Denton v. Conveyor Technology et al

Filing 25

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Kristine G. Baker on 2/25/13. (kpr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
LITTLE ROCK DIVISION
GLORIA DENTON
v.

PLAINTIFF
Case No. 4:12-cv-00191 KGB

CONVEYOR TECHNOLOGY
And JUSTIN CARMODY

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

Before the Court is defendants’ motion to compel (Dkt. No. 20). Plaintiff Gloria Denton
has responded. For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in
part.
Ms. Denton alleges she was employed by Conveyor Technology and Justin Carmody
from October 2010 through January 2012. She claims that Conveyor Technology and Mr.
Carmody violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by failing to compensate her for all
hours worked.

On or about October 3, 2012, Conveyor Technology and Mr. Carmody

propounded written discovery to Ms. Denton seeking information regarding her medical history.
She has refused to produce the requested information, claiming that her medical history is not
relevant to the issues in this case and that Conveyor Technology’s and Mr. Carmody’s requests
are overly broad.
Interrogatory No. 1 asks Ms. Denton to describe in detail her medical history during her
lifetime. It also seeks the full names and addresses of each hospital, medical doctor and/or other
practitioner of the healing arts who has examined or treated Ms. Denton in the last ten years, and
the dates and reasons for each examination or treatment. Request for Production No. 1 seeks a
medical authorization for her medical records and the names of her medical providers.

Conveyor Technology and Mr. Carmody argue that Ms. Denton’s medical records are
relevant to her claim that she was not paid for all hours worked. They contend that Ms. Denton
took time off for back surgery and other medical procedures while employed. The FLSA
requires an employer to compensate an employee for all hours worked. Copeland v. ABB, Inc.,
521 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2008). Time spent receiving medical attention does not constitute hours
worked unless it is on the employer’s premises or at the direction of the employer during the
employee’s normal working hours on days when he is working. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §
785.43). The information requested by Conveyor Technology and Mr. Carmody is, therefore,
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence on the issue of hours
worked.
Ms. Denton argues that Conveyor Technology and Mr. Carmody should not be allowed
to use her medical history to determine the amount of time she was off work for medical reasons
when it failed to keep accurate records of the hours worked by its employees. The Court
acknowledges that under Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), the
burden is on the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work
performed when the employer fails to comply with its record-keeping obligations under the
FLSA. However, Ms. Denton has cited no authority, and the Court is not aware of any, that
prohibits an employer from obtaining relevant evidence under such circumstances.
For these reasons, Conveyor Technology and Mr. Carmody are entitled to the type of
discovery they seek. Ms. Denton’s objection that the discovery requests are not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is overruled. However, the Court
sustains her objection that the requests are overly broad with respect to time. Ms. Denton is
ordered to supplement her responses to Interrogatory No. 1 and Request for Production No. 1

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and provide Conveyor Technology and Mr. Carmody with all necessary authorizations for the
requested information for the period of October 2010 through January 2012 within ten days of
the date of this Order. Each party will bear its own costs and fees associated with filing and
responding to this motion. Ms. Denton’s response requests a protective order to cover the
production of these records. If the parties are unable to agree to a reasonable protective order,
Ms. Denton is directed to file a separate motion with the Court specific to the issue of the
protective order.
SO ORDERED this 25th day of February, 2013.

____________________________________
Kristine G. Baker
United States District Judge

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