Pilkington v. National Oilwell Varco LP et al

Filing 40

ORDER granting 33 Mr. Pilkington's motion to remove pleading, accept substitute and file plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion to continue trial and to stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution of defendant's motion to dis miss and compel arbitration and memorandum of law; directing the Clerk of Court to replace the document listed as docket number 32 with the 33 -1 correct version of Mr. Pilkington's response to Defendants' motion to continue trial and to stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution of defendant's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration and memorandum of law, marked as filed on June 3, 2024; granting 28 Defendants' motion to continue trial and stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution of defendant's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration; staying all unexpired pending pretrial deadlines; and removing this matter from the 9/30/2024 trial calendar. Signed by Chief Judge Kristine G. Baker on 8/28/2024. (cmn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
ROBERT PILKINGTON
v.

PLAINTIFF
Case No. 4:22-cv-00825-KGB

NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO L.P.,
NOV, INC., and FIBER GLASS SYSTEMS, L.P.
d/b/a NOV FIBERGLASS SYSTEMS

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
Before the Court are defendants Fiber Glass Systems, L.P., National Oilwell Varco, L.P.,
and NOV, Inc.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to continue trial and stay pretrial deadlines
pending resolution of defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration (Dkt. No. 28) and
plaintiff Robert Pilkington’s motion to remove pleading, accept, substitute, and file plaintiff’s
response to defendant’s motion to continue trial and to stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution
of defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration and memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 33).
The Court will first address Mr. Pilkington’s motion, followed by Defendants’ motion.
I.

Mr. Pilkington’s Motion To Substitute Response

On May 22, 2024, Defendants filed their motion to continue trial and stay pretrial deadlines
(Dkt. No. 28). In the motion, Defendants asserted that Mr. Pilkington agreed to extend pretrial
deadlines but did not agree to a continuance of the trial date (Id., at 7). On May 23, 2024, Mr.
Pilkington filed a notice of opposition to Defendants’ motion to continue trial and to stay pretrial
deadlines (Dkt. No. 30). This document merely clarified that Mr. Pilkington did not agree to an
extension of pretrial deadlines and indicated Mr. Pilkington’s intent to file a more complete
response to the motion (Id., ¶¶ 2–4).

On May 30, 2024, Mr. Pilkington filed a response to Defendants’ motion to continue trial
and to stay pretrial deadlines (Dkt. No. 32). On June 3, 2024, Mr. Pilkington filed his motion to
remove pleading, accept, substitute, and file plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion to continue
trial and to stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution of defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration and memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 33). In that motion, Mr. Pilkington states that docket
number 32, his response to Defendants’ motion to continue and stay pretrial deadlines, was filed
in error and by mistake (Dkt. No. 33, ¶ 1). Mr. Pilkington asserts that he had until June 5, 2024,
to file his response to Defendants’ motion to continue and stay pretrial deadlines (Id., ¶ 2). Mr.
Pilkington further asserts that he completed his response by May 30, 2024, but filed on that date a
previous uncorrected draft instead of the final draft (Id., ¶ 3). Mr. Pilkington states that he
discovered the error on June 3, 2024 (Id., ¶ 3). Mr. Pilkington requests that the Court remove the
errant filing and substitute the response attached to his motion as docket number 32, as that is the
document that was supposed to have been filed on May 30, 2024 (Id., ¶ 4). Defendants have not
filed a response to this motion, and the time to do so has passed.
For good cause shown, the Court grants Mr. Pilkington’s motion (Dkt. No. 33). The Court
directs the Clerk of Court to replace the document listed as docket number 32 with the correct
version of Mr. Pilkington’s response to Defendants’ motion to continue trial and to stay pretrial
deadlines pending resolution of defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration and
memorandum of law, marked as filed on June 3, 2024 (Dkt. No. 33-1). The Court considers Mr.
Pilkington’s response as timely filed.
II.

Defendants’ Motion To Continue Trial And Stay Pretrial Deadlines

Next, the Court considers Defendants’ motion to continue trial and stay pretrial deadlines
(Dkt. No. 28). Defendants assert that, pursuant to the Final Scheduling Order in this case, the

