Jones v. Briggs et al

Filing 81

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION recommending that 59 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and that Jones's retaliation and inhumane conditions of confinement claims against Sylvester, Briggs, Bennett, Nelson, and Wilson be dismissed, with prejudice. Objections due within 14 days of this Recommendation. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Thomas Ray on 2/1/2018. (kdr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION

STACY JONES,
#7580355608
V.

PLAINTIFF
4:16CV00593 BSM/JTR

MATTHEW BRIGGS, Major,
Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility, et al.

DEFENDANTS

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
The following Recommended Disposition (ARecommendation@) has been sent
to United States Chief District Judge Brian S. Miller. Any party may file written
objections to this Recommendation. Objections must be specific and include the
factual or legal basis for disagreeing with the Recommendation. An objection to a
factual finding must specifically identify the finding of fact believed to be wrong
and describe the evidence that supports that belief.
An original and one copy of the objections must be received by the Clerk of
this Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. If no objections are
filed, Judge Miller can adopt this Recommendation without independently
reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may also waive
any right to appeal questions of fact.

1

I. Introduction
Stacy Jones ("Jones") is a prisoner in the Milwaukee County House of
Correction. He has filed this pro se ' 1983 action alleging that, while he was a
pretrial detainee in the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility ("PCRDF"),
Defendants Chief Mike Sylvester ("Sylvester"), Major Matthew Briggs ("Briggs"),
Lieutenant Jackson Bennett ("Bennett"), Lieutenant Vivalon Nelson ("Nelson"), and
Classification Representative Sylvia Wilson ("Wilson") retaliated against him for
seeking medical care and subjected him to inhumane conditions of confinement.
Docs. 2, 6, 7, & 8. Jones brings these claims against Defendants in their individual
capacities only. 1

Doc. 15.

Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the merits of
Jones's claims, two Briefs in Support, two Statements of Undisputed Facts, and a
Reply. Docs. 59, 60, 61, 71, 78, & 79. Jones has filed several Responses, a
Statement of Disputed Facts, and Affidavits. Docs. 64, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, & 75.
Before addressing the merits of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court
will summarize the relevant facts giving rise to Jones's retaliation and inhumane
conditions of confinement claims:2

1

The Court has previously: (1) dismissed, without prejudice, all claims Jones raised
against Defendants in their official capacities; (2) dismissed, without prejudice, Jones's claims
against the PCRDF; and (3) dismissed, with prejudice, Jones's inadequate medical care claim
against Defendant Dr. Johnson. Docs. 15 & 80.
2
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most favorable to
2

1.

On May 31, 2016, Jones was booked in the PCRDF and assigned to

general population in S-Unit.

Defendants concede, for purposes of summary

judgment, that Jones was "a pretrial detainee at all times during his incarceration at
the PCRDF." Doc. 60 at Ex. 1-1; Doc. 78 at Ex. 1.
2.

From June 13 to July 23, 2016, Jones filed four grievances complaining

about what he believed to be inadequate medical care for chest pains. Those
grievances were denied by non-parties. Doc. 3 at 9; Doc. 60 at Ex. 2-2; Doc. 68 at
19.
3.

On July 23, 2016, the air conditioning in S-Unit stopped working.

Sometime in the afternoon, Jones told a non-party guard that the heat was causing
him to have chest pains. Around 2:15 p.m., the detainees in S-Unit refused to lock
down in their cells in protest of the hot conditions. The parties disagree as to whether
Jones participated in that protest. Briggs ordered the Special Emergency Response
Team ("SERT") to S-Unit. Two minutes after the SERT arrived at S-Unit, the
detainees stopped their protest and entered their lock down cells without incident.

the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50
(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thereafter, the nonmoving party must present
specific facts demonstrating that there is a material dispute for trial. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011).
3

The SERT identified Jones as one of the two "ring leaders" of the protest, removed
him from S-Unit, and placed him in administrative segregation cell U-406. Briggs
and Sylvester ordered that Jones: (a) remain in his administrative segregation cell
twenty-three hours a day; and (b) be placed in "full restraints" with a "black box"
when he was allowed out of his administrative segregation cell for one hour each
day to shower, make phone calls, and have visitation.3 Doc. 2; Doc. 60 at Exs. 1-2,
1-3; Doc. 78 at Ex. 1-4.
4.

Later that day, a non-party member of the SERT filed an incident report

accusing Jones of disobeying orders and being one of the "ring leaders of the refusal
to lock down" in S-Unit. Doc. 71 at Ex. 1; Doc. 78 at Ex. 1-4.
5.

While Jones was in cell U-406, he complained to Bennett that his toilet,

which contained feces and urine, would not flush. Jones also raised that complaint
in two grievances, which were denied by a non-party. Doc. 3 at 1 & 7; Doc. 7;
Doc. 60 at Ex. 2-3.
6.

On July 27, 2016, the Classification Board, which included Wilson,

held a hearing to review the incident report filed against Jones. At the conclusion of

3

The parties agree that "full restraints" are handcuffs, leg shackles, a belly chain, and a
tether that connects all three. Neither party has explained the "black box." In Moody v. Proctor,
986 F.2d 239, 240 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993), the Court explained that the "black box is applied over the
chain and lock area of conventional handcuffs to form a rigid link between the two wristlets." The
Court also concluded that, "although the black box causes discomfort, its use is penologically
justified" to prevent escape and reduce the number of escorting guards. Id. at 241.
4

that hearing, the Classification Board determined that: (a) Jones had disobeyed
orders and was one of the "ring leaders" of the July 23, 2016 disturbance in S-Unit;
and (b) when Jones was allowed to leave his cell for one hour each day, he should
be placed in full restraints, with a black box, the highest security requirement at the
PCRDF. Nelson affirmed both decisions on appeal. Doc. 3; Doc. 78 at Exs. 1, 1-4,
1-5, 1-6.
7.

On July 29, 2016, Jones was transferred from cell U-406 to cell T-402

in administrative segregation. Jones does not allege that the toilet in T-402 was
malfunctioning or that he had insufficient toilet paper while held in that cell. Doc.
60 at Ex. 1-3.
8.

On August 3, 12, and 19, 2016, the Classification Board reviewed and

reaffirmed their earlier decision that Jones should remain in administrative
segregation and be placed in full restraints, with a black box, whenever he left his
cell. Doc. 78 at Exs. 1, 1-4.
9.

On August 24, 2016, the Classification Board noted that Jones was

"working his way down" from the highest security status. Thus, they allowed him to
be placed in full restraints, without the black box, whenever he left his administrative
segregation cell. The Classification Board reviewed and reaffirmed that decision
during their August 31 and September 8, 2016 meetings. Doc. 78 at Exs. 1, 1-4.

5

10.

On September 14, 2016, Jones was released from the PCRDF. Doc.

78 at Ex. 1-8.
II. Discussion
A.

Retaliation Claim
Jones alleges that Defendants placed him in administrative segregation to

retaliate against him for seeking medical treatment for chest pains.4 To proceed to
trial on that claim, Jones must have evidence demonstrating that he engaged in
constitutionally protected activity and that retaliation was the "actual motivating
factor" for his placement in administrative segregation. See Beaulieu v. Ludeman,
690 F.3d 1017, 1025 (8th Cir. 2012); Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir.
2007).
Clearly, Jones engaged in constitutionally protected activity when he
requested medical treatment for chest pains and filed grievances challenging the
medical care he received for that condition. See Lewis, 486 F.3d at 1029. However,
a retaliatory discipline claim fails, as matter of law, if there is "some evidence the
inmate actually committed a rule violation." Sanders v. Hobbs, 773 F.3d 186, 190
(8th Cir. 2014); Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2008). The parties

4

Specifically, Jones alleges that: (1) Sylvester and Briggs ordered that he be placed in
administrative segregation; (2) Bennett carried out those orders; (3) Wilson, as member of the
Classification Board, found him guilty of the charges made in the incident report; and (4) Nelson
denied his appeal challenging the Classification Board's findings.
6

