Runyan v. McNeil School Dist, et al

Filing 48

ORDER denying 19 Motion for TRO; denying 19 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Motion to Review; granting 30 Motion for Approval of Administrative Consolidation Order. Signed by Honorable Susan O. Hickey on June 25, 2014. (mll)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION

RONALD RUNYAN, et al

VS.

PLANITIFFS

CASE NO. 69-CV-00042

STEPHENS SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al

DEFENDANTS

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Stephens School District’s (“Stephens”) Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Petition for Judicial Review. (ECF
No. 19). 1 Also before the Court is Intervenor Arkansas State Board of Education’s (“ASBE”)
Motion for Approval of Administrative Consolidation Order. (ECF No. 30). 2 An evidentiary
hearing on the motions was held on June 4, 2014. (ECF No. 47). After reviewing the parties’
written briefs, the testimony set forth at the hearing, and all relevant exhibits, the Court finds that
the ASBE’s motion for approval should be granted and that Stephens’s motion for preliminary
injunction should be denied.
BACKGROUND
Before discussing recent events that led to the filing of the present motions, a brief overview
of the history of this case is needed. This action began almost forty-five years ago with the filing of
a complaint against the McNeil School District. Plaintiffs alleged that the McNeil School District
was operating a dual school system based on race and color and engaging in discriminatory
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Intervenors Arkansas State Board of Education; Camden Fairview School District; Magnolia School District; and
Nevada School District have filed responses in opposition to the motion. (ECF Nos. 22, 25, & 43). Stephens has filed
replies in support of the motion. (ECF Nos. 24 & 26).

2

Stephens has filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 38). The Arkansas State Board of Education has
filed a reply. (ECF No. 42).

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practices. Subsequently, the parties jointly filed a “Plan for Unification” (ECF No. 7) which was
approved by this Court on January 5, 1970. (ECF No. 8). The Court retained jurisdiction over the
case for the purpose of enforcing the consent decree.
The specific provisions of the 1970 unification plan and subsequent order are integral to the
issues presented in this case. The plan called for complete desegregation of the Northside and
Southside schools in McNeil. 3 Northside students within walking distance to Southside were to
walk to Southside so that they could then be bused to Northside, and vice versa. For students being
bused in from more rural areas, the plan stated that they would be “transported on a desegregated
basis.” The plan also made provisions for staff assignments and specific improvements that were to
be made at both campuses.
The unification plan was implemented by the McNeil School District, and this case lay
dormant for thirty-four years without any complaints of non-compliance with the plan. In 2004, the
case was re-opened to address the passage of Ark. Code Ann. § 6- 13-1601, et seq. (“Act 60”). Act
60 required school districts with an “average daily membership” of fewer than 350 students for two
consecutive years to be consolidated with or annexed to another school district. In 2004, the
McNeil School District and the Stephens School District elected to voluntarily consolidate pursuant
to Act 60, and this Court approved that consolidation on June 23, 2004. 4 (ECF No. 15). At the
request of Plaintiffs, and with no objection by Defendants, the Stephens School District was added
as a Defendant in this case on July 14, 2004 “in order to continue this litigation.” (ECF No. 17).
After the 2004 McNeil-Stephens consolidation, there was no movement in the case until this
year. Once again, this movement was the result of consolidation decisions made pursuant Act 60.

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More specifically, the plan called for grades 7-12 to operate at the Northside school on a desegregated basis and for
grades 1-6 to operate at the Southside school on a desegregated basis.

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When Act 60 was passed in 2004, the McNeil School District’s enrollment was 241 and the Stephens School District’s
enrollment was 346.

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The Stephens School District’s average daily membership had fallen below 350 students for two
years in a row, thereby requiring its involuntary consolidation into another district under Act 60.
On April 11, 2014, the Arkansas State Board of Education ordered the involuntary administrative
consolidation of the Stephens School District with the Camden Fairview, Magnolia, and Nevada
School Districts pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-1603 (a)(3)-(4).