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discovery deadline was June 7, 2024, dispositive and Daubert motions were due by July 1, 2024,
motions in limine are due by September 16, 2024, and the matter is set for jury trial during the
week of September 30, 2024 (Id., at 1–2). Defendants further assert that Fiber Glass Systems’
motion to dismiss and compel arbitration is currently pending before the Court and is not yet fully
briefed (Id., at 2). Further, Defendants request that the Court order a scheduling conference for
the parties to select a new trial date and set new pretrial deadlines in the event that Fiberglass
Systems’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration is denied (Id., at 1).
Defendants state that the parties have engaged in limited discovery, offering the following
explanation:
Defendants served written discovery to Plaintiff on September 1, 2023. Due to
scheduling conflicts between the parties, Plaintiff’s deposition could not be
scheduled until February 27, 2024.
Thereafter, Plaintiff served written
interrogatories and requests for production on March 29, 2024. On April 10, 2024,
Plaintiff requested to depose four witnesses, two of whom are no longer employed
by Defendants. Due to additional scheduling conflicts, the four witness[’]
depositions cannot reasonably be completed before the June 7, 2024[,] discovery
deadline. For example, Plaintiff has requested the deposition of Doris Gurule, a
former employee on whom Plaintiff rests much of his claims. In addition to being
in poor health, Ms. Gurule is scheduled to undergo surgery in June 2024, with a 68 week recovery period and is therefore unavailable to be deposed prior to the June
7, 2024[,] discovery deadline.
(Id., at 2).
Defendants request that the Court continue the current trial date and stay all discovery in
this matter pending the resolution of the motion to compel arbitration based on those facts and the
following legal arguments: (1) that Supreme Court precedent requires a stay; (2) that good cause
exists for the issuance of a continuance and stay; and (3) that the Federal Arbitration Act precludes
additional discovery (Id., at 3–7). Finally, Defendants argue that Mr. Pilkington does not oppose
extending pretrial deadlines but does not consent to a trial continuance (Id., at 7).

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As previously stated, on May 23, 2024, Mr. Pilkington filed a notice of opposition to
Defendants’ motion to continue trial and to stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution of
defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration (Dkt. No. 30). This document clarified that
Mr. Pilkington did not agree to an extension of pretrial deadlines (Id., ¶¶ 3–4). Per this Order, the
Court will also consider Mr. Pilkington’s response to Defendants’ motion to continue trial and to
stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution of defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration
and memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 33-1).
Mr. Pilkington asserts the following:
Prior to filing its Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, Defendants conducted
extensive written discovery and deposed the Plaintiff for approximately seven
hours. Plaintiff served written discovery on March 29, 2024. Defendants have yet
to respond to that discovery. Defendants have been given three extensions to
respond. The most recent extension gave the Defendants an additional week, until
May 28, 2024, to respond. After Defendants were given the extension until May
28, it moved to stay discovery. Beginning April 10, 2024, Plaintiff began to
informally request dates for depositions. Defendants stonewalled and Plaintiff
finally served Notices of Deposition on May 16, 2024. The depositions are
scheduled for May 30, and June 5 and 6. Defendants have informed Plaintiff that
they will not appear at the depositions, however, Defendants have not sought a
protective order. Instead, they have filed this motion.
(Dkt. No. 33-1, at 2 (footnote omitted)). In a footnote, Mr. Pilkington states that Defendants
propounded 88 requests for production to which Mr. Pilkington produced 1,042 pages (Id., at 2
n.1). Mr. Pilkington asserts that the Defendants have engaged in substantial discovery but now
seek to prevent him from doing the same, and therefore, Mr. Pilkington argues that a stay would
be prejudicial to him (Id., at 2).
Additionally, Mr. Pilkington reiterates that he did not consent to an extension of pretrial
deadlines as stated by Defendants (Id., at 3). Mr. Pilkington contests Defendants’ legal arguments
as well, stating that the cases relied upon by Defendants do not require a stay of pretrial deadlines
because: (1) Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736 (2023), is not applicable to the proceedings
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before the Court, and (2) Defendants have not met their burden for a stay and such a stay would
be prejudicial to Mr. Pilkington (Id., at 3–6).
A.

