Denney v. Social Security Administration Commissioner
ORDER for Attorney Fees in the amount of $2,766.60. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. Further, any EAJA award by this Court should be made payable to plaintiff and not counsel, but properly mailed to Plaintiffs attorney. Signed by Honorable James R. Marschewski on June 26, 2012. (lw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
CIVIL NO. 11-2035
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
Social Security Administration
ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Plaintiff, Bradley Denney, appealed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits to this court. ECF
No. 1. On February 9, 2012, judgment was entered remanding Plaintiff’s case to the Commissioner
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 14. Plaintiff now moves for a total of
$2766.60 in attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”), requesting compensation for 15.90 attorney hours at a rate of $174.00 and 5.10 paralegal
hours at a rate of $50.00. ECF No. 16, Ex. 2. Defendant filed a response making no objections to
the award or amount Plaintiff requested. ECF No. 17.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney’s fees to a prevailing
social security claimant unless the Commissioner’s position in denying benefits was substantially
justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for the government’s
denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After reviewing the file,
we find Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302
(1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four judgment reversing the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits and remanding the case for further proceedings is a prevailing
An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion of
the case, Plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was
specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S.
789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186
To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary
standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a claimant’s
past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or her expenses
and results in no windfall for the attorney.
Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under both
acts facilitates the purpose of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the prevailing party’s
litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action. Id. See also Cornella
v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).
The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit “an itemized statement...stating
the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting statutes such as the EAJA are
required to present fee applications with “contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates
claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work.” Id. Where documentation
is inadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
In determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, the court will in each case consider the following
factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required to handle the
problems presented; the attorney’s experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits resulting to the
client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency or certainty of
compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247
However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is “in the best position to evaluate counsel’s services and
fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand counsel’s
representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim.” Hickey v. Secretary of HHS, 923
F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1989)). The
court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the absence of an
objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 1992)
(“Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an accurately
calculated attorney’s fee award.”).
The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996, amended
the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to $125.00 per
hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Attorney’s fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per
hour, the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A), unless the court finds that an increase in
the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a
higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and
remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989).
In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be
increased when there is “uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify
hourly attorney’s fees of more than $75.00 an hour,” such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index
(“CPI”). In this instance, counsel requests attorney’s fees at an hourly rate of $174.00. ECF No. 16,
Ex. 2. Counsel presented a link to the CPI as evidence that this rate is a proper reflection of the cost
of living. ECF No. 16, at 2. Defendant does not object to this rate, and the court finds it to be
reasonable. ECF 17, at 1. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that counsel is entitled to an hourly
rate of $174.00.
The court next addresses the number of hours Plaintiff’s counsel claims he spent working on
this case. Counsel requests a total of 15.90 hours for work performed in 2011 and 2012. ECF No.
16, Ex. 1. The court finds that counsel’s requested time is reasonable, and, as such, will award the
full 15.90 hours. Accordingly, the court finds that counsel is entitled to 15.90 attorney hours at an
hourly rate of $174.00.
Counsel also requests compensation for 5.10 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $50.00. ECF
No. 16, Ex. 1. A prevailing party that satisfies EAJA's other requirements may recover paralegal fees
at prevailing market rates. Richlin Sec. Service Co. v. Chertoff, 128 S.Ct. 2007, 2019 (U.S. 2008).
Plaintiff’s counsel cited to Stockton v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 49 (8th Cir. 1994), as evidence that this
hourly rate is appropriate for paralegal work. ECF No. 17, at 3. The court finds $50.00 per hour for
paralegal work to be reasonable, and Defendant does not object to this rate. The court also finds the
requested time to be reasonable and will award the full 5.10 hours. Accordingly, the court finds that
counsel is entitled to 5.10 paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $50.00.
Based on the above, the court awards Plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA for 15.90
attorney hours at the rate of $174.00 per hour and 5.10 paralegal hours at the rate of $50.00, for a
total attorney's fee award of $2766.60. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of,
any past due benefits which Plaintiff may be awarded in the future. Further, this award should be
made payable directly to Plaintiff, but properly mailed to Plaintiff’s attorney.1 The parties are
reminded that the award under the EAJA will be taken into account at such time as a reasonable fee
is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent double recovery by counsel for the
IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of June 2012.
/s/ J. Marschewski
HONORABLE JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On June 14, 2010, the Supreme Court overturned Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2008), and
held that an EAJA fee award is payable to the prevailing litigant, not the prevailing litigant’s attorney. Astrue v.
Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521, 2252-2253 (2010). Therefore, any EAJA fee awarded by this court should be payable
directly to Plaintiff, but properly mailed to Plaintiff’s attorney.
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