dispute whether Jones participated in the July 23, 2016 protest in S-Unit, which was
the basis for him being placed in administrative segregation. However, that factual
dispute is immaterial to Jones's retaliation claim because a "report from a
correctional officer, even if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other
evidence, legally suffices as some evidence upon which to base a prison disciplinary
violation, if the violation is found by an impartial decision maker.” Sanders, 773
F.3d at 190 (emphasis added); see also Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that a disciplinary decision made by an impartial decision
maker and supported by some evidence "essentially checkmates" a retaliation
claim).
Here, Jones's confinement in administrative segregation is supported by the
incident report filed by a non-party member of the SERT, who personally observed
the incident and concluded that Jones disobeyed orders and was a "ring leaders" of
the uprising in S-Unit. After reviewing that report and holding a hearing, Wilson (as
a member of the Classification Board) and Nelson (on appeal) found that there was
some evidence to support those charges. That finding "essentially checkmates"
Jones's retaliation claim against Sylvester, Briggs, and Bennett.
Although Jones speculates that Wilson and Nelson found him guilty for
retaliatory reasons, he has offered no evidence to support that conclusory accusation.
See Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a prisoner
7

Acarries a substantial burden to prove that retaliation was the actual motivating
factor@ for an adverse action); Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781,784 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that "speculative and conclusory allegations cannot support a retaliation
claim"). In fact, there is no evidence that either Wilson or Nelson was aware that
Jones sought medical care for chest pains or that he filed grievances complaining
about the medical care he received for that condition. See Haynes v. Stephenson, 588
F.3d 1152, 1156 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a prisoner must demonstrate that
Abut for a retaliatory motive,@ the defendant would not have taken the disciplinary
action); Lewis, 486 F.3d at 1029 (holding that, to avoid summary judgment, a
prisoner "must submit affirmative evidence of a retaliatory motive").
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment, and that Jones's retaliation claim against them should be dismissed, with
prejudice.
B.

Inhumane Conditions of Confinement Claims
Jones alleges that Defendants subjected him to inhumane conditions of

confinement while he was administrative segregation by: (1) failing to repair his
toilet and provide him with toilet paper; and (2) placing him in full restraints when
he left his cell for one hour each day.
The Supreme Court has clarified that, because the AConstitution does not
mandate comfortable prisons,@ only Aextreme deprivations@ that deny Athe minimal
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civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis@ of an
Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992); Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Thus, to proceed to trial on his inhumane
conditions of confinement claims, Jones must have evidence demonstrating that:
(1) objectively, he was subjected to conditions that created a substantial risk of
serious harm to his health or safety; and (2) subjectively, Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm posed by those conditions. 5 Davis v.
Oregon Cnty., Mo., 607 F.3d 543, 548-49 (8th Cir. 2010); Butler v. Fletcher, 465
F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 2006).
1.

Broken Toilet and Lack of Toilet Paper

Jones alleges that Defendants subjected him to inhumane conditions of
confinement for the six days (July 23 to 29, 2016) that he was held in cell U-406
because he did not receive "any" toilet paper and the toilet, which was "full of feces
and urine," would not flush.6 Docs. 2, 6, 7 at 3. Jones has not produced any evidence

5

Currently, the Eighth Circuit applies the same deliberate indifference standard to
inhumane conditions of confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and convicted prisoners, under the Eighth Amendment. Butler, 465 F.3d at 345. In
Ingram v. Cole Cnty, 846 F.3d 282 (8th Cir. 2017), the Eighth Circuit heard arguments, en banc,
on whether the deliberate indifference standard still applies to conditions of confinement claims
asserted by pretrial detainees, based on the Court's holding in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct.
2466 (2015). As of the date of this Recommended Disposition, no opinion has been entered in the
Ingram case. However, even if the Eighth Circuit decides to extend Kingsley to conditions of
confinement claims asserted by pretrial detainees, Defendants in this case would be entitled to
qualified immunity from a retroactive application of that new legal standard.
6
Defendants claim that the toilet in cell U-406 was not broken, and that all detainees in
administrative segregation receive toilet paper in "quarter roll increments on an as needed basis."
9

demonstrating that Briggs, Sylvester, Nelson, or Wilson was subjectively aware of
these alleged conditions. See Corwin v. City of Indep., Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th
Cir. 2016) (explaining that deliberate indifference requires subjective knowledge
and that a negligent failure to be aware of a potential constitutional violation is
insufficient).
In contrast, Jones alleges that he told Bennett about the broken toilet and lack
of toilet paper in cell U-406. Accepting those facts as true, Jones's claim against
Bennett still fails because there is no evidence that Jones suffered any harm as a
result of not having toilet paper or being able to flush his toilet for six days. See
Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no constitutional
violation where a prisoner failed to demonstrate that he was actually harmed by
unsanitary conditions). Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has held that exposure, for
a limited duration, to unsanitary conditions does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078, 1082 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that unsanitary conditions of confinement may Abe tolerable for a few days
and intolerably cruel for weeks or months@).
In Smith, the Court held there was no constitutional violation when a detainee
was exposed to "raw sewage" from an overflowing toilet for four days. Smith, 87

