Rankin v. Norris

Filing 183

ORDER vacating 176 Order, 180 Order, and 181 Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge James M. Moody Jr. on 6/14/2022. (ldb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
PINE BLUFF DIVISION
THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
RODERICK LESHUN RANKIN
vs.

PETITIONER
5:06-cv-00228-JM

DEXTER PAYNE, Director,
Arkansas Division of Correction

RESPONDENT
ORDER

In November 2021, the Court determined Rankin was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
his procedurally defaulted ineffectiveness-of-trial-counsel claims related to (1) alleged mental
impairments and traumatic social history; (2) any involvement of Rankin’s brother, Rodney
Rankin, in the three homicides for which Rankin was convicted of three counts of capital murder
and sentenced to death; and (3) penalty-phase instructions on mitigating circumstances. Applying
the Martinez equitable exception, the Court found a hearing was warranted because Rankin may
be able to demonstrate excuse for procedural default based on ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. These are Claims 3, 4, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 22. The Court also found Rankin was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on actual innocence to overcome procedural default. And,
though the existing habeas record is sufficient for review of the Atkins claim, the Court invited the
parties to present other related evidence and argument. No. 176. The Court thereafter entered
discovery and scheduling orders. Nos. 180 & 181. These Orders, Nos. 176, 180, and 181, are
vacated based on recent controlling precedent.
In Martinez v. Ryan, the United States Supreme Court determined that, under certain
circumstances, ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel is cause to excuse procedural default of
ineffectiveness-of-trial-counsel claims. 566 U.S. 1 (2102); see Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413

(2013). The Circuit subsequently held district courts are “authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)
and required under Trevino” to grant an evidentiary hearing on defaulted ineffectiveness claims,
if they are “potentially meritorious.” Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833, 853–54 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000)). The United State Supreme Court, however,
recently decided Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. __, 2022 WL 1611786 (May 23, 2022), which applies
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) restrictions to procedurally defaulted ineffectiveness-of-trial-counsel
claims. The Supreme Court held that, unless § 2254(e)(2) exceptions are met, federal courts “may
not hold an evidentiary hearing—or otherwise consider new evidence—to assess cause and
prejudice under Martinez.” 2022 WL 1611786, *12.
Under Shinn, Rankin is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on procedurally defaulted
ineffectiveness-of-trial-counsel claims only if he can overcome § 2254(e)(2):
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless
the applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i)

a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable; or

(ii)

a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.
Rankin does not clear the statutory hurdle. His defaulted ineffectiveness-of-trial-counsel
claims are not supported by facts that could not have been discovered by a diligent Rule 37 lawyer.
This Court therefore is barred from holding an evidentiary hearing in assessing Rankin’s

2

procedural-default excuses under Martinez. Review of Claims 3, 4, 6, 9, 14, 18, and 22 is limited
to the state-court record.
For the sake of judicial efficiency, the Court decided to hear the actual-innocence evidence
in conjunction with the now-barred hearing on the related procedurally defaulted ineffectivenessof-trial-counsel claim. Evidence of actual innocence, however, cannot be addressed until Rankin’s
exhausted claims and other procedural defenses are resolved. No. 176 at 7–8; Dretke v. Haley,
541 U.S. 386, 393–394 (2004). If that review “does not obviate any need to reach the actual
innocence question,” the Court will revisit a hearing schedule. 541 U.S. at 388–89.
SO ORDERED this 14th day of June, 2022.

______________________________
JAMES M. MOODY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3