Jones v. Eli Lilly et al
ORDER denying all pending motions as moot; and dismissing this action with prejudice for lack of standing. Signed by Judge Jimm Larry Hendren on 8/23/11. (hph)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
ALBERTA ROSE JONES
ELI LILLY, et al.
Now on this 23rd day of August, 2011, this case comes on for
consideration and the Court, being well and sufficiently advised,
finds and orders as follows.
Plaintiff, Alberta Rose Jones (“Jones”), who is appearing
pro se, brings this action for declaratory relief, damages -–
compensatory and punitive –- and attorneys fees and costs.1
#1, #6, #103) She filed this action alleging twenty-five (25)
alleged violations of the First Amendment (Count I);
alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts II, V,
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Count III);
alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Count VII);
alleged violations of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act (Count VIII);
Plaintiff, as next friend of Ryan Garrett Jones, also
filed a habeas corpus action in the Eastern District of Arkansas,
Case No. 4:11CV00223, based on the same facts. By an order and
judgment entered on July 25, 2011, Judge Wright denied the habeas
petition and dismissed the case.
alleged violations of the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution (Count IX);
alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment (Count X);
alleged violations of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution
related to extradition of fugitives (Count XI);
alleged violations of A.C.A § 16-94-201 (Count XII);
alleged violations of California Propositions 63 and 36
alleged violations of Public Laws 108-414, 106-515 and 42
U.S.C. § 3711 (Count XIV);
alleged violations of California mental health courts
alleged violations of the precepts of
Unknown Agents (Count XVI);
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (Count XVII);
alleged violations of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Count XVIII);
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1351 (Count XIX);
alleged violations of California Civil Code § 51 (Count
alleged violations of the California Public Records Act
alleged violations of the Arkansas Public Records Act
negligence (Count XXIV); and
medical negligence (Count XXV).
Bivens v. Six
All of the District Judges in the Eastern District of
Arkansas recused in this matter.
On August 1, 2011, the case was
reassigned to the undersigned.
Pending before the Court are several motions to dismiss
and/or for summary judgment as well as Jones’s motion to stay these
For reasons that follow, all pending motions (Docs.
## 8, 12, 25, 56, 65, 77, 109, 120, 124, 126, 131 and 132) will be
denied as moot and the case will be dismissed in its entirety for
lack of standing to sue under Article III.
According to Jones, she and her son, Ryan Jones, were
Tennessee on February 20, 2011, when they were “illegally pulled
over” by an unmarked car driven by Detective Randy Couch from the
Lonoke County Sheriff’s Department.
(Doc. # 1, Complaint, at 48)
In support of her contentions, Jones alleges:
that, during the stop (which Jones does not believe was
random), Detective Couch asked for Ryan’s driver’s license, which
that the detective performed a National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) check on both Jones and her son.
NCIC showed a bench
California, County of Santa Clara.
Id. at 55-56;
that Detective Couch arrested Ryan and booked him into
the Lonoke County Detention Center, where Ryan later signed an
extradition waiver that his mother claims was “invalid.”
that Jones subsequently tried to file a writ of habeas
corpus in the Lonoke Circuit Court, which was refused.
Id. at 103;
retained to represent Ryan and, on his behalf, filed a state habeas
corpus action in Lonoke County trying to prevent Ryan’s extradition
back to California;
that on March 3, 2011, the Lonoke County Circuit Court
conducted a hearing on the petition, and on March 7, 2011, entered
an Order denying the petition.
Jones v. Sheriff of Lonoke County,
Case No. CR 2011-118 (Lonoke Co. Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 2011) (Doc. #251, at 17);
that, while her son was incarcerated at the Lonoke County
Detention Center, he was denied medical treatment;
that, after her son was transferred to the custody of the
Santa Clara Department of Corrections in California, he was denied
visitation with his father; and
medications are causing him physical harm.
On March 21, 2011, Jones initiated this action.
She filed a First Amended Complaint on March 30,
2011, Doc. #6, and a Second Amended Complaint on June 15, 2011,
The Complaint, which consists of 144 pages, contains
twenty-five (25) claims against more than 185 different named
defendants and thirty (30) John Doe defendants.
No party has raised the issue of whether Jones has
standing to bring this action, but the Court cannot consider the
parties’ arguments as to whether the complaint states a cause of
action until it has determined whether Jones has standing to
See Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.,Inc., 566 F.3d
jurisdictional issues); Jewell v. United States, 548 F.3d 1168,
1172 (8th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff must establish subject matter
jurisdiction, for which standing is prerequisite; standing requires
particularized invasion to legally protected interest; injury must
redressable by favorable decision); see also Frey v. City of
Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Landrum v.
Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1323 n. 2 (8th Cir.) (standing is an element
of the Article III case or controversy requirement and must be
considered as a threshold matter), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912, 58
L. Ed 2d 258, 99 S. Ct. 282 (1978)).
Standing is ‘the threshold question in every federal
case....’ Federal court jurisdiction is ‘defined and limited
constitutionally restricted to “cases” and “controversies.”’
A case or controversy exists only if a plaintiff ‘personally
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.’
plaintiff has not suffered an injury, there is no standing and
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the action.
Tarsney v. O’Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 934 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal
deprivation of another’s civil rights.
Mosher v. Beirne, 237 F.
Supp. 684, 687 (E.D. Mo. 1964) (citing McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka,
& Sante Fe Railway Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); State of Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Brown v. Board of
Trustees of LaGrange Independent Sch. Dist., 187 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.
actions/conspiracies of the named Defendants as to their conduct
related to her son.
Jones claims a “loss of consortium” by these
individuals and entities “whose objective was to deprive [her] of
her familial companionship with her son, Ryan Garrett Jones, and to
take care of him as a ‘mother.’”
(Doc. #103, Second Amended
Complaint, at 8).
Based upon the materials before the Court, it appears that
Jones’s son, Ryan Garrett Jones, is not a minor and, thus, Jones
lacks standing to state claims based upon the alleged violations of
his constitutionally protected rights.
See Clark v. Lutcher, 436
F. Supp. 1266 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (traditional rule that section 1983
litigants lack standing when they raise claim of violation of
constitutional rights of third party is to be relaxed where parents
are alleging that they have suffered financial loss as a result of
violation of constitutional rights of minor son).
is no absolute constitutionally protected right to enjoy the
companionship of one’s family members free from all encroachment by
See Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1062 (1st Cir.
1997); see also Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County,
637 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (while parents have a
companionship with their children, an isolated action against a
family member does not deprive one of a constitutionally protected
Even accepting as true all the facts pled by Jones and
granting her the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom,
the record does not reflect any cognizable injury to her that is
distinct from any alleged harm suffered by her son.2
this action must be dismissed in its entirety as against all
Other grounds for dismissal are cognizable in this
instance; however, because standing is a threshold matter, the
discussion was so limited.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
All pending motions (Docs. ## 8, 12, 25, 56, 65, 77, 109, 120,
124, 126, 131 and 132) are denied as moot.
This action is dismissed with prejudice for lack of standing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Jimm Larry Hendren
JIMM LARRY HENDREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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