Supreme Court Precedent Regarding Stays

Defendants argue that a stay of discovery is appropriate because:
If the [m]otion to [c]ompel is granted and the case is referred to arbitration, any
discovery would proceed in arbitration under the more streamlined discovery
procedures in that forum. If, on the other hand, the [m]otion to [c]ompel is denied,
Defendants will likely appeal that decision and the case will be subject to a
mandatory stay pending the appeal.
(Dkt. No. 28, at 3 (citing Bielski, 599 U.S. at 740)). Defendants cite Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, in
which the United States Supreme Court held that a district court must stay its proceedings while
the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. 599 U.S., at 740. Defendants argue that:
While Coinbase involved a stay during the pendency of an appeal, the Supreme
Court’s reasoning derives from the structure of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)
and applies equally to a scenario where, as here, a motion to compel arbitration is
pending before the district court. Accordingly, discovery should not proceed while
the Court is deciding the threshold question of whether this case belongs in
arbitration.
(Dkt. No. 28, at 4).
First, Mr. Pilkington argues that Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski does not apply because Coinbase
had not waived its right to arbitration, and he asserts that Fiber Glass Systems has waived its right
to arbitration in this case (Dkt. No. 33-1, at 3). Further, Mr. Pilkington argues that Coinbase, Inc.
v. Bielski does not apply because the Court has not yet made a determination on the arbitrability of
this matter (Id., at 3–4).
This Court has not yet determined whether Fiber Glass Systems has waived its right to
arbitration. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), any denial of a motion to compel
arbitration may be appealed. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C). The FAA appears to make no exception to
this provision, even if the reason that a district court declines to compel arbitration is that a party
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waived its right to arbitration, and Defendants indicate they will “likely appeal,” if the Court denies
the pending motion to compel arbitration (Dkt. No. 28, at 3). As a result, the Court agrees with
Defendants that any determination on the issue of arbitration will strain the current litigation
deadlines.
While Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski is not on point for this case, the Court acknowledges that
given the status of discovery, that the discovery deadline has passed, and the practical effect of any
ruling this Court makes on the pending motion to compel arbitration, the current scheduling Order
is likely unworkable at this point in the litigation.
B.

Good Cause

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), the Court’s scheduling Order setting this
matter for trial during the week of September 30, 2024, may be modified “only for good cause
shown and with the judge’s consent.” Therefore, continuance of the trial date requires good cause
shown.
However, a different test applies to a request to stay proceedings and pretrial deadlines.
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and
for litigants.” Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238, 1248 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co.,
299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)); see also Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 980 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (same). Further, “[a] district court has broad discretion to stay proceedings when doing so
is appropriate to control its docket.” Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 446 F.3d 808, 816
(8th Cir. 2006). “A Court may properly stay an action where the following criteria are met: (1)
the stay does not prejudice the non-movant; (2) the movant would suffer hardship and inequity
without a stay; and (3) the stay serves the interests of judicial economy and efficiency.” Adams v.

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Tyson Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 1539325, at *1 (W.D. Ark. May 25, 2007) (citing Rivers, 980 F.
Supp. at 1358).
Defendants argue that a stay of the proceedings will not prejudice Mr. Pilkington and, in
fact, that Mr. Pilkington will benefit from additional time to conduct depositions (Dkt. No. 28, at
4). Next, Defendants argue that while they do not believe Fiber Glass Systems’ past actions have
constituted a waiver of its right to arbitration, the Court may force it into a waiver if it requires
Fiber Glass Systems to participate in discovery (Id., at 5). Further, Defendants argue that “if the
Court does not issue a stay while it determines whether to dismiss this lawsuit and compel
arbitration, all parties will be forced to expend additional resources and incur unnecessary costs to
litigate this action in federal court only to risk duplicating those efforts in arbitration” (Id.). Lastly,
Defendants argue that a continuance or stay will promote judicial economy, as a stay will allow
the Court to determine whether arbitration is appropriate before ruling on other issues that may
arise during the course of litigation (Id., at 6).
Mr. Pilkington argues that a stay of discovery would be prejudicial to him because
Defendants “would have the advantage of going forward after having conducted discovery and
deposing” Mr. Pilkington (Dkt. No. 33-1, at 6). Additionally, Mr. Pilkington argues that a stay is
not reasonable (Id.).
The Court agrees with Defendants’ reasoning that a stay will not substantially prejudice
Mr. Pilkington, as a stay of discovery does not preclude the possibility of future discovery,
depending on this Court’s ruling on the pending motion to compel arbitration. Additionally, the
Court finds that a stay is appropriate to determine Defendants’ rights related to arbitration, the
absence of a stay would be prejudicial to Defendants’ rights to arbitration if such rights exist, and
a stay is in the interest of judicial economy.

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For the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown, the Court grants Defendants’ motion
to continue trial and stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution of Defendants’ motion to dismiss
and compel arbitration (Dkt. No. 28).
C.

FAA Impact On Discovery

Defendants further argue that “further discovery unrelated to the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement is prohibited under the FAA.” (Dkt. No. 28, at 6). The Court need not reach
these issues, as the Court has granted Defendants’ motion on other grounds.
III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown, the Court grants Mr. Pilkington’s
motion to remove pleading, accept substitute and file plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion to
continue trial and to stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution of defendant’s motion to dismiss
and compel arbitration and memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 33) and Defendants’ motion to continue
trial and stay pretrial deadlines pending resolution of defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration (Dkt. No. 28). The Court stays all unexpired pretrial deadlines and removes this matter
from the September 30, 2024, trial calendar. The Court will issue a new scheduling Order, if
appropriate, after ruling on Fiber Glass Systems’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration and
consulting with the parties.
It is so ordered this 28th day of August, 2024.
_________________________________
Kristine G. Baker
Chief United States District Judge

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