating workweek method is whether the employer and employee agreed that the salary
was intended to compensate for all hours worked or only for forty hours per week. See UrnikisNegro, 616 F.3d at 681.
Morton testified that when he interviewed each plaintiff he asked what salary that plaintiff was
looking to receive. He then agreed on that salary and discussed with each of them the expected
hours. In each instance, according to him, he explained that the plaintiff would be expected to work
forty-five hours on Monday through Friday until the store opened, and then the schedule would be
the same forty-five hours per week plus eight hours on alternate Saturdays. Madden confirmed
Morton’s testimony, which means that he has conceded that the fluctuating workweek method of
calculating damages applies to him. O’Bar and Wortman, however, testified that they believed that
their salary was intended only to cover forty hours per week. Even so, immediately after their
employment began, they worked more than forty hours per week and continued to work more than
forty hours per week in return for the salary that had been agreed upon at the beginning. See id. at
680-81 (explaining that acceptance of salary while working substantially more than forty hours per
week can be evidence that the parties intended the salary to cover all hours worked). Neither O’Bar
nor Wortman ever complained to Morton about the lack of overtime pay. Considering Morton’s
testimony, Madden’s testimony, the course of dealing between the parties, and the demeanor of the
witnesses, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the parties agreed that the salary for
hours actually worked even though the work week fluctuated, so the fluctuating workweek method
calculating overtime should apply).
7
each plaintiff was intended to compensate that plaintiff for all hours worked. Therefore, the
fluctuating workweek method will be applied to calculate the damages for each of the plaintiffs.
C.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The final legal issue is whether to award liquidated damages. Under the FLSA, “[a]n award
of liquidated damages . . . is mandatory unless the employer can show good faith and reasonable
grounds for believing that it was not in violation of the FLSA.” Braswell v. City of El Dorado, Ark.,
187 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1999); see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Jarrett v. ERC Props., Inc., 211 F.3d
1078, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000). The good-faith defense requires the employer to establish “an honest
intention to ascertain and follow the dictates of the FLSA.” Chao v. Barbeque Ventures, LLC, 547
F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hultgren v. Cnty. of Lancaster, Neb., 913 F.2d 498, 509 (8th
Cir. 1990)). “To carry his burden, a defendant employer must show that he took affirmative steps
to ascertain the Act’s requirements, but nonetheless, violated its provisions.” Id. (quoting Martin v.
Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 908 (3d Cir. 1991)). The employer’s burden is “a difficult
one, with double damages being the norm and single damages being the exception.” Id. at 941.
Morton testified:
Q.
So what did you do to determine that it was legally permissible for you to
place someone on salary?
A.
They were to be a lead person, a supervisor.
Q.
So it was your subjective determination that they were to be a supervisor, is
what you relied on to place someone on salary; is that correct?
A.
Correct.
Q.
Did you look at the requirements of the law for someone to qualify as an
exempt executive employee?
A.
Did I read the law? No, ma’am, I didn’t.
8
Q.
Do you do any investigation whatsoever into what job duties someone had to
perform in order to be paid salary under the executive exemption?
A.
No, ma’am, I didn’t.
Q.
None. It was just your –
A.
I did not read it, no.
Q.
So it was just your understanding that because you called them a supervisor
and put them on salary, that was okay.
A.
They supervised people. Yes, ma’am. To say I went and read the regs on it
and knew exactly what the regulations said, no, ma’am, I did not go read those. I
assumed the knowledge I had was good.
Q.
So where did you get your knowledge then?
A.
Just from being in business and employing -- I’ve been employing people for,
you know, 35 years.
Q.
Okay. Do you have an HR department who ensures compliance with legal
areas?
A.
We have particular people that are assigned to watch HR, yes, but not if -they have many other responsibilities. Amy was the person that as we’re moving into
Stuttgart or from Stuttgart, Amy was the person that had handled that in years past.
Q.
So help me understand. Did Amy -- did you and Amy have a conversation
about this is the law and these are the people who can permissibly be paid a salary and
don’t have to be paid overtime?
A.
No, ma’am, we did not have that conversation. We were just doing what
we’ve done for the last 25 years.
Tr. 228-29.
As this testimony shows, there was no reasonable basis for Morton’s conclusion that the three
plaintiffs were exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act by virtue of
the executive exemption. Even though he had been in business a number of years, Morton did
nothing to confirm or disconfirm his beliefs as to what qualifies as an executive under the Fair Labor
9
Standards Act. He did not read the regulations, nor did he consult with someone who had read them.
Furthermore, the Court concluded in granting plaintiffs’ motion for judgment as a matter of law that
the jury could not reasonably conclude that these plaintiffs were executives as that term is defined
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Document #76. Likewise, Morton could not reasonably
conclude that the plaintiffs were exempt. Therefore, liquidated damages will be awarded.
II.
FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO EACH PLAINTIFF
A.
TERRY MADDEN
In an attachment to the plaintiffs’ brief on damages, Madden has submitted a revised chart
with his estimate of the hours that he worked each week, his regular rate of pay, his overtime hours,
the rate of pay for his overtime hours, and, based on that information, the calculation of his damage
claim.3 The only challenges that Lumber One makes to Madden’s chart relate to some of the weeks
included on the chart.
First, Lumber One contends that the statute of limitations bars some of Madden’s overtime
claims. Madden’s chart includes overtime from May 2008, when he was first employed, through
May 22, 2010. The complaint was filed on August 23, 2010. The statute of limitations under the
FLSA is two years, unless the employer willfully violated the Act, in which case the statute is three
years. 29 U.S.C. § 255. The court has already found that Lumber One did not violate the FLSA
willfully. Document #76 at 5-6. Therefore, the period of limitations is two years, which means that
Madden cannot recover for overtime that he worked before August 23, 2008.
3
See Document #88-1. The chart for Madden will not be reproduced here.
10
Second, Madden’s chart claims overtime for the week of May 16, but Lumber One has shown
that he was reclassified beginning that week as an hourly employee and so was paid overtime for that
week.
Madden claims overtime in the amount of $4,233.94, which includes a claim for $387.70 for
overtime before August 24, 2008, and $68.64 for overtime during the week of May 16, 2010. When
both amounts are deducted from his claim, the amount Lumber One owes Madden for overtime
equals $3,777.60. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), an additional equal amount is added as liquidated
damages, so Madden’s total damages equal $7,555.20.
B.
REBECCA O’BAR
O’Bar was paid $1,153.85 every two weeks, which comes to $576.93 per week. For weeks
when O’Bar worked fifty-three hours, her regular rate is determined by dividing $576.93 by 53, which
yields a regular rate of $10.89 per hour. One-half of that amount ($5.45) is the additional amount
owed to her for each of the thirteen overtime hours. For weeks when O’Bar worked forty-five hours,
her regular rate is calculated by dividing $576.93 by 45, which yields a regular rate of $12.82 per
hour. One-half of that ($6.41) is the additional amount owed to her for each of the five overtime
hours.
The following chart4 reflects O’Bar’s damages, using the fluctuating workweek method and
applying it to the Court’s findings as to the hours that she worked.
4
The revised chart that O’Bar submitted after trial is Document #88-2. O’Bar’s revised chart
claims no overtime before November 16, 2008, and none after February 21, 2009. O’Bar was
reclassified as an hourly employee, and she quit on February 25, 2009.
11
Date of Employment
Rate of
Pay
Number
of Reg.
Hrs
Number
of OT
Hrs
Rate
of Pay
for OT
Hrs
11/16/2008-11/22/2008
$10.89
40
13
$5.45
$70.85
11/30/2008-12/06/2008
$10.89
40
13
$5.45
$70.85
12/07/2008-12/13/2008
$12.82
40
5
$6.41
$32.05
12/14/2008-12/20/2008
$10.89
40
13
$5.45
$70.85
12/28/2008-01/03/2009
$12.81
40
5
$6.41
$32.05
01/04/2009-01/10/2009
$12.82
40
5
$6.41
$32.05
01/11/2009-01/17/2009
$10.89
40
13
$5.45
$70.85
01/18/2009-01/24/2009
$12.81
40
5
$6.41
$32.05
01/25/2009-01/31/2009
$10.89
40
13
$5.45
$70.85
02/01/2009-02/07/2009
$12.81
40
5
$6.41
$32.05
02/08/2009-02/14/2009
$10.89
40
13
$5.45
$70.85
02/15/2009-02/21/2009
$12.81
40
5
$6.41
$32.05
Damages
$617.40
This calculation results in overtime pay owed to O’Bar in the amount of $617.40. Pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 216(b), an additional equal amount is added as liquidated damages. Therefore, O’Bar’s
total damages are $1,234.80.
C.
DOUG WORTMAN
Wortman’s damages have been calculated in a manner similar to that of O’Bar.5 Wortman
was hired in September of 2008 and was terminated in early March of 2009. During that period, he
earned $600 per week. Tr. 155. He was re-employed at Lumber One on June 15, 2009, at the rate
5
Wortman’s revised chart is Document #88-3.
12
of $550 per week. Tr. 156.6 He claims no overtime after August 1, 2009.7 Unlike the other two
plaintiffs, Wortman testified that his overtime alternated between ten hours per week and twenty
hours per week, which is to say that he purportedly worked thirty hours of overtime in each twoweek period, in contrast to the eighteen hours of overtime in each two-week period to which Madden
and Morton testified. The Court does not believe Wortman’s testimony on this point. As noted,
Morton conceded that each plaintiff worked forty-five hours per week, Monday through Friday, and
on alternate Saturdays after the store opened, and the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that Wortman worked those hours, i.e., forty-five hours per week, Monday through Friday, plus eight
hours on Saturday on alternate weeks after the store opened. It was undisputed that Wortman also
worked three Sundays in October leading up to the store opening. Tr. 147, 218. And, based on the
testimony of Quimby and O’Bar, employees, including Wortman, began working on alternate
Saturdays approximately two weeks before the store opened on November 16, 2008.
