Miles v. Arkansas, State of et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER; case dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Susan O. Hickey on July 20, 2018. (cnn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
DARRELL DEWAYNE MILES
v.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 1:18-cv-01011

STATE OF ARKANSAS; SERGEANT
SCOTT HARWELL; MELISSA BOOKER;
BRANDI WALTHALL; UNION COUNTY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER; and
EL DORADO NEWS TIMES

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights case filed by the Plaintiff, Darrell Dewayne Miles, under the provisions
of 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP). He is not currently
incarcerated.
The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. ' 1915, requires the Court to screen complaints for dismissal
under ' 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains
claims that: (a) are frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or, (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. '
1915(e)(2)(B).
I. BACKGROUND
According to the allegations in the Complaint (ECF No. 1) and Addendum (ECF No. 5),
on January 27, 2015, Sergeant Harwell, of the El Dorado Police Department, interviewed Melissa
Booker, who lived at 1401 West Block Street in El Dorado, Arkansas. Booker reported that on
January 21, 2015, a black male was standing at the corner of East Cedar Street and Reed Street
watching her closely. Booker reported feeling like she was being stalked. On January 22, 2015,
Booker indicated she saw the same black male standing in her neighbor=s front yard. Booker stated

she was afraid to get out of her vehicle until the black male started to walk away. He walked to
the intersection of West Cedar Street and Reed Street and stopped and started staring again.
Booker got out of her vehicle and went into her house. She then observed the black male walk
past her vehicle and into a wooded area at the end of the street.
A short time later, Booker was inside the house with a friend, Brandi Walthall, when she
realized she had left her phone charger in her car. Booker asked Walthall to watch out the window
while she went to her car to get the charger. When she was at her car getting her charger out of
the back seat, she saw the same black male emerge from the woods and begin walking toward her
at a brisk pace. Booker got into the back seat, shut the door, and locked it. Booker reported that
the black male stopped at the rear of her vehicle, removed his penis from his pants, and began to
masturbate. Booker got out of her car and ran into the house and dialed 911. Walthall was
watching the black male through the window and saw him begin to walk away. He stopped at the
intersection of West Cedar Street and Reed Street but then turned around and began walking
toward the side door of Booker=s house. The black male began knocking on her side door but
eventually left the area.

Booker described the black male as being medium complexion,

approximately 5=10@ tall, weighing approximately 230 pounds,1 having a close shaven beard and
mustache, and wearing sagging shorts and a hooded sweatshirt with the hood covering his head.
On January 23, 2015, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Booker=s dogs and her neighbor=s dogs
began barking. Booker called 911 because she feared someone was watching her house from the
nearby wooded area. She asked that an officer drive through the area shining a spotlight.

1

On the incident report, Plaintiff=s height is listed as 5=8@ and his weight as 230. (ECF No. 1 at 62). On a medical
record dated March 15, 2015, Plaintiff=s height is listed as 5=5@ and weight as 147.42 kg or 325 pounds. (ECF No. 1
at 130).

2

On January 28, 2015, at 1:43 p.m., officers were called to the 1400 block of West Block
Street regarding a black male running through the woods after being seen standing in the wooded
area watching Booker and her step-daughter who were talking beside a vehicle. While in the area,
officers saw Plaintiff, who they believed met the physical description given by Booker, and who
was standing on the front porch of an apartment located at the intersection of West Cedar Street
and Holloway Street (1300 West Cedar Street). Plaintiff alleges he was required to stand in the
yard bare footed with the police officers, including Sergeant Harwell, while Booker was driven by
in a vehicle with dark tinted windows by Sergeant Chris Lutman. When Booker saw Plaintiff, she
began crying and having difficulty breathing. She advised Sergeant Lutman that Plaintiff was the
man who had been stalking her and had masturbated in front of her car.
Plaintiff was asked to come to the police station and speak to investigators about the
incident. Plaintiff stated he wanted to contact his attorney. Plaintiff was told that after he talked
to his attorney, if he wanted to speak with the investigators he should do so at 9:00 a.m. on January
29, 2015. Booker was asked to come in at 8:00 a.m. on January 29, 2015, to look at some photos
and provide a recorded statement. Booker was also asked to bring Walthall with her to do the
same.
On January 29, 2015, both Booker and Walthall identified Plaintiff as the black male
involved in the incidents. As a result, Plaintiff was charged with stalking and indecent exposure.
(ECF No. 1 at 60). Plaintiff denies that he has ever engaged in socially aberrant behavior.
Plaintiff was arrested at his home on January 30, 2015. He remained incarcerated in the
Union County Criminal Justice Center (UCCJC) until he was able to post bail on March 12, 2015.
(ECF No. 1 at 50). Plaintiff contends he was falsely imprisoned and unlawfully detained.
3

Plaintiff contends Sergeant Harwell allowed the Adrive by@ identification which was
improper in Plaintiff=s opinion because he was the only person involved.

