Robinson v. Wright et al

Filing 73

ORDER ADOPTING 72 Proposed Findings and Partial Recommendation. Defendant William Connor's 61 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and the claims against Connor are dismissed with prejudice. Robinson's claims against Wright are also dismissed with prejudice because Wright did not apply excessive force to Robinson. Signed by Chief Judge Brian S. Miller on 12/28/2017. (mcz)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
PINE BLUFF DIVISION
ANDREW DOMINIQUE ROBINSON
ADC# 652013
v.

PLAINTIFF

CASE NO. 5:15-CV-00071 BSM

MATTHEW PAUL WRIGHT
and WILLIAM CONNOR

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

The proposed findings and partial recommendation [Doc. No. 72] submitted by United
States Magistrate Judge Patricia Harris are adopted, defendant William Connor’s motion for
summary judgment [Doc. No. 61] is granted, and the claims against Connor are dismissed
with prejudice.
Additionally, plaintiff Andrew Robinson’s motion for default judgment against
defendant Matthew Wright [Doc. No. 12], previously denied as premature, must now be
reconsidered. Whether to enter a default judgment is discretionary, and default judgments
are disfavored. Dahl v. Kanawha Inv. Holding Co., 161 F.R.D. 673, 683–84 (N.D. Iowa
1985). Instead, a determination on the merits is preferred. Marshall v. Boyd, 658 F.2d 552,
555 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Other factors [such as the showing of a potentially meritorious defense]
militate against a default judgment.”). And a default judgment is not warranted.
First, default judgment is denied because it is unclear whether Wright has received
proper notice of his default. Service was attempted on Wright on May 13, 2016. Doc. No.
27. Wright, however, has failed to respond. The United States Marshals Service attempted
to serve Wright with an order requiring him to show cause why he failed to respond [Doc.

No. 68], but service was not completed because the marshal was unable to locate Wright’s
residence and was unable to reach him by telephone. See Doc. No. 68. Although the reasons
for Wright’s failure to appear are unknown, it appears he may have occupied a mobile home
that moved to a new location. Id.
Next, even if Wright had received proper notice of default, a default judgment would
not be warranted given that Robinson is a dangerous inmate who has a history of tampering
with or blocking locks; assault; threatening staff; setting fires; resisting apprehension;
possession or introduction of weapons; destruction of property; and aggravated battery on
staff. Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 7, Doc. No. 63. The record shows that Robinson was
given multiple opportunities to remove his arm from the security trap door in his cell during
the incident at issue. Id. ¶¶ 17, 28, 30, 31, 34, 64–67. Wright warned Robinson that if he did
not remove his arm from the trap, force would be used. Id. ¶ 37. Robinson refused to
comply, and that is when Wright, who was called to the scene as the emergency preparedness
coordinator, took control over the situation. Id. ¶ 39. Wright sprayed a chemical agent into
the cell, but Robinson blocked the opening with his mattress. Id. ¶ 40. Wright began striking
Robinson’s hand repeatedly with the spray can when Robinson reached out in an attempt to
grab Wright or the can. Id. ¶¶ 41, 42. The exact number of times Wright struck Robinson
with the can is unknown, but in any case, Wright’s striking of Robinson with the spray can
did not result in Robinson withdrawing his arm from the security trap door. Id. ¶ 43.
Excessive force claims brought by prisoners are evaluated under the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and the “core judicial inquiry”
is . . . “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or

maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 6, 7 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). The factors used to evaluate this
inquiry include the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need for
force and the amount of force applied, and the extent of injury suffered by the inmate. Jones
v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2000). Unless it appears that the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the
infliction of pain, the case should not go to the jury.

Johnson v. Bi-State Justice

Ctr./Arkansas Dep’t of Corr., 12 F.3d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1993).
Here, force was needed because Robinson, known as a dangerous inmate, refused to
comply with orders to remove his arm from the security trap door in his cell. Progressively
forceful efforts were used to get Robinson to comply with orders, all to no avail. Under the
circumstances, the force was used in a legitimate effort to restore discipline. Robinson could
have removed his arm at any time from the trap door, and his refusal to do so and his implicit
willingness to have force applied in an attempt to dislodge his arm does not render the
application of force malicious or sadistic.
Accordingly, Robinson’s claims against Wright are also dismissed with prejudice
because Wright did not apply excessive force to Robinson.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 28th day of December 2017.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE