Wright v. Miles et al

Filing 5

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION recommending Wright's complaint be dismissed without prejudice; Dismissal of this action count as a "strike"; and the Court certify an in forma pauperis appeal from the order adopting this recommendation would not be taken in good faith. Objections due within 14 days of this Recommendation. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia S. Harris on 08/28/2024. (llg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
JAMES WRIGHT
ADC #142769
v.

PLAINTIFF
No: 4:24-cv-00575-BRW-PSH

MILES, et al.

DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
INSTRUCTIONS
The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge
Billy Roy Wilson. You may file written objections to all or part of this
Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the
factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this
Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you
may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.
DISPOSITION
Plaintiff James Wright, an inmate at the Arkansas Division of Correction’s
East Arkansas Regional Unit, filed a pro se complaint on July 8, 2024 (Doc. No. 2).
His application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted (Doc. No. 3). At the
Court’s direction, Wright filed an amended complaint to clarify his claims (Doc. No.

4). The Court has reviewed Wright’s amended complaint and finds that his claims
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. Screening Standard
Federal law requires courts to screen prisoner complaints. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
1915(e)(2). Claims that are legally frivolous or malicious; that fail to state a claim
for relief; or that seek money from a defendant who is immune from paying damages
should be dismissed before the defendants are served.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

1915(e)(2). Although a complaint requires only a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, the factual allegations set forth
therein must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .”). While construed liberally, a pro se
complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face, not merely conceivable.
II. Analysis
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the
conduct of a defendant acting under color of state law deprived him of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wright alleges that around February 14, 2024, he was convicted
of several disciplinaries on unknown charges and not given a chance to appear in
disciplinary court on those charges.

He claims that Sergeant Miles waived

disciplinary court on his behalf, and that Disciplinary Judge Justine Minor
improperly waived his appearance at disciplinary court. Doc. No. 4 at 4. According
to Wright, he never signed a form waiving his appearance in disciplinary court, and
Judge Minor’s waiver of his attendance violated his right to be heard and his right
to appeal. As a result, he was convicted of the disciplinaries, was transferred out of
the Wrightsville Unit where he was then housed, and was unable to make parole. Id.
He also claims he was placed in 24-hour lockdown as a result. Id. For the reasons
described below, the undersigned finds he fails to describe a viable claim for relief.
Wright cannot maintain a due process claim based on the disciplinary process
unless he can “demonstrate that he was deprived of life, liberty or property by
government action.” Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2003). Wright
was not deprived of life or property; accordingly, he must identify the deprivation
of a liberty interest sufficient to sustain a due process challenge to his prison
disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 847; Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). A
prisoner has no liberty interest in having certain procedures followed in the
disciplinary process; rather, the liberty interest arises from the “nature of the
prisoner’s confinement.” Phillips, 320 F.3d at 847. “In order to determine whether

an inmate possesses a liberty interest, we compare the conditions to which the inmate
was exposed in segregation with those he or she could ‘expect to experience as an
ordinary incident of prison life.’” Phillips, 320 F.3d at 847 (quoting Beverati v.
Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1997)).
Generally, an inmate has no liberty interest in avoiding segregated
confinement, as long as the conditions do not amount to an “atypical and significant”
hardship that would give rise to due process protection as set forth in Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-484 (1995). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
“consistently held that administrative and disciplinary segregation are not atypical
and significant hardships under Sandin.” Portly-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065
(8th Cir. 2002). An inmate making a due process challenge to confinement in
segregation is required to “make a threshold showing that the deprivation of which
he complains imposed an ‘atypical and significant hardship.’” Id. (quoting Sims v.
Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 2000)).1
Wright states that he was placed on 24-hour lockdown as a result of his
disciplinary convictions. Doc. No. 4 at 4. He does not otherwise describe the
conditions he endured as a result of his disciplinary convictions, and he fails to assert

See also Smith v. McKinney, 954 F.3d 1075, 1082 (8th Cir. 2020) (holding that
there is no atypical and significant hardship when an inmate is demoted to segregation or
deprived of commissary, phone, and visitation privileges); Persechini v. Callaway, 651
F.3d 802, 807 n.4 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that inmates do not have a liberty interest in
maintaining a particular classification level).
1

how any conditions to which he was exposed constituted an atypical and significant
hardship. And while Wright complains that his disciplinary conviction thwarted his
hope of parole, an inmate has no liberty interest in the possibility of parole. See
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Jackson
v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 551 (8th Cir. 2014). Additionally, while Wright complains
he was transferred to a different ADC facility because of his disciplinary
convictions, an inmate has no constitutional right to be housed in a particular prison.
See Oleson v. Bureau of Prisons, No. CIV. 09-5706 NLH, 2012 WL 6697274, at
*10 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)
(“The Constitution does not ... guarantee that the convicted prisoner will be placed
in any particular prison ...”)). For these reasons, Wright fails to state a viable due
process claim.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that:
1.

Wright’s complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted;
2.

Dismissal of this action count as a “strike” within the meaning of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

3.

The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma

pauperis appeal from the order adopting this recommendation would not be taken in
good faith.

SO RECOMMENDED this 28th day of August, 2024.
___________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE