Valley v. Social Security Administration

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER affirming the final decision of the Commissioner and dismissing pltf's complaint with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Thomas Ray on 11/29/11. (vjt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION
DIANNA J. VALLEY
V.

PLAINTIFF
NO. 4:10CV01393 JTR

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Dianna J. Valley, has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration denying her claim for Supplemental Security
Income (SSI). Both parties have submitted Appeal Briefs (docket entries #10, #11),
and the issues are now joined and ready for disposition.
The Commissioner’s denial of benefits must be upheld upon judicial review if
the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Moore v.
Astrue, 623 F.3d 599, 602 (8th Cir. 2010); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as
adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Moore, 623 F.3d at 602. In its
review, the Court should consider evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision
as well as evidence fairly detracting from it. Id. Nevertheless, if it is possible to draw
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence and one of these conclusions

represents the Commissioner's findings, the denial of benefits must be affirmed. Id.
On October 23, 2007, Plaintiff filed her SSI application. (Tr. 129-31.) She
reported that she had been unable to work since October 1, 2000, due to scoliosis,
migraines, seizures, and adult attention deficit disorder. (Tr. 152.) She was forty-six
years old at the time of her application, had completed high school, and had past work
as a certified nurse’s assistant. (Tr. 147, 153, 155.)
After Plaintiff’s claims were denied at the initial and reconsideration levels, she
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On October 21, 2009,
the ALJ conducted a hearing at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. (Tr.
6-34.)
The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s impairments by way of the familiar five-step
sequential evaluation process. Step 1 involves a determination of whether the
claimant is involved in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i) &
(b). If the claimant is, benefits are denied, regardless of medical condition, age,
education, or work experience. Id.
Step 2 involves a determination, based solely on the medical evidence, of
whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment, i.e., an impairment or combination
of impairments which significantly limits the claimant’s ability to perform basic work
activities. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii) & (c). If not, benefits are denied. Id.
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Step 3 involves a determination, again based solely on the medical evidence,
of whether the severe impairment(s) meets or equals a listed impairment, which is
presumed to be disabling. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii) & (d). If so, and the duration
requirement is met, benefits are awarded. Id.
Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has a sufficient residual
functional capacity (RFC), despite the impairment(s), to perform the physical and
mental demands of past relevant work. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If so, benefits
are denied. Id.
Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able to make an
adjustment to other work, given the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work
experience. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v) & (g). If so, benefits are denied; if not, benefits
are awarded. Id.
In his January 15, 2010 decision (Tr. 42-49), the ALJ found that Plaintiff: (1)
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 23, 2007, her application
date;1 (2) had “severe” impairments of scoliosis, migraines, and mood disorder; (3)
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed

1

SSI benefits are not payable for any period prior to the date a claimant files an SSI
application. 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. Therefore, the relevant time period in SSI cases starts
with the date the SSI application is filed. Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1185 (8th Cir.
1989).
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impairment; (4) had the RFC for a limited range of sedentary work,2 i.e., the ability
to lift and carry ten pounds occasionally and less then ten pounds frequently; to sit for
about six hours during an eight-hour workday; to stand and walk for two hours during
an eight-hour workday; to occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl and
reach overhead; to frequently handle and finger; to understand, remember and carry
out simple, routine and repetitive tasks; and to respond appropriately to supervisors,
co-workers, the general public, and usual work situations; (5) was not fully credible
regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms; (6) was
unable to perform her past relevant work; but (7) considering her age, education, work
experience and RFC, and based on the testimony of the vocational expert, was able
to perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Thus,
the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s
decision, thereby making it the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-5.)
Plaintiff then appealed the denial of benefits to this Court (docket entry #2).

II. Analysis

2

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a) (sedentary work requirements).
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred: (1) in finding that her left knee problem was
not a “severe” impairment; (2) in assessing the credibility of her subjective
complaints; (3) in discounting the opinions of two physicians in formulating an RFC
assessment; and (4) in evaluating her migraines. For the reasons discussed below, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit.
A.

Severity of Left Knee Impairment.

