Edwards v. Baptist Health et al

Filing 16

ORDER granting #5 defendants' motion for partial dismissal. Dismissal is granted on Edwards's Title VII, section 1988, ACRA, and wrongful termination claims. Edward's section 1981 claim will proceed. Signed by Judge Brian S. Miller on 3/5/2025. (ljb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
SHARON M. EDWARDS
v.

PLAINTIFF
CASE NO. 4:25-CV-00045-BSM

BAPTIST HEALTH, et al.

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

Defendants’ motion for partial dismissal [Doc. No. 5] is granted on Sharon Edwards’s
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. section 1988; Arkansas Civil Rights
Act, Arkansas Code section 16-123-101 et seq.; and wrongful termination claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Edwards is a black woman who is suing her former employer, Baptist Health, and two
of her former supervisors, Kelley Hamby and Debra Langley, for race discrimination and
wrongful termination. See Compl. ¶¶ 3–6, 32, 36–37, Doc. No. 2. She alleges that: (1) she
was not allowed to leave work early to attend school; (2) she did not receive on-call pay; (3)
she was required to return to in-person work with a set schedule; (4) she was not provided
with an assistant; and (5) she was not allowed access to a database. See id. ¶¶ 6–33.
Edwards identifies other non-black employees who were treated more favorably. See id. ¶¶
8, 13, 22–27, 38–41. Edwards is suing under Title VII, section 1981, section 1988, the
Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), and common law. See id. ¶ 1. Defendants move for
partial dismissal of Edwards’s Title VII, section 1988, ACRA, and wrongful termination
claims. Doc. No. 5.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when the plaintiff fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To meet the 12(b)(6) standard, a complaint
must allege sufficient facts that state a plausible claim of relief to which the plaintiff may be
entitled. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Although detailed factual
allegations are not required, threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, are insufficient. See id. In ruling on a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, materials embraced by the pleadings, as well as exhibits attached to the
pleadings and matters of public record, may all be considered. See Mills v. City of Grand
Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants’ motion for partial dismissal is granted on Edwards’s Title VII, section
1988, ACRA, and wrongful termination claims.
A.

Title VII

Edwards’s Title VII claims are dismissed because they are time-barred. This is true
because these claims were not included in a timely filed charge of discrimination. See Defs.’
Br. Supp. Mot. Partial Dismissal 2–5, Doc. No. 6 (explaining why); Br. Supp. Resp. Defs.’
Partial Mot. Dismiss 10–11, Doc. No. 11 (stating that “Edwards concedes that most of her
claims are time-barred under the 180-day statute of limitations set by Title VII” and only
opposing dismissal “as it relates to the race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981”).
Moreover, Edwards’s claims against Hamby and Langley are dismissed because “supervisors
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and other employees cannot be held liable under Title VII in their individual capacities.”
Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995).
B.

Section 1988

Edwards’s section 1988 claims are dismissed because section 1988 does not provide
for an independent cause of action. See Barnes v. Simmon, No. 4:14-CV-1989 RLW, 2015
WL 1800532, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2015).
C.

Arkansas Civil Rights Act

Edwards’s ACRA claims are dismissed because they are time-barred. See Defs.’ Br.
Supp. Mot. Partial Dismissal 6 (explaining why); Br. Supp. Resp. Defs.’ Partial Mot. Dismiss
10–11 (stating that “Edwards concedes that most of her claims are time-barred under the
. . . one-year statute of limitation under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act” and only opposing
dismissal “as it relates to the race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981”). Moreover, her
claims against Hamby and Langley are dismissed because a supervisor is not an “employer”
under the ACRA when establishing a discrimination claim. Gouldblum v. Arkansas Dep’t
of Hum. Servs., No. 4:16-CV-00936-KGB, 2018 WL 1569491, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 30,
2018) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-102(5)).
D.

Wrongful Termination

Edwards’s wrongful termination claim is dismissed because it is a naked assertion
devoid of factual support. See Christopherson v. Bushner, 33 F.4th 495, 499 (8th Cir. 2022).
This is true for several reasons. First, Edwards does not allege a separate claim of wrongful
termination, but merely alleges employment discrimination. See Compl. ¶¶ 36–44. She only
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mentions wrongful termination in the jurisdiction section of the complaint. Id. ¶ 1. Second,
Edwards specifically alleges that she quit her job. See id. ¶ 32. While Edwards’s wrongful
termination claim could be liberally construed as a constructive discharge claim, she did not
plead the elements of constructive discharge. See Coombs v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 388
S.W.3d 456, 464 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012); see also Rester v. Stephens Media, LLC, 739 F.3d
1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 2014). Finally, like Edwards’s Title VII, section 1988, and ACRA
claims, Edwards does not oppose dismissal of her wrongful termination claim. See Defs.’
Br. Supp. Mot. Partial Dismissal 5 n.2 (moving for dismissal for a claim of constructive
discharge against defendants “to the extent [Edwards] attempts to do so”); Br. Supp. Resp.
Defs.’ Partial Mot. Dismiss 11 (only opposing dismissal “as it relates to the race
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for partial dismissal is granted on
Edwards’s Title VII, section 1988, ACRA, and wrongful termination claims. Edwards’s
section 1981 claim will proceed.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of March, 2025.
________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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