USA v. Junction City School District et al

Filing 47

ORDER granting 2 Motion of Judgment to the extent that it requests modification of the 1970 Order; the 1970 Order (ECF No. 2-7) is MODIFIED to explicitly prohibit the segregative inter-district transfer of students from Junction City to other sch ool districts, unless such a transfer is requested for education or compassionate purposes and is approved by Junction Citys school board on a case-by-case basis; Junction Citys motion is denied as moot as to the remainder of Junction Citys alternative requests for relief. Signed by Honorable Susan O. Hickey on January 17, 2019. (cnn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

PLAINTIFF
Case No. 1:66-cv-1095

JUNCTION CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 75, et al.

DEFENDANTS

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and
ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION

INTERVENORS

ORDER
Before the Court is the Junction City School District’s (“Junction City”) Motion for
Declaratory Judgment, or Alternatively, for Clarification of Previous Orders, or Alternatively, for
Modification of Previous Orders. (ECF No. 2). The United States has filed a response to the
motion. (ECF No. 20). The Arkansas Department of Education (“ADE”) and the Arkansas State
Board of Education (“SBE”) have filed a response in opposition. (ECF No. 26). The Court finds
the matter ripe for consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 7, 1966, Plaintiff United States of America (“United States”) filed this action
against Junction City, seeking to dismantle the district’s operation of a dual school system. (See
ECF No. 20-1). On June 21, 1966, the United States filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction
requesting that Junction City and other defendants be enjoined from continuing to assign students
to particular schools because of their race; operating separate school buses for black and white
students; segregating faculty and staff based on race; and maintaining any distinctions in the
operation and management of Junction City based on race or color. (See ECF No. 20-2, p. 5). On

August 15, 1966, the Court granted the United States’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
issued an order enjoining Junction City from “maintaining and operating racially segregated public
schools” and directing Junction City to eliminate its dual school system “with all deliberate speed.”
(ECF No. 20-3, p. 3). On September 8, 1966, Junction City responded by filing a “freedom-ofchoice” desegregation plan to which the United States objected and proposed its own plan. (ECF
No. 2-4). On November 29, 1966, the Court entered an order finding that neither proposed plan
was acceptable and directing Defendants to “institute a good faith freedom of choice plan for
desegregation of the 11th and 12th grades beginning in January 1967.” (ECF No. 1, p. 3). The
Court further ordered Junction City and other defendants to submit a report to the Court regarding
its implementation of the freedom-of-choice plan. On August 14, 1967, the Court issued a decree
requiring Junction City to implement a freedom-of-choice plan and setting forth the procedural
framework for implementing the plan. (See ECF No. 20-4).
On May 24, 1968, the United States moved the Court for an order requiring the
consolidation of the Junction City schools. After a hearing on the motion, the Court cancelled its
decree dated August 14, 1967, and ordered Junction City to “propose an alternate plan for the
conversion of the school system to a unitary system in accordance with the decisions of the
Supreme Court made May 27, 1968, for all students in attendance.” (ECF No. 2-1, p. 3). The
Court allowed Junction City to begin operating schools in September 1968 under the freedom-ofchoice plan until the district filed a consolidation plan in January 1969. (ECF No. 2-3). The Court
then issued several orders directing Junction City to allow certain grades to attend school under
the freedom-of-choice plan and further directing the district to consolidate all students in certain
grades. (See id.; see also ECF No. 2-5 (assigning students grade 9-12 to Junction City High School
and permitting students from other grades to attend either Junction City Elementary or Rosenwald