At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s
recent complaint of left knee pain and the post-hearing medical evidence of
degenerative joint disease.3 However, the ALJ concluded that the condition was “nonsevere,” as it caused no more “than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to
perform basic work activities.” (Tr. 44.) See 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a) (impairment is
not severe if it “does not significantly limit [the claimant's] physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities”).
Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision

3

Plaintiff complained of knee pain at a doctor’s appointment on October 15, 2009.
(Tr. 300.) On October 29, 2009, an MRI revealed a “non-displaced fracture involving the
posterior tibial plateau underlying the PCL insertion with adjacent edema,” “thickening of
the ACL,” a “degenerative signal within the posterior horn of the medial meniscus,”
“focal full thickness cartilage loss,” and “medial and lateral compartment osteophytosis.”
(Tr. 302-04.) On November 13, 2009, Russell B. Allison, M.D., an orthopedist,
examined her knee, reviewed x-rays and the MRI, and diagnosed left knee degenerative
joint disease. (Tr. 311.)
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that her left knee impairment was non-severe. This argument does not merit reversal
because the ALJ did not terminate his analysis at step two, instead proceeding through
the sequential evaluation and stating that he was considering “all of the claimant’s
impairments, including impairments that are not severe,” in formulating Plaintiff’s
RFC. (Tr. 43 [emphasis added].) See Swartz v. Barnhart, 188 F. App’x 361, 368 (6th
Cir. 2006) (where ALJ finds at least one “severe” impairment and proceeds to assess
claimant’s RFC based on all alleged impairments, any error in failing to identify
particular impairment as “severe” at step two is harmless); Maziarz v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987); see also 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a)(2) (in assessing RFC, ALJ must consider “all of [a claimant’s] medically
determinable impairments ..., including ... impairments that are not ‘severe’”), §
416.923 (ALJ must “consider the combined effect of all [the claimant’s] impairments
without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of
sufficient severity”).
Moreover, the ALJ adequately accounted for limitations from Plaintiff’s knee
impairment in his RFC assessment for sedentary work, finding that she was capable
of two hours of standing or walking and was limited to occasional climbing, stooping,
kneeling, crouching and crawling. (Tr. 46.) The record as a whole does not support
the need for further limitation. Plaintiff did not allege a knee impairment or pain in
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her disability application and the first medical documentation of any such complaints
was at a doctor’s appointment about one week before her administrative hearing. (Tr.
300.) At the hearing on October 21, 2009, Plaintiff testified that her left knee pain
limited her ability to stand but that there were no household chores that she was
incapable of doing. (Tr. 20, 24.) She reported to an orthopedist on November 13,
2009, that she was “still able to do most of her needed activities,” albeit with some
limitations due to her left knee pain.

Although they “talked about [knee]

replacement,” Plaintiff told the orthopedist she was “not ready for that yet.” The
orthopedist told her that, if her knee was painful, she could come in for an injection
at any time. (Tr. 311.)
Thus, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s left knee problem was not a “severe”
impairment does not constitute reversible error.
B.

Credibility Determination.

An ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective allegations if they are inconsistent
with the record as a whole. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984).
An ALJ’s credibility determination normally will be granted deference if he explicitly
discredits a claimant’s testimony and gives good reasons for doing so. McCoy v.
Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2011). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c) (listing factors

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to consider);4 Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996)
(guidelines for assessing credibility of claimant’s statements regarding symptoms).
Here, the ALJ stated that he had considered Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of
pain and other symptoms in light of “the entire case record,” including the objective
medical evidence, and in accordance with § 416.929 and SSR 96-7p. (Tr. 46.) He
expressly found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of her symptoms were “not fully credible” to the extent they were
inconsistent with his RFC assessment. (Tr. 46, 48.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination is inadequate because:
(1) he appeared to base his decision only on alleged inconsistencies in her disability
onset date; (2) he placed undue weight on the fact that she was a mother of five,
implying that her housewife responsibilities were her primary reason for not working;
and (3) he failed to consider “the other Polaski credibility factors.”
When Plaintiff filed for disability for October 23, 2007, she alleged in her
application that her disability onset date was October 1, 2000. (Tr. 129.) In an

