Woods v. USA

Filing 14

ORDER granting 7 Motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge D. P. Marshall Jr. on 1/3/2025. (jak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
PLAINTIFF

NICHOLAS LEONARD WOODS
v.

No. 4:24-cv-501-DPM

UNITED STATES of AMERICA

DEFENDANT

ORDER

The United States moves to dismiss this pro se Federal Torts
Claims Act case, arguing that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because Woods' s lawsuit was premature.
*

While an inmate at FCC Forrest City, Woods fell out of his top
bunk. He injured his shoulder. Roughly nine months later, an MRI
confirmed that Woods needed surgery for a tom rotator cuff. No
surgery was done. Woods was released from custody. He then filed a
timely

administrative

claim - asserting

InJury

from

delayed

treatment-with the Bureau of Prisons.
The statute requires administrative exhaustion before suit.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). In early December 2023, the BOP denied Woods's
claim. "The investigation concluded that you did not suffer a loss of
personal property or injury caused by the negligence of an employee of
the United States acting within the scope of employment. Therefore,
your claim is denied." Doc. 2 at 7. The BOP also alerted Woods about

his right to sue. "You are advised that if you are dissatisfied with the
determination in this matter, you are afforded six (6) months from the
date of the mailing of this communication within which to bring suit in
the appropriate United States District Court." Doc. 2 at 8.
The BOP did not inform Woods that, instead of filing suit, he
could seek reconsideration by the BOP.

An applicable regulation

issued by the Attorney General echoes the statutory exhaustion
requirement plus authorizes agency reconsideration on timely request.
28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b). There's no indication of record that Woods knew
about this regulation. But, a few months after the BOP denied his claim,
in April 2024 he filed a written request for reconsideration supported
by additional documents and medical records.
The BOP acknowledged Woods's request in May 2024. Doc. 12 at
25. The regulation gives the agency six months to reconsider. It also

tolls the time for suit. If the agency takes no action, at the end of that
period the request is deemed denied, and a new six-month window
opens for a lawsuit. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The
BOP' s acknowledgment letter did not mention the regulation or any
effect on Woods' s right to sue from his reconsideration request. It did
say the agency usually responds to these requests within six months,
and therefore Woods could expect a final word during that period. Doc.
12 at 25.

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By the BOP' s calculation, the reconsideration period for Woods' s
request closed, and the new suit window opened, in late October 2024.
Woods, though, filed this case in early June 2024.

That was

approximately two weeks after his original statutory six-month period
to sue (measured from the December 2023 BOP denial) expired. And it
was approximately four months before the BOP' s reconsideration
period ended. Thus the motion to dismiss based on prematurity.
Briefing on that motion concluded before the reconsideration
period ended. Neither Woods nor the United States has informed the
Court what decision, if any, the BOP made on reconsideration. The
regulation requires notice of any such decision by certified or registered
mail. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) & (b). From the record's silence, the Court
infers-tentatively, and subject to a correction-that Woods's request
for a second look died on the vine. If so, it was deemed denied, as the
statute specifies, in late October 2024. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
*

To repeat: Congress required claimants such as Woods to exhaust
their administrative remedies before suing the United States. "An
action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for
money damages for [personal injury caused by a Government
employee's negligence] unless the claimant shall have first presented
the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have
been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or
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registered mail." 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). As the title to this section puts it,
the law requires "Disposition by federal agency as prerequisite[.]" The
tort-specific provision of the general statute of limitations for actions
against the United States includes this presentment requirement.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
One cannot sue first, then go to the agency, make a claim, and
proceed with the lawsuit after the agency denies that claim. McNeil v.

United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993). The United States presses that McNeil
controls here. But there's a difference. Woods started by filing a timely
administrative claim, which the BOP denied, before he filed suit. The
agency had the opportunity to investigate, evaluate, and adjudicate
Woods's claim short of the courthouse. Those are the statutory goals
embodied in the exhaustion requirement.