2

School)).
On October 23, 1970, the United States moved for further relief against Junction City on
the grounds that Junction City failed to remedy its within-school segregation and its segregated
transportation system. (ECF No. 2-6). On November 20, 1970, the Court entered an Order (“the
1970 Order”) enjoining Defendants from “assigning students to, or maintaining any homeroom,
classroom, or other school-related activity on the basis of race, color or national origin.” (ECF
No. 2-7). The Court’s Order further directed Defendants to redraw their bus routes and reassign
students to the buses on a non-racial basis. Id. Junction City has since been operating under the
1970 Order, which requires Junction City to comply with certain desegregations obligations.
In 1989, Arkansas enacted a school choice program. The Arkansas Public School Choice
Act of 1989 (the “1989 Act”) provided for a school choice program whereby a student could apply
to attend a public school in a district that the student did not reside in, subject to certain limitations.
The 1989 Act provided further that “[n]o student may transfer to a nonresident district where the
percentage of enrollment for the student’s race exceeds that percentage in his resident district” and
that “[i]n any instance where the foregoing provisions would result in a conflict with a
desegregation court order, the terms of the order shall govern.” (ECF No. 2-11, §§ 11(a-b)). Thus,
the 1989 Act did not hinder Junction City’s ongoing efforts to remove all vestiges of previous
segregation because the statute allowed Junction City to reject segregative transfers in and out of
the district.
In 2013, the Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 2013 (the “2013 Act”) was enacted,
expressly repealing the 1989 Act. The 2013 Act again allowed students to apply to attend a nonresident public school district. However, the 2013 Act did not contain the 1989 Act’s limiting

3

language barring segregative inter-district transfers. 1 The 2013 Act allowed any school district to
annually declare itself exempt from participating in school choice if said participation would
conflict with the school district’s obligations under a federal court’s “desegregation plan regarding
the effects of past racial segregation in student assignment” or a federal court order “remedying
the effects of past racial segregation.” (ECF No. 2-12, p. 11). Any school district that made this
declaration would be exempt from participating in school choice for that school year.
In 2015, the Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 2015 (the “2015 Act”) was enacted,
thereby amending the 2013 Act. The 2015 Act, among other things, eliminated the school districts’
ability to declare themselves exempt from participating in school choice due to a conflict with
existing obligations under a federal court’s desegregation plan or order. Instead, the 2015 Act
required that a school district wishing to be exempt from participating in school choice must submit
proof to the ADE “that the school district has a genuine conflict under an active desegregation
order or active court-approved desegregation plan with the [2015 Act.]” (ECF No. 2-13, p. 5). If
the school district submitted proof of an order or plan to the ADE, the provisions of the order or
plan would govern, thereby exempting the school district from participating in school choice.
In 2017, the Arkansas General Assembly passed Act 1066 of the Regular Session of 2017
(the “2017 Act”), thereby amending the 2015 Act. The 2017 Act, among other things, amended
the 2015 Act’s language allowing school districts to seek an exemption from participating in
school choice. Under the 2017 Act, school districts seeking to be exempt from participation in
school choice must now submit proof to the ADE “that the school district has a genuine conflict
under an active desegregation order or active court-approved desegregation plan that explicitly

The term “segregative,” as used throughout this Order, refers to a student transfer from a resident school district to
a non-resident school district where the percentage of enrollment for the transferring student’s race exceeds that
percentage in the student’s resident district.
1

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limits the transfer of students between school districts.” (ECF No. 2-14, p. 2) (emphasis added).
The ADE evaluates school districts’ applications for an exemption from school choice and
determines whether to grant an exemption. The SBE decides any appeals of the ADE’s decisions
regarding school choice exemption applications.
From 2013 through 2017, Junction City either declared itself exempt or applied for
exemptions from participating in school choice pursuant to the school choice law in effect at the
time. Each year, the ADE and SBE observed these declared conflicts with school choice and
included Junction City on a public list of school districts not participating in school choice.
Accordingly, Junction City did not participate in school choice at all while the 2013 Act and 2015
Act were in effect.
On December 27, 2017, Junction City applied for an exemption from participating in
school choice under the 2017 Act for the 2018-2019 school year and submitted supporting
documents to the ADE. On January 19, 2018, the ADE denied Junction City’s request for an
exemption, finding that Junction City failed to demonstrate that it was subject to a federal court’s
active desegregation order “explicitly limiting the interdistrict transfer of students.” (ECF No. 219) (emphasis in original). The ADE found that documentation submitted by Junction City as
proof of its conflict did not explicitly limit inter-district student transfers. Thus, the ADE
concluded that Junction City would be required to participate in school choice for the 2018-2019
school year.
Junction City appealed the ADE’s decision to the SBE. The SBE heard Junction City’s
appeal on March 8, 2018 and, in a subsequent order dated March 26, 2018, upheld the ADE’s
decision that Junction City would not receive an exemption and, therefore, must participate in
school choice for the 2018-2019 school year. (ECF No. 2-22).