4

As stated in this regulation, the ALJ is required to consider, in addition to the
objective medical evidence and the claimant’s prior work record, statements and
observations made by the claimant, his or her medical providers and any others regarding
(1) the claimant’s daily activities, (2) the location, duration, frequency and intensity of
pain or other symptoms, (3) precipitating and aggravating factors, (4) type, dosage,
effectiveness and side effects of medications, (5) non-medication treatments or other
measures taken to alleviate pain and symptoms, and (6) functional limitations.
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undated disability report submitted during the administrative process, she claimed that
she “bec[a]me unable to work” on October 1, 2000, due to her illnesses and conditions
but “stop[ped] working” on June 1, 2005, because she “was having problems with
[her] children’s health.” (Tr. 152.) At the administrative hearing, she amended her
disability onset to correspond to her application date, October 23, 2007. (Tr. 8.)
Plaintiff testified that she decided to file for disability at that time because she had
been thinking about trying to get a job but felt she could not do so because she was
not getting enough sleep. (Tr. 15-16.) An examining psychologist noted Plaintiff’s
report of numerous short-term jobs over the years and stated that she “tends to become
obsessive-compulsive and winds up quitting jobs.” (Tr. 211, 215.)
The ALJ noted these inconsistent responses and properly cited them as a basis
for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility. (Tr. 45, 46-47.) See Boettcher v. Astrue, 652
F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2011) (conflicting statements about reasons for stopping work
are valid reasons supporting adverse credibility determination).

"One strong

indication of the credibility of an individual's statements is their consistency, both
internally and with other information in the case record," including statements made
by the claimant at each prior step of the administrative review process. SSR 96-7p,
supra at *5.
Furthermore, the ALJ properly found that the record “more supported”
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Plaintiff’s statement that she quit work because of problems with caring for her
children, and he properly gave weight to this in his credibility analysis. (Tr. 47.)
Whether a claimant leaves work for reasons unrelated to his allegedly disabling
medical condition is a relevant factor in a credibility analysis. Ford v. Astrue, 518
F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2008); Goff v. Barhnart, 421 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2005).
The record confirms that the three children who still live with Plaintiff have attention
deficit disorder and require an increased level of attention and supervision. (Tr. 1213, 279, 281, 284-85, 291.) Her family physician wrote on September 18, 2009, that
Plaintiff had a “huge responsibility” in caring for her children, keeping them
appropriately monitored, administering their medications as prescribed, and “being
the only one to help them in life with education and daily life skills.” (Tr. 291.)
Additionally, Plaintiff’s ability to care for her children and manage her
household weighs against her subjective claims of disabling impairments. She
reported daily activities of housework, errands, meal preparation, caring for her
children and herself, as well as laundry, yard work, driving, shopping “pretty often,”
and attending weekly church activities. (Tr. 161-65, 215.) She testified at the
administrative hearing that, although she had some difficulty, there were no household
chores that she was incapable of doing. (Tr. 24-25.) See Heino v. Astrue, 578 F.3d
873, 881 (8th Cir. 2009) (subjective complaints of disabling physical and mental
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limitations were inconsistent with claimant’s daily activities as primary caregiver for
two special-needs children and doing household chores); Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d
872, 876 (8th Cir. 2008) (no error in discounting credibility where self-reported
limitations were inconsistent with medical evidence and daily activities, including
housework, caring for child, cooking and driving); Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953,
957 (8th Cir. 2005) (claimant's total disability allegation was inconsistent with her
daily living activities, including the care of her special needs children, bill paying,
laundry, and cooking).
Finally, although the Eighth Circuit’s preferred practice is for the ALJ to cite
Polaski, he is not required to do so, nor is he required to explicitly discuss each
Polaski factor. Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 558-59 (8th Cir. 2011); Schultz v.
Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007) (ALJ “adequately, if not expressly,” applied
Polaski factors where he cited and conducted credibility analysis pursuant to §
416.929, which “largely mirror[s] the Polaski factors”). Here, the ALJ expressly
noted that he had considered all alleged symptoms in accordance with the
requirements of § 416.929 and SSR 96-7p and in light of the entire case record. (Tr.
46.) His credibility discussion specifically addressed her inconsistent statements
regarding the date her disability began, her varying reasons for not working, and her
significant daily responsibilities. (Tr. 47.) Other parts of his decision addressed the
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objective medical evidence regarding her impairments (Tr. 46-48), her medication use
(Tr. 44, 47), her allegations of pain and functional limitations (Tr. 44, 45, 46-48), the
opinions of her examining and treating physicians (Tr. 47-48), and her history of
quitting jobs and her past work as a certified nurse’s assistant (Tr. 45, 48).
Thus, the ALJ's credibility analysis substantively and adequately covered the
relevant considerations, and he provided good reasons supported by substantial
evidence for not fully accepting Plaintiff's subjective complaints. While there is
evidence in the record both supporting and detracting from the ALJ's conclusion that
Plaintiff was not credible, the ALJ was able to observe Plaintiff during her testimony
at the hearing and this, in addition to the medical and other evidence in the record,
convinced the ALJ that she was not fully credible. Because the ALJ was in the best
position to make a credibility determination, the Court will defer to that determination.
See Steed, 524 F.3d at 876.
C.