Plaintiff maintains

Booker=s and Walthall=s falsehoods and the Aunprofessional,@ Aunfair,@ and Aunjust@ investigation
done by Sergeant Harwell caused him to lose his home, car, employment, and his family—a wife
and three small boys. (ECF No. 1 at 5-6). Plaintiff also maintains Sergeant Harwell violated his
constitutional rights by not reciting his Miranda rights, by committing perjury, and by informing
him that Booker was going to get a gun and that if Plaintiff did not quit committing deviant acts
the community would take action. (ECF No. 5 at 5).
Plaintiff alleges these falsehoods were printed in the El Dorado News Times resulting in
the entire community turning against him. Plaintiff has attached a copy of the published police
log from the newspaper in which the following is stated: ADarrell D. Miles, 37, of 1300 W. Cedar,
was arrested Friday on a warrant for second-degree stalking and indecent exposure.@ (ECF No. 1
at 89).
Plaintiff alleges this was Aa crime of hate which targeted the African American race.@ (ECF
No. 1 at 6). Plaintiff maintains Booker manipulated Sergeant Harwell and the El Dorado Police
Department. Plaintiff asserts that Booker=s actions were the result of a delusional mind Awhich
specifically target[ed] a voting, tax pay[ing] working man [and his] family.@ (ECF No. 1 at 7).
Plaintiff maintains the actual guilty party has never even been identified.
According to Plaintiff, both Booker and Walthall later retracted their statements identifying
him. (ECF No. 5 at 2). As a result of the retraction, the criminal charges were dismissed. (ECF
No. 5 at 2). 2 Plaintiff asserts he was never allowed to face his accusers and would not recognize

2

Plaintiff actually states he was “acquitted.” However, the docket sheets indicate the charges were dismissed because

4

them.
Further, while he was incarcerated at the UCCJC, Plaintiff alleges he was badly mistreated
and placed on twenty-three hour lock down immediately following his booking. Plaintiff alleges
that Sheriff Roberts allowed jail personnel to mistreat him by denying him medical treatment and
giving him Amustard@ for what he thinks was a mild heart attack. (ECF No. 5 at 3). Plaintiff further
asserts he was denied outside recreation.
Plaintiff also claims that his landlord, Kelly Paraski, who is not a named Defendant,
unlawfully evicted him the day prior to his arrest. (ECF No. 5 at 5). Plaintiff states he was told
that his fiancé and children could stay but he could not. Plaintiff states he had been living there
for fifteen months and had never missed a rent payment.
Plaintiff has sued Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages.
II. DISCUSSION
Under ' 1915, the Court is obligated to screen a case prior to service of process being
issued. A claim is frivolous when it Alacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.@ Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege Aenough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.@
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Court bears in mind, however, that
when “evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold
‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, . . . to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

the victim did not wish to pursue the charges. (ECF No. 1 at 86 & 88).

5

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
In the present case, the Court finds that Plaintiff=s claims are subject to dismissal.
A. Claims Against the State of Arkansas
All claims against the State of Arkansas must be dismissed. States and state agencies are
not Apersons@ subject to suit under ' 1983. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008).
“This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.” Williams v. Missouri, 973 F.2d
599, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986)). “Congress did
not abrogate constitutional sovereign immunity when enacting the law that was to become section
1983.” Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
342 (1979)).
B. Claims against Defendants Booker and Walthall
Plaintiff=s claims against Booker and Walthall are subject to dismissal. A private individual
who complains of criminal conduct and is a witness for the prosecution does not act under color
of law. See e.g., Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The mere fact that the
individual defendants were complainants and witnesses in an action which itself was prosecuted
under color of law does not make their complaining or testifying other that what it was, i.e., the
action of private persons not acting under color of law.”); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 13, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff’d, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) (A private citizen does
not act under color of law when reporting a crime).
C. Claims Against the El Dorado News Times
Plaintiff=s defamation claims against the El Dorado News Times are subject to dismissal
6