During Wortman’s first stint with Lumber One, for weeks when he worked forty-eight hours,8
his regular rate of pay is determined by dividing $600 by 48, which yields a regular rate of pay of
$12.50. One-half of that amount ($6.25) is the additional amount owed to him for each of the eight
hours of overtime. For the weeks when Wortman worked forty-five hours, his regular rate of pay
is determined by dividing $600 by 45, which yields a regular rate of pay of $13.33. One half of that
amount ($6.67) is the additional amount owed to him for each of the five hours of overtime. For the
6
The transcript says that Wortman started to make $1,100 every two weeks on July 1, 2009,
but the charts of both parties show that he started on June 15, 2009, so the Court concludes that
July 1 was the date that he received his first salary payment in that amount.
7
Wortman’s employment at Lumber One terminated in September of 2009. Tr. 163.
8
These are the three weeks in October when he worked on Sundays.
13
weeks when Wortman worked fifty-three hours, his regular rate of pay is determined by dividing $600
by 53, which yields a regular rate of pay of $11.32. One-half of that amount ($5.66) is the additional
amount owed to him for each of the thirteen overtime hours. For the weeks when Wortman worked
42 hours, his regular rate of pay is determined by dividing $600 by 42, which yields a regular rate of
pay of $14.29. One-half of that amount ($7.15) is the amount owed to him for each of the two
overtime hours. The formula remains the same, though the rates change, for the time during which
Wortman worked at a lesser salary in June and July of 2009.
The following chart reflects Wortman’s damages, using the fluctuating workweek method and
applying it to the Court’s findings for the hours that he worked:
Date of Employment
Rate of
Pay
Number
of Reg.
Hrs
Number
of OT
Hrs
Rate
of Pay
for OT
Hrs
10/12/2008-10/18/2008
$12.50
40
8
$6.25
$50.00
10/19/2008-10/25/2008
$12.50
40
8
$6.25
$50.00
10/26/2008-11/01/2008
$12.50
40
8
$6.25
$50.00
11/02/2008-11/08/2008
$13.33
40
5
$6.67
$33.35
11/09/2008-11/15/2008
$11.32
40
13
$5.66
$73.58
11/16/2008-11/22/2008
$13.33
40
5
$6.67
$33.35
11/23/2008-11/29/2008
$14.29
40
2
$7.15
$14.30
11/30/2008-12/06/2008
$13.33
40
5
$6.67
$33.35
12/07/2008-12/13/2008
$11.32
40
13
$5.66
$73.58
12/14/2008-12/20/2008
$13.33
40
5
$6.67
$33.35
12/21/2008-12/27/2008
$14.29
40
2
$7.15
$14.30
01/04/2009-01/10/2009
$11.32
40
13
$5.66
$73.58
01/11/2009-01/17/2009
$13.33
40
5
$6.67
$33.35
01/18/2009-01/24/2009
$11.32
40
13
$5.66
$73.58
01/25/2009-01/31/2009
$13.33
40
5
$6.67
$33.35
14
Damages
02/01/2009-02/07/2009
$11.32
40
13
$5.66
$73.58
02/08/2009-02/14/2009
$13.33
40
5
$6.67
$33.35
02/15/2009-02/21/2009
$11.32
40
13
$5.66
$73.58
02/22/2009-02/28/2009
$13.33
40
5
$6.67
$33.35
03/01/2009-03/07/2009
$11.32
40
13
$5.66
$73.58
06/15/2009-06/20/2009
$12.22
40
5
$6.11
$30.55
06/21/2009-06/27/2009
$10.38
40
13
$5.19
$67.47
07/05/2009-07/11/2009
$13.10
40
2
$6.55
$13.10
07/12/2009-07/18/2009
$12.22
40
5
$6.11
$30.55
07/19/2009-07/25/2009
$10.38
40
13
$5.19
$67.47
$1,169.60
This calculation results in overtime pay owed to Wortman in the amount of $1,169.60. Pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 216(b), an additional equal amount is added as liquidated damages. Therefore,
Wortman’s total damages are $2,339.20.
CONCLUSION
Judgment will be entered in favor of Terry Madden against Lumber One in the amount of
$7,555.20. Judgment will be entered in favor of Rebecca O’Bar against Lumber One in the amount
of $1,234.80. Judgment will be entered in favor of Doug Wortman against Lumber One in the
amount of $2,339.20.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of March, 2013.
J. LEON HOLMES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15
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