The consolidation is to be

effective on July 1, 2014. The plan calls for the Stephens School District to be divided along
county lines and consolidated with the corresponding school districts. Students living in Ouachita
County will be consolidated with Camden Fairview; students living in Nevada County will be
consolidated with the Nevada School District; and students living in Columbia County will be
consolidated with the Magnolia School District.
While Stephens clearly meets the criteria for consolidation under Act 60, the parties feel that
this Court’s continuing jurisdiction over the 1970 consent decree necessitates a Court order
approving the consolidation. The ASBE’s present motion requests this approval. Conversely,
Stephens’s motion for injunctive relief requests that the Court decline to approve the consolidation
and prevent the closure of the Stephens campus. 5 The parties’ motions raise the same issues and
ask the Court to decide the following question: whether the consolidation of Stephens into the
Camden Fairview, Magnolia, and Nevada School Districts violates the 1970 McNeil consent decree.
Stephens’s only argument on this point is that the proposed consolidation could result in excessive
transportation time for students being bused to Camden Fairview. Stephens requests that the Court
impose a maximum one-way transportation time of forty-five minutes for these students. The
ASBE and Intervenors dispute Stephens’s arguments that the transportation time from Stephens to
Camden Fairview would be excessive. The ASBE also argues that the busing issues raised by

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Nothing in the ASBE’s administrative consolidation order requires the closure of the schools in Stephens. The
decision regarding the closure of the Stephens campus is left to the receiving district—in this case, Camden Fairview.
See Ark. Code Ann. § l-13-1603(e).

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Stephens are outside the scope of the 1970 desegregation order. The Court will address these
arguments in turn.
JURSIDICTION
Questions regarding the Court’s jurisdiction over this proposed consolidation and the
continued application of the 1970 consent decree are fairly unsettled and deserve some attention
before addressing the merits of the parties’ motions.

The 1970 consent decree contained very

specific provisions relating to a school district that no longer exists.
Because this case was not formally dismissed 6 after the consolidation and dissolution of the
McNeil School District, the parties have taken the position that the 1970 consent decree is still in
effect and that the Court must approve the consolidation. This is a position shared by the Arkansas
Attorney General who issued an advisory opinion directing the ASBE to seek this Court’s approval
of the consolidation in light of the lingering 1970 consent decree. (ECF No. 19, Exh. 4).
The Court has serious concerns about the continued applicability of a very specific consent
decree directed toward a school district that has been dissolved. Nonetheless, in order to provide
some much needed finality to this situation, the Court will take up the issue and assume arguendo
that the consent decree is still in effect and requires this Court’s approval of the consolidation. 7
DISCUSSION
“A party seeking modification of a consent decree ‘must establish that a significant change
in facts or law warrants revision of the decree.’” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch.
Dist., No. 1, 56 F.3d 904, 914 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502

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It should be noted that McNeil did file a motion to dismiss this case in 2004. (ECF No. 9). The parties then reached
an agreement regarding the voluntary consolidation of Stephens and McNeil. Thereafter, the parties submitted an
agreed order to the Court that denied the motion to dismiss and approved the consolidation. That order was entered on
June 23, 2004. (ECF No. 15). In sum, at the request of the parties, the Court did not delve into the merits of McNeil’s
Motion to Dismiss and what effect the 1970 consent decree would have in the future.
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After the Stephens consolidation has taken effect, the Court will require the parties to submit argument regarding the
continued applicability of the 1970 consent decree, or lack thereof, to the receiving school districts.

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U.S. 367, 393, 112 S.Ct. 748, 764, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992)). If a significant change in
circumstances is shown, the Court must then determine “whether the proposed modification is
suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
A. Excessive Transportation
All of the parties in this case agree that the administrative consolidation of Stephens is a
change in circumstance that requires modification of the 1970 consent decree. Stephens does not
dispute that its student body has dwindled considerably and that consolidation is mandated under
Act 60. Stephens’s only argument against consolidation is rooted in the potential for excessive
transportation times for Stephens students being bused to the receiving school districts. Stephens
argues that potential for excessive transportation time makes consolidation an “unsuitable
modification” to the consent decree. To remedy this problem, Stephens asks the Court to impose a
45 minute one-way transportation limit.
While the 1970 consent decree addresses the issue of busing students on a desegregated
basis, it says nothing regarding actual transportation times. This raises the question of this Court’s
authority to impose a maximum transportation time or even consider Stephens’s concerns regarding
the transportation time. The job of this Court is to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement
reached by the parties in 1970. Knight v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 953, 954 (8th
Cir. 1997). The fact that a settlement agreement has been entered does not make the school district
a “ward[] of the Court”—it does not give the Court general jurisdiction over every alleged injustice
committed by a school district.

Simply put, if the settlement is silent on the subject of

transportation time, this Court’s authority does not extend to that issue. Stephen’s motion could be
denied on this ground alone. The Court will nonetheless go on to discuss the merits of Stephens’s
arguments.