Physical RFC Determination.5

Plaintiff asserts that, in making his physical RFC assessment, the ALJ failed to
afford adequate weight to the opinions of a consultative examiner, Carl Johnson,
M.D., and her treating family physician, Clifford L. Evans, M.D.
In deciding whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ is required to consider

5

Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s mental RFC determination.
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every medical opinion received from physicians and other medical sources; he must
resolve conflicts among the various opinions; and he may reject any conclusions that
are inconsistent with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d); Heino, 578 F.3d
at 879. Furthermore, the ALJ must assess a claimant's RFC based on "all of the
relevant medical and other evidence," including opinions from any medical sources.
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(e)(2), 416.945(a)(3).
Here, the ALJ expressly stated that he had considered all opinion evidence in
accordance with the requirements of § 416.927 and the relevant rulings.6 He noted
that Plaintiff had been evaluated “on a number of occasions, either in person, based
on the medical evidence, or both,” referencing the records of Dr. Johnson, Dr. Evans,
and others. (Tr. 46.)
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by giving “little
weight” to the opinion of Dr. Johnson, who performed a one-time, general physical
examination on November 14, 2007. (Tr. 218-24.) Dr. Johnson noted Plaintiff’s
reports of migraine headaches, scoliosis7 with pain and stiffness in the right shoulder
6

SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996) (treating source medical opinions);
SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 (July 2, 1996) (medical opinions on issues reserved to the
Commissioner); SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 (July 2, 1996) (state agency medical
opinions); SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006) (evidence from sources who
are not “acceptable medical sources”).
7

The evidence shows that Plaintiff was born with scoliosis and had a Harrington
rod inserted at age 13. (Tr. 16, 206, 218, 282.)
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and neck, and paresthesia in the right upper extremity.

(Tr. 218, 220.)