for several reasons. Initially, as noted above, private parties or entities do not act under color of
law for purposes of ' 1983. 3 See e.g., Thomas v. News World Communications, 681 F. Supp. 55,
66 (D.D.C. 1988) (newspaper did not act under color of state law); Casterlow-Bey v. Tacoma News
Tribune, Case No. C17-5649, 2017 WL 6820162, *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2017) (same). Next,
the Supreme Court has held that defamation, by itself, is insufficient to support a claim under '
1983. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); see also Wade v. Goodwin, 843 F.2d 1150, 1152
(8th Cir. 1988) (A cause of action for damage to character or reputation is not cognizable under '
1983). In Paul, the Supreme Court found that a person’s interest in his reputation is not considered
liberty or property protected by the due process clause. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. Thus, Aregardless
of whom a plaintiff chooses to sue, section 1983 does not address an alleged injury to reputation.@
Idema v. Wager, 120 F. Supp. 2d 361, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff=d 29 Fed. Appx. 676 (2nd Cir.
2002).
C. Claims Against Defendant Harwell
Plaintiff=s claims against Sergeant Harwell are subject to dismissal. The claims based on
Sergeant Harwell=s alleged failure to read Plaintiff his Miranda warnings fail as a matter of law.
The constitution does not require the giving of Miranda warnings. See e.g., Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760 (2003). In United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), the Supreme Court noted
that “[o]ur cases . . . make clear . . . that a mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by
itself, violate a suspect=s constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule. . . . [T]he nature of the
right protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause, which the Miranda rule, in turn, protects . . . is a

3

There is no allegation that the El Dorado News Times conspired with a state actor to deprive Plaintiff of his
constitutional rights. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).

7

fundamental trial right.” Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If statements
obtained during custodial interrogation are not used against the party, there is no constitutional
violation. Davis v. City of Charleston, 827 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1987).
E. Malicious Prosecution Claim
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert a malicious prosecution claim, no claim is stated
under ' 1983. Plaintiff maintains he would not have been prosecuted had Sergeant Harwell utilized
proper identification procedures and properly investigated the matter. “It is well established in
[the Eighth Circuit] that an action for malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under '
1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.” Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d
1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff=s claims against Sergeant Harwell based on the alleged improper single person
“showup” 4 also fail. In Pace, the Eighth Circuit noted that:
In the context of unduly suggestive lineups [or in this case a showup], only a
violation of the core right—the right to a fair trial—is actionable under ' 1983. The
jurisprudential doctrine . . . against the admission of unduly suggestive lineups is
only a procedural safeguard, and does not establish a constitutional right to be free
of suggestive lineups.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, Neb., 874 F. Supp. 1006, 1010-11 (D.
Neb. 1995), aff=d, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996). Thus, Plaintiff has Ano claim under ' 1983 arising
out of his participation in an unduly suggestive [showup] since he was not deprived of his right to
a fair trial. He could not possibly have been deprived of his right to a fair trial since he was never
tried.@ Hensley v. Carey, 818 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1987).

4

“In a ‘showup,’ as opposed to a ‘lineup,’ a single individual is exhibited to a witness and that witness is asked whether
she can identify the individual as the perpetrator of the crime being investigated.” Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, Neb.,
874 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 n.4 (D. Neb. 1995), aff=d, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996).

8

Plaintiff=s claims against Sergeant Harwell based on his alleged mishandling of the
investigation fail to state a claim for relief. Section 1983 only applies to intentional deprivations
of constitutional rights; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a
constitutional right under ' 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon,
474 U.S. 344 (1986); see also Barbera v. City of St. Clair Shores, 93 F.2d 572, 1991 WL 112807,
*4 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpub. table op.) (AWhile the [police officers=] investigation of this case may
not have been exemplary, it did not violate the plaintiff=s constitutional rights. We believe that the
defects in the investigation are analogous to >poor tactical preparation=@ which has been held
insufficient to state a cause of action); Dowling v. North Charleston Police Dep’t, Case No. 2:102607, 2010 WL 4822569, *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2010) (“[T]o the extent Plaintiff is claiming
negligence or improper investigation of his criminal charges, such claims are not actionable” under
' 1983).
Here, there is no suggestion that Sergeant Harwell deliberately fabricated evidence or took
any other deliberate action to hinder the investigation. Rather, Plaintiff alleges Sergeant Harwell
failed to properly investigate the alleged crime. In other words, Plaintiff contends Sergeant
Harwell was negligent in the conduct of the investigation.
To the extent Plaintiff alleges a false arrest claim against Sergeant Harwell, this claim also
fails. An arrest warrant was issued on January 30, 2015 (ECF No. 1 at 74-75). For an arrest
warrant to issue, the judicial officer issuing the warrant must be “supplied with sufficient
information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant.”
Whitely v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971). “Probable cause to arrest
exists when there is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt that is particularized with respect to the
9

