Meza et al v. Ford Motor Company

Filing 22

ORDER granting #16 Motion for Summary Judgment. Further denying as moot #16 Motion to Strike, #19 Motion for Extension of Time to File and #20 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. This case is dismissed with prejudice, and judgment shall enter contemporaneously herein by separate order. Signed by Honorable P. K. Holmes, III on May 1, 2012. (lw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
RAMONA MEZA, individually and as
Personal Representative and the Executor of
the Estate of VALENTIN MEZA;
ARNOLDO GIOVANI MEZA RODRIGUEZ; and
JESUS RAMON MEZA RODRIGUEZ
v.

PLAINTIFFS

Case No. 2:11-CV-02069

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

DEFENDANT

ORDER
Currently before the Court are Defendant Ford Motor Company’s (“Ford”) Combined Motion
to Strike and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) and Brief in Support (Doc. 17). Plaintiffs
did not file any response to the Combined Motion. For the reasons articulated herein, Defendant’s
Combined Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART AS MOOT.
I. Background
This case is a product liability action arising from a single-vehicle accident that occurred on
April 26, 2008. According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs are now residents of Mexico, but on the date
of the accident, they were residing in Arkansas. It is alleged that Plaintiff Valentin Meza, who is
now deceased, was driving a 1990 Ford F-150 pick-up truck in which his wife, Ramona Meza, was
a passenger. The truck exited the road and tipped over onto its side, whereupon the fuel line
disengaged, causing fuel to spew and feed a truck fire which engulfed the truck in flames. The fire
caused the death of Valentin Meza and caused severe personal injuries to Ramona Meza. Plaintiffs