On

examination, he observed that her right shoulder was higher than the left, her neck was
“very short” on the right, her right chest wall was concave, her posture was abnormal,
and her range of motion was limited in the cervical spine. (Tr. 220-22.) He further
observed that she had normal range of motion in the lumbar spine and all extremities,
had no reflex or sensory abnormalities, had no muscle weakness, and had “adequate
gait and coordination” and “excellent” limb function. (Tr. 221-22.) He expressed the
opinion that she “can’t sit [or] stand for long periods of time,” but did not cite any
specific findings to support his conclusion. (Tr. 224.)
The ALJ noted that, while it was not “entirely clear” what Dr. Johnson meant
by “long periods of time,” his opinion was nevertheless inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
disability report – about one week earlier – that she “probably could walk one mile
before needing to rest” and could engage in other activities. (Tr. 47, 166.) As stated,
her reported activities included daily household chores, childcare and personal care,
in addition to yard work, driving, shopping and church activities. (Tr. 161-65.) In the
same report, Plaintiff was asked to identify the areas of functioning that were affected
by her conditions. She checked “standing” and added the notation “for long periods
of time,” but did not identify “walking” or “sitting” as affected areas. (Tr. 166.)
The ALJ is entitled to discount the opinion, in whole or in part, of a one-time
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examining medical source, particularly when it is inconsistent with other evidence in
the record. See Vandenboom v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 745, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2005);
Hilkemeyer v. Barnhart, 380 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)
(factors to evaluate in determining weight given to medical opinions, including
"frequency of examination" and "consistency"). Dr. Johnson’s conclusion regarding
Plaintiff’s restricted ability to sit or stand was inconsistent with other evidence in the
record. Thus, it was not improper for the ALJ to afford limited weight to his opinion.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in discrediting the opinions of Dr.
Evans, her family physician, solely on the basis of a letter he wrote in September 2009
expressing sympathy for her responsibilities in taking care of her children, without
considering other factors identified by § 416.927 for evaluating medical opinions.
The ALJ can properly discount a treating physician's opinion if it is inconsistent with
the physician's own clinical treatment notes, or is inconsistent with and unsupported
by the medical evidence as a whole. Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929-30 (8th
Cir. 2010). The record shows that the ALJ did not err in evaluating Dr. Evans’
opinions and that the ALJ had multiple reasons for discounting those opinions.
The ALJ specifically noted three of Dr. Evans’ opinions. (Tr. 47.) First, on
July 31, 2007, Dr. Evans wrote a “To Whom it May Concern” letter in which he stated
that Plaintiff was “neither physically or mentally capable to function in a normal work
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environment.” (Tr. 209.) Second, on September 18, 2009, Dr. Evans wrote a letter
in which he noted Plaintiff’s “huge responsibility” and increased physical and mental
stress from taking care of her five children, three of whom had attention deficit
disorder. As discussed earlier, Dr. Evans’ letter stated that Plaintiff was responsible
for appropriately monitoring her children and administering their medication, and was
the only person who helped them with their education and daily life skills. (Tr. 291.)
Third, on October 8, 2009, Dr. Evans completed a Medical Source Statement (MSS)
in which he assessed significant limitations in Plaintiff’s physical capabilities,
including her inability to: stand and/or walk for more than one hour in a day; sit more
than one hour in a day; and perform handling/fingering more than two hours in the
day. (Tr. 295-98.)
There are a number of inconsistencies associated with Dr. Evans’ MSS. First,
he found that Plaintiff had extreme, disabling limitations in her ability to sit, walk and
stand. This finding is inconsistent with his earlier letter stating that Plaintiff was fully
responsible for caring for the considerable needs of her five children. It is also
inconsistent with Plaintiff’s own statements, discussed above, that she thought she
could walk a mile, regularly engaged in various activities, and was capable of
performing all household chores. Dr. Evans’ finding of severe restrictions on
handling/fingering also is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s reported activities and with Dr.
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Johnson’s objective observations that Plaintiff had “excellent” limb function,
including the ability to hold a pen and write, touch fingertips to palm, grip, oppose
thumb to fingers and pick up a coin, as well as unrestricted range of motion in her
hands and arms. (Tr. 221-22.) Thus, the record supports the ALJ’s decision to afford
limited weight to Dr. Evans’ opinion.
Furthermore, the ALJ’s decision makes it clear that he did not ignore the
opinions of Dr. Johnson or Dr. Evans and, in fact, incorporated many of their specific
findings into his RFC determination by limiting Plaintiff to sedentary work. After
discussing the physicians’ opinions regarding Plaintiff’s scoliosis and related
limitations, he stated: “[I]t is clear the claimant will face limitations due to this
impairment and these have been addressed in the [RFC].” (Tr. 47.)
D.

Evaluation of Migraines.

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s analysis of her migraine headaches is insufficient
because, even though she was doing better on medications, she still experienced
headaches three to four times per month lasting a few hours, and this was not
accounted for in the ALJ’s RFC determination, which did not allow for unscheduled
breaks.
The ALJ expressly found that Plaintiff’s migraine headaches constituted a
“severe” impairment (Tr. 44), and he discussed the relevant medical evidence (Tr. 47).
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He stated that the medical evidence showed Plaintiff had experienced problems with
headaches since at least 2004, referencing treatment notes from December 2004 and
January 2005. (Tr. 282-83.) He cited records from September 2009 indicating that,
for the previous three to four months, Plaintiff had been having two to three migraines
per week. (Tr. 292.) By the time of the administrative hearing, one month later,
Plaintiff testified that the new medication she was taking had helped and that she was
now having about three to four headaches a month, generally lasting a couple of
hours. (Tr. 21-22.) The ALJ noted that this was “in stark contrast” to her previous
complaints and showed that she was “doing much better” on the new medication. He
nevertheless stated that he had considered her headaches in formulating his RFC
assessment. (Tr. 47.)
This record constitutes substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision not
to impose further limitations due to Plaintiff’s migraine headaches or to find her
disabled on that basis.

A condition that can be controlled with treatment or

medication cannot be considered disabling. Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 924 (8th
Cir. 2011) (“Because [claimant’s] migraine headaches are controllable and amenable
to treatment, they do not support a finding of disability.”); Qualls v. Apfel, 158 F.3d
425, 427 (8th Cir. 1998) (same).

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III. Conclusion
After a careful review of the entire record and all arguments presented, the
Court finds that Plaintiff's arguments for reversal are without merit and that the record
as a whole contains substantial evidence upon which the ALJ could rely in reaching
his decision. The Court further concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not based on legal
error.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the final decision of the Commissioner
is affirmed and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED THIS 29th DAY OF November, 2011.

______________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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