person to be searched or seized.” United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 870 (8th Cir. 2005).
This independent determination of probable cause “breaks the chain of causation and
insulates the initiating party from liability. [E]ven if the officer seeking the warrant has acted
maliciously in procuring these warrants, and even if that action results in false arrest, an
intermediary’s decision to issue a warrant insulates the malicious action from liability.” Jureczki
v. City of Seabrook, 760 F.2d 666, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted), cited with approval
in, Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1080 (8th Cir. 1990); see also
Simpson v. City of New York, 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2nd Cir. 2015) (the existence of an arrest warrant
is a complete defense to a ' 1983 claim for false arrest). Further, in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137 (1979), the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the
guilty will be arrested.

If it did, ' 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant

acquitted—indeed, for every suspect released.” Id. at 145.
Plaintiff also alleges Sergeant Harwell engaged in a hate crime which targeted the African
American race and/or engaged in stereotyping. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7). In this case, the victim of the
crime and her friend identified the perpetrator as being a black male; both then positively identified
the Plaintiff as the black male involved in the crime. This is not a case where an officer targeted
or singled out a specific race. To the extent Plaintiff contends Sergeant Harwell committed a crime
against him, the claim fails because a private citizen has no right to institute criminal prosecution.
See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986).
E. Official Capacity Claims
To state an official capacity claim, Plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of the City
of El Dorado was the moving force behind the deprivation of his constitutional rights. “Official10

capacity liability under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 occurs only when a constitutional injury is caused by a
‘government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official capacity.’” Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 811 (8th Cir.
2006) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Here, Plaintiff fails to
allege that a custom or policy of the City of El Dorado or Union County was the moving force
behind any alleged constitutional violations. Thus, all official capacity claims against the City of
El Dorado and Union County must be dismissed.
F. Claims Against the UCCJC
Plaintiff has named the UCCJC as a Defendant. The UCCJC is not a “person” subject to
suit under ' 1983. See e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (police and
sheriff=s departments are not usually legal entities subject to suit); La Garza v. Kandiyohi County
Jail, 18 Fed. Appx. 436 (8th Cir. 2001) (unpub. table op.) (affirming dismissal of county jail on
grounds that the jail is not an entity subject to suit). Thus, the UCCJC will be dismissed as a
Defendant.
G. Claims Against Ricky Roberts
Although not mentioned in the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges in his Addendum that Sheriff
Ricky Roberts allowed personnel of the detention center to mistreat him. (ECF No. 5 at 3). Well
settled law provides that “a supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 for an
employee’s unconstitutional activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994); see also
Whitson v. Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2010) (“In a ' 1983 case, an official is
only liable for his own misconduct and is not accountable for the misdeeds of his agents under a
theory such as respondeat superior or supervisor liability.”) (internal quotations omitted).
11

“[G]eneral responsibility for supervising the operations of a [detention center] is insufficient to
establish the personal involvement required to support liability.” Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309,
1314 (8th Cir. 1997). Rather, “[l]iability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct
responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of [Sheriff Roberts,
Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a
deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir.
2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff has not
alleged such specific facts of personal involvement against Ricky Roberts. Thus, any claims
against him must be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
The claims found in the Complaint (ECF No. 1) and Addendum (ECF No. 2) are subject
to dismissal because they are either frivolous or fail to state claims upon which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B). Therefore, all claims against the State of Arkansas, Sergeant
Scott Harwell, Melissa Booker, Brandi Walthall, the Union County Criminal Justice Center, and
the El Dorado News Times are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 20th day of July, 2018.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
United States District Court

12