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Stephens has alleged that students being bused to Camden Fairview could be on a bus for up
to four hours a day. Stephens has not submitted evidence or testimony to support this estimate.
Stephens has not made any specific assertions about the transportation times for students traveling
to Magnolia or Nevada, but they request that the 45-minute one-way transportation time be applied
to these students as well.
As to students living in the McNeil area who would now be bused to Magnolia, the Court
has not been given any evidence whatsoever that their transportation times will be excessive. The
driving distance from McNeil to Stephens is ten miles. The driving distance from McNeil to
Magnolia is six miles. Based on these numbers, it would appear that the transportation burden for
McNeil residents will actually be lower after consolidation. With no evidence to the contrary, the
Court sees no reason to impose any sort of maximum transportation time for these students.
As to Nevada County students, the most recent numbers provided to the Court show that
Stephens’s current enrollment of 300 students would be divided between only Camden Fairview
and Magnolia since no Stephens students currently reside in Nevada County. Accordingly, a
discussion of Nevada County transportation times is unnecessary.
The travel burdens of the Stephens students who will be bused to Camden Fairview were
discussed in detail at the hearing of this matter on June 4, 2014. The city of Stephens is situated
approximately 20 miles from the city of Camden. The majority of the Ouachita County students,
roughly 58%, live in or very near the city of Stephens while the remaining students live along
Highway 79, north of Stephens.
Camden Fairview Superintendent Robert Davis testified as to Camden Fairview’s
preliminary busing plans for these Ouachita County students. Davis testified that the district plans
to operate three buses in the Stephens area. One of these buses will circulate on the east side of
Stephens with limited bus stops. The second bus will circulate on the west side of Stephens with
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limited bus stops. Davis estimated that students would have to walk no further than a block to reach
a bus stop. These two buses would then proceed to Camden without making any further stops.
Davis testified that the pickup and travel time to Camden would be approximately 25 minutes. The
third bus will pick up students just outside the city of Stephens and proceed along Highway 79
making stops along the way. Davis testified that the pickup and travel time to Camden for this bus
would also be roughly 25 minutes. Once inside Camden, Davis testified that it could take the buses
25 minutes to make drop offs at the five schools in the district. However, Davis noted that this time
could be shortened by arranging for students to switch buses at staging areas where they would then
be taken to their respective schools by a more direct route.
The testimony above indicates that students living in the Stephens area are facing a one-way
transportation time of approximately 50 minutes. No evidence or testimony to the contrary has
been submitted. The testimony by Robert Davis establishes a transportation time that is in step with
Stephens’s requested maximum. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to take the extraordinary
step of mandating a maximum transportation time when there is no evidence to indicate that the
travel time will actually be excessive. If the school year begins and the Stephens students being
bused to Camden Fairview feel that their travel times are in fact excessive and not in line with the
testimony submitted by Robert Davis, they are free to seek Court intervention at that time. 8
B. Demographics
While excessive transportation time is the only disputed issue in this case, the Court finds
that the current demographics of these four school districts, and the post-consolidation
demographics, warrant some discussion.

For the 2013-2014 school year, Stephens’s student

population was 81% African-American; Camden Fairview’s student population was 60% African

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This intervention would likely need to take the form of a new lawsuit against the Camden Fairview School District.
Again, the future application of the 1970 consent decree is an unsettled question, and transportation time was not
covered by the terms of the settlement agreement.

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American; Magnolia’s student population was 53% African American; and Nevada’s student
population was 33% African American. Again, most recent numbers provided to the Court show
that Stephens’s current enrollment of 300 students would be divided between only Camden
Fairview and Magnolia since no Stephens students currently reside in Nevada County. Onehundred seventy-four of these students reside in Ouachita County and would attend Camden
Fairview. The remaining 126 students reside in Columbia County and would attend Magnolia.
Importantly, the influx of students into Camden Fairview and Magnolia would not alter their current
racial demographics. These numbers demonstrate that the students from Stephens would be moving
to districts that are actually more racially diverse than the Stephens School District. Accordingly,
there is nothing in these percentages to suggest that the desegregation efforts outlined in the 1970
unification plan will be hindered in any way by consolidation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons state above, the Court finds that the ASBE’s Motion for Approval of
Administrative Consolidation Order (ECF No. 30) should be and hereby is GRANTED. Stephens
School District’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No.
19) should be and hereby is DENIED. The Court retains jurisdiction over this matter in order to
decide Stephens’s pending Motion to Consolidate (ECF No. 32) and hear further argument from the
parties regarding the future application of the 1970 consent decree.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 25th day of June, 2014.

/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Judge

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