5

On May 14, 2018, Junction City filed the instant Motion for Declaratory Judgment, or
Alternatively, for Clarification of Previous Orders, or Alternatively, for Modification of Previous
Orders (hereinafter “Motion for Declaratory Judgment”). (ECF No. 2). In that motion, Junction
City states that it is still subject to its desegregation obligations imposed by the Court’s prior orders
and that participation in school choice would have a segregative impact on Junction City, thereby
causing it to violate the Court’s previous orders. Accordingly, Junction City asserts that it has a
conflict with taking part in school choice pursuant to the 2017 Act. Junction City seeks, by various
alternative means, a finding that it is prohibited from taking part in school choice and/or a
declaration that portions of the 2017 Act are unconstitutional.
On June 15, 2018, the Court issued an order certifying Junction City’s constitutional
challenge and sending notice to the Arkansas Attorney General’s Office of the same, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(b). (ECF No. 5). On June 21, 2018, the ADE and SBE filed
a motion to intervene in this case for the limited purpose of opposing Junction City’s Motion for
Declaratory Judgment. (ECF No. 13). On June 22, 2018, the Court held a status conference in
which Junction City, the United States, and counsel from the Arkansas Attorney General’s Office
participated. On July 3, 2018, the United States filed its response to Junction City’s Motion for
Declaratory Judgment, posing no opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 20). On July 9, 2018, the
Court granted the ADE and SBE’s motion to intervene, thereby allowing those parties to intervene
for the limited purpose of opposing Junction City’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment. (ECF No.
21). On July 20, 2018, the ADE and SBE filed their response in opposition to Junction City’s
Motion for Declaratory Judgment. (ECF No. 26).
On August 1, 2018, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on Junction City’s separate
motion for preliminary injunctive relief. At the hearing, the parties offered evidence and witness

6

testimony, much of which is also relevant and applicable to the instant motion. On September 11,
2018, Junction City informed the Court that it did not desire an additional evidentiary hearing
regarding the instant motion. (ECF No. 41). On September 21, 2018, the ADE and SBE informed
the Court that they also did not desire an additional evidentiary hearing regarding the instant
motion. (ECF No. 42). Accordingly, the Court finds the matter fully briefed and ripe for
consideration.
II. DISCUSSION
Junction City seeks a ruling that it is prohibited from taking part in school choice.
Specifically, Junction City asks that the Court confirm its conflict with participating in school
choice and declare void the SBE’s March 26, 2018 order requiring that Junction City participate
in school choice. Junction City asks the Court to do so through one of the following means: (1)
modifying the Court’s 1970 Order to prohibit segregative inter-district transfers in light of changes
in Arkansas law, occurring with the 2013 repeal of the 1989 Act and the subsequent enactment of
the 2017 Act; (2) clarifying that the Court’s 1970 Order, as written, prohibits segregative interdistrict transfers; (3) issuing a declaratory judgment confirming that Junction City has a conflict
with participating in school choice because it remains subject to a federal court desegregation order
and ordering the SBE to reverse its March 26, 2018 order requiring Junction City to participate in
school choice; or (4) declaring that the 2017 Act is unconstitutional to the extent that it authorizes
the ADE to determine whether or not a school district has a conflict with participating in school
choice.
The Court will begin by addressing Junction City’s request for modification of the Court’s
previous orders. If necessary, the Court will then address Junction City’s requests for clarification
of the Court’s previous orders, for a declaratory judgment, and that portions of the 2017 Act be

7

declared unconstitutional.
A. Modification of the Court’s Orders
Junction City asks that the Court modify the 1970 Order to prohibit segregative interdistrict transfers in light of significant changes in Arkansas’ school choice laws that were not
contemplated by the Court or by the parties to this case during the litigation that resulted in the
1970 Order.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) authorizes modification of consent decrees and court
orders. 2 See Smith v. Bd. of Educ. of the Palestine-Wheatley Sch. Dist., 769 F.3d 566, 570 (8th
Cir. 2014). “Rule 60(b)(5) provides that a party may obtain relief from a court order when ‘it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application,’ not when it is no longer
convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree.” Id. (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992)); id. at 572 (“Rufo and its progeny grant federal courts of
equity substantial flexibility to adapt their decrees to changes in the facts or law.”). Further, the
Eighth Circuit has found that modification of consent decrees in school desegregation cases is
permissible under certain circumstances. See id. (affirming a district court’s modification of a
consent decree in a school desegregation case).
“A party seeking modification of a consent decree ‘must [first] establish that a significant
change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree.’” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty.
Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 56 F.3d 904, 914 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393). If the
movant carries this burden, the court “must then determine whether the proposed modification is
suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Id.

