Henderson v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Honorable Erin L. Setser on August 15, 2016. (cnn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION

SHARON HENDERSON

PLAINTIFF

v.

NO. 15-1049

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Sharon Henderson, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(Commissioner) denying her claim for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the
provisions of Title XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court
must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support
the Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Procedural Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed her current application for SSI on June 11, 2012, alleging an

inability to work due to depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and anxiety. (Doc. 25, pp.
96, 203). An administrative hearing was held on August 14, 2013, at which Plaintiff appeared
with counsel and testified. (Doc. 25, pp. 55-94). Plaintiff’s pastor and a vocational expert also
testified at the hearing.
By written decision dated January 21, 2014, the ALJ found that during the relevant
time period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Doc.
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25, p. 40). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: a
history of schizophrenia and psychosis, due to drug abuse, allegedly in remission; a depressive
disorder; bipolar disorder; an anxiety disorder; cannabis abuse; and cocaine abuse. However,
after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments
did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of
Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Doc. 25, p. 42). The ALJ
found Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional level but with the following
nonexertional limitations: the claimant can perform no greater than unskilled
work. She is able to understand, retain, and carryout simple instructions, make
simple work related decisions, and perform work where the complexity of a
task is learned by rote with few variables and little judgment. The claimant can
perform work where interpersonal contact is incidental to the work performed.
The claimant can perform work where there are few changes if any in the
workplace. The claimant can perform work where supervision is simple, direct,
and concrete. However, the claimant works better with things rather than
people.
(Doc. 25, p. 43). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could
perform work as a conveyor feeder-off bearer. (Doc. 25, p. 49).
Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which
denied that request on April 8, 2015. (Doc. 25, p. 29). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action.
(Doc. 1). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc. 8).
Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Docs. 23, 24).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments
are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.

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II.

Applicable Law:
This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th
Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable
mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must
be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314
F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that
supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial
evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the
Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th
Cir. 2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the
decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the
burden of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted
at least one year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.
Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c (a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that
results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least
twelve consecutive months.

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The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation
process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in
substantial gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical
and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet
or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from
doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the
national economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Only
if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and
work experience in light of her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683
F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Higgins v. Apfel, 222 F.3d
504, 505 (8th Cir. 2000); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
III.

Discussion:
Plaintiff argues the following issues on appeal: 1) the ALJ erred in determining

Plaintiff’s RFC; 2) the ALJ failed to accord adequate weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s
treating and/or examining physicians; and 3) the ALJ erred in the analysis of Plaintiff’s GAF
score. 1
A.

Subjective Complaints and Credibility Analysis:

We now address the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's subjective complaints. The ALJ
was required to consider all the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints including
evidence presented by third parties that relates to: (1) Plaintiff's daily activities; (2) the
duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4)
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of her medication; and (5) functional restrictions. See

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The Court has reordered Plaintiff’s arguments to correspond with the five-step analysis utilized by the Commissioner.

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Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may not discount a
claimant's subjective complaints solely because the medical evidence fails to support them, an
ALJ may discount those complaints where inconsistencies appear in the record as a whole. Id.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit observed, “Our touchstone is that
[a claimant's] credibility is primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards v. Barnhart,
314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).
After reviewing the administrative record, it is clear that the ALJ properly considered
and evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including the Polaski factors. A review of the
record reveals that in June of 2012, Plaintiff indicated that she was able to perform all activities
of daily living without assistance. (Doc. 25, p. 302). The Court notes that Plaintiff attended a
consultative mental diagnostic evaluation on August 24, 2012, before Dr. Charles Spellman,
wherein she reported that she was unable to perform activities of daily living independently.
(Doc. 25, p. 319). A review of this report reveals that Dr. Spellman indicated that Plaintiff
“sounded phony from the first word she said,” and opined that Plaintiff did not give adequate
effort during the evaluation and exaggerated her symptoms. A review of the record also shows
that while Plaintiff testified that she did not have a driver’s license and could not pass the test,
a review of the medical evidence reveals that Plaintiff indicated in July of 2013, that she was
able to drive. (Doc. 25, pp. 62, 413). As noted by the ALJ, the record reveals that Plaintiff’s
impairments responded well to treatment.
The Court would also note that while Plaintiff alleged an inability to seek treatment
due to a lack of finances, the record is void of any indication that Plaintiff had been denied
treatment due to the lack of funds. Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.3d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that lack of evidence that plaintiff sought low-cost medical treatment from her doctor,

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clinics, or hospitals does not support plaintiff’s contention of financial hardship). The record
further reveals that Plaintiff was able to come up with the funds to support her smoking habit,
as well as her use of both crack cocaine and marijuana during the relevant time period.
With regard to the testimony from Plaintiff’s pastor, the ALJ properly considered this
evidence but found it unpersuasive. This determination was within the ALJ's province. See
Siemers v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1995); Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 342, 345 (8th
Cir. 1993).
Therefore, although it is clear that Plaintiff suffers with some degree of limitation, she
has not established that she is unable to engage in any gainful activity. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints were not totally credible.
B.

ALJ’s RFC Determination:

RFC is the most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes
medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own
descriptions of her limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005);
Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from
symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual
functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001).
Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical
evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart,

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353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically a
claimant’s limitations and to determine how those limitations affect h[er] RFC.” Id.
In the present case, the ALJ considered the medical assessments of examining and nonexamining agency medical consultants, Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and her medical
records when he determined Plaintiff could perform work at all exertional levels with mental
limitations. The Court notes that in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ discussed the
medical opinions of examining and non-examining medical professionals, and set forth the
reasons for the weight given to the opinions. Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th
Cir. 2012) (“It is the ALJ’s function to resolve conflicts among the opinions of various treating
and examining physicians”)(citations omitted); Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010 at 1012 (the
ALJ may reject the conclusions of any medical expert, whether hired by the claimant or the
government, if they are inconsistent with the record as a whole).
While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in the analysis of Plaintiff’s GAF scores, a
GAF score is not essential to the RFC’s accuracy. Howard v. Commissioner of Social Security,
276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002). “[A]n ALJ may afford greater weight to medical evidence
and testimony than to GAF scores when the evidence requires it.” Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d
963, 974 (8th Cir. 2010). Based on the record as a whole, the Court finds substantial evidence
to support the ALJ’s RFC determination for the time period in question.
C.

Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert:

After thoroughly reviewing the hearing transcript along with the entire evidence of
record, the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the vocational expert fully set
forth the impairments which the ALJ accepted as true and which were supported by the record
as a whole. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Court finds
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that the vocational expert's opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's
conclusion that Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude her from performing work as a
conveyor feeder-off bearer. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1996) (testimony
from vocational expert based on properly phrased hypothetical question constitutes substantial
evidence).
IV.

Conclusion:
Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision
should be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 16th day of August, 2016.
/s/ Erin L. Setser
HON. ERIN L. SETSER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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