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allege that the fuel line in the Mezas’ pick-up truck was defective in design and/or manufacturing,
and that the defect(s) in design proximately caused Valentin Meza’s death and Ramona Meza’s
injuries. The other Plaintiffs, Arnoldo Giovani Meza Rodriguez and Jesus Ramon Meza Rodriguez,
are the surviving children of Valentin and Ramona Meza, and as such, they allege damages
stemming from the wrongful death of their father. The Complaint alleges causes of action for
negligence and breach of express and implied warranties and demands both compensatory and
exemplary damages.
After Ford answered the Complaint on May 23, 2011, the parties began the discovery
process. At some point in this process, the parties agreed that Plaintiffs would designate their expert
witness on or about 120 days prior to the trial date. However, that deadline came and went, and
Plaintiffs have yet to designate an expert, though this matter is set for trial in two months, on June
25, 2012.
Ford asks the Court for two things in its pending Combined Motion. First, Ford asks the
Court to prospectively strike any expert witness disclosures Plaintiffs will make because such
disclosures are untimely. Second, Ford asks the Court to rule in its favor on summary judgment on
the basis of Plaintiffs’ lack of expert testimony at trial. Ford contends that without expert testimony,
Plaintiffs will be unable to prove that the fuel line in their F-150 Ford pick-up truck was defective
and was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries and other damages, and that a non-defective
alternative design for the fuel line exists.
Plaintiffs have not responded to Ford’s Combined Motion to Strike and for Summary
Judgment. The discovery deadline in this case has passed. At this point, any attempt by Plaintiffs
to designate an expert would be untimely.
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II. Legal Standard
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the burden is placed on the
moving party to establish both the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Nat’l. Bank of Commerce of El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1999). The Court must review the facts in a light most favorable
to the party opposing a motion for summary judgment and give that party the benefit of any
inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Canada v. Union Elec. Co., 135 F.3d 1211,
1212-13 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1983). In order for
there to be a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must produce evidence “such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc.,
28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
III. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e) states that if a party fails to properly support or address a fact asserted
by another party, that fact may be deemed undisputed for purposes of a motion for summary
judgment. The unusual circumstance exists in this case where Defendant has filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs have failed to respond. The basis for Defendant’s Motion is
solely that Plaintiffs have failed to designate an expert to provide testimony in this product liability
case. The Court cannot summarily grant Defendant’s Motion simply because Plaintiffs have not
responded. Instead, the Court must examine the legal issue of whether expert testimony is necessary
to prove the elements of Plaintiffs’ product liability action and claim for damages.
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Under the Arkansas product liability statute, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant
manufactured or sold the product; (2) that the product was defective so as to render it unreasonably
dangerous; and (3) that such defect was the proximate cause of the damages sustained. Ark. Code
Ann. § 4-86-107; Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 292 Ark. 376, 382 (Ark. 1987). The mere fact
that an accident occurred does not entitle a plaintiff to recovery in a product liability action. Farm
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Case Corp., 317 Ark. 467, 472 (Ark. 1994). Instead, a plaintiff must prove “that
a particular defendant has sold a product which he should not have sold and that it caused his injury.”
Williams, 292 Ark. at 382. Although according to the Eighth Circuit, “Arkansas law does not
require expert testimony in all product liability cases,” the type of product defect that is most likely
to require expert testimony is that of design defect. Dancy v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir.
1997).
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs allege that a design defect in the fuel line of Ford’s F-150 pickup truck proximately caused a vehicle fire which led to injuries, wrongful death, and other damages.
In Dancy v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d 649, the Court of Appeals found that, under Arkansas law, expert
testimony is usually required in design defect cases such as the instant one, where common
experience and lay knowledge will not suffice to show the nature of the alleged defect. The Dancy
plaintiff suffered a below-the-knee amputation following an accident on a lift truck. He then sued
the manufacturer of the truck, alleging that the truck’s design was defective and that the defect
proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 651. The expert witness presented by the plaintiff was
excluded at trial after a Daubert challenge, and the district court then granted summary judgment to
the defendant, holding that the plaintiff could not prevail without expert witness testimony. In
affirming the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment, the Dancy court agreed that,
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“without the aid of expert testimony, there was no evidence demonstrating (1) the existence of a
defect in the product or (2) negligence by [defendant].” Furthermore, the court held that a plaintiff
in a product liability action has the burden of proving the existence of a defect “by showing that a
safer alternative actually exists,” even though the plaintiff does not have to prove that an alternative,
safer design is available and feasible. Id. Ultimately, if establishing the existence of a defect and
an alternative safe design are matters that are “beyond the ken of lay jurors,” then expert testimony
is required. Id. at 653-54.
In examining the Complaint in the case at bar, the Court finds that establishing a defect in
the design of the fuel system of a pick-up truck will require expert testimony. The fuel system of
an automobile is a technologically advanced product, and the functioning of such a system is beyond
the understanding of most laymen. In addition, the Court finds that establishing the existence of a
defect by showing an alternative safer design will also require expert testimony. The facts of this
design defect case are similar to those in Dancy,1 and there as here, jurors are “not likely to possess
‘common understanding’ about how products are designed.” Id. Accordingly, the Court grants
summary judgment in favor of Defendant Ford because Plaintiffs cannot make out a prima facie case
for design-related product liability without the benefit of expert testimony.
B. Motion to Strike
In light of the Court’s determination that Ford is entitled to summary judgment, Ford’s
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To buttress its conclusion that expert testimony is required in the majority of
design defect cases, the Dancy court cited to three Arkansas Supreme Court decisions in which
design defects were alleged and expert testimony was needed to establish the existence of the
defects. These cases, Higgins v. General Motors Corp., 287 Ark. 390 (Ark. 1985); Williams, 292
Ark. at 483; and Lakeview Country Club, Inc. v. Superior Products, 325 Ark. 218 (Ark. 1996)
also provide support for the Court’s conclusion above that expert testimony is required in the
instant product liability case alleging a design defect.
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Motion to Strike is moot.
IV. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, the Court finds that summary judgment on behalf of Defendant
Ford is proper due to the fact that Plaintiffs have failed to designate an expert, and any attempt to
do so going forward would be untimely. As lay jurors will be unable to possess a common
understanding as to how a complicated product such as an automobile’s fuel line system is designed,
proving a defect in that system and the existence of a safer alternative design will not be possible
without expert testimony. Accordingly, the portion of Defendant’s Combined Motion (Doc. 16) in
which summary judgment is sought is GRANTED, and the portion of the Motion in which
Defendant asks the Court to prospectively strike Plaintiffs’ future designation of an expert is
DENIED AS MOOT. All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. This case is dismissed
with prejudice, and judgment shall enter contemporaneously herein by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of May, 2012.

/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P.K. HOLMES, III
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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