Junction City’s desegregation obligations are set forth in various Court orders and decrees. For these proceedings,
the Court and parties focus on the 1970 Order. Although the 1970 Order is not technically a consent decree, it is
similar to consent decrees entered in other desegregation cases, and the parties treat it as if it were a consent decree.
Thus, the Court will do the same.
2

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The Court must first determine whether a significant change in facts or law warrants
modification of the 1970 Order. If the Court answers that question in the affirmative, it will then
determine whether Junction City’s proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed
circumstance.
1. Significant Change in Facts or Law
Junction City contends that the repeal of the 1989 Act and the passage of the 2013, 2015,
and 2017 Acts qualifies as a significant change that warrants modification, arguing that the changes
in the statutory framework now prevent Junction City from complying with its constitutional
obligations to avoid taking any action with the natural and foreseeable consequence of causing
segregative impact within Junction City. Junction City argues further that “[t]he State’s shift from
enacting laws that prohibited segregation and encouraged integrative transfers to advocating for
school choice above all else, including desegregation efforts, is another important change in
circumstance justifying modification.” (ECF No. 3, p. 22).
The 1989 Act came into effect approximately nineteen years after the 1970 Order was
entered. The 1989 Act included limitations stating that “[n]o student may transfer to a nonresident
district where the percentage of enrollment for the student’s race exceeds that percentage in his
resident district” and “[i]n any instance where the foregoing provisions would result in a conflict
with a desegregation court order, the terms of the order shall govern.” (ECF No. 2-11, §§ 11(ab)). The State of Arkansas subsequently repealed the 1989 Act and enacted the 2013 Act, which
did not contain the 1989 Act’s limiting language prohibiting segregative student transfers, and
instead allowed school districts to declare themselves exempt from participating in school choice
if participation would conflict with the school district’s obligations under a court desegregation
plan or order. Subsequent amendments to the school choice statutory framework further limited

9

school districts’ ability to obtain an exemption from participating in school choice.
Under the current iteration of Arkansas’ school choice law—the 2017 Act—a school that
claims a conflict with participating in school choice must show that it is subject to an active and
enforceable desegregation court order or plan that “explicitly limits the transfer of students
between school districts.” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-1906(a)(2). Accordingly, for Junction City to
receive an exemption from participating in school choice under the 2017 Act, it must show that it
is subject to a desegregation order that explicitly bars “inter-district” student transfers.
As previously mentioned, a party seeking modification of a consent decree must show that
significant changes in facts or law warrant revision of the decree. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393.
“Ordinarily, . . . modification should not be granted where a party relies upon events that actually
were anticipated at the time it entered into a decree.” Mays v. Bd. of Educ. of Hamburg Sch. Dist.,
834 F.3d 910, 919 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385). However, changes in statutory
law may warrant modification. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388 (noting that “modification of a consent
decree may be warranted when the statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the
decree was designed to prevent.”). Modification may also be warranted when changed factual
conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous or when a decree proves
to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles. Id. at 384.
Junction City states that modification is warranted because inter-district transfers, such as
those contemplated by the 2013 Act, 2015 Act, and 2017 Act, did not exist when the 1970 Order
was entered. Junction City argues that it is now unable to comply with its constitutional obligations
because the school choice law currently in effect does not contain express limitations against
segregative inter-district transfers and instead only affords exemptions from participating in school
choice to school districts that can produce a court order explicitly prohibiting the transfer of

10

students between school districts.
The ADE and SBE argue in response that modification of the 1970 Order is not warranted
in this instance. 3 Without citing to authority, the ADE and SBE argue that the repeal of the 1989
Act and the subsequent passage of the 2013, 2015, and 2017 Acts is not a significant change in
circumstances that warrants revision of a consent decree. In a separate section of their brief, the
ADE and SBE also argue that the Junction City desegregation orders do not specifically prohibit
inter-district student transfers, but instead prohibit unconstitutional conduct occurring within
Junction City. The ADE and SBE argue that the Court should not read “inter-district” language
into the desegregation orders.
Upon consideration, the Court finds that the repeal of the 1989 Act and its subsequent
replacement by the 2013, 2015, and 2017 Acts is a significant change in circumstances. The 1970
Order contains no language expressly prohibiting inter-district student transfers but instead enjoins
Junction City from “assigning students to, or maintaining any homeroom, classroom, or other
school-related activity on the basis of race, color or national origin.” (ECF No. 2-7). The Court’s
Order further directed Defendants to redraw their bus routes and reassign students to the buses on
a non-racial basis. Id. The Eighth Circuit has instructed that courts interpreting a consent decree:
are not to ignore the context in which the parties were operating, nor the
circumstances surrounding the order . . . because a consent decree is a particular
sort of legal instrument that cannot be read in a vacuum. It is a kind of private law,
agreed to by the parties and given shape over time through interpretation by the
court that entered it.

The Court notes that, although not asserted in the section responding to Junction City’s request for modification, the
ADE and SBE make the threshold argument that Junction City does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the 2017 Act or to request declaratory relief. To the extent that the ADE and SBE also intended to argue that
Junction City does not have standing to request modification of the 1970 Order, the Court finds that argument
unavailing. The Eighth Circuit has made clear in a desegregation context that school districts that are subject to a
consent decree may seek modification of the consent decree. See, e.g., Smith, 769 F.3d at 570. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Junction City has standing to request modification of the consent decree entered into by Junction City in
this case.
3

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United States v. Knote, 29 F.3d 1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the 1970 Order does not expressly prohibit inter-district transfers, the Court finds that
the 1970 Order clearly intended to prohibit any racial discrimination occurring within Junction
City, including preventing student transfers which result in segregation of Junction City’s student
body. Moreover, it was unnecessary for the parties to draft the 1970 Order in a way that explicitly
barred segregative inter-district student transfers because inter-district student transfers, such as
those contemplated by the 2013 Act, 2015 Act, and 2017 Act, did not exist when the 1970 Order
was entered.
Changes in statutory law may be significant changes in circumstances, and the Court finds
that the repeal of the 1989 Act and the subsequent enactment of the 2017 Act is a significant
change. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388. Moreover, the Court finds that the 2017 Act’s requirement that a
school district’s produced court order must explicitly bar inter-district transfers presents an
unforeseen obstacle that causes the 1970 Order to be unworkable, as the parties drafted the 1970
Order at a time in which including that language was unnecessary. Id. at 384. From the time the
1970 Order was entered until 2017, Junction City was able to comply with its desegregation
obligations. When Arkansas enacted a school choice program in 1989 and continuing through
2013, Junction City did not experience any segregative inter-district transfers because such
transfers were prohibited by the existing statutory scheme. Even after the repeal of the 1989 Act
and the subsequent enactment of the 2013 Act, Junction City did not experience any segregative
inter-district transfers because it was able to declare itself exempt from participating in school
choice. Junction City still did not experience any segregative inter-district transfers while the 2015
Act was in place because the ADE and SBE found that Junction City submitted sufficient evidence
of a conflict, allowing Junction City to claim an exemption from participating in school choice.

12

However, the changes to the statutory framework brought about with the 2017 Act
currently prevent Junction City from claiming an exemption from participating in school choice.
Junction City is, for the first time since 1970, being required to allow students to make segregative
inter-district transfers pursuant to school choice because the 1970 Order does not explicitly bar
inter-district student transfers as now required by the 2017 Act. Therefore, the Court finds that
Junction City’s asserted change in circumstances satisfies its burden because changes in the
governing school-choice statutory framework—and the ensuing requirements and limitations—
have an actual effect on Junction City’s ability to comply with the 1970 Order. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Junction City has shown that a significant change in circumstances is present,
justifying modification of the 1970 Order. The Court will now determine whether Junction City’s
proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.
2. Suitably Tailored Modification
Junction City asks the Court to modify the 1970 Order to reflect the changes in the
governing school-choice statutory framework since the entry of the 1970 Order. Specifically,
Junction City asks that the Court modify the decree to explicitly prohibit segregative inter-district
transfers unless requested as otherwise provided by Arkansas law for educational or compassionate
purposes and approved by the Junction City school board. (ECF No. 2, pp. 17-18).
The ADE and SBE argue that modification of the 1970 Order is not suitably tailored to the
changed circumstances. The ADE and SBE argue that Junction City’s proposed modification is
an inter-district remedy, which is impermissible in this situation because the Court has not found
an inter-district constitutional violation between Junction City and any of the school districts
accepting student transfers from Junction City. The ADE and SBE also argue, without citing to
supporting authority, that any modification would have to be based on Junction City’s “implied

13

unitary status.”
A movant seeking a modification of a consent decree must show that the proposed
modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. Id. at 391. To be “suitably tailored
to the changed circumstance,” a modification “must not create or perpetuate a constitutional
violation,” or “strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor.”
Id.
As an initial matter, the Court will take up the ADE and SBE’s argument that any
modification would have to be based on Junction City’s “implied unitary status.” Although the
ADE and SBE do not explain this argument in the section of their brief opposing modification,
they argue elsewhere in their response that the Court should not grant the instant motion because
there is no evidence that Junction City has failed to reach unitary status or that it has failed to
comply with the Court’s desegregation orders since the 1970s. To the extent that the ADE and
SBE intended to support their “implied unitary status” argument with this line of argument, the
Court finds the argument unpersuasive because Junction City has not obtained unitary status.
It is well settled that a federal court supervising a school system in a desegregation case
may order an incremental or partial withdrawal of its supervision and control after finding that the
school system has achieved “unitary” status. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992). No
party to this case has ever asked the Court to determine whether Junction City has achieved unitary
status, nor has the Court declared that Junction City has indeed achieved unitary status. The ADE
and SBE cite no authority for the proposition that a school district may attain an “implied unitary
status” over time by complying with its constitutional requirements, and the Court is unaware of
any such authority. Thus, the Court finds unavailing the ADE and SBE’s argument that the Court
should deny the instant motion because of an implicitly attained unitary status, and the Court will

14

not address the argument further in this Order.
With that ancillary argument now addressed, the Court finds that Junction City’s proposed
modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances. The ADE and SBE’s primary
contention is that the Court should not modify the 1970 Order to expressly prohibit segregative
inter-district student transfers because it would be an impermissible inter-district remedy in that
this case originally concerned intra-district conduct attributable only to Junction City. The ADE
and SBE argue that the Court has not found in this case that Junction City and another school
district committed an inter-district constitutional violation and, thus, any remedy fashioned to
address Junction City’s conduct must be limited solely to Junction City. The ADE and SBE do
not elaborate further on this point, nor do they cite authority supporting the proposition that
modification of a consent decree under circumstances like this case is an inter-district remedy.
However, the ADE and SBE argue in their response to a separate motion in this case that granting
the relief Junction City seeks would effectively enjoin other school districts from accepting
Junction City’s transfer students by way of a modification to a court order entered in a case to
which no other district was ever a party. (ECF No. 18, p. 23).
Assuming arguendo that the ADE and SBE’s present argument is also based on this line
of thinking, the Court finds the argument unpersuasive. The ADE and SBE correctly point out
that an “interdistrict remedy is appropriate only upon a showing of a constitutional violation within
one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district.” Little Rock Sch. Dist.
v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 444 (8th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to mean that “district courts may not
restructure or coerce local governments or their subdivisions.” Liddell v. State of Mo., 731 F.2d
1294, 1308 (8th Cir. 1984) (discussing Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976)). In other words,

