Wilder v. Miller et al
ORDER granting motion to proceed ifp but DISMISSING CASE with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This dismissal counts as a "strike". The Court certifies that an ifp appeal would not be taken in good faith. Signed by Judge D. P. Marshall Jr. on 10/18/12. (kpr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
KEITH L. WILDER
BRIAN S. MILLER, Chief United
States District Judge, and
THOMAS RAY, United States
1. Wilder, currently held at the Pulaski County Detention Facility, filed
a prose complaint, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Document No. 1, and
naming as Defendants Chief United States District Judge Brian S. Miller and
United States Magistrate Judge J. Thomas Ray of this District Court. Wilder
also filed an amended complaint that did not contain any additional
allegations. Document No. 4.
2. Wilder also applied for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Document
No. 3. Because he has submitted a declaration that makes the showing
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the request to proceed in forma pauperis is
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Based on information contained in a certified copy of Wilder's inmate
trust fund account, the Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. But
Wilder will be obligated to make monthly payments in the amount of twenty
percent of the preceding month's income credited to Wilder's prison trust
account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. Wilder's
custodian is requested to send the Clerk of the Court the monthly payments
from Wilder's prison trust account when the amount exceeds $10.00, until the
statutory filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
As Wilder's present custodian, the Pulaski County Sheriff, or his
designee, or any future custodian, is directed to collect from Wilder's
institutional account the $350.00 filing fee by collecting monthly payments
equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to Wilder's account
each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. The Pulaski County
Sheriff, or his designee, or any future custodian, is further directed to forward
the payments to the Clerk of the Court in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(2), until a total of $350.00 has been collected and forwarded to the
Clerk. The payments also must be clearly identified by the name and number
assigned to this action.
3. Before docketing the complaint, or as soon thereafter as practicable,
the Court must review the complaint to identify cognizable claims or dismiss
the complaint if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from that relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Wilder alleges that Judges Miller and Ray have illegally dismissed all
claims brought by prisoners alleging constitutional violations by state
officials. But "[j]udges performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity
from § 1983 liability." Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994).
Judges Miller and Ray are absolutely immune for acts committed within
[their] judicial jurisdiction[,]" even if [they are] accused of acting maliciously
or corruptly[.]" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); see also Liles v.
Reagan, 804 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1986). This is for the public benefit:
[J]udges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence
and without fear of consequences." Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. Appeal is the
cure for error by any trial court. Ibid. Like other forms of official immunity,
judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment
of damages. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
Whether an act of a judge is considered "judicial" is a functional
analysis. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349,362 (1978). Entering orders, including orders of dismissal, are
just the sort of functions that judicial immunity contemplates. Ibid. Therefore,
Judge Miller and Judge Ray are immune from Wilder's suit.
Moreover, the facts pleaded about these judges, even if true, do not state
a plausible claim that they violated Wilder's rights under § 1983. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663-64 (2009). The Court recognizes that detailed factpleading is not required, but Wilder's complaint consists of nothing more
than"naked assertions" and "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation[s]." Ibid. (quotation omitted).
4. Because all the claims against Judges Miller and Ray suffer from
insufficient pleading and are barred by absolute immunity, Wilder's
complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). This dismissal counts as a
"strike" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court also certifies that an
in forma pauperis appeal taken from the order and judgment dismissing this
action would be frivolous and not in good faith. The Court directs the Clerk
to send a copy of this Order to the Pulaski County Sheriff, 3201 West
Roosevelt Road, Little Rock, AR 72204.
D.P. Marshall Jr.
United States District Judge
18 October 2012
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