Mader v. United States,

654 F.3d 794, 797-98 (8th Cir. 2011) (en bane).
government

might

respond,

but when

True enough, the

Woods

sought

BOP

reconsidemtion he created a shadow over the agency's decision; his
claim was not "finally denied," as the statute requires, until the agency
either rejected his claim again in writing or it was deemed denied
because at least six months had passed without a formal decision on
reconsideration. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). And there
must be a final decision before the lawsuit is "instituted." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(a).

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. Well-reasoned, albeit non-binding, authority exists to the
contrary. In these cases, the agency's original decision was held to be
final enough, and pursuit of reconsideration did not undermine the
lawsuit. E.g., Atherton v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 3d 2, 5 (D.D.C. 2016);
Doc. 21 in Wilson v. United States, 4:05-cv-562-GTE (E.D. Ark. 24 January

2006); Bond v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 351, 356-57 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
Here, other circumstances stand out, too. When it originally denied his
claim, the BOP did not inform Woods about the regulation, his option
to pursue reconsideration, or the consequences of doing so. And when
it acknowledged receiving his reconsideration request, the BOP did not
mention the regulation, the regulatory suspension of his right to sue, or
his right to sue after the agency denied his request in writing or it was
deemed denied six months after receipt.

The BOP' s unequivocal

original decision, coupled with the gaps in the agency's notices about
reconsideration, weigh against attributing jurisdictional consequences
to the regulation.
But Woods faces an additional difficulty: Measured from the
BOP' s original denial, his lawsuit was late by a couple of weeks.
Compare Doc. 2 at 7, with Doc. 2 at 1. He therefore must lean on his

request for reconsideration to avoid the limitations bar. The Attorney
General's regulation§ 14.9, the equitable tolling principle it embodies,
and the facts support deciding Woods' s case on the merits rather than
on limitations grounds.
-5-

In United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015), the Supreme Court
held that the FTCA' s time limitations were mandatory claim processing
rules rather than jurisdictional matters. Sovereign immunity goes, of
course, to a Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Federal Deposit Insurance

Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). But the Wong Court clarified
that the FTCA' s limitations periods were not defining aspects of the
United States' waiver of its sovereign immunity. The Court specifically
rejected the United States' argument that the time limits are conditions
on the government's waiver. 575 U.S. at 417-20. Instead, they are
important and mandatory rules for moving claims promptly through
the adjudicative process, both administrative and judicial. Equitable
tolling principles are therefore available when a claimant misses a
deadline. 575 U.S. at 410-12. The Court of Appeals had reached the
same ultimate conclusion, though by a different analytic road, and
without the benefit of Wong's reasoning, in T.L. v. Ingram,
443 F.3d 956, 959-61 (8th Cir. 2006).
Back to subject matter jurisdiction. Does this Court have authority
at this point to decide Woods's case on the merits? The general rule,
stated often and strongly in the binding Eighth Circuit precedent, is that
exhaustion is essential to jurisdiction. E.g., Mader, 654 F.3d at 807-08;

Melo v. United States, 505 F.2d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Jackson
v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 3d 818, 822-23 and n.4 (E.D. Ark. 2020)
(applying the rule and ~ollecting cases from other circuits). Woods's
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request for reconsideration creates some doubt about when the BOP' s
decision was final. Though it will involve re-filing and re-serving this
case, dismissal without prejudice to re-filing is the best way to remove
that jurisdictional doubt. "Longest way round is the shortest way
home." JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 377 (Modern Library ed. 1992).
To press his claim forward, Woods must therefore re-file his case
within six months of (1) the date that the BOP mailed him notice that
his request for reconsideration was denied or (2) the date that his
request was deemed denied. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b).
In any new complaint, Woods should plead that he sought
reconsideration, when he did so, what decision the BOP made (if any)
on that request, and when the BOP mailed him any letter explaining
that decision. Those facts will address the equitable tolling that the
United States has helpfully highlighted. Doc. 8 at 5 and n.1.
Motion, Doc. 7, granted.
So Ordered.

D .P. Marshall Jr.
United States District Judge

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