15

absent proof of an inter-district violation, a court-imposed remedy exceeds its scope when it is
“imposed upon governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected by the constitutional
violation.” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977).
Upon consideration, the Court finds that Junction City’s proposed modification would not
constitute an inter-district remedy. Junction City asks the Court to modify the 1970 Order to
prohibit Junction City from allowing segregative inter-district student transfers to other school
districts. To be fair, this modification would indirectly prevent other school districts from
receiving Junction City transfer students via school choice because Junction City would not be
allowed to permit segregative inter-district transfers. However, the ADE and SBE cite no binding
authority finding that a remedy like the modification Junction City seeks is an inter-district remedy,
and the Court is unaware of any such authority. 4 Rather, the Eighth Circuit has found inter-district
remedies where courts directly order action that directly impacts multiple school districts. See,
e.g., Edgerson on Behalf of Edgerson v. Clinton, 86 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 1996) (describing
forced consolidation of school districts and imposing an inter-district magnet school plan as interdistrict remedies); Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 754 (1974) (characterizing the creation of an inter-district
student bussing plan as an inter-district remedy).
The modification would not directly restrict any other school district’s ability to participate
in school choice or to receive students from other school districts that are otherwise eligible to
participate in school choice. The proposed modification would only prevent other school districts
from receiving segregative transfer students from Junction City pursuant to school choice. This

4
In Milliken v. Bradley, the case cited primarily by the ADE and SBE in support of their argument, the United States
Supreme Court found an impermissible inter-district remedy where the federal district court forced multiple school
districts to consolidate to remedy a condition of segregation found to exist in only one of the school districts. 418
U.S. 717, 744, 752 (1974). In the case at bar, Junction City does not ask the Court to force consolidation of it and any
other school district.

16

minor intrusion into other school districts’ abilities to receive Junction City transfer students does
not directly impact those other school districts. Therefore, the Court finds that the modification
sought by Junction City is not an impermissible inter-district remedy.
Junction City’s proposed modification modifies the terms of the 1970 Order to include the
necessary language required by the 2017 Act, thereby letting Junction City prohibit segregative
inter-district transfers from Junction City to other school districts, which it was able to do until the
enactment of the 2017 Act. Beginning with the 2019-2020 school year, the 1970 Order, as
modified, would explicitly feature the newly added language required by the 2017 Act. Thus, the
1970 Order would constitute evidence of a “genuine conflict under an active desegregation order
or active court-approved desegregation plan that explicitly limits the transfer of students between
school districts.” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-1906(a)(2). Thus, moving forward, no students could
undergo a segregative inter-district transfer from Junction City to another school district pursuant
to the 2017 Act. The Court finds that this modification is suitably tailored to address the changed
circumstance that occurred when the 1989 Act was repealed and subsequently replaced by the
2013 Act, the 2015 Act, and—most importantly—the 2017 Act.
The Court will not require that the students who transferred from Junction City to other
school districts pursuant to school choice for the 2018-2019 school year return to Junction City.
At the time those students transferred, the 1970 Order did not contain the necessary language
contemplated by the 2017 Act for Junction City to claim an exemption from school choice. For
this same reason, the Court will not void the SBE’s March 26, 2018 order requiring Junction City
to participate in school choice for the 2018-2019 school year. At the time the SBE’s March 26,
2018 order was entered, the 1970 Order did not feature the necessary language contemplated by
the 2017 Act for Junction City to attain an exemption from school choice. The modified 1970

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Order shall have prospective effect, allowing Junction City to claim an exemption from school
choice beginning with the 2019-2020 school year.
3. Conclusion
The Court has determined that “a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of
the [1970 Order.]” Little Rock Sch. Dist., 56 F.3d at 914. The Court has also determined that “the
proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Id. Accordingly, the
Court shall modify the 1970 Order in accordance with Junction City’s proposed modification.
B. Other Requested Forms of Relief
Junction City also requested that the Court grant it relief via other alternative methods.
However, in light of the Court’s above finding that modification of the 1970 Order is warranted,
the Court finds it unnecessary to address the parties’ arguments regarding the other forms of relief
sought.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above-discussed reasons, the Court finds that Junction City’s motion (ECF No. 2)
should be and hereby is GRANTED to the extent that it requests modification of the 1970 Order.
Accordingly, the 1970 Order (ECF No. 2-7) is hereby MODIFIED to explicitly prohibit the
segregative inter-district transfer of students from Junction City to other school districts, unless
such a transfer is requested for education or compassionate purposes and is approved by Junction
City’s school board on a case-by-case basis. Junction City’s motion (ECF No. 2) is DENIED AS
MOOT as to the remainder of Junction City’s alternative requests for relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 17th day of January, 2019.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Judge

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