Doc. 60, Exs. 1, 1-5, & 1-6. However, at summary judgment, the Court must construe these
disputed facts in Jones's favor.
10

F.3d at 269. In Goldman v. Forbus, 17 F. App’x 487, 489 (8th Cir. 2001)
(unpublished opinion), the Court held there was no constitutional violation when a
detainee was “sprinkled with urine” for six days while sleeping on the floor near a
toilet. Similarly, the Court found no constitutional violation when a detainee, who
did not have any toilet paper for three to four days each week, was allowed to shower
daily. Stickley v. Byrd, 703 F.3d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 2013). In this case, unlike in
Smith and Goldman, Jones does not allege that he ever came into contact with feces
or urine from the broken toilet in cell U-406. Furthermore, as in Stickley, it is
undisputed that Jones was allowed to shower on each of the six days he alleges he
was without toilet paper.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Jones's inhumane conditions of confinement claim regarding the
broken toilet and lack of toilet paper, and that claim should be dismissed, with
prejudice.
2.

Use of Full Restraints

Jones alleges that Defendants subjected him to inhumane conditions of
confinement by requiring him to be placed in full restraints when he was allowed
outside his administrative segregation cell for one hour each day.7
7

Jones alleges that: (1) Briggs and Sylvester ordered that he be placed in full restraints;
(2) Bennett carried out those orders; (3) Wilson was a member of the Classification Board that
periodically reviewed and approved that decision; and (4) Nelson affirmed that decision on appeal.
11

Importantly, is undisputed that Jones was not harmed, in any way, by this
limited use of full restraints. See Smith, 87 F.3d at 268 (finding no constitutional
violation where a prisoner failed to demonstrate that he was actually harmed by the
conditions of his confinement); Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir. 1995)
(same). Similarly, there is no evidence suggesting that Jones was unable to exercise
or adequately move about his administrative segregation cell for the twenty-three
hours each day that he was not restrained. See Key v. McKinney, 176 F.3d 1083,
1085 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that a prisoner did not suffer an objectively serious risk
to his health and safety when he was placed in full restraints for twenty-four
consecutive hours). Thus, the Court concludes that no reasonable juror could find
that the limited use of full restraints on Jones was an "extreme deprivation" of the
"minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
Finally, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979), the Court held that:
"Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail
security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they
are discomforting." Here, it is undisputed that Defendants required Jones to be
placed in full restraints whenever he was out of his administrative segregation cell
because they believed he was a "ring leader" of a volatile and dangerous situation
during which the detainees in S-Unit banded together, disobeyed orders, and ceased
their protest only after there was a show of force by the SERT. See Ferguson v. Cape
12

Girardeau Cnty., 88 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 1996) (confining a pretrial detainee to thirty
foot cell, twenty-four hours a day for eleven consecutive days was "reasonably
related" to the county's "legitimate governmental objectives" of monitoring "his
medical condition as well as general safety concerns"). Further, it is undisputed that
Defendants regularly reviewed their decision and lessened Jones's restrictions, by
removing the black box, after he demonstrated his ability to obey orders and refrain
from creating disturbances.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Jones's inhumane conditions of confinement claim regarding him being
placed in full restraints during the one hour each day he was allowed to be outside
his cell, and that claim should be dismissed, with prejudice.
III. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) be GRANTED, and that Jones's retaliation and
inhumane conditions of confinement claims against Sylvester, Briggs, Bennett,
Nelson, and Wilson be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE.8

8

Defendants have also raised a qualified immunity defense. Because there is no evidence
of a constitutional violation, there is no need for the Court to address qualified immunity as an
alternative reason for dismissal. See Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 574 (8th Cir.
2009) ("Since we find no constitutional violation, we need not address the issues of qualified
immunity and municipal liability"); Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1077 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007)
("[I]f the court finds no constitutional violation occurred, the analysis ends and the issue of
qualified immunity is not addressed").
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Dated this 1st day of February, 2018.

____________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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